On the Improvement of the Understanding

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On the Improvement of the Understanding

(Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect)

by

Baruch Spinoza

[Benedict de Spinoza]

Translated by R. H. M. Elwes

TABLE OF CONTENTS:

1 On the Improvement of the Understanding

3 Of the ordinary objects of men's desires

12 Of the true and final good

17 Certain rules of life

19 Of the four modes of perception

25 Of the best mode of perception

33 Of the instruments of the intellect, or true ideas

43 Answers to objections

First part of method:

50 Distinction of true ideas from fictitious ideas

64 And from false ideas

77 Of doubt

81 Of memory and forgetfulness

86 Mental hindrances from words--and from the popular confusion

of ready imagination with distinct understanding.

Second part of method:

91 Its object, the acquisition of clear and distinct ideas

94 Its means, good definitions

Conditions of definition

107 How to define understanding

----------------------------------------------------------------------

[Notice to the Reader.]

(This notice to the reader was written by the editors of the

Opera Postuma in 1677. Taken from Curley, Note 3, at end)

*This Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect etc., which we

give you here, kind reader, in its unfinished [that is, defective]

state, was written by the author many years ago now. He always

intended to finish it. But hindered by other occupations, and

finally snatched away by death, he was unable to bring it to the

desired conclusion. But since it contains many excellent and useful

things, which--we have no doubt--will be of great benefit to

anyone sincerely seeking the truth, we did not wish to deprive you

of them. And so that you would be aware of, and find less difficult

to excuse, the many things that are still obscure, rough, and

unpolished, we wished to warn you of them. Farewell.*

[1] (1) After experience had taught me that all the usual

surroundings of social life are vain and futile; seeing that none

of the objects of my fears contained in themselves anything either

good or bad, except in so far as the mind is affected by them,

I finally resolved to inquire whether there might be some real

good having power to communicate itself, which would affect the

mind singly, to the exclusion of all else: whether, in fact, there

might be anything of which the discovery and attainment would

enable me to enjoy continuous, supreme, and unending happiness.

[2] (1) I say "I finally resolved," for at first sight it seemed

unwise willingly to lose hold on what was sure for the sake of

something then uncertain. (2) I could see the benefits which are

acquired through fame and riches, and that I should be obliged to

abandon the quest of such objects, if I seriously devoted myself

to the search for something different and new. (3) I perceived

that if true happiness chanced to be placed in the former I should

necessarily miss it; while if, on the other hand, it were not so

placed, and I gave them my whole attention, I should equally fail.

[3] (1) I therefore debated whether it would not be possible to

arrive at the new principle, or at any rate at a certainty

concerning its existence, without changing the conduct and usual

plan of my life; with this end in view I made many efforts,

in vain. (2) For the ordinary surroundings of life which are

esteemed by men (as their actions testify) to be the highest

good, may be classed under the three heads--Riches, Fame, and

the Pleasures of Sense: with these three the mind is so absorbed

that it has little power to reflect on any different good.

[4] (1) By sensual pleasure the mind is enthralled to the extent

of quiescence, as if the supreme good were actually attained, so

that it is quite incapable of thinking of any other object; when

such pleasure has been gratified it is followed by extreme

melancholy, whereby the mind, though not enthralled, is disturbed

and dulled. (2) The pursuit of honors and riches is likewise very

absorbing, especially if such objects be sought simply for their

own sake, [a] inasmuch as they are then supposed to constitute the

highest good.

[5] (1) In the case of fame the mind is still more absorbed, for fame

is conceived as always good for its own sake, and as the ultimate end

to which all actions are directed. (2) Further, the attainment of

riches and fame is not followed as in the case of sensual pleasures by

repentance, but, the more we acquire, the greater is our delight, and,

consequently, the more are we incited to increase both the one and the

other; on the other hand, if our hopes happen to be frustrated we are

plunged into the deepest sadness. (3) Fame has the further drawback

that it compels its votaries to order their lives according to the

opinions of their fellow-men, shunning what they usually shun, and

seeking what they usually seek.

[6] (1) When I saw that all these ordinary objects of desire would

be obstacles in the way of a search for something different and new--nay,

that they were so opposed thereto, that either they or it would

have to be abandoned, I was forced to inquire which would prove the

most useful to me: for, as I say, I seemed to be willingly losing

hold on a sure good for the sake of something uncertain. (6:2) However,

after I had reflected on the matter, I came in the first place to the

conclusion that by abandoning the ordinary objects of pursuit, and

betaking myself to a new quest, I should be leaving a good, uncertain

by reason of its own nature, as may be gathered from what has been

said, for the sake of a good not uncertain in its nature (for I sought

for a fixed good), but only in the possibility of its attainment.

[7] (1) Further reflection convinced me that if I could really get

to the root of the matter I should be leaving certain evils for a

certain good. (2) I thus perceived that I was in a state of great

peril, and I compelled myself to seek with all my strength for a

remedy, however uncertain it might be; as a sick man struggling with

a deadly disease, when he sees that death will surely be upon him

unless a remedy be found, is compelled to seek a remedy with all his

strength, inasmuch as his whole hope lies therein. (7:3) All the

objects pursued by the multitude not only bring no remedy that tends

to preserve our being, but even act as hindrances, causing the death

not seldom of those who possess them, [b] and always of those who

are possessed by them.

[8] (1) There are many examples of men who have suffered persecution

even to death for the sake of their riches, and of men who in pursuit

of wealth have exposed themselves to so many dangers, that they have

paid away their life as a penalty for their folly. (2) Examples are

no less numerous of men, who have endured the utmost wretchedness for

the sake of gaining or preserving their reputation. (3) Lastly,

are innumerable cases of men, who have hastened their death through

over-indulgence in sensual pleasure.

[9] (1) All these evils seem to have arisen from the fact, that

happiness or unhappiness is made wholly dependent on the quality of the

object which we love. (2) When a thing is not loved, no quarrels will

arise concerning it--no sadness will be felt if it perishes--no envy if

it is possessed by another--no fear, no hatred, in short no disturbances

of the mind. (3) All these arise from the love of what is perishable,

such as the objects already mentioned.

[10] (1) But love towards a thing eternal and infinite feeds the

mind wholly with joy, and is itself unmingled with any sadness,

wherefore it is greatly to be desired and sought for with all our

strength. (2) Yet it was not at random that I used the words,

"If I could go to the root of the matter," for, though what I have

urged was perfectly clear to my mind, I could not forthwith lay

aside all love of riches, sensual enjoyment, and fame.

[11] (1) One thing was evident, namely, that while my mind was

employed with these thoughts it turned away from its former objects

of desire, and seriously considered the search for a new principle;

this state of things was a great comfort to me, for I perceived

that the evils were not such as to resist all remedies. (11:2) Although

these intervals were at first rare, and of very short duration, yet

afterwards, as the true good became more and more discernible to me,

they became more frequent and more lasting; especially after I had

recognized that the acquisition of wealth, sensual pleasure, or fame,

is only a hindrance, so long as they are sought as ends not as means;

if they be sought as means, they will be under restraint, and, far

from being hindrances, will further not a little the end for which

they are sought, as I will show in due time.

[12] (1) I will here only briefly state what I mean by true good,

and also what is the nature of the highest good. (2) In order that

this may be rightly understood, we must bear in mind that the terms

good and evil are only applied relatively, so that the same thing

may be called both good and bad according to the relations in view,

in the same way as it may be called perfect or imperfect.

(3) Nothing regarded in its own nature can be called perfect or

imperfect; especially when we are aware that all things which come

to pass, come to pass according to the eternal order and fixed

laws of nature.

[13] (1) However, human weakness cannot attain to this order in its

own thoughts, but meanwhile man conceives a human character much more

stable than his own, and sees that there is no reason why he should

not himself acquire such a character. (2) Thus he is led to seek

for means which will bring him to this pitch of perfection, and

calls everything which will serve as such means a true good.

(13:3) The chief good is that he should arrive, together with other

individuals if possible, at the possession of the aforesaid

character. (4) What that character is we shall show in due time,

namely, that it is the knowledge of the union existing being

the mind and the whole of nature. [c]

[14] (1) This, then, is the end for which I strive, to attain to

such a character myself, and to endeavor that many should attain to

it with me. (2) In other words, it is part of my happiness to lend

a helping hand, that many others may understand even as I do, so

that their understanding and desire may entirely agree with my own.

(3) In order to bring this about, it is necessary to understand as

much of nature as will enable us to attain to the aforesaid character,

and also to form a social order such as is most conducive to the

attainment of this character by the greatest number with the least

difficulty and danger.

[15] (1) We must seek the assistance of Moral Philosophy [d] and

the Theory of Education; further, as health is no insignificant means

for attaining our end, we must also include the whole science of

Medicine, and, as many difficult things are by contrivance rendered

easy, and we can in this way gain much time and convenience, the

science of Mechanics must in no way be despised.

[16] (1) But before all things, a means must be devised for

improving the understanding and purifying it, as far as may be at

the outset, so that it may apprehend things without error, and in

the best possible way. (2) Thus it is apparent to everyone that I

wish to direct all science to one end [e] and aim, so that we may

attain to the supreme human perfection which we have named; and,

therefore, whatsoever in the sciences does not serve to promote

our object will have to be rejected as useless. (3) To sum up the

matter in a word, all our actions and thoughts must be directed to

this one end.

[17] (1) Yet, as it is necessary that while we are endeavoring to

attain our purpose, and bring the understanding into the right path

we should carry on our life, we are compelled first of all to lay

down certain rules of life as provisionally good, to wit the

following:--

I. (2) To speak in a manner intelligible to the multitude, and to

comply with every general custom that does not hinder the

attainment of our purpose. (3) For we can gain from the multitude

no small advantages, provided that we strive to accommodate

ourselves to its understanding as far as possible: moreover,

we shall in this way gain a friendly audience for the reception

of the truth.

II. (17:4) To indulge ourselves with pleasures only in so far as they

are necessary for preserving health.

III. (5) Lastly, to endeavor to obtain only sufficient money or other

commodities to enable us to preserve our life and health, and to

follow such general customs as are consistent with our purpose.

[18] (1) Having laid down these preliminary rules, I will betake

myself to the first and most important task, namely, the amendment

of the understanding, and the rendering it capable of understanding

things in the manner necessary for attaining our end. (2) In order

to bring this about, the natural order demands that I should here

recapitulate all the modes of perception, which I have hitherto

employed for affirming or denying anything with certainty, so that

I may choose the best, and at the same time begin to know my own

powers and the nature which I wish to perfect.

[19] (1) Reflection shows that all modes of perception or knowledge

may be reduced to four:--

I. (2) Perception arising from hearsay or from some sign which

everyone may name as he please.

II. (3) Perception arising from mere experience--that is, form

experience not yet classified by the intellect, and only so called

because the given event has happened to take place, and we have no

contradictory fact to set against it, so that it therefore remains

unassailed in our minds.

III. (19:4) Perception arising when the essence of one thing is inferred

from another thing, but not adequately; this comes when [f] from some

effect we gather its cause, or when it is inferred from some general

proposition that some property is always present.

IV. (5) Lastly, there is the perception arising when a thing is

perceived solely through its essence, or through the knowledge

of its proximate cause.

[20] (1) All these kinds of perception I will illustrate by examples.

(2) By hearsay I know the day of my birth, my parentage, and other

matters about which I have never felt any doubt. (3) By mere

experience I know that I shall die, for this I can affirm from

having seen that others like myself have died, though all did not

live for the same period, or die by the same disease. (4) I know

by mere experience that oil has the property of feeding fire, and

water of extinguishing it. (5) In the same way I know that a dog

is a barking animal, man a rational animal, and in fact nearly all

the practical knowledge of life.

[21] (1) We deduce one thing from another as follows: when we

clearly perceive that we feel a certain body and no other, we

thence clearly infer that the mind is united [g] to the body,

and that their union is the cause of the given sensation; but

we cannot thence absolutely understand [h] the nature of the

sensation and the union. (2) Or, after I have become acquainted

with the nature of vision, and know that it has the property of

making one and the same thing appear smaller when far off than

when near, I can infer that the sun is larger than it appears,

and can draw other conclusions of the same kind.

[22] (1) Lastly, a thing may be perceived solely through its essence;

when, from the fact of knowing something, I know what it is to know

that thing, or when, from knowing the essence of the mind, I know

that it is united to the body. (2) By the same kind of knowledge

we know that two and three make five, or that two lines each parallel

to a third, are parallel to one another, &c. (3) The things which I

have been able to know by this kind of knowledge are as yet very few.

[23] (1) In order that the whole matter may be put in a clearer

light, I will make use of a single illustration as follows.

(2) Three numbers are given--it is required to find a fourth,

which shall be to the third as the second is to the first.

(23:3) Tradesmen will at once tell us that they know what is required

to find the fourth number, for they have not yet forgotten the rule

which was given to them arbitrarily without proof by their masters;

others construct a universal axiom from their experience with simple

numbers, where the fourth number is self-evident, as in the case of

2, 4, 3, 6; here it is evident that if the second number be

multiplied by the third, and the product divided by the first,

the quotient is 6; when they see that by this process the number

is produced which they knew beforehand to be the proportional,

they infer that the process always holds good for finding a fourth

number proportional.

[24] (1) Mathematicians, however, know by the proof of the nineteenth

proposition of the seventh book of Euclid, what numbers are

proportionals, namely, from the nature and property of proportion

it follows that the product of the first and fourth will be equal

to the product of the second and third: still they do not see the

adequate proportionality of the given numbers, or, if they do see it,

they see it not by virtue of Euclid's proposition, but intuitively,

without going through any process.

[25] (1) In order that from these modes of perception the best may

be selected, it is well that we should briefly enumerate the means

necessary for attaining our end.

I. (2) To have an exact knowledge of our nature which we desire to

perfect, and to know as much as is needful of nature in general.

II. To collect in this way the differences, the agreements, and the

oppositions of things.

III. To learn thus exactly how far they can or cannot be modified.

IV. To compare this result with the nature and power of man.

(4) We shall thus discern the highest degree of perfection

to which man is capable of attaining.

[26] (1) We shall then be in a position to see which mode of

perception we ought to choose. (2) As to the first mode, it is

evident that from hearsay our knowledge must always be uncertain,

and, moreover, can give us no insight into the essence of a thing,

as is manifest in our illustration; now one can only arrive at

knowledge of a thing through knowledge of its essence, as will

hereafter appear. (3) We may, therefore clearly conclude that

the certainty arising from hearsay cannot be scientific in its

character. (4) For simple hearsay cannot affect anyone whose

understanding does not, so to speak, meet it half way.

[27] (1) The second mode of perception [i] cannot be said to

give us the idea of the proportion of which we are in search.

(2) Moreover its results are very uncertain and indefinite,

for we shall never discover anything in natural phenomena by its

means, except accidental properties, which are never clearly

understood, unless the essence of the things in question be

known first. (3) Wherefore this mode also must be rejected.

[28] (1) Of the third mode of perception we may say in a manner

that it gives us the idea of the thing sought, and that it

us to draw conclusions without risk of error; yet it is not by

itself sufficient to put us in possession of the perfection we

aim at.

[29] (1) The fourth mode alone apprehends the adequate essence of

a thing without danger of error. (2) This mode, therefore, must be

the one which we chiefly employ. (3) How, then, should we avail

ourselves of it so as to gain the fourth kind of knowledge with

the least delay concerning things previously unknown? (4) I will

proceed to explain.

[30] (1) Now that we know what kind of knowledge is necessary for

us, we must indicate the way and the method whereby we may gain

the said knowledge concerning the things needful to be known.

(2) In order to accomplish this, we must first take care not to

commit ourselves to a search, going back to infinity--that is,

in order to discover the best method of finding truth, there is

no need of another method to discover such method; nor of a third

method for discovering the second, and so on to infinity. (3) By

such proceedings, we should never arrive at the knowledge of the

truth, or, indeed, at any knowledge at all. (30:4) The matter stands

on the same footing as the making of material tools, which might

be argued about in a similar way. (5) For, in order to work iron,

a hammer is needed, and the hammer cannot be forthcoming unless

it has been made; but, in order to make it, there was need

of another hammer and other tools, and so on to infinity.

(6) We might thus vainly endeavor to prove that men have no

power of working iron.

[31] (1) But as men at first made use of the instruments supplied

by nature to accomplish very easy pieces of workmanship, laboriously

and imperfectly, and then, when these were finished, wrought other

things more difficult with less labour and greater perfection;

and so gradually mounted from the simplest operations to the making

of tools, and from the making of tools to the making of more complex

tools, and fresh feats of workmanship, till they arrived at making,

complicated mechanisms which they now possess. (31:2) So, in like

manner, the intellect, by its native strength, [k], makes for itself

intellectual instruments, whereby it acquires strength for performing

other intellectual operations, [l], and from these operations

again fresh instruments, or the power of pushing its investigations

further, and thus gradually proceeds till it reaches the summit

of wisdom.

[32] (1) That this is the path pursued by the understanding may be

readily seen, when we understand the nature of the method for

finding out the truth, and of the natural instruments so necessary

complex instruments, and for the progress of investigation. I thus

proceed with my demonstration.

[33] (1) A true idea, [m], (for we possess a true idea) is something

different from its correlate (ideatum); thus a circle is different

from the idea of a circle. (2) The idea of a circle is not something

having a circumference and a center, as a circle has; nor is the idea

of a body that body itself. (3) Now, as it is something different

from its correlate, it is capable of being understood through itself;

in other words, the idea, in so far as its actual essence (essentia

formalis) is concerned, may be the subject of another subjective

essence (essentia objectiva). [33note1] (4) And, again, this second

subjective essence will, regarded in itself, be something real,

capable of being understood; and so on, indefinitely.

[34] (1) For instance, the man Peter is something real; the true

idea of Peter is the reality of Peter represented subjectively,

and is in itself something real, and quite distinct from the

actual Peter. (2) Now, as this true idea of Peter is in itself

something real, and has its own individual existence, it will

also be capable of being understood--that is, of being the

subject of another idea, which will contain by representation

(objective) all that the idea of Peter contains actually

(formaliter). (3) And, again, this idea of the idea of Peter

has its own individuality, which may become the subject of yet

another idea; and so on, indefinitely. (4) This everyone may

make trial of for himself, by reflecting that he knows what

Peter is, and also knows that he knows, and further knows that

he knows that he knows, &c. (34:5) Hence it is plain that, in

order to understand the actual Peter, it is not necessary first

to understand the idea of Peter, and still less the idea of

the idea of Peter. (6) This is the same as saying that, in order

to know, there is no need to know that we know, much less to

know that we know that we know. (7) This is no more necessary

than to know the nature of a circle before knowing the nature of

a triangle. [n]. (8) But, with these ideas, the contrary is the

case: for, in order to know that I know, I must first know.

[35] (1) Hence it is clear that certainty is nothing else than

the subjective essence of a thing: in other words, the mode in

which we perceive an actual reality is certainty. (2) Further,

it is also evident that, for the certitude of truth, no further

sign is necessary beyond the possession of a true idea: for,

as I have shown, it is not necessary to know that we know that

we know. (3) Hence, again, it is clear that no one can know

the nature of the highest certainty, unless he possesses an

adequate idea, or the subjective essence of a thing:

certainty is identical with such subjective essence.

[36] (1) Thus, as the truth needs no sign--it being to possess

the subjective essence of things, or, in other words, the ideas

of them, in order that all doubts may be removed--it follows

that the true method does not consist in seeking for the signs

of truth after the acquisition of the idea, but that the true

method teaches us the order in which we should seek for truth

itself, [o] or the subjective essences of things, or ideas,

for all these expressions are synonymous.

[37] (1) Again, method must necessarily be concerned with

reasoning or understanding--I mean, method is not identical

with reasoning in the search for causes, still less is it

the comprehension of the causes of things: it is the

discernment of a true idea, by distinguishing it from other

perceptions, and by investigating its nature, in order that

we may so train our mind that it may, by a given standard,

comprehend whatsoever is intelligible, by laying down

certain rules as aids, and by avoiding useless mental

exertion.

[38] (1) Whence we may gather that method is nothing else

than reflective knowledge, or the idea of an idea; and that

as there can be no idea of an idea--unless an idea exists

previously,--there can be no method without a pre-existent

idea. (2) Therefore, that will be a good method which

shows us how the mind should be directed, according to the

standard of the given true idea.

(38:3) Again, seeing that the ratio existing between two

ideas the same as the ratio between the actual realities

corresponding to those ideas, it follows that the reflective

knowledge which has for its object the most perfect being is

more excellent than reflective knowledge concerning other

objects--in other words, that method will be most perfect

which affords the standard of the given idea of the most

perfect being whereby we may direct our mind.

[39] (1) We thus easily understand how, in proportion as it

acquires new ideas, the mind simultaneously acquires fresh

instruments for pursuing its inquiries further. (2) For we

may gather from what has been said, that a true idea must

necessarily first of all exist in us as a natural instrument;

and that when this idea is apprehended by the mind, it enables

us to understand the difference existing between itself and

all other perceptions. (3) In this, one part of the method

consists.

(39:4) Now it is clear that the mind apprehends itself better

in proportion as it understands a greater number of natural

objects; it follows, therefore, that this portion of the method

will be more perfect in proportion as the mind attains to the

comprehension of a greater number of objects, and that it will

be absolutely perfect when the mind gains a knowledge of the

absolutely perfect being, or becomes conscious thereof.

[40] (1) Again, the more things the mind knows, the better does

it understand its own strength and the order of nature; by

increased self-knowledge, it can direct itself more easily, and

lay down rules for its own guidance; and, by increased knowledge

of nature, it can more easily avoid what is useless. (2) And

this is the sum total of method, as we have already stated.

[41] (1) We may add that the idea in the world of thought is in

the same case as its correlate in the world of reality. (2) If,

therefore, there be anything in nature which is without connection

with any other thing, and if we assign to it a subjective essence,

which would in every way correspond to the objective reality,

the subjective essence would have no connection, [p] with any

other ideas--in other words, we could not draw any conclusions

with regard to it. (41:3) On the other hand, those things which are

connected with others--as all things that exist in nature--will

be understood by the mind, and their subjective essences will

maintain the same mutual relations as their objective realities--that

is to say, we shall infer from these ideas other ideas, which

will in turn be connected with others, and thus our instruments

for proceeding with our investigation will increase. (4) This is

what we were endeavoring to prove.

[42] (1) Further, from what has just been said--namely, that an

idea must, in all respects, correspond to its correlate in the

world of reality,--it is evident that, in order to reproduce in

every respect the faithful image of nature, our mind must deduce

all its ideas from the idea which represents the origin and source

of the whole of nature, so that it may itself become the source

of other ideas.

[43] (1) It may, perhaps, provoke astonishment that, after having

said that the good method is that which teaches us to direct our

mind according to the standard of the given true idea, we should

prove our point by reasoning, which would seem to indicate that it

is not self-evident. (2) We may, therefore, be questioned as to

the validity of our reasoning. (3) If our reasoning be sound, we

must take as a starting-point a true idea. (4) Now, to be certain

that our starting-point is really a true idea, we need proof.

(5) This first course of reasoning must be supported by a second,

the second by a third, and so on to infinity.

[44] (1) To this I make answer that, if by some happy chance anyone

had adopted this method in his investigations of nature--that is,

if he had acquired new ideas in the proper order, according to the

standard of the original true idea, he would never have doubted [q]

of the truth of his knowledge, inasmuch as truth, as we have shown,

makes itself manifest, and all things would flow, as it were,

spontaneously towards him. (44:2) But as this never, or rarely,

happens, I have been forced so to arrange my proceedings, that we

may acquire by reflection and forethought what we cannot acquire

by chance, and that it may at the same time appear that, for

proving the truth, and for valid reasoning, we need no other means

than the truth and valid reasoning themselves: for by valid

reasoning I have established valid reasoning, and, in like measure,

I seek still to establish it.

[45] (1) Moreover, this is the order of thinking adopted by men

in their inward meditations. (2) The reasons for its rare employment

in investigations of nature are to be found in current misconceptions,

whereof we shall examine the causes hereafter in our philosophy.

(3) Moreover, it demands, as we shall show, a keen and accurate

discernment. (4) Lastly, it is hindered by the conditions of human

life, which are, as we have already pointed out, extremely changeable.

(5) There are also other obstacles, which we will not here inquire into.

[46] (1) If anyone asks why I have not at the starting-point set forth

all the truths of nature in their due order, inasmuch as truth is

self-evident, I reply by warning him not to reject as false any

paradoxes he may find here, but to take the trouble to reflect on

the chain of reasoning by which they are supported; he will then

be no longer in doubt that we have attained to the truth.

(2) This is why I have as above.

[47] (1) If there yet remains some sceptic, who doubts of our

primary truth, and of all deductions we make, taking such truth

as our standard, he must either be arguing in bad faith, or we

must confess that there are men in complete mental blindness

either innate or due to misconceptions--that is, to some external

influence. (2) Such persons are not conscious of themselves.

(3) If they affirm or doubt anything, they know not that they

affirm or doubt: they say that they know nothing, and they say

that they are ignorant of the very fact of their knowing nothing.

(4) Even this they do not affirm absolutely, they are afraid of

confessing that they exist, so long as they know nothing;

in fact, they ought to remain dumb, for fear of haply supposing

which should smack of truth.

[48] (1) Lastly, with such persons, one should not speak of

sciences: for, in what relates to life and conduct, they are

compelled by necessity to suppose that they exist, and seek

their own advantage, and often affirm and deny, even with an

oath. (2) If they deny, grant, or gainsay, they know not that

they deny, grant, or gainsay, so that they ought to be

regarded as automata, utterly devoid of intelligence.

[49] (1) Let us now return to our proposition. (2) Up to the present,

we have, first, defined the end to which we desire to direct all our

thoughts; secondly, we have determined the mode of perception best

adapted to aid us in attaining our perfection; thirdly, we have

discovered the way which our mind should take, in order to make a good

beginning--namely, that it should use every true idea as a standard in

pursuing its inquiries according to fixed rules. (49:3) Now, in order

that it may thus proceed, our method must furnish us, first, with a

means of distinguishing a true idea from all other perceptions, and

enabling the mind to avoid the latter; secondly, with rules for

perceiving unknown things according to the standard of the true idea;

thirdly, with an order which enables us to avoid useless labor.

(49:4) When we became acquainted with this method, we saw that,

fourthly, it would be perfect when we had attained to the idea of the

absolutely perfect Being. (5) This is an observation which should be

made at the outset, in order that we may arrive at the knowledge of

such a being more quickly.

[50] (1) Let us then make a beginning with the first part of the method,

which is, as we have said, to distinguish and separate the true idea

from other perceptions, and to keep the mind from confusing with true

ideas those which are false, fictitious, and doubtful. (2) I intend to

dwell on this point at length, partly to keep a distinction so necessary

before the reader's mind, and also because there are some who doubt of

true ideas, through not having attended to the distinction between a true

perception and all others. (3) Such persons are like men who, while they

are awake, doubt not that they are awake, but afterwards in a dream, as

often happens, thinking that they are surely awake, and then finding that

they were in error, become doubtful even of being awake. (4) This state

of mind arises through neglect of the distinction between sleeping and

waking.

[51] (1) Meanwhile, I give warning that I shall not here give

essence of every perception, and explain it through its proximate

cause. (2) Such work lies in the province of philosophy. (3) I shall

confine myself to what concerns method--that is, to the character of

fictitious, false and doubtful perceptions, and the means of freeing

ourselves therefrom. (4) Let us then first inquire into the nature of

a fictitious idea.

[52] (1) Every perception has for its object either a thing considered

as existing, or solely the essence of a thing. (2) Now "fiction" is

chiefly occupied with things considered as existing. (3) I will,

therefore, consider these first--I mean cases where only the existence

of an object is feigned, and the thing thus feigned is understood, or

assumed to be understood. (4) For instance, I feign that Peter, whom

I know to have gone home, is gone to see me, [r] or something of that

kind. (5) With what is such an idea concerned? (6) It is concerned

with things possible, and not with things necessary or impossible.

[53] (1) I call a thing impossible when its existence would imply a

contradiction; necessary, when its non-existence would imply a

contradiction; possible, when neither its existence nor its

non-existence imply a contradiction, but when the necessity or

impossibility of its nature depends on causes unknown to us, while

we feign that it exists. (2) If the necessity or impossibility of

its existence depending on external causes were known to us, we

could not form any fictitious hypotheses about it;

[54] (1) Whence it follows that if there be a God, or omniscient

Being, such an one cannot form fictitious hypotheses. (2) For,

as regards ourselves, when I know that I exist, [s] I cannot

hypothesize that I exist or do not exist, any more than I can

hypothesize an elephant that can go through the eye of a needle;

nor when I know the nature of God, can I hypothesize that He

or does not exist. [t] (54:3) The same thing must be said of the

Chimaera, whereof the nature implies a contradiction. (4) From

these considerations, it is plain, as I have already stated, that

fiction cannot be concerned with eternal truths. [u]

[55] (1) But before proceeding further, I must remark, in passing,

that the difference between the essence of one thing and the essence

of another thing is the same as that which exists between the reality

or existence of one thing and the reality or existence of another;

therefore, if we wished to conceive the existence, for example,

of Adam, simply by means of existence in general, it would be the

same as if, in order to conceive his existence, we went back to the

nature of being, so as to define Adam as a being. (2) Thus, the more

existence is conceived generally, the more is it conceived confusedly

and the more easily can it be ascribed to a given object.

(55:3) Contrariwise, the more it is conceived particularly, the more

is it understood clearly, and the less liable is it to be ascribed,

through negligence of Nature's order, to anything save its proper

object. (4) This is worthy of remark.

[56] (1) We now proceed to consider those cases which are commonly

called fictions, though we clearly understood that the thing is not

as we imagine it. (2) For instance, I know that the earth is round,

but nothing prevents my telling people that it is a hemisphere,

and that it is like a half apple carved in relief on a dish; or,

that the sun moves round the earth, and so on. (56:3) However,

examination will show us that there is nothing here inconsistent

with what has been said, provided we first admit that we may have

made mistakes, and be now conscious of them; and, further, that we

can hypothesize, or at least suppose, that others are under the

same mistake as ourselves, or can, like us, fall under it. (4) We can,

I repeat, thus hypothesize so long as we see no impossibility.

(56:5) Thus, when I tell anyone that the earth is not round, &c.,

I merely recall the error which I perhaps made myself, or which I

might have fallen into, and afterwards I hypothesize that the person

to whom I tell it, is still, or may still fall under the same mistake.

(6) This I say, I can feign so long as I do not perceive any

impossibility or necessity; if I truly understood either one or the

other I should not be able to feign, and I should be reduced to saying

that I had made the attempt.

[57] (1) It remains for us to consider hypotheses made in problems,

which sometimes involve impossibilities. (2) For instance, when we

say--let us assume that this burning candle is not burning, or,

let us assume that it burns in some imaginary space, or where there

are no physical objects. (3) Such assumptions are freely made,

though the last is clearly seen to be impossible. (4) But, though

this be so, there is no fiction in the case. (57:5) For, in the first

case, I have merely recalled to memory, [x] another candle not

burning, or conceived the candle before me as without a flame, and

then I understand as applying to the latter, leaving its flame out

of the question, all that I think of the former. (6) In the second

case, I have merely to abstract my thoughts from the objects

surrounding the candle, for the mind to devote itself to the

contemplation of the candle singly looked at in itself only; I can

then draw the conclusion that the candle contains in itself no

causes for its own destruction, so that if there were no physical

objects the candle, and even the flame, would remain unchangeable,

and so on. (7) Thus there is here no fiction, but, [y] true and

bare assertions.

[58] (1) Let us now pass on to the fictions concerned with essences

only, or with some reality or existence simultaneously. (2) Of

these we must specially observe that in proportion as the mind's

understanding is smaller, and its experience multiplex, so will its

power of coining fictions be larger, whereas as its understanding

increases, its capacity for entertaining fictitious ideas becomes

less. (58:3) For instance, in the same way as we are unable, while

we are thinking, to feign that we are thinking or not thinking, so,

also, when we know the nature of body we cannot imagine an infinite

fly; or, when we know the nature of the soul, [z] we cannot imagine

it as square, though anything may be expressed verbally. (4) But,

as we said above, the less men know of nature the more easily can

they coin fictitious ideas, such as trees speaking, men instantly

changed into stones, or into fountains, ghosts appearing in mirrors,

something issuing from nothing, even gods changed into beasts and men

and infinite other absurdities of the same kind.

[59] (1) Some persons think, perhaps, that fiction is limited by

fiction, and not by understanding; in other words, after I have

formed some fictitious idea, and have affirmed of my own free will

that it exists under a certain form in nature, I am thereby

precluded from thinking of it under any other form. (2) For

instance, when I have feigned (to repeat their argument) that the

nature of body is of a certain kind, and have of my own free will

desired to convince myself that it actually exists under this

form, I am no longer able to hypothesize that a fly, for example,

is infinite; so, when I have hypothesized the essence of the soul,

I am not able to think of it as square, &c.

[60] (1) But these arguments demand further inquiry. (2) First,

their upholders must either grant or deny that we can understand

anything. If they grant it, then necessarily the same must be

said of understanding, as is said of fiction. (3) If they deny

it, let us, who know that we do know something, see what they

mean. (4) They assert that the soul can be conscious of, and

perceive in a variety of ways, not itself nor things which

exist, but only things which are neither in itself nor anywhere

else, in other words, that the soul can, by its unaided power,

create sensations or ideas unconnected with things. (5) In fact,

they regard the soul as a sort of god. (60:6) Further, they assert

that we or our soul have such freedom that we can constrain

ourselves, or our soul, or even our soul's freedom. (7) For,

after it has formed a fictitious idea, and has given its assent

thereto, it cannot think or feign it in any other manner, but is

constrained by the first fictitious idea to keep all its other

thoughts in harmony therewith. (8) Our opponents are thus driven

to admit, in support of their fiction, the absurdities which I

have just enumerated; and which are not worthy of rational

refutation.

[61] (1) While leaving such persons in their error, we will take

care to derive from our argument with them a truth serviceable for

our purpose, namely, [61a] that the mind, in paying attention to

a thing hypothetical or false, so as to meditate upon it and

understand it, and derive the proper conclusions in due order

therefrom, will readily discover its falsity; and if the thing

hypothetical be in its nature true, and the mind pays attention

to it, so as to understand it, and deduce the truths which are

derivable from it, the mind will proceed with an uninterrupted

series of apt conclusions; in the same way as it would at once

discover (as we showed just now) the absurdity of a false

hypothesis, and of the conclusions drawn from it.

[62] (1) We need, therefore, be in no fear of forming hypotheses,

so long as we have a clear and distinct perception of what is

involved. (2) For, if we were to assert, haply, that men are

suddenly turned into beasts, the statement would be extremely

general, so general that there would be no conception, that is,

no idea or connection of subject and predicate, in our mind.

(3) If there were such a conception we should at the same time

be aware of the means and the causes whereby the event took place.

(4) Moreover, we pay no attention to the nature of the subject

and the predicate.

[63] (1) Now, if the first idea be not fictitious, and if all the

other ideas be deduced therefrom, our hurry to form fictitious ideas

will gradually subside. (2) Further, as a fictitious idea cannot be

clear and distinct, but is necessarily confused, and as all confusion

arises from the fact that the mind has only partial knowledge of a

thing either simple or complex, and does not distinguish between the

known and the unknown, and, again, that it directs its attention

promiscuously to all parts of an object at once without making

distinctions, it follows, first, that if the idea be of something

very simple, it must necessarily be clear and distinct. (3) For

a very simple object cannot be known in part, it must either be

known altogether or not at all.

[64] (1) Secondly, it follows that if a complex object be divided by

thought into a number of simple component parts, and if each be

regarded separately, all confusion will disappear. (2) Thirdly, it

follows that fiction cannot be simple, but is made up of the blending

of several confused ideas of diverse objects or actions existent in

nature, or rather is composed of attention directed to all such ideas

at once, [64b] and unaccompanied by any mental assent.

(64:3) Now a fiction that was simple would be clear and distinct,

and therefore true, also a fiction composed only of distinct ideas

would be clear and distinct, and therefore true. (4) For instance,

when we know the nature of the circle and the square, it is

impossible for us to blend together these two figures, and to

hypothesize a square circle, any more than a square soul, or things

of that kind.

[65] (1) Let us shortly come to our conclusion, and again repeat

that we need have no fear of confusing with true ideas that which

is only a fiction. (2) As for the first sort of fiction of which

we have already spoken, when a thing is clearly conceived, we saw

that if the existence of a that thing is in itself an eternal truth

fiction can have no part in it; but if the existence of the

conceived be not an eternal truth, we have only to be careful

such existence be compared to the thing's essence, and to

consider the order of nature. (64:3) As for the second sort of

fiction, which we stated to be the result of simultaneously

directing the attention, without the assent of the intellect,

to different confused ideas representing different things and

actions existing in nature, we have seen that an absolutely

simple thing cannot be feigned, but must be understood, and that

a complex thing is in the same case if we regard separately the

simple parts whereof it is composed; we shall not even be able

to hypothesize any untrue action concerning such objects, for we

shall be obliged to consider at the same time the causes and manner

of such action.

[66] (1) These matters being thus understood, let us pass on to

consider the false idea, observing the objects with which it is

concerned, and the means of guarding ourselves from falling into

false perceptions. (2) Neither of these tasks will present much

difficulty, after our inquiry concerning fictitious ideas.

(3) The false idea only differs from the fictitious idea in the

fact of implying a mental assent--that is, as we have already

remarked, while the representations are occurring, there are no

causes present to us, wherefrom, as in fiction, we can conclude

that such representations do not arise from external objects:

in fact, it is much the same as dreaming with our eyes open,

or while awake. (67:4) Thus, a false idea is concerned with, or

(to speak more correctly) is attributable to, the existence of

a thing whereof the essence is known, or the essence itself, in

the same way as a fictitious idea.

[67] (1) If attributable to the existence of the thing, it is

corrected in the same way as a fictitious idea under similar

circumstances. (2) If attributable to the essence, it is

likewise corrected in the same way as a fictitious idea.

(67:3) For if the nature of the thing known implies necessary

existence, we cannot possible be in error with regard to its

existence; but if the nature of the thing be not an eternal

truth, like its essence, but contrariwise the necessity or

impossibility of its existence depends on external causes,

then we must follow the same course as we adopted in the

of fiction, for it is corrected in the same manner.

[68] (1) As for false ideas concerned with essences, or even

with actions, such perceptions are necessarily always confused,

being compounded of different confused perceptions of things

existing in nature, as, for instance, when men are persuaded

that deities are present in woods, in statues, in brute beasts,

and the like; that there are bodies which, by their composition

alone, give rise to intellect; that corpses reason, walk about,

and speak; that God is deceived, and so on. (68:2) But ideas which

are clear and distinct can never be false: for ideas of things

clearly and distinctly conceived are either very simple

themselves, or are compounded from very simple ideas, that is,

are deduced therefrom. (3) The impossibility of a very simple

idea being false is evident to everyone who understands the nature

of truth or understanding and of falsehood.

[69] (1) As regards that which constitutes the reality of truth,

it is certain that a true idea is distinguished from a false one,

not so much by its extrinsic object as by its intrinsic nature.

(2) If an architect conceives a building properly constructed,

though such a building may never have existed, and amy never exist,

nevertheless the idea is true; and the idea remains the same,

whether it be put into execution or not. (69:3) On the other hand,

if anyone asserts, for instance, that Peter exists, without

knowing whether Peter really exists or not, the assertion, as far

as its asserter is concerned, is false, or not true, even though

Peter actually does exist. (4) The assertion that Peter exists is

true only with regard to him who knows for certain that Peter does

exist.

[70] (1) Whence it follows that there is in ideas something real,

whereby the true are distinguished from the false. (2) This reality

must be inquired into, if we are to find the best standard of truth

(we have said that we ought to determine our thoughts by the given

standard of a true idea, and that method is reflective knowledge),

and to know the properties of our understanding. (70:3) Neither must

we say that the difference between true and false arises from the

fact, that true knowledge consists in knowing things through their

primary causes, wherein it is totally different from false knowledge,

as I have just explained it: for thought is said to be true, if

it involves subjectively the essence of any principle which has no

cause, and is known through itself and in itself.

[71] (1) Wherefore the reality (forma) of true thought must exist

in the thought itself, without reference to other thoughts; it does

not acknowledge the object as its cause, but must depend on the

actual power and nature of the understanding. (2) For, if we

suppose that the understanding has perceived some new entity which

has never existed, as some conceive the understanding of God before

He created thing (a perception which certainly could not arise

any object), and has legitimately deduced other thoughts from said

perception, all such thoughts would be true, without being

determined by any external object; they would depend solely on the

power and nature of the understanding. (71:3) Thus, that which

constitutes the reality of a true thought must be sought in the

thought itself, and deduced from the nature of the understanding.

[72] (1) In order to pursue our investigation, let us confront

ourselves with some true idea, whose object we know for

certain to be dependent on our power of thinking, and to have

nothing corresponding to it in nature. (2) With an idea of this

kind before us, we shall, as appears from what has just been said,

be more easily able to carry on the research we have in view.

(72:3) For instance, in order to form the conception of a sphere,

I invent a cause at my pleasure--namely, a semicircle revolving

round its center, and thus producing a sphere. (4) This is

indisputably a true idea; and, although we know that no sphere in

nature has ever actually been so formed, the perception remains

true, and is the easiest manner of conceiving a sphere.

(72:5) We must observe that this perception asserts the rotation

of a semicircle--which assertion would be false, if it were not

associated with the conception of a sphere, or of a cause

determining a motion of the kind, or absolutely, if the assertion

were isolated. (6) The mind would then only tend to the

affirmation of the sole motion of a semicircle, which is not

contained in the conception of a semicircle, and does not arise

from the conception of any cause capable of producing such motion.

(72:7) Thus falsity consists only in this, that something is

affirmed of a thing, which is not contained in the conception

we have formed of that thing, as motion or rest of a semicircle.

(8) Whence it follows that simple ideas cannot be other than

true--e.g., the simple idea of a semicircle, of motion, of rest,

of quantity, &c.

(72:9) Whatsoever affirmation such ideas contain is equal to the

concept formed, and does not extend further. (10) Wherefore we

form as many simple ideas as we please, without any fear of error.

[73] (1) It only remains for us to inquire by what power our mind

can form true ideas, and how far such power extends. (2) It is

certain that such power cannot extend itself infinitely. (3) For

when we affirm somewhat of a thing, which is not contained in the

concept we have formed of that thing, such an affirmation shows a

defect of our perception, or that we have formed fragmentary or

mutilated ideas. (4) Thus we have seen that the notion of a

semicircle is false when it is isolated in the mind, but true when

it is associated with the concept of a sphere, or of some cause

determining such a motion. (73:5) But if it be the nature of a

thinking being, as seems, prima facie, to be the case, to form true

or adequate thoughts, it is plain that inadequate ideas arise in us

only because we are parts of a thinking being, whose thoughts--some

in their entirety, others in fragments only--constitute our mind.

[74] (1) But there is another point to be considered, which was not

worth raising in the case of fiction, but which give rise to complete

deception--namely, that certain things presented to the imagination

also exist in the understanding--in other words, are conceived

clearly and distinctly. (2) Hence, so long as we do not separate that

which is distinct from that which is confused, certainty, or the true

idea, becomes mixed with indistinct ideas. (3) For instance, certain

Stoics heard, perhaps, the term "soul," and also that the soul is

immortal, yet imagined it only confusedly; they imaged, also, and

understood that very subtle bodies penetrate all others, and are

penetrated by none. (74:4) By combining these ideas, and being at the

same time certain of the truth of the axiom, they forthwith became

convinced that the mind consists of very subtle bodies; that these

very subtle bodies cannot be divided &c.

[75] (1) But we are freed from mistakes of this kind, so long as we

endeavor to examine all our perceptions by the standard of the given

true idea. (2) We must take care, as has been said, to separate such

perceptions from all those which arise from hearsay or unclassified

experience. (3) Moreover, such mistakes arise from things being

conceived too much in the abstract; for it is sufficiently self-evident

that what I conceive as in its true object I cannot apply to anything

else. (75:4) Lastly, they arise from a want of understanding of the

primary elements of nature as a whole; whence we proceed without due

order, and confound nature with abstract rules, which, although they

be true enough in their sphere, yet, when misapplied, confound

themselves, and pervert the order of nature. (5) However, if we

proceed with as little abstraction as possible, and begin from primary

elements--that is, from the source and origin of nature, as far back

as we can reach,--we need not fear any deceptions of this kind.

[76] (1) As far as the knowledge of the origin of nature is concerned,

there is no danger of our confounding it with abstractions. (2) For

when a thing is conceived in the abstract, as are all universal

notions, the said universal notions are always more extensive in the

mind than the number of individuals forming their contents really

existing in nature. (3) Again, there are many things in nature, the

difference between which is so slight as to be hardly perceptible to

the understanding; so that it may readily happen that such things are

confounded together, if they be conceived abstractedly. (4) But since

the first principle of nature cannot (as we shall see hereafter) be

conceived abstractedly or universally, and cannot extend further in

the understanding than it does in reality, and has no likeness to

mutable things, no confusion need be feared in respect to the idea of

it, provided (as before shown) that we possess a standard of truth.

(5) This is, in fact, a being single and infinite [76z]; in other

words, it is the sum total of being, beyond which there is no being

found. [76a]

[77] (1) Thus far we have treated of the false idea. We have now

to investigate the doubtful idea--that is, to inquire what can

cause us to doubt, and how doubt may be removed. (2) I speak of

real doubt existing in the mind, not of such doubt as we see

exemplified when a man says that he doubts, though his mind does

not really hesitate. (77:3) The cure of the latter does not fall

within the province of method, it belongs rather to inquiries

concerning obstinacy and its cure.

[78] (1) Real doubt is never produced in the mind by the thing

doubted of. (2) In other words, if there were only one idea in

the mind, whether that idea were true or false, there would be no

doubt or certainty present, only a certain sensation. (3) For an

idea is in itself nothing else than a certain sensation. (4) But

doubt will arise through another idea, not clear and distinct

enough for us to be able to draw any certain conclusions with

regard to the matter under consideration; that is, the idea which

causes us to doubt is not clear and distinct. (5) To take an example.

(78:6) Supposing that a man has never reflected, taught by experience

or by any other means, that our senses sometimes deceive us, he will

never doubt whether the sun be greater or less than it appears.

(7) Thus rustics are generally astonished when they hear that the

sun is much larger than the earth. (8) But from reflection on the

deceitfulness of the senses [78a] doubt arises, and if, after

doubting, we acquire a true knowledge of the senses, and how things

at a distance are represented through their instrumentality, doubt

is again removed.

[79] (1) Hence we cannot cast doubt on true ideas by the supposition

that there is a deceitful Deity, who leads us astray even in what is

most certain. (2) We can only hold such an hypothesis so long as we

have no clear and distinct idea--in other words, until we reflect

the knowledge which we have of the first principle of all things, and

find that which teaches us that God is not a deceiver, and until we

know this with the same certainty as we know from reflecting on the

are equal to two right angles. (3) But if we have a knowledge of God

equal to that which we have of a triangle, all doubt is removed.

(79:4) In the same way as we can arrive at the said knowledge of a

triangle, though not absolutely sure that there is not some

arch-deceiver leading us astray, so can we come to a like knowledge

of God under the like condition, and when we have attained to it,

it is sufficient, as I said before, to remove every doubt which we can

possess concerning clear and distinct ideas.

[80] (1) Thus, if a man proceeded with our investigations in due

order, inquiring first into those things which should first be

inquired into, never passing over a link in the chain of association,

and with knowledge how to define his questions before seeking to

answer them, he will never have any ideas save such as are very

certain, or, in other words, clear and distinct; for doubt is only a

suspension of the spirit concerning some affirmation or negation

which it would pronounce upon unhesitatingly if it were not in

ignorance of something, without which the knowledge of the matter in

hand must needs be imperfect. (2) We may, therefore, conclude that

doubt always proceeds from want of due order in investigation.

[81] (1) These are the points I promised to discuss in the first part

of my treatise on method. (2) However, in order not to omit anything

which can conduce to the knowledge of the understanding and its

faculties, I will add a few words on the subject of memory and

forgetfulness.

(81:3) The point most worthy of attention is, that memory is

strengthened both with and without the aid of the understanding.

(4) For the more intelligible a thing is, the more easily is it

remembered, and the less intelligible it is, the more easily do we

forget it. (5) For instance, a number of unconnected words is much

more difficult to remember than the same number in the form of a

narration.

[82] (1) The memory is also strengthened without the aid of the

understanding by means of the power wherewith the imagination or

the sense called common, is affected by some particular physical

object. (2) I say particular, for the imagination is only affected

by particular objects. (3) If we read, for instance, a single romantic

comedy, we shall remember it very well, so long as we do not read

many others of the same kind, for it will reign alone in the memory

(4) If, however, we read several others of the same kind, we shall

think of them altogether, and easily confuse one with another.

(82:5) I say also, physical. (6) For the imagination is only

affected by physical objects. (7) As, then, the memory is

strengthened both with and without the aid of the understanding,

we may conclude that it is different from the understanding,

and that in the latter considered in itself there is neither

memory nor forgetfulness.

[83] (1) What, then, is memory? (2) It is nothing else than the

actual sensation of impressions on the brain, accompanied with the

thought of a definite duration, [83d] of the sensation. (3) This

is also shown by reminiscence. (4) For then we think of the

sensation, but without the notion of continuous duration; thus the

idea of that sensation is not the actual duration of the sensation

or actual memory. (83:5) Whether ideas are or are not subject to

corruption will be seen in philosophy. (6) If this seems too

absurd to anyone, it will be sufficient for our purpose, if he

reflect on the fact that a thing is more easily remembered in

proportion to its singularity, as appears from the example of

the comedy just cited. (83:7) Further, a thing is remembered more

easily in proportion to its intelligibility; therefore we cannot

help remember that which is extremely singular and sufficiently

intelligible.

[84] (1) Thus, then, we have distinguished between a true idea and

other perceptions, and shown that ideas fictitious, false, and the

rest, originate in the imagination--that is, in certain sensations

fortuitous (so to speak) and disconnected, arising not from the power

of the mind, but from external causes, according as the body,

sleeping or waking, receives various motions.

(2) But one may take any view one likes of the imagination so long

as one acknowledges that it is different from the understanding, and

that the soul is passive with regard to it. (3) The view taken is

immaterial, if we know that the imagination is something indefinite,

with regard to which the soul is passive, and that we can by some

means or other free ourselves therefrom with the help of the

understanding. (4) Let no one then be astonished that before proving

the existence of body, and other necessary things, I speak of

imagination of body, and of its composition. (5) The view taken is,

I repeat, immaterial, so long as we know that imagination is something

indefinite, &c.

[85] (1) As regards as a true idea, we have shown that it is simple

or compounded of simple ideas; that it shows how and why something

is or has been made; and that its subjective effects in the soul

correspond to the actual reality of its object. (2) This conclusion

is identical with the saying of the ancients, that true proceeds

from cause to effect; though the ancients, so far as I know,

never formed the conception put forward here that the soul acts

according to fixed laws, and is as it were an immaterial automaton.

[86] (1) Hence, as far as is possible at the outset, we have

acquired a knowledge of our understanding, and such a standard of

a true idea that we need no longer fear confounding truth with

falsehood and fiction. (2) Neither shall we wonder why we

understand some things which in nowise fall within the scope of

the imagination, while other things are in the imagination but

wholly opposed to the understanding, or others, again, which

agree therewith. (3) We now know that the operations, whereby the

effects of imagination are produced, take place under other laws

quite different from the laws of the understanding, and that the

mind is entirely passive with regard to them.

[87] (1) Whence we may also see how easily men may fall into grave

errors through not distinguishing accurately between the imagination

and the understanding; such as believing that extension must be

localized, that it must be finite, that its parts are really distinct

one from the other, that it is the primary and single foundation of

all things, that it occupies more space at one time than at another

and other similar doctrines, all entirely opposed to truth, as we

shall duly show.

[88] (1) Again, since words are a part of the imagination--that is,

since we form many conceptions in accordance with confused

arrangements of words in the memory, dependent on particular bodily

conditions,--there is no doubt that words may, equally with the

imagination, be the cause of many and great errors, unless we

strictly on our guard.

[89] (1) Moreover, words are formed according to popular fancy and

intelligence, and are, therefore, signs of things as existing in the

imagination, not as existing in the understanding. (2) This is

evident from the fact that to all such things as exist only in the

understanding, not in the imagination, negative names are often

given, such as incorporeal, infinite, &c. (3) So, also, many

conceptions really affirmative are expressed negatively, and vice

versa, such as uncreate, independent, infinite, immortal, &c.,

inasmuch as their contraries are much more easily imagined, and,

therefore, occurred first to men, and usurped positive names.

(89:4) Many things we affirm and deny, because the nature of words

allows us to do so, though the nature of things does not. (5) While

we remain unaware of this fact, we may easily mistake falsehood for

truth.

[90] (1) Let us also beware of another great cause of confusion,

which prevents the understanding from reflecting on itself.

(2) Sometimes, while making no distinction between the imagination

and the intellect, we think that what we more readily imagine is

clearer to us; and also we think that what we imagine we understand.

(3) Thus, we put first that which should be last: the true order of

progression is reversed, and no legitimate conclusion is drawn.

[91] [91e] (1) Now, in order at length to pass on to the second

part of this method, I shall first set forth the object aimed at,

and next the means for its attainment. (2) The object aimed at

is the acquisition of clear and distinct ideas, such as are

produced by the pure intellect, and not by chance physical motions.

(3) In order that all ideas may be reduced to unity, we shall

endeavor so to associate and arrange them that our mind may, as far

as possible, reflect subjectively the reality of nature, both as

a whole and as parts.

[92] (1) As for the first point, it is necessary (as we have said)

for our purpose that everything should be conceived, either solely

through its essence, or through its proximate cause. (2) If the

thing be self-existent, or, as is commonly said, the cause of

itself, it must be understood through its essence only; if it be

not self-existent, but requires a cause for its existence, it must

be understood through its proximate cause. (3) For, in reality,

the knowledge, [92f] of an effect is nothing else than the

acquisition of more perfect knowledge of its cause.

[93] (1) Therefore, we may never, while we are concerned with

inquiries into actual things, draw any conclusion from

abstractions; we shall be extremely careful not to confound that

which is only in the understanding with that which is in the

thing itself. (2) The best basis for drawing a conclusion will

be either some particular affirmative essence, or a true and

legitimate definition. (93:3) For the understanding cannot descend

from universal axioms by themselves to particular things, since

axioms are of infinite extent, and do not determine the

understanding to contemplate one particular thing more than

another.

[94] (1) Thus the true method of discovery is to form thoughts

from some given definition. (2) This process will be the

more fruitful and easy in proportion as the thing given be

better defined. (3) Wherefore, the cardinal point of all this

second part of method consists in the knowledge of the conditions

of good definition, and the means of finding them. (4) I will

first treat of the conditions of definition.

[95] (1) A definition, if it is to be called perfect, must

explain the inmost essence of a thing, and must take care not

to substitute for this any of its properties. (2) In order

to illustrate my meaning, without taking an example which

would seem to show a desire to expose other people's errors,

I will choose the case of something abstract, the definition

of which is of little moment. (95:3) Such is a circle. (4) If

a circle be defined as a figure, such that all straight lines

drawn from the center to the circumference are equal, every

one can see that such a definition does not in the least

explain the essence of a circle, but solely one of its

properties. (5) Though, as I have said, this is of no

importance in the case of figures and other abstractions,

it is of great importance in the case of physical beings

and realities: for the properties of things are not understood

so long as their essences are unknown. (6) If the latter be

passed over, there is necessarily a perversion of the

succession of ideas which should reflect the succession of

nature, and we go far astray from our object.

[96] In order to be free from this fault, the following rules

should be observed in definition:--

I. (1) If the thing in question be created, the definition

must (as we have said) comprehend the proximate cause.

(2) For instance, a circle should, according to this rule,

be defined as follows: the figure described by any line

whereof one end is fixed and the other free. (3) This

definition clearly comprehends the proximate cause.

II. (4) A conception or definition of a thing should be such

that all the properties of that thing, in so far as it is

considered by itself, and not in conjunction with other

things, can be deduced from it, as may be seen in the

definition given of a circle: for from that it clearly follows

that all straight lines drawn from the center to the

circumference are equal. (5) That this is a necessary

characteristic of a definition is so clear to anyone, who

reflects on the matter, that there is no need to spend time

in proving it, or in showing that, owing to this second

condition, every definition should be affirmative. (6) I

speak of intellectual affirmation, giving little thought to

verbal affirmations which, owing to the poverty of language,

must sometimes, perhaps, be expressed negatively, though

the idea contained is affirmative.

[97] The rules for the definition of an uncreated thing

are as follows:--

I. The exclusion of all idea of cause--that is, the thing

must not need explanation by Anything outside itself.

II. When the definition of the thing has been given, there must

be no room for doubt as to whether the thing exists or not.

III. It must contain, as far as the mind is concerned, no

substantives which could be put into an adjectival form;

in other words, the object defined must not be explained

through abstractions.

IV. Lastly, though this is not absolutely necessary, it should

be possible to deduce from the definition all the properties

of the thing defined.

All these rules become obvious to anyone giving strict

attention to the matter.

[98] (1) I have also stated that the best basis for drawing a

conclusion is a particular affirmative essence. (2) The more

specialized the idea is, the more it is distinct, and therefore

clear. (3) Wherefore a knowledge of particular things should

be sought for as diligently as possible.

[99] (1) As regards the order of our perceptions, and the manner

in which they should be arranged and united, it is necessary that,

as soon as is possible and rational, we should inquire whether

there be any being (and, if so, what being), that is the cause

of all things, so that its essence, represented in thought, may

be the cause of all our ideas, and then our mind will to the

utmost possible extent reflect nature. (2) For it will possess,

subjectively, nature's essence, order, and union. (3) Thus we

can see that it is before all things necessary for us to deduce

all our ideas from physical things--that is, from real entities,

proceeding, as far as may be, according to the series of causes,

from one real entity to another real entity, never passing to

universals and abstractions, either for the purpose of deducing

some real entity from them, or deducing them from some real

entity. (4) Either of these processes interrupts the true

progress of the understanding.

[100] (1) But it must be observed that, by the series of causes

and real entities, I do not here mean the series of particular

and mutable things, but only the series of fixed and eternal

things. (2) It would be impossible for human infirmity to follow

up the series of particular mutable things, both on account

their multitude, surpassing all calculation, and on account of

the infinitely diverse circumstances surrounding one and the same

thing, any one of which may be the cause of its existence or

non-existence. (3) Indeed, their existence has no connection

with their essence, or (as we have said already) is not an

eternal truth.

[101] (1) Neither is there any need that we should understand

their series, for the essences of particular mutable things are

not to be gathered from their series or order of existence,

which would furnish us with nothing beyond their extrinsic

denominations, their relations, or, at most, their circumstances,

all of which are very different from their inmost essence.

(101:2) This inmost essence must be sought solely from fixed and

eternal things, and from the laws, inscribed (so to speak) in

those things as in their true codes, according to which all

particular things take place and are arranged; nay, these mutable

particular things depend so intimately and essentially (so to

phrase it) upon the fixed things, that they cannot either be

conceived without them.

[102] (1) But, though this be so, there seems to be no small

difficulty in arriving at the knowledge of these particular things,

for to conceive them all at once would far surpass the powers of

the human understanding. (2) The arrangement whereby one thing is

understood, before another, as we have stated, should not be sought

from their series of existence, nor from eternal things. (3) For

the latter are all by nature simultaneous. (4) Other aids are

therefore needed besides those employed for understanding eternal

things and their laws. (5) However, this is not the place to recount

such aids, nor is there any need to do so, until we have acquired a

sufficient knowledge of eternal things and their infallible laws,

and until the nature of our senses has become plain to us.

[103] (1) Before betaking ourselves to seek knowledge of particular

things, it will be seasonable to speak of such aids, as all tend to

teach us the mode of employing our senses, and to make certain

experiments under fixed rules and arrangements which may suffice to

determine the object of our inquiry, so that we may therefrom infer

what laws of eternal things it has been produced under, and may gain

an insight into its inmost nature, as I will duly show. (2) Here,

to return to my purpose, I will only endeavor to set forth what seems

necessary for enabling us to attain to knowledge of eternal things,

and to define them under the conditions laid down above.

[104] (1) With this end, we must bear in mind what has already been

stated, namely, that when the mind devotes itself to any thought, so

as to examine it, and to deduce therefrom in due order all the

legitimate conclusions possible, any falsehood which may lurk in the

thought will be detected; but if the thought be true, the mind will

readily proceed without interruption to deduce truths from it.

(104:2) This, I say, is necessary for our purpose, for our thoughts

may be brought to a close by the absence of a foundation.

[105] (1) If, therefore, we wish to investigate the first thing of

all, it will be necessary to supply some foundation which may direct

our thoughts thither. (2) Further, since method is reflective

knowledge, the foundation which must direct our thoughts can be

nothing else than the knowledge of that which constitutes the reality

of truth, and the knowledge of the understanding, its properties, and

powers. (3) When this has been acquired we shall possess a foundation

wherefrom we can deduce our thoughts, and a path whereby the intellect,

according to its capacity, may attain the knowledge of eternal things,

allowance being made for the extent of the intellectual powers.

[106] (1) If, as I stated in the first part, it belongs to the nature

of thought to form true ideas, we must here inquire what is meant by

the faculties and power of the understanding. (2) The chief part of

our method is to understand as well as possible the powers of the

intellect, and its nature; we are, therefore, compelled (by the

considerations advanced in the second part of the method) necessarily

to draw these conclusions from the definition itself of thought and

understanding.

[107] (1) But, so far as we have not got any rules for finding

definitions, and, as we cannot set forth such rules without a

previous knowledge of nature, that is without a definition of the

understanding and its power, it follows either that the definition

of the understanding must be clear in itself, or that we can

understand nothing. (2) Nevertheless this definition is not

absolutely clear in itself; however, since its properties, like

all things that we possess through the understanding, cannot be

known clearly and distinctly, unless its nature be known previously,

understanding makes itself manifest, if we pay attention to its

properties, which we know clearly and distinctly. (3) Let us,

then, enumerate here the properties of the understanding, let us

examine them, and begin by discussing the instruments for research

which we find innate in us. See [31]

[108] (1) The properties of the understanding which I have chiefly

remarked, and which I clearly understand, are the following:--

I. (2) It involves certainty--in other words, it knows that a thing

exists in reality as it is reflected subjectively.

II. (108:3) That it perceives certain things, or forms some ideas

absolutely, some ideas from others. (4) Thus it forms the

idea of quantity absolutely, without reference to any other

thoughts; but ideas of motion it only forms after taking into

consideration the idea of quantity.

III. (108:5) Those ideas which the understanding forms absolutely

express infinity; determinate ideas are derived from other

ideas. (6) Thus in the idea of quantity, perceived by means

of a cause, the quantity is determined, as when a body is

perceived to be formed by the motion of a plane, a plane by

the motion of a line, or, again, a line by the motion of a

point. (7) All these are perceptions which do not serve

towards understanding quantity, but only towards determining

it. (108:8) This is proved by the fact that we conceive them

as formed as it were by motion, yet this motion is not perceived

unless the quantity be perceived also; we can even prolong the

motion to form an infinite line, which we certainly could not do

unless we had an idea of infinite quantity.

IV. (9) The understanding forms positive ideas before forming

negative ideas.

V. (108:10) It perceives things not so much under the condition

of duration as under a certain form of eternity, and in an

infinite number; or rather in perceiving things it does not

consider either their number or duration, whereas, in imagining

them, it perceives them in a determinate number, duration, and

quantity.

VI. (108:11) The ideas which we form as clear and distinct, seem

to follow from the sole necessity of our nature, that they

appear to depend absolutely on our sole power; with confused

ideas the contrary is the case. (12) They are often formed

against our will.

VII. (108:13) The mind can determine in many ways the ideas of things,

which the understanding forms from other ideas: thus, for instance,

in order to define the plane of an ellipse, it supposes a point

adhering to a cord to be moved around two centers, or, again, it

conceives an infinity of points, always in the same fixed relation

to a given straight line, angle of the vertex of the cone, or in an

infinity of other ways.

VIII. (108:14) The more ideas express perfection of any object,

the more perfect are they themselves; for we do not admire the

architect who has planned a chapel so much as the architect who

has planned a splendid temple.

[109] (1) I do not stop to consider the rest of what is referred

to thought, such as love, joy, &c. (2) They are nothing to our

present purpose, and cannot even be conceived unless the

understanding be perceived previously. (3) When perception is

removed, all these go with it.

[110] (1) False and fictitious ideas have nothing positive about

them (as we have abundantly shown), which causes them to be called

false or fictitious; they are only considered as such through the

defectiveness of knowledge. (2) Therefore, false and fictitious

ideas as such can teach us nothing concerning the essence of thought;

this must be sought from the positive properties just enumerated;

in other words, we must lay down some common basis from which these

properties necessarily follow, so that when this is given, the

properties are necessarily given also, and when it is removed,

they too vanish with it.

The rest of the treatise is wanting.

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Spinoza's Endnotes: Marks as per Curley, see Note 5 above.

[a] (1) This might be explained more at large and more clearly:

I mean by distinguishing riches according as they are pursued for

their own sake, in or furtherance of fame, or sensual pleasure,

or the advancement of science and art. (2) But this subject is

reserved to its own place, for it is not here proper to

investigate the matter more accurately.

[b] These considerations should be set forth more precisely.

[c] These matters are explained more at length elsewhere.

[d] N.B. I do no more here than enumerate the sciences necessary

for our purpose; I lay no stress on their order.

[e] There is for the sciences but one end, to which they should

all be directed.

[f] (1) In this case we do not understand anything of the cause

from the consideration of it in the effect. (2) This is

sufficiently evident from the fact that the cause is only

spoken of in very general terms, such as--there exists then

something; there exists then some power, &c.; or from the

that we only express it in a negative manner--it is not

or that, &c. (3) In the second case something is ascribed

to the cause because of the effect, as we shall show in an

example, but only a property, never an essence.

[g] (1) From this example may be clearly seen what I have just

drawn attention to. (2) For through this union we understand

nothing beyond the sensation, the effect, to wit, from which

we inferred the cause of which we understand nothing.

[h] (1) A conclusion of this sort, though it be certain, is yet

not to be relied on without great caution; for unless we are

exceedingly careful we shall forthwith fall into error.

(2) When things are conceived thus abstractedly, and not

through their true essence, they are apt to be confused by the

imagination. (3) For that which is in itself one, men imagine

to be multiplex. (4) To those things which are conceived

abstractedly, apart, and confusedly, terms are applied which are

apt to become wrested from their strict meaning, and bestowed on

things more familiar; whence it results that these latter are

imagined in the same way as the former to which the terms were

originally given.

[i] I shall here treat a little more in detail of experience,

and shall examine the method adopted by the Empirics,

and by recent philosophers.

[k] By native strength, I mean that not bestowed on us by external

causes, as I shall afterwards explain in my philosophy.

[l] Here I term them operations: I shall explain their nature

in my philosophy.

[m] I shall take care not only to demonstrate what I have just

advanced, but also that we have hitherto proceeded rightly,

and other things needful to be known.

[33note1] (1) In modern language, "the idea may become the

subject of another presentation." (2) Objectivus generally

corresponds to the modern "subjective," formalis to the

modern "objective." [Trans.- Note 1]

[n] (1) Observe that we are not here inquiring how the first

subjective essence is innate in us. (2) This belongs to an

investigation into nature, where all these matters are amply

explained, and it is shown that without ideas neither

affirmation, nor negation, nor volition are possible.

[o] The nature of mental search is explained in my philosophy.

[p] To be connected with other things is to be produced by them,

or to produce them.

[q] In the same way as we have here no doubt of the truth of

our knowledge.

[r] See below the note on hypotheses, whereof we have a clear

understanding; the fiction consists in saying that such

hypotheses exist in heavenly bodies.

[s] (1) As a thing, when once it is understood, manifests itself,

we have need only of an example without further proof.

(2) In the same way the contrary has only to be presented to

our minds to be recognized as false, as will forthwith appear

when we come to discuss fiction concerning essences.

[t] Observe, that although many assert that they doubt whether God

exists, they have nought but his name in their minds, or else

some fiction which they call God: this fiction is not in

harmony with God's real nature, as we will duly show.

[u] (1) I shall presently show that no fiction can concern eternal

truths. By an eternal truth, I mean that which being positive

could never become negative. (2) Thus it is a primary and

eternal truth that God exists, but it is not an eternal truth

that Adam thinks. (3) That the Chimaera does not exist is an

eternal truth, that Adam does not think is not so.

[x] (1) Afterwards, when we come to speak of fiction that is

concerned with essences, it will be evident that fiction never

creates or furnishes the mind with anything new; only such things

as are already in the brain or imagination are recalled to the

memory, when the attention is directed to them confusedly and all

at once. (2) For instance, we have remembrance of spoken words

and of a tree; when the mind directs itself to them confusedly,

it forms the notion of a tree speaking. (3) The same may be said

of existence, especially when it is conceived quite generally as

an entity; it is then readily applied to all things together in

the memory. (4) This is specially worthy of remark.

[y] We must understand as much in the case of hypotheses put forward

to explain certain movements accompanying celestial phenomena;

but from these, when applied to the celestial motions, we any

draw conclusions as to the nature of the heavens, whereas this

last may be quite different, especially as many other causes are

conceivable which would account for such motions.

[z] (1) It often happens that a man recalls to mind this word soul,

and forms at the same time some corporeal image: as the two

representations are simultaneous, he easily thinks that he

imagines and feigns a corporeal soul: thus confusing the name

with the thing itself. (2) I here beg that my readers will not

be in a hurry to refute this proposition; they will, I hope,

have no mind to do so, if they pay close attention to the

examples given and to what follows.

[61a] (1) Though I seem to deduce this from experience, some

may deny its cogency because I have given no formal proof.

(2) I therefore append the following for those who may

desire it. (3) As there can be nothing in nature contrary

to nature's laws, since all things come to pass by fixed

laws, so that each thing must irrefragably produce its own

proper effect, it follows that the soul, as soon as it

possesses the true conception of a thing, proceeds to

reproduce in thought that thing's effects. (4) See below,

where I speak of the false idea.

[64b] (1) Observe that fiction regarded in itself, only differs

from dreams in that in the latter we do not perceive the

external causes which we perceive through the senses while

awake. (2) It has hence been inferred that representations

occurring in sleep have no connection with objects external

to us. (3) We shall presently see that error is the dreaming

of a waking man: if it reaches a certain pitch it becomes delirium.

[76z] These are not attributes of God displaying His essence,

as I will show in my philosophy.

[76a] (1) This has been shown already. (2) For if such a being

did not exist it would never be produced; therefore the mind

would be able to understand more than nature could furnish;

and this has been shown above to be false.

[78a] (1) That is, it is known that the senses sometimes deceive us.

(2) But it is only known confusedly, for it is not known how

they deceive us.

[83d] (1) If the duration be indefinite, the recollection is

imperfect; this everyone seems to have learnt from nature.

(2) For we often ask, to strengthen our belief in something

we hear of, when and where it happened; though ideas

themselves have their own duration in the mind, yet, as we

are wont to determine duration by the aid of some measure

of motion which, again, takes place by aid of imagination,

we preserve no memory connected with pure intellect.

[91e] The chief rule of this part is, as appears from the first

part, to review all the ideas coming to us through pure

intellect, so as to distinguish them from such as we imagine:

the distinction will be shown through the properties of each,

namely, of the imagination and of the understanding.

[92f] Observe that it is thereby manifest that we cannot understand

anything of nature without at the same time increasing our

knowledge of the first cause, or God.

End of "On the Improvement of the Understanding."

Notes by Volunteer.

1. Used, in part, with kind permission from:

http://www.physics.wisc.edu/~shalizi/Spinoza/TIE/

2. The text is that of the translation of the Tractatus de Intellectus

Emendatione by R. H. M. Elwes, as printed by Dover Publications

(NY):1955), ISBN 0-486-20250-X. This text is "an unabridged and

unaltered republication of the Bohn Library edition originally

published by George Bell and Sons in 1883."

3. Paragraph Numbers, shown thus [1], are from Edwin Curley's

translation in his "The Collected Works of Spinoza", Volume 1, 1985,

Princeton University Press; ISBN 0-691-07222-1.

4. Sentence Numbers, shown thus (1), have been added by volunteer.

5. Spinoza's endnotes are shown thus [a]. The letter is taken from

Curley, see Note 3.

6. Search strings are enclosed in square brackets; include brackets.

7. HTML versions of "On the Improvement of the Understanding" are

published in the Books On-Line Web Pages;

ttp://www.cs.cmu.edu/books.html and they include:

http://www.physics.wisc.edu/~shalizi/Spinoza/TIE/

http://www.erols.com/jyselman/teielwes.htm