Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant — Volume 2

PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT

VOLUME II.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER XL. FIRST MEETING WITH SECRETARY STANTON--GENERAL ROSECRANS

--COMMANDING MILITARY DIVISION OF MISSISSIPPI--ANDREW JOHNSON'S ADDRESS

--ARRIVAL AT CHATTANOOGA.

CHAPTER XLI. ASSUMING THE COMMAND AT CHATTANOOGA--OPENING A LINE OF

SUPPLIES--BATTLE OF WAUHATCHIE--ON THE PICKET LINE.

CHAPTER XLII. CONDITION OF THE ARMY--REBUILDING THE RAILROAD--GENERAL

BURNSIDE'S SITUATION--ORDERS FOR BATTLE--PLANS FOR THE ATTACK--HOOKER'S

POSITION--SHERMAN'S MOVEMENTS.

CHAPTER XLIII. PREPARATIONS FOR BATTLE--THOMAS CARRIES THE FIRST LINE OF

THE ENEMY--SHERMAN CARRIES MISSIONARY RIDGE--BATTLE OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN

--GENERAL HOOKER'S FIGHT.

CHAPTER XLIV. BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA--A GALLANT CHARGE--COMPLETE ROUT OF

THE ENEMY--PURSUIT OF THE CONFEDERATES--GENERAL BRAGG--REMARKS ON

CHATTANOOGA.

CHAPTER XLV. THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE--HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO NASHVILLE

--VISITING KNOXVILLE--CIPHER DISPATCHES--WITHHOLDING ORDERS.

CHAPTER XLVI. OPERATIONS IN MISSISSIPPI--LONGSTREET IN EAST TENNESSEE

--COMMISSIONED LIEUTENANT-GENERAL--COMMANDING THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED

STATES--FIRST INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT LINCOLN.

CHAPTER XLVII. THE MILITARY SITUATION--PLANS FOR THE CAMPAIGN--SHERIDAN

ASSIGNED TO COMMAND OF THE CAVALRY--FLANK MOVEMENTS--FORREST AT FORT

PILLOW--GENERAL BANKS'S EXPEDITION--COLONEL MOSBY--AN INCIDENT OF THE

WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN.

CHAPTER XLVIII. COMMENCEMENT OF THE GRAND CAMPAIGN--GENERAL BUTLER'S

POSITION--SHERIDAN'S FIRST RAID.

CHAPTER XLIX. SHERMAN S CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA--SIEGE OF ATLANTA--DEATH OF

GENERAL MCPHERSON--ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE ANDERSONVILLE--CAPTURE OF ATLANTA.

CHAPTER L. GRAND MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC--CROSSING THE

RAPIDAN--ENTERING THE WILDERNESS--BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS.

CHAPTER LI. AFTER THE BATTLE--TELEGRAPH AND SIGNAL SERVICE--MOVEMENT BY

THE LEFT FLANK.

CHAPTER LII. BATTLE OF SPOTTSYLVANIA--HANCOCK'S POSITION--ASSAULT OF

WARREN'S AND WRIGHT'S CORPS--UPTON PROMOTED ON THE FIELD--GOOD NEWS FROM

BUTLER AND SHERIDAN.

CHAPTER LIII. HANCOCK'S ASSAULT--LOSSES OF THE CONFEDERATES--PROMOTIONS

RECOMMENDED--DISCOMFITURE OF THE ENEMY--EWELL'S ATTACK--REDUCING THE

ARTILLERY.

CHAPTER LIV. MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT FLANK--BATTLE OF NORTH ANNA--AN

INCIDENT OF THE MARCH--MOVING ON RICHMOND--SOUTH OF THE PAMUNKEY

--POSITION OF THE NATIONAL ARMY.

CHAPTER LV. ADVANCE ON COLD HARBOR--AN ANECDOTE OF THE WAR--BATTLE OF

COLD HARBOR--CORRESPONDENCE WITH LEE RETROSPECTIVE.

CHAPTER LVI. LEFT FLANK MOVEMENT ACROSS THE CHICKAHOMINY AND JAMES

--GENERAL LEE--VISIT TO BUTLER--THE MOVEMENT ON PETERSBURG

--THE INVESTMENT OF PETERSBURG.

CHAPTER LVII. RAID ON THE VIRGINIA CENTRAL RAILROAD--RAID ON THE WELDON

RAILROAD--EARLY'S MOVEMENT UPON WASHINGTON--MINING THE WORKS BEFORE

PETERSBURG--EXPLOSION OF THE MINE BEFORE PETERSBURG--CAMPAIGN IN THE

SHENANDOAH VALLEY--CAPTURE OF THE WELDON RAILROAD.

CHAPTER LVIII. SHERIDAN'S ADVANCE--VISIT TO SHERIDAN--SHERIDAN'S VICTORY

IN THE SHENANDOAH--SHERIDAN'S RIDE TO WINCHESTER--CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN

FOR THE WINTER.

CHAPTER LIX. THE CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA--SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA--WAR

ANECDOTES--THE MARCH ON SAVANNAH--INVESTMENT OF SAVANNAH--CAPTURE OF

SAVANNAH.

CHAPTER LX. THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN--THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE

CHAPTER LXI. EXPEDITION AGAINST FORT FISHER--ATTACK ON THE FORT--FAILURE

OF THE EXPEDITION--SECOND EXPEDITION AGAINST THE FORT--CAPTURE OF FORT

FISHER.

CHAPTER LXII. SHERMAN'S MARCH NORTH--SHERIDAN ORDERED TO LYNCHBURG

--CANBY ORDERED TO MOVE AGAINST MOBILE--MOVEMENTS OF SCHOFIELD AND THOMAS

--CAPTURE OF COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA--SHERMAN IN THE CAROLINAS.

CHAPTER LXIII. ARRIVAL OF THE PEACE COMMISSIONERS--LINCOLN AND THE PEACE

COMMISSIONERS--AN ANECDOTE OF LINCOLN--THE WINTER BEFORE PETERSBURG

--SHERIDAN DESTROYS THE RAILROAD--GORDON CARRIES THE PICKET LINE--PARKE

RECAPTURES THE LINE--THE BATTLE OF WHITE OAK ROAD.

CHAPTER LXIV. INTERVIEW WITH SHERIDAN--GRAND MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE

POTOMAC--SHERIDAN'S ADVANCE ON FIVE FORKS--BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS--PARKE

AND WRIGHT STORM THE ENEMY'S LINE--BATTLES BEFORE PETERSBURG.

CHAPTER LXV. THE CAPTURE OF PETERSBURG--MEETING PRESIDENT LINCOLN IN

PETERSBURG--THE CAPTURE OF RICHMOND--PURSUING THE ENEMY--VISIT TO

SHERIDAN AND MEADE.

CHAPTER LXVI. BATTLE OF SAILOR'S CREEK--ENGAGEMENT AT FARMVILLE

--CORRESPONDENCE WITH GENERAL LEE--SHERIDAN INTERCEPTS THE ENEMY.

CHAPTER LXVII. NEGOTIATIONS AT APPOMATTOX--INTERVIEW WITH LEE AT

MCLEAN'S HOUSE--THE TERMS OF SURRENDER--LEE'S SURRENDER--INTERVIEW WITH

LEE AFTER THE SURRENDER.

CHAPTER LXVIII. MORALE OF THE TWO ARMIES--RELATIVE CONDITIONS OF THE

NORTH AND SOUTH--PRESIDENT LINCOLN VISITS RICHMOND--ARRIVAL AT

WASHINGTON--PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S ASSASSINATION--PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S

POLICY.

CHAPTER LXIX. SHERMAN AND JOHNSTON--JOHNSTON'S SURRENDER TO SHERMAN

--CAPTURE OF MOBILE--WILSON'S EXPEDITION--CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS

--GENERAL THOMAS'S QUALITIES--ESTIMATE OF GENERAL CANBY.

CHAPTER LXX. THE END OF THE WAR--THE MARCH TO WASHINGTON--ONE OF

LINCOLN'S ANECDOTES--GRAND REVIEW AT WASHINGTON--CHARACTERISTICS OF

LINCOLN AND STANTON--ESTIMATE OF THE DIFFERENT CORPS COMMANDERS.

CONCLUSION

APPENDIX

CHAPTER XL.

FIRST MEETING WITH SECRETARY STANTON--GENERAL ROSECRANS--COMMANDING

MILITARY DIVISION OF MISSISSIPPI--ANDREW JOHNSON'S ADDRESS--ARRIVAL AT

CHATTANOOGA.

The reply (to my telegram of October 16, 1863, from Cairo, announcing my

arrival at that point) came on the morning of the 17th, directing me to

proceed immediately to the Galt House, Louisville, where I would meet an

officer of the War Department with my instructions. I left Cairo within

an hour or two after the receipt of this dispatch, going by rail via

Indianapolis. Just as the train I was on was starting out of the depot

at Indianapolis a messenger came running up to stop it, saying the

Secretary of War was coming into the station and wanted to see me.

I had never met Mr. Stanton up to that time, though we had held frequent

conversations over the wires the year before, when I was in Tennessee.

Occasionally at night he would order the wires between the War

Department and my headquarters to be connected, and we would hold a

conversation for an hour or two. On this occasion the Secretary was

accompanied by Governor Brough of Ohio, whom I had never met, though he

and my father had been old acquaintances. Mr. Stanton dismissed the

special train that had brought him to Indianapolis, and accompanied me

to Louisville.

Up to this time no hint had been given me of what was wanted after I

left Vicksburg, except the suggestion in one of Halleck's dispatches

that I had better go to Nashville and superintend the operation of

troops sent to relieve Rosecrans. Soon after we started the Secretary

handed me two orders, saying that I might take my choice of them. The

two were identical in all but one particular. Both created the

"Military Division of Mississippi," (giving me the command) composed of

the Departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee, and all

the territory from the Alleghanies to the Mississippi River north of

Banks's command in the south-west. One order left the department

commanders as they were, while the other relieved Rosecrans and assigned

Thomas to his place. I accepted the latter. We reached Louisville

after night and, if I remember rightly, in a cold, drizzling rain. The

Secretary of War told me afterwards that he caught a cold on that

occasion from which he never expected to recover. He never did.

A day was spent in Louisville, the Secretary giving me the military news

at the capital and talking about the disappointment at the results of

some of the campaigns. By the evening of the day after our arrival all

matters of discussion seemed exhausted, and I left the hotel to spend

the evening away, both Mrs. Grant (who was with me) and myself having

relatives living in Louisville. In the course of the evening Mr.

Stanton received a dispatch from Mr. C. A. Dana, then in Chattanooga,

informing him that unless prevented Rosecrans would retreat, and

advising peremptory orders against his doing so.

As stated before, after the fall of Vicksburg I urged strongly upon the

government the propriety of a movement against Mobile. General

Rosecrans had been at Murfreesboro', Tennessee, with a large and

well-equipped army from early in the year 1863, with Bragg confronting

him with a force quite equal to his own at first, considering it was on

the defensive. But after the investment of Vicksburg Bragg's army was

largely depleted to strengthen Johnston, in Mississippi, who was being

reinforced to raise the siege. I frequently wrote General Halleck

suggesting that Rosecrans should move against Bragg. By so doing he

would either detain the latter's troops where they were or lay

Chattanooga open to capture. General Halleck strongly approved the

suggestion, and finally wrote me that he had repeatedly ordered

Rosecrans to advance, but that the latter had constantly failed to

comply with the order, and at last, after having held a council of war,

had replied in effect that it was a military maxim "not to fight two

decisive battles at the same time." If true, the maxim was not

applicable in this case. It would be bad to be defeated in two decisive

battles fought the same day, but it would not be bad to win them. I,

however, was fighting no battle, and the siege of Vicksburg had drawn

from Rosecrans' front so many of the enemy that his chances of victory

were much greater than they would be if he waited until the siege was

over, when these troops could be returned. Rosecrans was ordered to

move against the army that was detaching troops to raise the siege.

Finally he did move, on the 24th of June, but ten days afterwards

Vicksburg surrendered, and the troops sent from Bragg were free to

return.

It was at this time that I recommended to the general-in-chief the

movement against Mobile. I knew the peril the Army of the Cumberland

was in, being depleted continually, not only by ordinary casualties, but

also by having to detach troops to hold its constantly extending line

over which to draw supplies, while the enemy in front was as constantly

being strengthened. Mobile was important to the enemy, and in the

absence of a threatening force was guarded by little else than

artillery. If threatened by land and from the water at the same time

the prize would fall easily, or troops would have to be sent to its

defence. Those troops would necessarily come from Bragg. My judgment

was overruled, and the troops under my command were dissipated over

other parts of the country where it was thought they could render the

most service.

Soon it was discovered in Washington that Rosecrans was in trouble and

required assistance. The emergency was now too immediate to allow us to

give this assistance by making an attack in rear of Bragg upon Mobile.

It was therefore necessary to reinforce directly, and troops were sent

from every available point.

Rosecrans had very skilfully manoeuvred Bragg south of the Tennessee

River, and through and beyond Chattanooga. If he had stopped and

intrenched, and made himself strong there, all would have been right and

the mistake of not moving earlier partially compensated. But he pushed

on, with his forces very much scattered, until Bragg's troops from

Mississippi began to join him. Then Bragg took the initiative.

Rosecrans had to fall back in turn, and was able to get his army

together at Chickamauga, some miles south-east of Chattanooga, before

the main battle was brought on. The battle was fought on the 19th and

20th of September, and Rosecrans was badly defeated, with a heavy loss

in artillery and some sixteen thousand men killed, wounded and captured.

The corps under Major-General George H. Thomas stood its ground, while

Rosecrans, with Crittenden and McCook, returned to Chattanooga. Thomas

returned also, but later, and with his troops in good order. Bragg

followed and took possession of Missionary Ridge, overlooking

Chattanooga. He also occupied Lookout Mountain, west of the town, which

Rosecrans had abandoned, and with it his control of the river and the

river road as far back as Bridgeport. The National troops were now

strongly intrenched in Chattanooga Valley, with the Tennessee River

behind them and the enemy occupying commanding heights to the east and

west, with a strong line across the valley from mountain to mountain,

and with Chattanooga Creek, for a large part of the way, in front of

their line.

On the 29th Halleck telegraphed me the above results, and directed all

the forces that could be spared from my department to be sent to

Rosecrans. Long before this dispatch was received Sherman was on his

way, and McPherson was moving east with most of the garrison of

Vicksburg.

A retreat at that time would have been a terrible disaster. It would

not only have been the loss of a most important strategic position to

us, but it would have been attended with the loss of all the artillery

still left with the Army of the Cumberland and the annihilation of that

army itself, either by capture or demoralization.

All supplies for Rosecrans had to be brought from Nashville. The

railroad between this base and the army was in possession of the

government up to Bridgeport, the point at which the road crosses to the

south side of the Tennessee River; but Bragg, holding Lookout and

Raccoon mountains west of Chattanooga, commanded the railroad, the river

and the shortest and best wagon-roads, both south and north of the

Tennessee, between Chattanooga and Bridgeport. The distance between

these two places is but twenty-six miles by rail, but owing to the

position of Bragg, all supplies for Rosecrans had to be hauled by a

circuitous route north of the river and over a mountainous country,

increasing the distance to over sixty miles.

This country afforded but little food for his animals, nearly ten

thousand of which had already starved, and not enough were left to draw

a single piece of artillery or even the ambulances to convey the sick.

The men had been on half rations of hard bread for a considerable time,

with but few other supplies except beef driven from Nashville across the

country. The region along the road became so exhausted of food for the

cattle that by the time they reached Chattanooga they were much in the

condition of the few animals left alive there--"on the lift." Indeed,

the beef was so poor that the soldiers were in the habit of saying, with

a faint facetiousness, that they were living on "half rations of hard

bread and BEEF DRIED ON THE HOOF."

Nothing could be transported but food, and the troops were without

sufficient shoes or other clothing suitable for the advancing season.

What they had was well worn. The fuel within the Federal lines was

exhausted, even to the stumps of trees. There were no teams to draw it

from the opposite bank, where it was abundant. The only way of

supplying fuel, for some time before my arrival, had been to cut trees

on the north bank of the river at a considerable distance up the stream,

form rafts of it and float it down with the current, effecting a landing

on the south side within our lines by the use of paddles or poles. It

would then be carried on the shoulders of the men to their camps.

If a retreat had occurred at this time it is not probable that any of

the army would have reached the railroad as an organized body, if

followed by the enemy.

On the receipt of Mr. Dana's dispatch Mr. Stanton sent for me. Finding

that I was out he became nervous and excited, inquiring of every person

he met, including guests of the house, whether they knew where I was,

and bidding them find me and send me to him at once. About eleven

o'clock I returned to the hotel, and on my way, when near the house,

every person met was a messenger from the Secretary, apparently

partaking of his impatience to see me. I hastened to the room of the

Secretary and found him pacing the floor rapidly in his dressing-gown.

Saying that the retreat must be prevented, he showed me the dispatch. I

immediately wrote an order assuming command of the Military Division of

the Mississippi, and telegraphed it to General Rosecrans. I then

telegraphed to him the order from Washington assigning Thomas to the

command of the Army of the Cumberland; and to Thomas that he must hold

Chattanooga at all hazards, informing him at the same time that I would

be at the front as soon as possible. A prompt reply was received from

Thomas, saying, "We will hold the town till we starve." I appreciated

the force of this dispatch later when I witnessed the condition of

affairs which prompted it. It looked, indeed, as if but two courses

were open: one to starve, the other to surrender or be captured.

On the morning of the 20th of October I started, with my staff, and

proceeded as far as Nashville. At that time it was not prudent to

travel beyond that point by night, so I remained in Nashville until the

next morning. Here I met for the first time Andrew Johnson, Military

Governor of Tennessee. He delivered a speech of welcome. His composure

showed that it was by no means his maiden effort. It was long, and I

was in torture while he was delivering it, fearing something would be

expected from me in response. I was relieved, however, the people

assembled having apparently heard enough. At all events they commenced

a general hand-shaking, which, although trying where there is so much of

it, was a great relief to me in this emergency.

From Nashville I telegraphed to Burnside, who was then at Knoxville,

that important points in his department ought to be fortified, so that

they could be held with the least number of men; to Admiral Porter at

Cairo, that Sherman's advance had passed Eastport, Mississippi, that

rations were probably on their way from St. Louis by boat for supplying

his army, and requesting him to send a gunboat to convoy them; and to

Thomas, suggesting that large parties should be put at work on the

wagon-road then in use back to Bridgeport.

On the morning of the 21st we took the train for the front, reaching

Stevenson Alabama, after dark. Rosecrans was there on his way north.

He came into my car and we held a brief interview, in which he described

very clearly the situation at Chattanooga, and made some excellent

suggestions as to what should be done. My only wonder was that he had

not carried them out. We then proceeded to Bridgeport, where we stopped

for the night. From here we took horses and made our way by Jasper and

over Waldron's Ridge to Chattanooga. There had been much rain, and the

roads were almost impassable from mud, knee-deep in places, and from

wash-outs on the mountain sides. I had been on crutches since the time

of my fall in New Orleans, and had to be carried over places where it

was not safe to cross on horseback. The roads were strewn with the

debris of broken wagons and the carcasses of thousands of starved mules

and horses. At Jasper, some ten or twelve miles from Bridgeport, there

was a halt. General O. O. Howard had his headquarters there. From this

point I telegraphed Burnside to make every effort to secure five hundred

rounds of ammunition for his artillery and small-arms. We stopped for

the night at a little hamlet some ten or twelve miles farther on. The

next day we reached Chattanooga a little before dark. I went directly

to General Thomas's headquarters, and remaining there a few days, until

I could establish my own.

During the evening most of the general officers called in to pay their

respects and to talk about the condition of affairs. They pointed out

on the map the line, marked with a red or blue pencil, which Rosecrans

had contemplated falling back upon. If any of them had approved the

move they did not say so to me. I found General W. F. Smith occupying

the position of chief engineer of the Army of the Cumberland. I had

known Smith as a cadet at West Point, but had no recollection of having

met him after my graduation, in 1843, up to this time. He explained the

situation of the two armies and the topography of the country so plainly

that I could see it without an inspection. I found that he had

established a saw-mill on the banks of the river, by utilizing an old

engine found in the neighborhood; and, by rafting logs from the north

side of the river above, had got out the lumber and completed pontoons

and roadway plank for a second bridge, one flying bridge being there

already. He was also rapidly getting out the materials and constructing

the boats for a third bridge. In addition to this he had far under way

a steamer for plying between Chattanooga and Bridgeport whenever we

might get possession of the river. This boat consisted of a scow, made

of the plank sawed out at the mill, housed in, and a stern wheel

attached which was propelled by a second engine taken from some shop or

factory.

I telegraphed to Washington this night, notifying General Halleck of my

arrival, and asking to have General Sherman assigned to the command of

the Army of the Tennessee, headquarters in the field. The request was

at once complied with.

CHAPTER XLI.

ASSUMING THE COMMAND AT CHATTANOOGA--OPENING A LINE OF SUPPLIES--BATTLE

OF WAUHATCHIE--ON THE PICKET LINE.

The next day, the 24th, I started out to make a personal inspection,

taking Thomas and Smith with me, besides most of the members of my

personal staff. We crossed to the north side of the river, and, moving

to the north of detached spurs of hills, reached the Tennessee at

Brown's Ferry, some three miles below Lookout Mountain, unobserved by

the enemy. Here we left our horses back from the river and approached

the water on foot. There was a picket station of the enemy on the

opposite side, of about twenty men, in full view, and we were within

easy range. They did not fire upon us nor seem to be disturbed by our

presence. They must have seen that we were all commissioned officers.

But, I suppose, they looked upon the garrison of Chattanooga as

prisoners of war, feeding or starving themselves, and thought it would

be inhuman to kill any of them except in self-defence.

That night I issued orders for opening the route to Bridgeport--a

cracker line, as the soldiers appropriately termed it. They had been so

long on short rations that my first thought was the establishment of a

line over which food might reach them.

Chattanooga is on the south bank of the Tennessee, where that river runs

nearly due west. It is at the northern end of a valley five or six

miles in width, through which Chattanooga Creek runs. To the east of

the valley is Missionary Ridge, rising from five to eight hundred feet

above the creek and terminating somewhat abruptly a half mile or more

before reaching the Tennessee. On the west of the valley is Lookout

Mountain, twenty-two hundred feet above-tide water. Just below the town

the Tennessee makes a turn to the south and runs to the base of Lookout

Mountain, leaving no level ground between the mountain and river. The

Memphis and Charleston Railroad passes this point, where the mountain

stands nearly perpendicular. East of Missionary Ridge flows the South

Chickamauga River; west of Lookout Mountain is Lookout Creek; and west

of that, Raccoon Mountains. Lookout Mountain, at its northern end,

rises almost perpendicularly for some distance, then breaks off in a

gentle slope of cultivated fields to near the summit, where it ends in a

palisade thirty or more feet in height. On the gently sloping ground,

between the upper and lower palisades, there is a single farmhouse,

which is reached by a wagon-road from the valley east.

The intrenched line of the enemy commenced on the north end of

Missionary Ridge and extended along the crest for some distance south,

thence across Chattanooga valley to Lookout Mountain. Lookout Mountain

was also fortified and held by the enemy, who also kept troops in

Lookout valley west, and on Raccoon Mountain, with pickets extending

down the river so as to command the road on the north bank and render it

useless to us. In addition to this there was an intrenched line in

Chattanooga valley extending from the river east of the town to Lookout

Mountain, to make the investment complete. Besides the fortifications

on Mission Ridge, there was a line at the base of the hill, with

occasional spurs of rifle-pits half-way up the front. The enemy's

pickets extended out into the valley towards the town, so far that the

pickets of the two armies could converse. At one point they were

separated only by the narrow creek which gives its name to the valley

and town, and from which both sides drew water. The Union lines were

shorter than those of the enemy.

Thus the enemy, with a vastly superior force, was strongly fortified to

the east, south, and west, and commanded the river below. Practically,

the Army of the Cumberland was besieged. The enemy had stopped with his

cavalry north of the river the passing of a train loaded with ammunition

and medical supplies. The Union army was short of both, not having

ammunition enough for a day's fighting.

General Halleck had, long before my coming into this new field, ordered

parts of the 11th and 12th corps, commanded respectively by Generals

Howard and Slocum, Hooker in command of the whole, from the Army of the

Potomac to reinforce Rosecrans. It would have been folly to send them

to Chattanooga to help eat up the few rations left there. They were

consequently left on the railroad, where supplies could be brought to

them. Before my arrival, Thomas ordered their concentration at

Bridgeport.

General W. F. Smith had been so instrumental in preparing for the move

which I was now about to make, and so clear in his judgment about the

manner of making it, that I deemed it but just to him that he should

have command of the troops detailed to execute the design, although he

was then acting as a staff officer and was not in command of troops.

On the 24th of October, after my return to Chattanooga, the following

details were made: General Hooker, who was now at Bridgeport, was

ordered to cross to the south side of the Tennessee and march up by

Whitesides and Wauhatchie to Brown's Ferry. General Palmer, with a

division of the 14th corps, Army of the Cumberland, was ordered to move

down the river on the north side, by a back road, until opposite

Whitesides, then cross and hold the road in Hooker's rear after he had

passed. Four thousand men were at the same time detailed to act under

General Smith directly from Chattanooga. Eighteen hundred of them, under

General Hazen, were to take sixty pontoon boats, and under cover of

night float by the pickets of the enemy at the north base of Lookout,

down to Brown's Ferry, then land on the south side and capture or drive

away the pickets at that point. Smith was to march with the remainder

of the detail, also under cover of night, by the north bank of the river

to Brown's Ferry, taking with him all the material for laying the bridge

as soon as the crossing was secured.

On the 26th, Hooker crossed the river at Bridgeport and commenced his

eastward march. At three o'clock on the morning of the 27th, Hazen

moved into the stream with his sixty pontoons and eighteen hundred brave

and well-equipped men. Smith started enough in advance to be near the

river when Hazen should arrive. There are a number of detached spurs of

hills north of the river at Chattanooga, back of which is a good road

parallel to the stream, sheltered from the view from the top of Lookout.

It was over this road Smith marched. At five o'clock Hazen landed at

Brown's Ferry, surprised the picket guard, and captured most of it. By

seven o'clock the whole of Smith's force was ferried over and in

possession of a height commanding the ferry. This was speedily

fortified, while a detail was laying the pontoon bridge. By ten o'clock

the bridge was laid, and our extreme right, now in Lookout valley, was

fortified and connected with the rest of the army. The two bridges over

the Tennessee River--a flying one at Chattanooga and the new one at

Brown's Ferry--with the road north of the river, covered from both the

fire and the view of the enemy, made the connection complete. Hooker

found but slight obstacles in his way, and on the afternoon of the 28th

emerged into Lookout valley at Wauhatchie. Howard marched on to Brown's

Ferry, while Geary, who commanded a division in the 12th corps, stopped

three miles south. The pickets of the enemy on the river below were now

cut off, and soon came in and surrendered.

The river was now opened to us from Lookout valley to Bridgeport.

Between Brown's Ferry and Kelly's Ferry the Tennessee runs through a

narrow gorge in the mountains, which contracts the stream so much as to

increase the current beyond the capacity of an ordinary steamer to stem

it. To get up these rapids, steamers must be cordelled; that is, pulled

up by ropes from the shore. But there is no difficulty in navigating

the stream from Bridgeport to Kelly's Ferry. The latter point is only

eight miles from Chattanooga and connected with it by a good wagon-road,

which runs through a low pass in the Raccoon Mountains on the south side

of the river to Brown's Ferry, thence on the north side to the river

opposite Chattanooga. There were several steamers at Bridgeport, and

abundance of forage, clothing and provisions.

On the way to Chattanooga I had telegraphed back to Nashville for a good

supply of vegetables and small rations, which the troops had been so

long deprived of. Hooker had brought with him from the east a full

supply of land transportation. His animals had not been subjected to

hard work on bad roads without forage, but were in good condition. In

five days from my arrival in Chattanooga the way was open to Bridgeport

and, with the aid of steamers and Hooker's teams, in a week the troops

were receiving full rations. It is hard for any one not an eye-witness

to realize the relief this brought. The men were soon reclothed and

also well fed, an abundance of ammunition was brought up, and a

cheerfulness prevailed not before enjoyed in many weeks. Neither

officers nor men looked upon themselves any longer as doomed. The weak

and languid appearance of the troops, so visible before, disappeared at

once. I do not know what the effect was on the other side, but assume

it must have been correspondingly depressing. Mr. Davis had visited

Bragg but a short time before, and must have perceived our condition to

be about as Bragg described it in his subsequent report. "These

dispositions," he said, "faithfully sustained, insured the enemy's

speedy evacuation of Chattanooga for want of food and forage. Possessed

of the shortest route to his depot, and the one by which reinforcements

must reach him, we held him at our mercy, and his destruction was only a

question of time." But the dispositions were not "faithfully

sustained," and I doubt not but thousands of men engaged in trying to

"sustain" them now rejoice that they were not. There was no time during

the rebellion when I did not think, and often say, that the South was

more to be benefited by its defeat than the North. The latter had the

people, the institutions, and the territory to make a great and

prosperous nation. The former was burdened with an institution

abhorrent to all civilized people not brought up under it, and one which

degraded labor, kept it in ignorance, and enervated the governing class.

With the outside world at war with this institution, they could not have

extended their territory. The labor of the country was not skilled, nor

allowed to become so. The whites could not toil without becoming

degraded, and those who did were denominated "poor white trash." The

system of labor would have soon exhausted the soil and left the people

poor. The non-slaveholders would have left the country, and the small

slaveholder must have sold out to his more fortunate neighbor. Soon the

slaves would have outnumbered the masters, and, not being in sympathy

with them, would have risen in their might and exterminated them. The

war was expensive to the South as well as to the North, both in blood

and treasure, but it was worth all it cost.

The enemy was surprised by the movements which secured to us a line of

supplies. He appreciated its importance, and hastened to try to recover

the line from us. His strength on Lookout Mountain was not equal to

Hooker's command in the valley below. From Missionary Ridge he had to

march twice the distance we had from Chattanooga, in order to reach

Lookout Valley; but on the night of the 28th and 29th an attack was made

on Geary at Wauhatchie by Longstreet's corps. When the battle

commenced, Hooker ordered Howard up from Brown's Ferry. He had three

miles to march to reach Geary. On his way he was fired upon by rebel

troops from a foot-hill to the left of the road and from which the road

was commanded. Howard turned to the left, charged up the hill and

captured it before the enemy had time to intrench, taking many

prisoners. Leaving sufficient men to hold this height, he pushed on to

reinforce Geary. Before he got up, Geary had been engaged for about

three hours against a vastly superior force. The night was so dark that

the men could not distinguish one from another except by the light of

the flashes of their muskets. In the darkness and uproar Hooker's

teamsters became frightened and deserted their teams. The mules also

became frightened, and breaking loose from their fastenings stampeded

directly towards the enemy. The latter, no doubt, took this for a

charge, and stampeded in turn. By four o'clock in the morning the

battle had entirely ceased, and our "cracker line" was never afterward

disturbed.

In securing possession of Lookout Valley, Smith lost one man killed and

four or five wounded. The enemy lost most of his pickets at the ferry,

captured. In the night engagement of the 28th-9th Hooker lost 416

killed and wounded. I never knew the loss of the enemy, but our troops

buried over one hundred and fifty of his dead and captured more than a

hundred.

After we had secured the opening of a line over which to bring our

supplies to the army, I made a personal inspection to see the situation

of the pickets of the two armies. As I have stated, Chattanooga Creek

comes down the centre of the valley to within a mile or such a matter of

the town of Chattanooga, then bears off westerly, then north-westerly,

and enters the Tennessee River at the foot of Lookout Mountain. This

creek, from its mouth up to where it bears off west, lay between the two

lines of pickets, and the guards of both armies drew their water from

the same stream. As I would be under short-range fire and in an open

country, I took nobody with me, except, I believe, a bugler, who stayed

some distance to the rear. I rode from our right around to our left.

When I came to the camp of the picket guard of our side, I heard the

call, "Turn out the guard for the commanding general." I replied,

"Never mind the guard," and they were dismissed and went back to their

tents. Just back of these, and about equally distant from the creek,

were the guards of the Confederate pickets. The sentinel on their post

called out in like manner, "Turn out the guard for the commanding

general," and, I believe, added, "General Grant." Their line in a

moment front-faced to the north, facing me, and gave a salute, which I

returned.

The most friendly relations seemed to exist between the pickets of the

two armies. At one place there was a tree which had fallen across the

stream, and which was used by the soldiers of both armies in drawing

water for their camps. General Longstreet's corps was stationed there

at the time, and wore blue of a little different shade from our uniform.

Seeing a soldier in blue on this log, I rode up to him, commenced

conversing with him, and asked whose corps he belonged to. He was very

polite, and, touching his hat to me, said he belonged to General

Longstreet's corps. I asked him a few questions--but not with a view of

gaining any particular information--all of which he answered, and I rode

off.

CHAPTER XLII.

CONDITION OF THE ARMY--REBUILDING THE RAILROAD--GENERAL BURNSIDE'S

SITUATION--ORDERS FOR BATTLE--PLANS FOR THE ATTACK--HOOKER'S POSITION

--SHERMAN'S MOVEMENTS.

Having got the Army of the Cumberland in a comfortable position, I now

began to look after the remainder of my new command. Burnside was in

about as desperate a condition as the Army of the Cumberland had been,

only he was not yet besieged. He was a hundred miles from the nearest

possible base, Big South Fork of the Cumberland River, and much farther

from any railroad we had possession of. The roads back were over

mountains, and all supplies along the line had long since been

exhausted. His animals, too, had been starved, and their carcasses

lined the road from Cumberland Gap, and far back towards Lexington, Ky.

East Tennessee still furnished supplies of beef, bread and forage, but

it did not supply ammunition, clothing, medical supplies, or small

rations, such as coffee, sugar, salt and rice.

Sherman had started from Memphis for Corinth on the 11th of October.

His instructions required him to repair the road in his rear in order to

bring up supplies. The distance was about three hundred and thirty

miles through a hostile country. His entire command could not have

maintained the road if it had been completed. The bridges had all been

destroyed by the enemy, and much other damage done. A hostile community

lived along the road; guerilla bands infested the country, and more or

less of the cavalry of the enemy was still in the West. Often Sherman's

work was destroyed as soon as completed, and he only a short distance

away.

The Memphis and Charleston Railroad strikes the Tennessee River at

Eastport, Mississippi. Knowing the difficulty Sherman would have to

supply himself from Memphis, I had previously ordered supplies sent from

St. Louis on small steamers, to be convoyed by the navy, to meet him at

Eastport. These he got. I now ordered him to discontinue his work of

repairing roads and to move on with his whole force to Stevenson,

Alabama, without delay. This order was borne to Sherman by a messenger,

who paddled down the Tennessee in a canoe and floated over Muscle

Shoals; it was delivered at Iuka on the 27th. In this Sherman was

notified that the rebels were moving a force towards Cleveland, East

Tennessee, and might be going to Nashville, in which event his troops

were in the best position to beat them there. Sherman, with his

characteristic promptness, abandoned the work he was engaged upon and

pushed on at once. On the 1st of November he crossed the Tennessee at

Eastport, and that day was in Florence, Alabama, with the head of

column, while his troops were still crossing at Eastport, with Blair

bringing up the rear.

Sherman's force made an additional army, with cavalry, artillery, and

trains, all to be supplied by the single track road from Nashville. All

indications pointed also to the probable necessity of supplying

Burnside's command in East Tennessee, twenty-five thousand more, by the

same route. A single track could not do this. I gave, therefore, an

order to Sherman to halt General G. M. Dodge's command, of about eight

thousand men, at Athens, and subsequently directed the latter to arrange

his troops along the railroad from Decatur north towards Nashville, and

to rebuild that road. The road from Nashville to Decatur passes over a

broken country, cut up with innumerable streams, many of them of

considerable width, and with valleys far below the road-bed. All the

bridges over these had been destroyed, and the rails taken up and

twisted by the enemy. All the cars and locomotives not carried off had

been destroyed as effectually as they knew how to destroy them. All

bridges and culverts had been destroyed between Nashville and Decatur,

and thence to Stevenson, where the Memphis and Charleston and the

Nashville and Chattanooga roads unite. The rebuilding of this road

would give us two roads as far as Stevenson over which to supply the

army. From Bridgeport, a short distance farther east, the river

supplements the road.

General Dodge, besides being a most capable soldier, was an experienced

railroad builder. He had no tools to work with except those of the

pioneers--axes, picks, and spades. With these he was able to intrench

his men and protect them against surprises by small parties of the

enemy. As he had no base of supplies until the road could be completed

back to Nashville, the first matter to consider after protecting his men

was the getting in of food and forage from the surrounding country. He

had his men and teams bring in all the grain they could find, or all

they needed, and all the cattle for beef, and such other food as could

be found. Millers were detailed from the ranks to run the mills along

the line of the army. When these were not near enough to the troops for

protection they were taken down and moved up to the line of the road.

Blacksmith shops, with all the iron and steel found in them, were moved

up in like manner. Blacksmiths were detailed and set to work making the

tools necessary in railroad and bridge building. Axemen were put to

work getting out timber for bridges and cutting fuel for locomotives

when the road should be completed. Car-builders were set to work

repairing the locomotives and cars. Thus every branch of railroad

building, making tools to work with, and supplying the workmen with

food, was all going on at once, and without the aid of a mechanic or

laborer except what the command itself furnished. But rails and cars

the men could not make without material, and there was not enough

rolling stock to keep the road we already had worked to its full

capacity. There were no rails except those in use. To supply these

deficiencies I ordered eight of the ten engines General McPherson had at

Vicksburg to be sent to Nashville, and all the cars he had except ten.

I also ordered the troops in West Tennessee to points on the river and

on the Memphis and Charleston road, and ordered the cars, locomotives

and rails from all the railroads except the Memphis and Charleston to

Nashville. The military manager of railroads also was directed to

furnish more rolling stock and, as far as he could, bridge material.

General Dodge had the work assigned him finished within forty days after

receiving his orders. The number of bridges to rebuild was one hundred

and eighty-two, many of them over deep and wide chasms; the length of

road repaired was one hundred and two miles.

The enemy's troops, which it was thought were either moving against

Burnside or were going to Nashville, went no farther than Cleveland.

Their presence there, however, alarmed the authorities at Washington,

and, on account of our helpless condition at Chattanooga, caused me much

uneasiness. Dispatches were constantly coming, urging me to do

something for Burnside's relief; calling attention to the importance of

holding East Tennessee; saying the President was much concerned for the

protection of the loyal people in that section, etc. We had not at

Chattanooga animals to pull a single piece of artillery, much less a

supply train. Reinforcements could not help Burnside, because he had

neither supplies nor ammunition sufficient for them; hardly, indeed,

bread and meat for the men he had. There was no relief possible for him

except by expelling the enemy from Missionary Ridge and about

Chattanooga.

On the 4th of November Longstreet left our front with about fifteen

thousand troops, besides Wheeler's cavalry, five thousand more, to go

against Burnside. The situation seemed desperate, and was more

aggravating because nothing could be done until Sherman should get up.

The authorities at Washington were now more than ever anxious for the

safety of Burnside's army, and plied me with dispatches faster than

ever, urging that something should be done for his relief. On the 7th,

before Longstreet could possibly have reached Knoxville, I ordered

Thomas peremptorily to attack the enemy's right, so as to force the

return of the troops that had gone up the valley. I directed him to

take mules, officers' horses, or animals wherever he could get them to

move the necessary artillery. But he persisted in the declaration that

he could not move a single piece of artillery, and could not see how he

could possibly comply with the order. Nothing was left to be done but

to answer Washington dispatches as best I could; urge Sherman forward,

although he was making every effort to get forward, and encourage

Burnside to hold on, assuring him that in a short time he should be

relieved. All of Burnside's dispatches showed the greatest confidence

in his ability to hold his position as long as his ammunition held out.

He even suggested the propriety of abandoning the territory he held

south and west of Knoxville, so as to draw the enemy farther from his

base and make it more difficult for him to get back to Chattanooga when

the battle should begin. Longstreet had a railroad as far as Loudon;

but from there to Knoxville he had to rely on wagon trains. Burnside's

suggestion, therefore, was a good one, and it was adopted. On the 14th

I telegraphed him:

"Sherman's advance has reached Bridgeport. His whole force will be

ready to move from there by Tuesday at farthest. If you can hold

Longstreet in check until he gets up, or by skirmishing and falling back

can avoid serious loss to yourself and gain time, I will be able to

force the enemy back from here and place a force between Longstreet and

Bragg that must inevitably make the former take to the mountain-passes

by every available road, to get to his supplies. Sherman would have

been here before this but for high water in Elk River driving him some

thirty miles up that river to cross."

And again later in the day, indicating my plans for his relief, as

follows:

"Your dispatch and Dana's just received. Being there, you can tell

better how to resist Longstreet's attack than I can direct. With your

showing you had better give up Kingston at the last moment and save the

most productive part of your possessions. Every arrangement is now made

to throw Sherman's force across the river, just at and below the mouth

of Chickamauga Creek, as soon as it arrives. Thomas will attack on his

left at the same time, and together it is expected to carry Missionary

Ridge, and from there push a force on to the railroad between Cleveland

and Dalton. Hooker will at the same time attack, and, if he can, carry

Lookout Mountain. The enemy now seems to be looking for an attack on

his left flank. This favors us. To further confirm this, Sherman's

advance division will march direct from Whiteside to Trenton. The

remainder of his force will pass over a new road just made from

Whiteside to Kelly's Ferry, thus being concealed from the enemy, and

leave him to suppose the whole force is going up Lookout Valley.

Sherman's advance has only just reached Bridgeport. The rear will only

reach there on the 16th. This will bring it to the 19th as the earliest

day for making the combined movement as desired. Inform me if you think

you can sustain yourself until this time. I can hardly conceive of the

enemy breaking through at Kingston and pushing for Kentucky. If they

should, however, a new problem would be left for solution. Thomas has

ordered a division of cavalry to the vicinity of Sparta. I will

ascertain if they have started, and inform you. It will be entirely out

of the question to send you ten thousand men, not because they cannot be

spared, but how would they be fed after they got even one day east from

here?"

Longstreet, for some reason or other, stopped at Loudon until the 13th.

That being the terminus of his railroad communications, it is probable

he was directed to remain there awaiting orders. He was in a position

threatening Knoxville, and at the same time where he could be brought

back speedily to Chattanooga. The day after Longstreet left Loudon,

Sherman reached Bridgeport in person and proceeded on to see me that

evening, the 14th, and reached Chattanooga the next day.

My orders for battle were all prepared in advance of Sherman's arrival

(*15), except the dates, which could not be fixed while troops to be

engaged were so far away. The possession of Lookout Mountain was of no

special advantage to us now. Hooker was instructed to send Howard's

corps to the north side of the Tennessee, thence up behind the hills on

the north side, and to go into camp opposite Chattanooga; with the

remainder of the command, Hooker was, at a time to be afterwards

appointed, to ascend the western slope between the upper and lower

palisades, and so get into Chattanooga valley.

The plan of battle was for Sherman to attack the enemy's right flank,

form a line across it, extend our left over South Chickamauga River so

as to threaten or hold the railroad in Bragg's rear, and thus force him

either to weaken his lines elsewhere or lose his connection with his

base at Chickamauga Station. Hooker was to perform like service on our

right. His problem was to get from Lookout Valley to Chattanooga Valley

in the most expeditious way possible; cross the latter valley rapidly to

Rossville, south of Bragg's line on Missionary Ridge, form line there

across the ridge facing north, with his right flank extended to

Chickamauga Valley east of the ridge, thus threatening the enemy's rear

on that flank and compelling him to reinforce this also. Thomas, with

the Army of the Cumberland, occupied the centre, and was to assault

while the enemy was engaged with most of his forces on his two flanks.

To carry out this plan, Sherman was to cross the Tennessee at Brown's

Ferry and move east of Chattanooga to a point opposite the north end of

Mission Ridge, and to place his command back of the foot-hills out of

sight of the enemy on the ridge. There are two streams called

Chickamauga emptying into the Tennessee River east of Chattanooga--North

Chickamauga, taking its rise in Tennessee, flowing south, and emptying

into the river some seven or eight miles east; while the South

Chickamauga, which takes its rise in Georgia, flows northward, and

empties into the Tennessee some three or four miles above the town.

There were now one hundred and sixteen pontoons in the North Chickamauga

River, their presence there being unknown to the enemy.

At night a division was to be marched up to that point, and at two

o'clock in the morning moved down with the current, thirty men in each

boat. A few were to land east of the mouth of the South Chickamauga,

capture the pickets there, and then lay a bridge connecting the two

banks of the river. The rest were to land on the south side of the

Tennessee, where Missionary Ridge would strike it if prolonged, and a

sufficient number of men to man the boats were to push to the north side

to ferry over the main body of Sherman's command while those left on the

south side intrenched themselves. Thomas was to move out from his lines

facing the ridge, leaving enough of Palmer's corps to guard against an

attack down the valley. Lookout Valley being of no present value to us,

and being untenable by the enemy if we should secure Missionary Ridge,

Hooker's orders were changed. His revised orders brought him to

Chattanooga by the established route north of the Tennessee. He was

then to move out to the right to Rossville.

Hooker's position in Lookout Valley was absolutely essential to us so

long as Chattanooga was besieged. It was the key to our line for

supplying the army. But it was not essential after the enemy was

dispersed from our front, or even after the battle for this purpose was

begun. Hooker's orders, therefore, were designed to get his force past

Lookout Mountain and Chattanooga Valley, and up to Missionary Ridge. By

crossing the north face of Lookout the troops would come into

Chattanooga Valley in rear of the line held by the enemy across the

valley, and would necessarily force its evacuation. Orders were

accordingly given to march by this route. But days before the battle

began the advantages as well as the disadvantages of this plan of action

were all considered. The passage over the mountain was a difficult one

to make in the face of an enemy. It might consume so much time as to

lose us the use of the troops engaged in it at other points where they

were more wanted. After reaching Chattanooga Valley, the creek of the

same name, quite a formidable stream to get an army over, had to be

crossed. I was perfectly willing that the enemy should keep Lookout

Mountain until we got through with the troops on Missionary Ridge. By

marching Hooker to the north side of the river, thence up the stream,

and recrossing at the town, he could be got in position at any named

time; when in this new position, he would have Chattanooga Creek behind

him, and the attack on Missionary Ridge would unquestionably cause the

evacuation by the enemy of his line across the valley and on Lookout

Mountain. Hooker's order was changed accordingly. As explained

elsewhere, the original order had to be reverted to, because of a flood

in the river rendering the bridge at Brown's Ferry unsafe for the

passage of troops at the exact juncture when it was wanted to bring all

the troops together against Missionary Ridge.

The next day after Sherman's arrival I took him, with Generals Thomas

and Smith and other officers, to the north side of the river, and showed

them the ground over which Sherman had to march, and pointed out

generally what he was expected to do. I, as well as the authorities in

Washington, was still in a great state of anxiety for Burnside's safety.

Burnside himself, I believe, was the only one who did not share in this

anxiety. Nothing could be done for him, however, until Sherman's troops

were up. As soon, therefore, as the inspection was over, Sherman

started for Bridgeport to hasten matters, rowing a boat himself, I

believe, from Kelly's Ferry. Sherman had left Bridgeport the night

of the 14th, reached Chattanooga the evening of the 15th, made the

above-described inspection on the morning of the 16th, and started back

the same evening to hurry up his command, fully appreciating the

importance of time.

His march was conducted with as much expedition as the roads and season

would admit of. By the 20th he was himself at Brown's Ferry with the

head of column, but many of his troops were far behind, and one division

(Ewing's) was at Trenton, sent that way to create the impression that

Lookout was to be taken from the south. Sherman received his orders at

the ferry, and was asked if he could not be ready for the assault the

following morning. News had been received that the battle had been

commenced at Knoxville. Burnside had been cut off from telegraphic

communications. The President, the Secretary of War, and General

Halleck, were in an agony of suspense. My suspense was also great, but

more endurable, because I was where I could soon do something to relieve

the situation. It was impossible to get Sherman's troops up for the

next day. I then asked him if they could not be got up to make the

assault on the morning of the 22d, and ordered Thomas to move on that

date. But the elements were against us. It rained all the 20th and

21st. The river rose so rapidly that it was difficult to keep the

pontoons in place.

General Orlando B. Willcox, a division commander under Burnside, was at

this time occupying a position farther up the valley than Knoxville

--about Maynardville--and was still in telegraphic communication with the

North. A dispatch was received from him saying that he was threatened

from the east. The following was sent in reply:

"If you can communicate with General Burnside, say to him that our

attack on Bragg will commence in the morning. If successful, such a

move will be made as I think will relieve East Tennessee, if he can hold

out. Longstreet passing through our lines to Kentucky need not cause

alarm. He would find the country so bare that he would lose his

transportation and artillery before reaching Kentucky, and would meet

such a force before he got through, that he could not return."

Meantime, Sherman continued his crossing without intermission as fast as

his troops could be got up. The crossing had to be effected in full

view of the enemy on the top of Lookout Mountain. Once over, however,

the troops soon disappeared behind the detached hill on the north side,

and would not come to view again, either to watchmen on Lookout Mountain

or Missionary Ridge, until they emerged between the hills to strike the

bank of the river. But when Sherman's advance reached a point opposite

the town of Chattanooga, Howard, who, it will be remembered, had been

concealed behind the hills on the north side, took up his line of march

to join the troops on the south side. His crossing was in full view

both from Missionary Ridge and the top of Lookout, and the enemy of

course supposed these troops to be Sherman's. This enabled Sherman to

get to his assigned position without discovery.

CHAPTER XLIII.

PREPARATIONS FOR BATTLE--THOMAS CARRIES THE FIRST LINE OF THE ENEMY

--SHERMAN CARRIES MISSIONARY RIDGE--BATTLE OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN

--GENERAL HOOKER'S FIGHT.

On the 20th, when so much was occurring to discourage--rains falling so

heavily as to delay the passage of troops over the river at Brown's

Ferry and threatening the entire breaking of the bridge; news coming of

a battle raging at Knoxville; of Willcox being threatened by a force

from the east--a letter was received from Bragg which contained these

words: "As there may still be some non-combatants in Chattanooga, I

deem it proper to notify you that prudence would dictate their early

withdrawal." Of course, I understood that this was a device intended to

deceive; but I did not know what the intended deception was. On the

22d, however, a deserter came in who informed me that Bragg was leaving

our front, and on that day Buckner's division was sent to reinforce

Longstreet at Knoxville, and another division started to follow but was

recalled. The object of Bragg's letter, no doubt, was in some way to

detain me until Knoxville could be captured, and his troops there be

returned to Chattanooga.

During the night of the 21st the rest of the pontoon boats, completed,

one hundred and sixteen in all, were carried up to and placed in North

Chickamauga. The material for the roadway over these was deposited out

of view of the enemy within a few hundred yards of the bank of the

Tennessee, where the north end of the bridge was to rest.

Hearing nothing from Burnside, and hearing much of the distress in

Washington on his account, I could no longer defer operations for his

relief. I determined, therefore, to do on the 23d, with the Army of the

Cumberland, what had been intended to be done on the 24th.

The position occupied by the Army of the Cumberland had been made very

strong for defence during the months it had been besieged. The line was

about a mile from the town, and extended from Citico Creek, a small

stream running near the base of Missionary Ridge and emptying into the

Tennessee about two miles below the mouth of the South Chickamauga, on

the left, to Chattanooga Creek on the right. All commanding points on

the line were well fortified and well equipped with artillery. The

important elevations within the line had all been carefully fortified

and supplied with a proper armament. Among the elevations so fortified

was one to the east of the town, named Fort Wood. It owed its

importance chiefly to the fact that it lay between the town and

Missionary Ridge, where most of the strength of the enemy was. Fort

Wood had in it twenty-two pieces of artillery, most of which would reach

the nearer points of the enemy's line. On the morning of the 23d

Thomas, according to instructions, moved Granger's corps of two

divisions, Sheridan and T. J. Wood commanding, to the foot of Fort Wood,

and formed them into line as if going on parade, Sheridan on the right,

Wood to the left, extending to or near Citico Creek. Palmer, commanding

the 14th corps, held that part of our line facing south and southwest.

He supported Sheridan with one division (Baird's), while his other

division under Johnson remained in the trenches, under arms, ready to be

moved to any point. Howard's corps was moved in rear of the centre. The

picket lines were within a few hundred yards of each other. At two

o'clock in the afternoon all were ready to advance. By this time the

clouds had lifted so that the enemy could see from his elevated position

all that was going on. The signal for advance was given by a booming of

cannon from Fort Wood and other points on the line. The rebel pickets

were soon driven back upon the main guards, which occupied minor and

detached heights between the main ridge and our lines. These too were

carried before halting, and before the enemy had time to reinforce their

advance guards. But it was not without loss on both sides. This

movement secured to us a line fully a mile in advance of the one we

occupied in the morning, and the one which the enemy had occupied up to

this time. The fortifications were rapidly turned to face the other

way. During the following night they were made strong. We lost in this

preliminary action about eleven hundred killed and wounded, while the

enemy probably lost quite as heavily, including the prisoners that were

captured. With the exception of the firing of artillery, kept up from

Missionary Ridge and Fort Wood until night closed in, this ended the

fighting for the first day.

The advantage was greatly on our side now, and if I could only have been

assured that Burnside could hold out ten days longer I should have

rested more easily. But we were doing the best we could for him and the

cause.

By the night of the 23d Sherman's command was in a position to move,

though one division (Osterhaus's) had not yet crossed the river at

Brown's Ferry. The continuous rise in the Tennessee had rendered it

impossible to keep the bridge at that point in condition for troops to

cross; but I was determined to move that night even without this

division. Orders were sent to Osterhaus accordingly to report to

Hooker, if he could not cross by eight o'clock on the morning of the

24th. Because of the break in the bridge, Hooker's orders were again

changed, but this time only back to those first given to him.

General W. F. Smith had been assigned to duty as Chief Engineer of the

Military Division. To him were given the general direction of moving

troops by the boats from North Chickamauga, laying the bridge after they

reached their position, and generally all the duties pertaining to his

office of chief engineer. During the night General Morgan L. Smith's

division was marched to the point where the pontoons were, and the

brigade of Giles A. Smith was selected for the delicate duty of manning

the boats and surprising the enemy's pickets on the south bank of the

river. During this night also General J. M. Brannan, chief of

artillery, moved forty pieces of artillery, belonging to the Army of the

Cumberland, and placed them on the north side of the river so as to

command the ground opposite, to aid in protecting the approach to the

point where the south end of the bridge was to rest. He had to use

Sherman's artillery horses for this purpose, Thomas having none.

At two o'clock in the morning, November 24th, Giles A. Smith pushed out

from the North Chickamauga with his one hundred and sixteen boats, each

loaded with thirty brave and well-armed men. The boats with their

precious freight dropped down quietly with the current to avoid

attracting the attention of any one who could convey information to the

enemy, until arriving near the mouth of South Chickamauga. Here a few

boats were landed, the troops debarked, and a rush was made upon the

picket guard known to be at that point. The guard were surprised, and

twenty of their number captured. The remainder of the troops effected a

landing at the point where the bridge was to start, with equally good

results. The work of ferrying over Sherman's command from the north

side of the Tennessee was at once commenced, using the pontoons for the

purpose. A steamer was also brought up from the town to assist. The

rest of M. L. Smith's division came first, then the division of John E.

Smith. The troops as they landed were put to work intrenching their

position. By daylight the two entire divisions were over, and well

covered by the works they had built.

The work of laying the bridge, on which to cross the artillery and

cavalry, was now begun. The ferrying over the infantry was continued

with the steamer and the pontoons, taking the pontoons, however, as fast

as they were wanted to put in their place in the bridge. By a little

past noon the bridge was completed, as well as one over the South

Chickamauga connecting the troops left on that side with their comrades

below, and all the infantry and artillery were on the south bank of the

Tennessee.

Sherman at once formed his troops for assault on Missionary Ridge. By

one o'clock he started with M. L. Smith on his left, keeping nearly the

course of Chickamauga River; J. E. Smith next to the right and a little

to the rear; and Ewing still farther to the right and also a little to

the rear of J. E. Smith's command, in column, ready to deploy to the

right if an enemy should come from that direction. A good skirmish line

preceded each of these columns. Soon the foot of the hill was reached;

the skirmishers pushed directly up, followed closely by their supports.

By half-past three Sherman was in possession of the height without

having sustained much loss. A brigade from each division was now

brought up, and artillery was dragged to the top of the hill by hand.

The enemy did not seem to be aware of this movement until the top of the

hill was gained. There had been a drizzling rain during the day, and

the clouds were so low that Lookout Mountain and the top of Missionary

Ridge were obscured from the view of persons in the valley. But now the

enemy opened fire upon their assailants, and made several attempts with

their skirmishers to drive them away, but without avail. Later in the

day a more determined attack was made, but this, too, failed, and

Sherman was left to fortify what he had gained.

Sherman's cavalry took up its line of march soon after the bridge was

completed, and by half-past three the whole of it was over both bridges

and on its way to strike the enemy's communications at Chickamauga

Station. All of Sherman's command was now south of the Tennessee.

During the afternoon General Giles A. Smith was severely wounded and

carried from the field.

Thomas having done on the 23d what was expected of him on the 24th,

there was nothing for him to do this day except to strengthen his

position. Howard, however, effected a crossing of Citico Creek and a

junction with Sherman, and was directed to report to him. With two or

three regiments of his command he moved in the morning along the banks

of the Tennessee, and reached the point where the bridge was being laid.

He went out on the bridge as far as it was completed from the south end,

and saw Sherman superintending the work from the north side and moving

himself south as fast as an additional boat was put in and the roadway

put upon it. Howard reported to his new chief across the chasm between

them, which was now narrow and in a few minutes closed.

While these operations were going on to the east of Chattanooga, Hooker

was engaged on the west. He had three divisions: Osterhaus's, of the

15th corps, Army of the Tennessee; Geary's, 12th corps, Army of the

Potomac; and Cruft's, 14th corps, Army of the Cumberland. Geary was on

the right at Wauhatchie, Cruft at the centre, and Osterhaus near Brown's

Ferry. These troops were all west of Lookout Creek. The enemy had the

east bank of the creek strongly picketed and intrenched, and three

brigades of troops in the rear to reinforce them if attacked. These

brigades occupied the summit of the mountain. General Carter L.

Stevenson was in command of the whole. Why any troops, except artillery

with a small infantry guard, were kept on the mountain-top, I do not

see. A hundred men could have held the summit--which is a palisade for

more than thirty feet down--against the assault of any number of men

from the position Hooker occupied.

The side of Lookout Mountain confronting Hooker's command was rugged,

heavily timbered, and full of chasms, making it difficult to advance

with troops, even in the absence of an opposing force. Farther up, the

ground becomes more even and level, and was in cultivation. On the east

side the slope is much more gradual, and a good wagon road, zigzagging

up it, connects the town of Chattanooga with the summit.

Early on the morning of the 24th Hooker moved Geary's division,

supported by a brigade of Cruft's, up Lookout Creek, to effect a

crossing. The remainder of Cruft's division was to seize the bridge

over the creek, near the crossing of the railroad. Osterhaus was to move

up to the bridge and cross it. The bridge was seized by Gross's brigade

after a slight skirmish with the pickets guarding it. This attracted

the enemy so that Geary's movement farther up was not observed. A heavy

mist obscured him from the view of the troops on the top of the

mountain. He crossed the creek almost unobserved, and captured the

picket of over forty men on guard near by. He then commenced ascending

the mountain directly in his front. By this time the enemy was seen

coming down from their camps on the mountain slope, and filing into

their rifle-pits to contest the crossing of the bridge. By eleven

o'clock the bridge was complete. Osterhaus was up, and after some sharp

skirmishing the enemy was driven away with considerable loss in killed

and captured.

While the operations at the bridge were progressing, Geary was pushing

up the hill over great obstacles, resisted by the enemy directly in his

front, and in face of the guns on top of the mountain. The enemy,

seeing their left flank and rear menaced, gave way, and were followed by

Cruft and Osterhaus. Soon these were up abreast of Geary, and the whole

command pushed up the hill, driving the enemy in advance. By noon Geary

had gained the open ground on the north slope of the mountain, with his

right close up to the base of the upper palisade, but there were strong

fortifications in his front. The rest of the command coming up, a line

was formed from the base of the upper palisade to the mouth of

Chattanooga Creek.

Thomas and I were on the top of Orchard Knob. Hooker's advance now made

our line a continuous one. It was in full view, extending from the

Tennessee River, where Sherman had crossed, up Chickamauga River to the

base of Mission Ridge, over the top of the north end of the ridge to

Chattanooga Valley, then along parallel to the ridge a mile or more,

across the valley to the mouth of Chattanooga Creek, thence up the slope

of Lookout Mountain to the foot of the upper palisade. The day was

hazy, so that Hooker's operations were not visible to us except at

moments when the clouds would rise. But the sound of his artillery and

musketry was heard incessantly. The enemy on his front was partially

fortified, but was soon driven out of his works. During the afternoon

the clouds, which had so obscured the top of Lookout all day as to hide

whatever was going on from the view of those below, settled down and

made it so dark where Hooker was as to stop operations for the time. At

four o'clock Hooker reported his position as impregnable. By a little

after five direct communication was established, and a brigade of troops

was sent from Chattanooga to reinforce him. These troops had to cross

Chattanooga Creek and met with some opposition, but soon overcame it,

and by night the commander, General Carlin, reported to Hooker and was

assigned to his left. I now telegraphed to Washington: "The fight

to-day progressed favorably. Sherman carried the end of Missionary

Ridge, and his right is now at the tunnel, and his left at Chickamauga

Creek. Troops from Lookout Valley carried the point of the mountain, and

now hold the eastern slope and a point high up. Hooker reports two

thousand prisoners taken, besides which a small number have fallen into

our hands from Missionary Ridge." The next day the President replied:

"Your dispatches as to fighting on Monday and Tuesday are here. Well

done. Many thanks to all. Remember Burnside." And Halleck also

telegraphed: "I congratulate you on the success thus far of your plans.

I fear that Burnside is hard pushed, and that any further delay may

prove fatal. I know you will do all in your power to relieve him."

The division of Jefferson C. Davis, Army of the Cumberland, had been

sent to the North Chickamauga to guard the pontoons as they were

deposited in the river, and to prevent all ingress or egress of

citizens. On the night of the 24th his division, having crossed with

Sherman, occupied our extreme left from the upper bridge over the plain

to the north base of Missionary Ridge. Firing continued to a late hour

in the night, but it was not connected with an assault at any point.

CHAPTER XLIV.

BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA--A GALLANT CHARGE--COMPLETE ROUT OF THE ENEMY

--PURSUIT OF THE CONFEDERATES--GENERAL BRAGG--REMARKS ON CHATTANOOGA.

At twelve o'clock at night, when all was quiet, I began to give orders

for the next day, and sent a dispatch to Willcox to encourage Burnside.

Sherman was directed to attack at daylight. Hooker was ordered to move

at the same hour, and endeavor to intercept the enemy's retreat if he

still remained; if he had gone, then to move directly to Rossville and

operate against the left and rear of the force on Missionary Ridge.

Thomas was not to move until Hooker had reached Missionary Ridge. As I

was with him on Orchard Knob, he would not move without further orders

from me.

The morning of the 25th opened clear and bright, and the whole field was

in full view from the top of Orchard Knob. It remained so all day.

Bragg's headquarters were in full view, and officers--presumably staff

officers--could be seen coming and going constantly.

The point of ground which Sherman had carried on the 24th was almost

disconnected from the main ridge occupied by the enemy. A low pass, over

which there is a wagon road crossing the hill, and near which there is a

railroad tunnel, intervenes between the two hills. The problem now was

to get to the main ridge. The enemy was fortified on the point; and back

farther, where the ground was still higher, was a second fortification

commanding the first. Sherman was out as soon as it was light enough to

see, and by sunrise his command was in motion. Three brigades held the

hill already gained. Morgan L. Smith moved along the east base of

Missionary Ridge; Loomis along the west base, supported by two brigades

of John E. Smith's division; and Corse with his brigade was between the

two, moving directly towards the hill to be captured. The ridge is

steep and heavily wooded on the east side, where M. L. Smith's troops

were advancing, but cleared and with a more gentle slope on the west

side. The troops advanced rapidly and carried the extreme end of the

rebel works. Morgan L. Smith advanced to a point which cut the enemy

off from the railroad bridge and the means of bringing up supplies by

rail from Chickamauga Station, where the main depot was located. The

enemy made brave and strenuous efforts to drive our troops from the

position we had gained, but without success. The contest lasted for two

hours. Corse, a brave and efficient commander, was badly wounded in

this assault. Sherman now threatened both Bragg's flank and his stores,

and made it necessary for him to weaken other points of his line to

strengthen his right. From the position I occupied I could see column

after column of Bragg's forces moving against Sherman. Every

Confederate gun that could be brought to bear upon the Union forces was

concentrated upon him. J. E. Smith, with two brigades, charged up the

west side of the ridge to the support of Corse's command, over open

ground and in the face of a heavy fire of both artillery and musketry,

and reached the very parapet of the enemy. He lay here for a time, but

the enemy coming with a heavy force upon his right flank, he was

compelled to fall back, followed by the foe. A few hundred yards

brought Smith's troops into a wood, where they were speedily reformed,

when they charged and drove the attacking party back to his

intrenchments.

Seeing the advance, repulse, and second advance of J. E. Smith from the

position I occupied, I directed Thomas to send a division to reinforce

him. Baird's division was accordingly sent from the right of Orchard

Knob. It had to march a considerable distance directly under the eye of

the enemy to reach its position. Bragg at once commenced massing in the

same direction. This was what I wanted. But it had now got to be late

in the afternoon, and I had expected before this to see Hooker crossing

the ridge in the neighborhood of Rossville and compelling Bragg to mass

in that direction also.

The enemy had evacuated Lookout Mountain during the night, as I expected

he would. In crossing the valley he burned the bridge over Chattanooga

Creek, and did all he could to obstruct the roads behind him. Hooker

was off bright and early, with no obstructions in his front but distance

and the destruction above named. He was detained four hours crossing

Chattanooga Creek, and thus was lost the immediate advantage I expected

from his forces. His reaching Bragg's flank and extending across it was

to be the signal for Thomas's assault of the ridge. But Sherman's

condition was getting so critical that the assault for his relief could

not be delayed any longer.

Sheridan's and Wood's divisions had been lying under arms from early

morning, ready to move the instant the signal was given. I now directed

Thomas to order the charge at once (*16). I watched eagerly to see the

effect, and became impatient at last that there was no indication of any

charge being made. The centre of the line which was to make the charge

was near where Thomas and I stood, but concealed from view by an

intervening forest. Turning to Thomas to inquire what caused the delay,

I was surprised to see Thomas J. Wood, one of the division commanders

who was to make the charge, standing talking to him. I spoke to General

Wood, asking him why he did not charge as ordered an hour before. He

replied very promptly that this was the first he had heard of it, but

that he had been ready all day to move at a moment's notice. I told him

to make the charge at once. He was off in a moment, and in an

incredibly short time loud cheering was heard, and he and Sheridan were

driving the enemy's advance before them towards Missionary Ridge. The

Confederates were strongly intrenched on the crest of the ridge in front

of us, and had a second line half-way down and another at the base. Our

men drove the troops in front of the lower line of rifle-pits so

rapidly, and followed them so closely, that rebel and Union troops went

over the first line of works almost at the same time. Many rebels were

captured and sent to the rear under the fire of their own friends higher

up the hill. Those that were not captured retreated, and were pursued.

The retreating hordes being between friends and pursuers caused the

enemy to fire high to avoid killing their own men. In fact, on that

occasion the Union soldier nearest the enemy was in the safest position.

Without awaiting further orders or stopping to reform, on our troops

went to the second line of works; over that and on for the crest--thus

effectually carrying out my orders of the 18th for the battle and of the

24th (*17) for this charge.

I watched their progress with intense interest. The fire along the

rebel line was terrific. Cannon and musket balls filled the air: but

the damage done was in small proportion to the ammunition expended. The

pursuit continued until the crest was reached, and soon our men were

seen climbing over the Confederate barriers at different points in front

of both Sheridan's and Wood's divisions. The retreat of the enemy along

most of his line was precipitate and the panic so great that Bragg and

his officers lost all control over their men. Many were captured, and

thousands threw away their arms in their flight.

Sheridan pushed forward until he reached the Chickamauga River at a

point above where the enemy crossed. He met some resistance from troops

occupying a second hill in rear of Missionary Ridge, probably to cover

the retreat of the main body and of the artillery and trains. It was

now getting dark, but Sheridan, without halting on that account pushed

his men forward up this second hill slowly and without attracting the

attention of the men placed to defend it, while he detached to the right

and left to surround the position. The enemy discovered the movement

before these dispositions were complete, and beat a hasty retreat,

leaving artillery, wagon trains, and many prisoners in our hands. To

Sheridan's prompt movement the Army of the Cumberland, and the nation,

are indebted for the bulk of the capture of prisoners, artillery, and

small-arms that day. Except for his prompt pursuit, so much in this way

would not have been accomplished.

While the advance up Mission Ridge was going forward, General Thomas

with staff, General Gordon Granger, commander of the corps making the

assault, and myself and staff occupied Orchard Knob, from which the

entire field could be observed. The moment the troops were seen going

over the last line of rebel defences, I ordered Granger to join his

command, and mounting my horse I rode to the front. General Thomas left

about the same time. Sheridan on the extreme right was already in

pursuit of the enemy east of the ridge. Wood, who commanded the

division to the left of Sheridan, accompanied his men on horseback in

the charge, but did not join Sheridan in the pursuit. To the left, in

Baird's front where Bragg's troops had massed against Sherman, the

resistance was more stubborn and the contest lasted longer. I ordered

Granger to follow the enemy with Wood's division, but he was so much

excited, and kept up such a roar of musketry in the direction the enemy

had taken, that by the time I could stop the firing the enemy had got

well out of the way. The enemy confronting Sherman, now seeing

everything to their left giving way, fled also. Sherman, however, was

not aware of the extent of our success until after nightfall, when he

received orders to pursue at daylight in the morning.

As soon as Sherman discovered that the enemy had left his front he

directed his reserves, Davis's division of the Army of the Cumberland,

to push over the pontoon-bridge at the mouth of the Chickamauga, and to

move forward to Chickamauga Station. He ordered Howard to move up the

stream some two miles to where there was an old bridge, repair it during

the night, and follow Davis at four o'clock in the morning. Morgan L.

Smith was ordered to reconnoitre the tunnel to see if that was still

held. Nothing was found there but dead bodies of men of both armies.

The rest of Sherman's command was directed to follow Howard at daylight

in the morning to get on to the railroad towards Graysville.

Hooker, as stated, was detained at Chattanooga Creek by the destruction

of the bridge at that point. He got his troops over, with the exception

of the artillery, by fording the stream at a little after three o'clock.

Leaving his artillery to follow when the bridge should be reconstructed,

he pushed on with the remainder of his command. At Rossville he came

upon the flank of a division of the enemy, which soon commenced a

retreat along the ridge. This threw them on Palmer. They could make

but little resistance in the position they were caught in, and as many

of them as could do so escaped. Many, however, were captured. Hooker's

position during the night of the 25th was near Rossville, extending east

of the ridge. Palmer was on his left, on the road to Graysville.

During the night I telegraphed to Willcox that Bragg had been defeated,

and that immediate relief would be sent to Burnside if he could hold

out; to Halleck I sent an announcement of our victory, and informed him

that forces would be sent up the valley to relieve Burnside.

Before the battle of Chattanooga opened I had taken measures for the

relief of Burnside the moment the way should be clear. Thomas was

directed to have the little steamer that had been built at Chattanooga

loaded to its capacity with rations and ammunition. Granger's corps was

to move by the south bank of the Tennessee River to the mouth of the

Holston, and up that to Knoxville accompanied by the boat. In addition

to the supplies transported by boat, the men were to carry forty rounds

of ammunition in their cartridge-boxes, and four days' rations in

haversacks.

In the battle of Chattanooga, troops from the Army of the Potomac, from

the Army of the Tennessee, and from the Army of the Cumberland

participated. In fact, the accidents growing out of the heavy rains and

the sudden rise in the Tennessee River so mingled the troops that the

organizations were not kept together, under their respective commanders,

during the battle. Hooker, on the right, had Geary's division of the

12th corps, Army of the Potomac; Osterhaus's division of the 15th corps,

Army of the Tennessee; and Cruft's division of the Army of the

Cumberland. Sherman had three divisions of his own army, Howard's corps

from the Army of the Potomac, and Jefferson C. Davis's division of the

Army of the Cumberland. There was no jealousy--hardly rivalry. Indeed,

I doubt whether officers or men took any note at the time of the fact of

this intermingling of commands. All saw a defiant foe surrounding them,

and took it for granted that every move was intended to dislodge him,

and it made no difference where the troops came from so that the end was

accomplished.

The victory at Chattanooga was won against great odds, considering the

advantage the enemy had of position, and was accomplished more easily

than was expected by reason of Bragg's making several grave mistakes:

first, in sending away his ablest corps commander with over twenty

thousand troops; second, in sending away a division of troops on the eve

of battle; third, in placing so much of a force on the plain in front of

his impregnable position.

It was known that Mr. Jefferson Davis had visited Bragg on Missionary

Ridge a short time before my reaching Chattanooga. It was reported and

believed that he had come out to reconcile a serious difference between

Bragg and Longstreet, and finding this difficult to do, planned the

campaign against Knoxville, to be conducted by the latter general. I

had known both Bragg and Longstreet before the war, the latter very

well. We had been three years at West Point together, and, after my

graduation, for a time in the same regiment. Then we served together in

the Mexican War. I had known Bragg in Mexico, and met him occasionally

subsequently. I could well understand how there might be an

irreconcilable difference between them.

Bragg was a remarkably intelligent and well-informed man, professionally

and otherwise. He was also thoroughly upright. But he was possessed of

an irascible temper, and was naturally disputatious. A man of the

highest moral character and the most correct habits, yet in the old army

he was in frequent trouble. As a subordinate he was always on the

lookout to catch his commanding officer infringing his prerogatives; as

a post commander he was equally vigilant to detect the slightest

neglect, even of the most trivial order.

I have heard in the old army an anecdote very characteristic of Bragg.

On one occasion, when stationed at a post of several companies commanded

by a field officer, he was himself commanding one of the companies and

at the same time acting as post quartermaster and commissary. He was

first lieutenant at the time, but his captain was detached on other

duty. As commander of the company he made a requisition upon the

quartermaster--himself--for something he wanted. As quartermaster he

declined to fill the requisition, and endorsed on the back of it his

reasons for so doing. As company commander he responded to this, urging

that his requisition called for nothing but what he was entitled to, and

that it was the duty of the quartermaster to fill it. As quartermaster

he still persisted that he was right. In this condition of affairs

Bragg referred the whole matter to the commanding officer of the post.

The latter, when he saw the nature of the matter referred, exclaimed:

"My God, Mr. Bragg, you have quarrelled with every officer in the army,

and now you are quarrelling with yourself!"

Longstreet was an entirely different man. He was brave, honest,

intelligent, a very capable soldier, subordinate to his superiors, just

and kind to his subordinates, but jealous of his own rights, which he

had the courage to maintain. He was never on the lookout to detect a

slight, but saw one as soon as anybody when intentionally given.

It may be that Longstreet was not sent to Knoxville for the reason

stated, but because Mr. Davis had an exalted opinion of his own military

genius, and thought he saw a chance of "killing two birds with one

stone." On several occasions during the war he came to the relief of

the Union army by means of his SUPERIOR MILITARY GENIUS.

I speak advisedly when I saw Mr. Davis prided himself on his military

capacity. He says so himself, virtually, in his answer to the notice of

his nomination to the Confederate presidency. Some of his generals have

said so in their writings since the downfall of the Confederacy.

My recollection is that my first orders for the battle of Chattanooga

were as fought. Sherman was to get on Missionary Ridge, as he did;

Hooker to cross the north end of Lookout Mountain, as he did, sweep

across Chattanooga Valley and get across the south end of the ridge near

Rossville. When Hooker had secured that position the Army of the

Cumberland was to assault in the centre. Before Sherman arrived,

however, the order was so changed as that Hooker was directed to come to

Chattanooga by the north bank of the Tennessee River. The waters in the

river, owing to heavy rains, rose so fast that the bridge at Brown's

Ferry could not be maintained in a condition to be used in crossing

troops upon it. For this reason Hooker's orders were changed by

telegraph back to what they were originally.------

NOTE.--From this point on this volume was written (with the exception of

the campaign in the Wilderness, which had been previously written) by

General Grant, after his great illness in April, and the present

arrangement of the subject-matter was made by him between the 10th and

18th of July, 1885.

CHAPTER XLV.

THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE--HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO NASHVILLE--VISITING

KNOXVILLE-CIPHER CIPHER DISPATCHES--WITHHOLDING ORDERS.

Chattanooga now being secure to the National troops beyond any doubt, I

immediately turned my attention to relieving Knoxville, about the

situation of which the President, in particular, was very anxious.

Prior to the battles, I had made preparations for sending troops to the

relief of Burnside at the very earliest moment after securing

Chattanooga. We had there two little steamers which had been built and

fitted up from the remains of old boats and put in condition to run.

General Thomas was directed to have one of these boats loaded with

rations and ammunition and move up the Tennessee River to the mouth of

the Holston, keeping the boat all the time abreast of the troops.

General Granger, with the 4th corps reinforced to make twenty thousand

men, was to start the moment Missionary Ridge was carried, and under no

circumstances were the troops to return to their old camps. With the

provisions carried, and the little that could be got in the country, it

was supposed he could hold out until Longstreet was driven away, after

which event East Tennessee would furnish abundance of food for

Burnside's army and his own also.

While following the enemy on the 26th, and again on the morning of the

27th, part of the time by the road to Ringgold, I directed Thomas,

verbally, not to start Granger until he received further orders from me;

advising him that I was going to the front to more fully see the

situation. I was not right sure but that Bragg's troops might be over

their stampede by the time they reached Dalton. In that case Bragg

might think it well to take the road back to Cleveland, move thence

towards Knoxville, and, uniting with Longstreet, make a sudden dash upon

Burnside.

When I arrived at Ringgold, however, on the 27th, I saw that the retreat

was most earnest. The enemy had been throwing away guns, caissons and

small-arms, abandoning provisions, and, altogether, seemed to be moving

like a disorganized mob, with the exception of Cleburne's division,

which was acting as rear-guard to cover the retreat.

When Hooker moved from Rossville toward Ringgold Palmer's division took

the road to Graysville, and Sherman moved by the way of Chickamauga

Station toward the same point. As soon as I saw the situation at

Ringgold I sent a staff officer back to Chattanooga to advise Thomas of

the condition of affairs, and direct him by my orders to start Granger

at once. Feeling now that the troops were already on the march for the

relief of Burnside I was in no hurry to get back, but stayed at Ringgold

through the day to prepare for the return of our troops.

Ringgold is in a valley in the mountains, situated between East

Chickamauga Creek and Taylor's Ridge, and about twenty miles south-east

from Chattanooga. I arrived just as the artillery that Hooker had left

behind at Chattanooga Creek got up. His men were attacking Cleburne's

division, which had taken a strong position in the adjacent hills so as

to cover the retreat of the Confederate army through a narrow gorge

which presents itself at that point. Just beyond the gorge the valley

is narrow, and the creek so tortuous that it has to be crossed a great

many times in the course of the first mile. This attack was

unfortunate, and cost us some men unnecessarily. Hooker captured,

however, 3 pieces of artillery and 230 prisoners, and 130 rebel dead

were left upon the field.

I directed General Hooker to collect the flour and wheat in the

neighboring mills for the use of the troops, and then to destroy the

mills and all other property that could be of use to the enemy, but not

to make any wanton destruction.

At this point Sherman came up, having reached Graysville with his

troops, where he found Palmer had preceded him. Palmer had picked up

many prisoners and much abandoned property on the route. I went back in

the evening to Graysville with Sherman, remained there over night and

did not return to Chattanooga until the following night, the 29th. I

then found that Thomas had not yet started Granger, thus having lost a

full day which I deemed of so much importance in determining the fate of

Knoxville. Thomas and Granger were aware that on the 23d of the month

Burnside had telegraphed that his supplies would last for ten or twelve

days and during that time he could hold out against Longstreet, but if

not relieved within the time indicated he would be obliged to surrender

or attempt to retreat. To effect a retreat would have been an

impossibility. He was already very low in ammunition, and with an army

pursuing he would not have been able to gather supplies.

Finding that Granger had not only not started but was very reluctant to

go, he having decided for himself that it was a very bad move to make, I

sent word to General Sherman of the situation and directed him to march

to the relief of Knoxville. I also gave him the problem that we had to

solve--that Burnside had now but four to six days supplies left, and

that he must be relieved within that time.

Sherman, fortunately, had not started on his return from Graysville,

having sent out detachments on the railroad which runs from Dalton to

Cleveland and Knoxville to thoroughly destroy that road, and these

troops had not yet returned to camp. I was very loath to send Sherman,

because his men needed rest after their long march from Memphis and hard

fighting at Chattanooga. But I had become satisfied that Burnside would

not be rescued if his relief depended upon General Granger's movements.

Sherman had left his camp on the north side of the Tennessee River, near

Chattanooga, on the night of the 23d, the men having two days' cooked

rations in their haversacks. Expecting to be back in their tents by

that time and to be engaged in battle while out, they took with them

neither overcoats nor blankets. The weather was already cold, and at

night they must have suffered more or less. The two days' rations had

already lasted them five days; and they were now to go through a country

which had been run over so much by Confederate troops that there was but

little probability of finding much food. They did, however, succeed in

capturing some flour. They also found a good deal of bran in some of

the mills, which the men made up into bread; and in this and other ways

they eked out an existence until they could reach Knoxville.

I was so very anxious that Burnside should get news of the steps being

taken for his relief, and thus induce him to hold out a little longer if

it became necessary, that I determined to send a message to him. I

therefore sent a member of my staff, Colonel J. H. Wilson, to get into

Knoxville if he could report to Burnside the situation fully, and give

him all the encouragement possible. Mr. Charles A. Dana was at

Chattanooga during the battle, and had been there even before I assumed

command. Mr. Dana volunteered to accompany Colonel Wilson, and did

accompany him. I put the information of what was being done for the

relief of Knoxville into writing, and directed that in some way or other

it must be secretly managed so as to have a copy of this fall into the

hands of General Longstreet. They made the trip safely; General

Longstreet did learn of Sherman's coming in advance of his reaching

there, and Burnside was prepared to hold out even for a longer time if

it had been necessary.

Burnside had stretched a boom across the Holston River to catch scows

and flats as they floated down. On these, by previous arrangements with

the loyal people of East Tennessee, were placed flour and corn, with

forage and provisions generally, and were thus secured for the use of

the Union troops. They also drove cattle into Knoxville by the east

side, which was not covered by the enemy; so that when relief arrived

Burnside had more provisions on hand than when he had last reported.

Our total loss (not including Burnside's) in all these engagements

amounted to 757 killed, 4,529 wounded and 330 missing. We captured

6,142 prisoners--about 50 per cent. more than the enemy reported for

their total loss--40 pieces of artillery, 69 artillery carriages and

caissons and over 7,000 stands of small-arms. The enemy's loss in arms

was probably much greater than here reported, because we picked up a

great many that were found abandoned.

I had at Chattanooga, in round numbers, about 60,000 men. Bragg had

about half this number, but his position was supposed to be impregnable.

It was his own fault that he did not have more men present. He had sent

Longstreet away with his corps swelled by reinforcements up to over

twenty thousand men, thus reducing his own force more than one-third and

depriving himself of the presence of the ablest general of his command.

He did this, too, after our troops had opened a line of communication by

way of Brown's and Kelly's ferries with Bridgeport, thus securing full

rations and supplies of every kind; and also when he knew reinforcements

were coming to me. Knoxville was of no earthly use to him while

Chattanooga was in our hands. If he should capture Chattanooga,

Knoxville with its garrison would have fallen into his hands without a

struggle. I have never been able to see the wisdom of this move.

Then, too, after Sherman had arrived, and when Bragg knew that he was on

the north side of the Tennessee River, he sent Buckner's division to

reinforce Longstreet. He also started another division a day later, but

our attack having commenced before it reached Knoxville Bragg ordered it

back. It had got so far, however, that it could not return to

Chattanooga in time to be of service there. It is possible this latter

blunder may have been made by Bragg having become confused as to what

was going on on our side. Sherman had, as already stated, crossed to

the north side of the Tennessee River at Brown's Ferry, in full view of

Bragg's troops from Lookout Mountain, a few days before the attack.

They then disappeared behind foot hills, and did not come to the view of

the troops on Missionary Ridge until they met their assault. Bragg knew

it was Sherman's troops that had crossed, and, they being so long out of

view, may have supposed that they had gone up the north bank of the

Tennessee River to the relief of Knoxville and that Longstreet was

therefore in danger. But the first great blunder, detaching Longstreet,

cannot be accounted for in any way I know of. If he had captured

Chattanooga, East Tennessee would have fallen without a struggle. It

would have been a victory for us to have got our army away from

Chattanooga safely. It was a manifold greater victory to drive away the

besieging army; a still greater one to defeat that army in his chosen

ground and nearly annihilate it.

The probabilities are that our loss in killed was the heavier, as we

were the attacking party. The enemy reported his loss in killed at 361:

but as he reported his missing at 4,146, while we held over 6,000 of

them as prisoners, and there must have been hundreds if not thousands

who deserted, but little reliance can be placed on this report. There

was certainly great dissatisfaction with Bragg on the part of the

soldiers for his harsh treatment of them, and a disposition to get away

if they could. Then, too, Chattanooga, following in the same half year

with Gettysburg in the East and Vicksburg in the West, there was much

the same feeling in the South at this time that there had been in the

North the fall and winter before. If the same license had been allowed

the people and press in the South that was allowed in the North,

Chattanooga would probably have been the last battle fought for the

preservation of the Union.

General William F. Smith's services in these battles had been such that

I thought him eminently entitled to promotion. I was aware that he had

previously been named by the President for promotion to the grade of

major-general, but that the Senate had rejected the nomination. I was

not aware of the reasons for this course, and therefore strongly

recommended him for a major-generalcy. My recommendation was heeded and

the appointment made.

Upon the raising of the siege of Knoxville I, of course, informed the

authorities at Washington--the President and Secretary of War--of the

fact, which caused great rejoicing there. The President especially was

rejoiced that Knoxville had been relieved (*18) without further

bloodshed. The safety of Burnside's army and the loyal people of East

Tennessee had been the subject of much anxiety to the President for

several months, during which time he was doing all he could to relieve

the situation; sending a new commander (*19) with a few thousand troops

by the way of Cumberland Gap, and telegraphing me daily, almost hourly,

to "remember Burnside," "do something for Burnside," and other appeals

of like tenor. He saw no escape for East Tennessee until after our

victory at Chattanooga. Even then he was afraid that Burnside might be

out of ammunition, in a starving condition, or overpowered: and his

anxiety was still intense until he heard that Longstreet had been driven

from the field.

Burnside followed Longstreet only to Strawberry Plains, some twenty

miles or more east, and then stopped, believing that Longstreet would

leave the State. The latter did not do so, however, but stopped only a

short distance farther on and subsisted his army for the entire winter

off East Tennessee. Foster now relieved Burnside. Sherman made

disposition of his troops along the Tennessee River in accordance with

instructions. I left Thomas in command at Chattanooga, and, about the

20th of December, moved my headquarters to Nashville, Tennessee.

Nashville was the most central point from which to communicate with my

entire military division, and also with the authorities at Washington.

While remaining at Chattanooga I was liable to have my telegraphic

communications cut so as to throw me out of communication with both my

command and Washington.

Nothing occurred at Nashville worthy of mention during the winter, (*20)

so I set myself to the task of having troops in positions from which

they could move to advantage, and in collecting all necessary supplies

so as to be ready to claim a due share of the enemy's attention upon the

appearance of the first good weather in the spring. I expected to

retain the command I then had, and prepared myself for the campaign

against Atlanta. I also had great hopes of having a campaign made

against Mobile from the Gulf. I expected after Atlanta fell to occupy

that place permanently, and to cut off Lee's army from the West by way

of the road running through Augusta to Atlanta and thence south-west. I

was preparing to hold Atlanta with a small garrison, and it was my

expectation to push through to Mobile if that city was in our

possession: if not, to Savannah; and in this manner to get possession

of the only east and west railroad that would then be left to the enemy.

But the spring campaign against Mobile was not made.

The Army of the Ohio had been getting supplies over Cumberland Gap until

their animals had nearly all starved. I now determined to go myself to

see if there was any possible chance of using that route in the spring,

and if not to abandon it. Accordingly I left Nashville in the latter

part of December by rail for Chattanooga. From Chattanooga I took one of

the little steamers previously spoken of as having been built there,

and, putting my horses aboard, went up to the junction of the Clinch

with the Tennessee. From that point the railroad had been repaired up

to Knoxville and out east to Strawberry Plains. I went by rail

therefore to Knoxville, where I remained for several days. General John

G. Foster was then commanding the Department of the Ohio. It was an

intensely cold winter, the thermometer being down as low as zero every

morning for more than a week while I was at Knoxville and on my way from

there on horseback to Lexington, Kentucky, the first point where I could

reach rail to carry me back to my headquarters at Nashville.

The road over Cumberland Gap, and back of it, was strewn with debris of

broken wagons and dead animals, much as I had found it on my first trip

to Chattanooga over Waldron's Ridge. The road had been cut up to as

great a depth as clay could be by mules and wagons, and in that

condition frozen; so that the ride of six days from Strawberry Plains to

Lexington over these holes and knobs in the road was a very cheerless

one, and very disagreeable.

I found a great many people at home along that route, both in Tennessee

and Kentucky, and, almost universally, intensely loyal. They would

collect in little places where we would stop of evenings, to see me,

generally hearing of my approach before we arrived. The people

naturally expected to see the commanding general the oldest person in

the party. I was then forty-one years of age, while my medical director

was gray-haired and probably twelve or more years my senior. The crowds

would generally swarm around him, and thus give me an opportunity of

quietly dismounting and getting into the house. It also gave me an

opportunity of hearing passing remarks from one spectator to another

about their general. Those remarks were apt to be more complimentary to

the cause than to the appearance of the supposed general, owing to his

being muffled up, and also owing to the travel-worn condition we were

all in after a hard day's ride. I was back in Nashville by the 13th of

January, 1864.

When I started on this trip it was necessary for me to have some person

along who could turn dispatches into cipher, and who could also read the

cipher dispatches which I was liable to receive daily and almost hourly.

Under the rules of the War Department at that time, Mr. Stanton had

taken entire control of the matter of regulating the telegraph and

determining how it should be used, and of saying who, and who alone,

should have the ciphers. The operators possessed of the ciphers, as

well as the ciphers used, were practically independent of the commanders

whom they were serving immediately under, and had to report to the War

Department through General Stager all the dispatches which they received

or forwarded.

I was obliged to leave the telegraphic operator back at Nashville,

because that was the point at which all dispatches to me would come, to

be forwarded from there. As I have said, it was necessary for me also

to have an operator during this inspection who had possession of this

cipher to enable me to telegraph to my division and to the War

Department without my dispatches being read by all the operators along

the line of wires over which they were transmitted. Accordingly I

ordered the cipher operator to turn over the key to Captain Cyrus B.

Comstock, of the Corps of Engineers, whom I had selected as a wise and

discreet man who certainly could be trusted with the cipher if the

operator at my headquarters could.

The operator refused point blank to turn over the key to Captain

Comstock as directed by me, stating that his orders from the War

Department were not to give it to anybody--the commanding general or any

one else. I told him I would see whether he would or not. He said that

if he did he would be punished. I told him if he did not he most

certainly would be punished. Finally, seeing that punishment was certain

if he refused longer to obey my order, and being somewhat remote (even

if he was not protected altogether from the consequences of his

disobedience to his orders) from the War Department, he yielded. When I

returned from Knoxville I found quite a commotion. The operator had

been reprimanded very severely and ordered to be relieved. I informed

the Secretary of War, or his assistant secretary in charge of the

telegraph, Stager, that the man could not be relieved, for he had only

obeyed my orders. It was absolutely necessary for me to have the

cipher, and the man would most certainly have been punished if he had

not delivered it; that they would have to punish me if they punished

anybody, or words to that effect.

This was about the only thing approaching a disagreeable difference

between the Secretary of War and myself that occurred until the war was

over, when we had another little spat. Owing to his natural disposition

to assume all power and control in all matters that he had anything

whatever to do with, he boldly took command of the armies, and, while

issuing no orders on the subject, prohibited any order from me going out

of the adjutant-general's office until he had approved it. This was

done by directing the adjutant-general to hold any orders that came from

me to be issued from the adjutant-general's office until he had examined

them and given his approval. He never disturbed himself, either, in

examining my orders until it was entirely convenient for him; so that

orders which I had prepared would often lie there three or four days

before he would sanction them. I remonstrated against this in writing,

and the Secretary apologetically restored me to my rightful position of

General-in-Chief of the Army. But he soon lapsed again and took control

much as before.

After the relief of Knoxville Sherman had proposed to Burnside that he

should go with him to drive Longstreet out of Tennessee; but Burnside

assured him that with the troops which had been brought by Granger, and

which were to be left, he would be amply prepared to dispose of

Longstreet without availing himself of this offer. As before stated

Sherman's command had left their camps north of the Tennessee, near

Chattanooga, with two days' rations in their haversacks, without coats

or blankets, and without many wagons, expecting to return to their camps

by the end of that time. The weather was now cold and they were

suffering, but still they were ready to make the further sacrifice, had

it been required, for the good of the cause which had brought them into

service. Sherman, having accomplished the object for which he was sent,

marched back leisurely to his old camp on the Tennessee River.

CHAPTER XLVI.

OPERATIONS IN MISSISSIPPI--LONGSTREET IN EAST TENNESSEE--COMMISSIONED

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL--COMMANDING THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES--FIRST

INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT LINCOLN.

Soon after his return from Knoxville I ordered Sherman to distribute his

forces from Stevenson to Decatur and thence north to Nashville; Sherman

suggested that he be permitted to go back to Mississippi, to the limits

of his own department and where most of his army still remained, for the

purpose of clearing out what Confederates might still be left on the

east bank of the Mississippi River to impede its navigation by our

boats. He expected also to have the co-operation of Banks to do the

same thing on the west shore. Of course I approved heartily.

About the 10th of January Sherman was back in Memphis, where Hurlbut

commanded, and got together his Memphis men, or ordered them collected

and sent to Vicksburg. He then went to Vicksburg and out to where

McPherson was in command, and had him organize his surplus troops so as

to give him about 20,000 men in all.

Sherman knew that General (Bishop) Polk was occupying Meridian with his

headquarters, and had two divisions of infantry with a considerable

force of cavalry scattered west of him. He determined, therefore, to

move directly upon Meridian.

I had sent some 2,500 cavalry under General Sooy Smith to Sherman's

department, and they had mostly arrived before Sherman got to Memphis.

Hurlbut had 7,000 cavalry, and Sherman ordered him to reinforce Smith so

as to give the latter a force of about 7,000 with which to go against

Forrest, who was then known to be south-east from Memphis. Smith was

ordered to move about the 1st of February.

While Sherman was waiting at Vicksburg for the arrival of Hurlbut with

his surplus men, he sent out scouts to ascertain the position and

strength of the enemy and to bring back all the information they could

gather. When these scouts returned it was through them that he got the

information of General Polk's being at Meridian, and of the strength and

disposition of his command.

Forrest had about 4,000 cavalry with him, composed of thoroughly

well-disciplined men, who under so able a leader were very effective.

Smith's command was nearly double that of Forrest, but not equal, man to

man, for the lack of a successful experience such as Forrest's men had

had. The fact is, troops who have fought a few battles and won, and

followed up their victories, improve upon what they were before to an

extent that can hardly be counted by percentage. The difference in

result is often decisive victory instead of inglorious defeat. This

same difference, too, is often due to the way troops are officered, and

for the particular kind of warfare which Forrest had carried on neither

army could present a more effective officer than he was.

Sherman got off on the 3d of February and moved out on his expedition,

meeting with no opposition whatever until he crossed the Big Black, and

with no great deal of opposition after that until he reached Jackson,

Mississippi. This latter place he reached on the 6th or 7th, Brandon on

the 8th, and Morton on the 9th. Up to this time he moved in two columns

to enable him to get a good supply of forage, etc., and expedite the

march. Here, however, there were indications of the concentration of

Confederate infantry, and he was obliged to keep his army close

together. He had no serious engagement; but he met some of the enemy

who destroyed a few of his wagons about Decatur, Mississippi, where, by

the way, Sherman himself came near being picked up.

He entered Meridian on the 14th of the month, the enemy having retreated

toward Demopolis, Alabama. He spent several days in Meridian in

thoroughly destroying the railroad to the north and south, and also for

the purpose of hearing from Sooy Smith, who he supposed had met Forrest

before this time and he hoped had gained a decisive victory because of a

superiority of numbers. Hearing nothing of him, however, he started on

his return trip to Vicksburg. There he learned that Smith, while

waiting for a few of his men who had been ice-bound in the Ohio River,

instead of getting off on the 1st as expected, had not left until the

11th. Smith did meet Forrest, but the result was decidedly in Forrest's

favor.

Sherman had written a letter to Banks, proposing a co-operative movement

with him against Shreveport, subject to my approval. I disapproved of

Sherman's going himself, because I had other important work for him to

do, but consented that he might send a few troops to the aid of Banks,

though their time to remain absent must be limited. We must have them

for the spring campaign. The trans-Mississippi movement proved

abortive.

My eldest son, who had accompanied me on the Vicksburg campaign and

siege, had while there contracted disease, which grew worse, until he

had grown so dangerously ill that on the 24th of January I obtained

permission to go to St. Louis, where he was staying at the time, to see

him, hardly expecting to find him alive on my arrival. While I was

permitted to go, I was not permitted to turn over my command to any one

else, but was directed to keep the headquarters with me and to

communicate regularly with all parts of my division and with Washington,

just as though I had remained at Nashville.

When I obtained this leave I was at Chattanooga, having gone there again

to make preparations to have the troops of Thomas in the southern part

of Tennessee co-operate with Sherman's movement in Mississippi. I

directed Thomas, and Logan who was at Scottsboro, Alabama, to keep up a

threatening movement to the south against J. E. Johnston, who had again

relieved Bragg, for the purpose of making him keep as many troops as

possible there.

I learned through Confederate sources that Johnston had already sent two

divisions in the direction of Mobile, presumably to operate against

Sherman, and two more divisions to Longstreet in East Tennessee. Seeing

that Johnston had depleted in this way, I directed Thomas to send at

least ten thousand men, besides Stanley's division which was already to

the east, into East Tennessee, and notified Schofield, who was now in

command in East Tennessee, of this movement of troops into his

department and also of the reinforcements Longstreet had received. My

object was to drive Longstreet out of East Tennessee as a part of the

preparations for my spring campaign.

About this time General Foster, who had been in command of the

Department of the Ohio after Burnside until Schofield relieved him

(*21), advised me that he thought it would be a good thing to keep

Longstreet just where he was; that he was perfectly quiet in East

Tennessee, and if he was forced to leave there, his whole well-equipped

army would be free to go to any place where it could effect the most for

their cause. I thought the advice was good, and, adopting that view,

countermanded the orders for pursuit of Longstreet.

On the 12th of February I ordered Thomas to take Dalton and hold it, if

possible; and I directed him to move without delay. Finding that he had

not moved, on the 17th I urged him again to start, telling him how

important it was, that the object of the movement was to co-operate with

Sherman, who was moving eastward and might be in danger. Then again on

the 21st, he not yet having started, I asked him if he could not start

the next day. He finally got off on the 22d or 23d. The enemy fell

back from his front without a battle, but took a new position quite as

strong and farther to the rear. Thomas reported that he could not go

any farther, because it was impossible with his poor teams, nearly

starved, to keep up supplies until the railroads were repaired. He soon

fell back.

Schofield also had to return for the same reason. He could not carry

supplies with him, and Longstreet was between him and the supplies still

left in the country. Longstreet, in his retreat, would be moving

towards his supplies, while our forces, following, would be receding

from theirs. On the 2d of March, however, I learned of Sherman's

success, which eased my mind very much. The next day, the 3d, I was

ordered to Washington.

The bill restoring the grade of lieutenant-general of the army had

passed through Congress and became a law on the 26th of February. My

nomination had been sent to the Senate on the 1st of March and confirmed

the next day (the 2d). I was ordered to Washington on the 3d to receive

my commission, and started the day following that. The commission was

handed to me on the 9th. It was delivered to me at the Executive

Mansion by President Lincoln in the presence of his Cabinet, my eldest

son, those of my staff who were with me and and a few other visitors.

The President in presenting my commission read from a paper--stating,

however, as a preliminary, and prior to the delivery of it, that he had

drawn that up on paper, knowing my disinclination to speak in public,

and handed me a copy in advance so that I might prepare a few lines of

reply. The President said:

"General Grant, the nation's appreciation of what you have done, and its

reliance upon you for what remains to be done in the existing great

struggle, are now presented, with this commission constituting you

lieutenant-general in the Army of the United States. With this high

honor, devolves upon you, also, a corresponding responsibility. As the

country herein trusts you, so, under God, it will sustain you. I

scarcely need to add, that, with what I here speak for the nation, goes

my own hearty personal concurrence."

To this I replied: "Mr. President, I accept the commission, with

gratitude for the high honor conferred. With the aid of the noble

armies that have fought in so many fields for our common country, it

will be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint your expectations. I feel

the full weight of the responsibilities now devolving on me; and I know

that if they are met, it will be due to those armies, and above all, to

the favor of that Providence which leads both nations and men."

On the 10th I visited the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac at

Brandy Station; then returned to Washington, and pushed west at once to

make my arrangements for turning over the commands there and giving

general directions for the preparations to be made for the spring

campaign.

It had been my intention before this to remain in the West, even if I

was made lieutenant-general; but when I got to Washington and saw the

situation it was plain that here was the point for the commanding

general to be. No one else could, probably, resist the pressure that

would be brought to bear upon him to desist from his own plans and

pursue others. I determined, therefore, before I started back to have

Sherman advanced to my late position, McPherson to Sherman's in command

of the department, and Logan to the command of McPherson's corps. These

changes were all made on my recommendation and without hesitation. My

commission as lieutenant-general was given to me on the 9th of March,

1864. On the following day, as already stated, I visited General Meade,

commanding the Army of the Potomac, at his headquarters at Brandy

Station, north of the Rapidan. I had known General Meade slightly in

the Mexican war, but had not met him since until this visit. I was a

stranger to most of the Army of the Potomac, I might say to all except

the officers of the regular army who had served in the Mexican war.

There had been some changes ordered in the organization of that army

before my promotion. One was the consolidation of five corps into

three, thus throwing some officers of rank out of important commands.

Meade evidently thought that I might want to make still one more change

not yet ordered. He said to me that I might want an officer who had

served with me in the West, mentioning Sherman specially, to take his

place. If so, he begged me not to hesitate about making the change. He

urged that the work before us was of such vast importance to the whole

nation that the feeling or wishes of no one person should stand in the

way of selecting the right men for all positions. For himself, he would

serve to the best of his ability wherever placed. I assured him that I

had no thought of substituting any one for him. As to Sherman, he could

not be spared from the West.

This incident gave me even a more favorable opinion of Meade than did

his great victory at Gettysburg the July before. It is men who wait to

be selected, and not those who seek, from whom we may always expect the

most efficient service.

Meade's position afterwards proved embarrassing to me if not to him. He

was commanding an army and, for nearly a year previous to my taking

command of all the armies, was in supreme command of the Army of the

Potomac--except from the authorities at Washington. All other general

officers occupying similar positions were independent in their commands

so far as any one present with them was concerned. I tried to make

General Meade's position as nearly as possible what it would have been

if I had been in Washington or any other place away from his command. I

therefore gave all orders for the movements of the Army of the Potomac

to Meade to have them executed. To avoid the necessity of having to

give orders direct, I established my headquarters near his, unless there

were reasons for locating them elsewhere. This sometimes happened, and

I had on occasions to give orders direct to the troops affected. On the

11th I returned to Washington and, on the day after, orders were

published by the War Department placing me in command of all the armies.

I had left Washington the night before to return to my old command in

the West and to meet Sherman whom I had telegraphed to join me in

Nashville.

Sherman assumed command of the military division of the Mississippi on

the 18th of March, and we left Nashville together for Cincinnati. I had

Sherman accompany me that far on my way back to Washington so that we

could talk over the matters about which I wanted to see him, without

losing any more time from my new command than was necessary. The first

point which I wished to discuss was particularly about the co-operation

of his command with mine when the spring campaign should commence. There

were also other and minor points, minor as compared with the great

importance of the question to be decided by sanguinary war--the

restoration to duty of officers who had been relieved from important

commands, namely McClellan, Burnside and Fremont in the East, and Buell,

McCook, Negley and Crittenden in the West.

Some time in the winter of 1863-64 I had been invited by the

general-in-chief to give my views of the campaign I thought advisable

for the command under me--now Sherman's. General J. E. Johnston was

defending Atlanta and the interior of Georgia with an army, the largest

part of which was stationed at Dalton, about 38 miles south of

Chattanooga. Dalton is at the junction of the railroad from Cleveland

with the one from Chattanooga to Atlanta.

There could have been no difference of opinion as to the first duty of

the armies of the military division of the Mississippi. Johnston's army

was the first objective, and that important railroad centre, Atlanta,

the second. At the time I wrote General Halleck giving my views of the

approaching campaign, and at the time I met General Sherman, it was

expected that General Banks would be through with the campaign which he

had been ordered upon before my appointment to the command of all the

armies, and would be ready to co-operate with the armies east of the

Mississippi, his part in the programme being to move upon Mobile by land

while the navy would close the harbor and assist to the best of its

ability. (*22) The plan therefore was for Sherman to attack Johnston and

destroy his army if possible, to capture Atlanta and hold it, and with

his troops and those of Banks to hold a line through to Mobile, or at

least to hold Atlanta and command the railroad running east and west,

and the troops from one or other of the armies to hold important points

on the southern road, the only east and west road that would be left in

the possession of the enemy. This would cut the Confederacy in two

again, as our gaining possession of the Mississippi River had done

before. Banks was not ready in time for the part assigned to him, and

circumstances that could not be foreseen determined the campaign which

was afterwards made, the success and grandeur of which has resounded

throughout all lands.

In regard to restoring officers who had been relieved from important

commands to duty again, I left Sherman to look after those who had been

removed in the West while I looked out for the rest. I directed,

however, that he should make no assignment until I could speak to the

Secretary of War about the matter. I shortly after recommended to the

Secretary the assignment of General Buell to duty. I received the

assurance that duty would be offered to him; and afterwards the

Secretary told me that he had offered Buell an assignment and that the

latter had declined it, saying that it would be degradation to accept

the assignment offered. I understood afterwards that he refused to

serve under either Sherman or Canby because he had ranked them both.

Both graduated before him and ranked him in the old army. Sherman

ranked him as a brigadier-general. All of them ranked me in the old

army, and Sherman and Buell did as brigadiers. The worst excuse a

soldier can make for declining service is that he once ranked the

commander he is ordered to report to.

On the 23d of March I was back in Washington, and on the 26th took up my

headquarters at Culpeper Court-House, a few miles south of the

headquarters of the Army of the Potomac.

Although hailing from Illinois myself, the State of the President, I

never met Mr. Lincoln until called to the capital to receive my

commission as lieutenant-general. I knew him, however, very well and

favorably from the accounts given by officers under me at the West who

had known him all their lives. I had also read the remarkable series of

debates between Lincoln and Douglas a few years before, when they were

rival candidates for the United States Senate. I was then a resident of

Missouri, and by no means a "Lincoln man" in that contest; but I

recognized then his great ability.

In my first interview with Mr. Lincoln alone he stated to me that he had

never professed to be a military man or to know how campaigns should be

conducted, and never wanted to interfere in them: but that

procrastination on the part of commanders, and the pressure from the

people at the North and Congress, WHICH WAS ALWAYS WITH HIM, forced him

into issuing his series of "Military Orders"--one, two, three, etc. He

did not know but they were all wrong, and did know that some of them

were. All he wanted or had ever wanted was some one who would take the

responsibility and act, and call on him for all the assistance needed,

pledging himself to use all the power of the government in rendering

such assistance. Assuring him that I would do the best I could with the

means at hand, and avoid as far as possible annoying him or the War

Department, our first interview ended.

The Secretary of War I had met once before only, but felt that I knew

him better.

While commanding in West Tennessee we had occasionally held

conversations over the wires, at night, when they were not being

otherwise used. He and General Halleck both cautioned me against giving

the President my plans of campaign, saying that he was so kind-hearted,

so averse to refusing anything asked of him, that some friend would be

sure to get from him all he knew. I should have said that in our

interview the President told me he did not want to know what I proposed

to do. But he submitted a plan of campaign of his own which he wanted

me to hear and then do as I pleased about. He brought out a map of

Virginia on which he had evidently marked every position occupied by the

Federal and Confederate armies up to that time. He pointed out on the

map two streams which empty into the Potomac, and suggested that the

army might be moved on boats and landed between the mouths of these

streams. We would then have the Potomac to bring our supplies, and the

tributaries would protect our flanks while we moved out. I listened

respectfully, but did not suggest that the same streams would protect

Lee's flanks while he was shutting us up.

I did not communicate my plans to the President, nor did I to the

Secretary of War or to General Halleck.

March the 26th my headquarters were, as stated, at Culpeper, and the

work of preparing for an early campaign commenced.

CHAPTER XLVII.

THE MILITARY SITUATION--PLANS FOR THE CAMPAIGN--SHERIDAN ASSIGNED TO

COMMAND OF THE CAVALRY--FLANK MOVEMENTS--FORREST AT FORT PILLOW--GENERAL

BANKS'S EXPEDITION--COLONEL MOSBY--AN INCIDENT OF THE WILDERNESS

CAMPAIGN.

When I assumed command of all the armies the situation was about this:

the Mississippi River was guarded from St. Louis to its mouth; the line

of the Arkansas was held, thus giving us all the North-west north of

that river. A few points in Louisiana not remote from the river were

held by the Federal troops, as was also the mouth of the Rio Grande.

East of the Mississippi we held substantially all north of the Memphis

and Charleston Railroad as far east as Chattanooga, thence along the

line of the Tennessee and Holston rivers, taking in nearly all of the

State of Tennessee. West Virginia was in our hands; and that part of

old Virginia north of the Rapidan and east of the Blue Ridge we also

held. On the sea-coast we had Fortress Monroe and Norfolk in Virginia;

Plymouth, Washington and New Berne in North Carolina; Beaufort, Folly

and Morris islands, Hilton Head, Port Royal and Fort Pulaski in South

Carolina and Georgia; Fernandina, St. Augustine, Key West and Pensacola

in Florida. The balance of the Southern territory, an empire in extent,

was still in the hands of the enemy.

Sherman, who had succeeded me in the command of the military division of

the Mississippi, commanded all the troops in the territory west of the

Alleghanies and north of Natchez, with a large movable force about

Chattanooga. His command was subdivided into four departments, but the

commanders all reported to Sherman and were subject to his orders. This

arrangement, however, insured the better protection of all lines of

communication through the acquired territory, for the reason that these

different department commanders could act promptly in case of a sudden

or unexpected raid within their respective jurisdictions without

awaiting the orders of the division commander.

In the East the opposing forces stood in substantially the same

relations towards each other as three years before, or when the war

began; they were both between the Federal and Confederate capitals. It

is true, footholds had been secured by us on the sea-coast, in Virginia

and North Carolina, but, beyond that, no substantial advantage had been

gained by either side. Battles had been fought of as great severity as

had ever been known in war, over ground from the James River and

Chickahominy, near Richmond, to Gettysburg and Chambersburg, in

Pennsylvania, with indecisive results, sometimes favorable to the

National army, sometimes to the Confederate army; but in every instance,

I believe, claimed as victories for the South by the Southern press if

not by the Southern generals. The Northern press, as a whole, did not

discourage these claims; a portion of it always magnified rebel success

and belittled ours, while another portion, most sincerely earnest in

their desire for the preservation of the Union and the overwhelming

success of the Federal armies, would nevertheless generally express

dissatisfaction with whatever victories were gained because they were

not more complete.

That portion of the Army of the Potomac not engaged in guarding lines of

communication was on the northern bank of the Rapidan. The Army of

Northern Virginia confronting it on the opposite bank of the same river,

was strongly intrenched and commanded by the acknowledged ablest general

in the Confederate army. The country back to the James River is cut up

with many streams, generally narrow, deep, and difficult to cross except

where bridged. The region is heavily timbered, and the roads narrow,

and very bad after the least rain. Such an enemy was not, of course,

unprepared with adequate fortifications at convenient intervals all the

way back to Richmond, so that when driven from one fortified position

they would always have another farther to the rear to fall back into.

To provision an army, campaigning against so formidable a foe through

such a country, from wagons alone seemed almost impossible. System and

discipline were both essential to its accomplishment.

The Union armies were now divided into nineteen departments, though four

of them in the West had been concentrated into a single military

division. The Army of the Potomac was a separate command and had no

territorial limits. There were thus seventeen distinct commanders.

Before this time these various armies had acted separately and

independently of each other, giving the enemy an opportunity often of

depleting one command, not pressed, to reinforce another more actively

engaged. I determined to stop this. To this end I regarded the Army of

the Potomac as the centre, and all west to Memphis along the line

described as our position at the time, and north of it, the right wing;

the Army of the James, under General Butler, as the left wing, and all

the troops south, as a force in rear of the enemy. Some of these latter

were occupying positions from which they could not render service

proportionate to their numerical strength. All such were depleted to

the minimum necessary to hold their positions as a guard against

blockade runners; where they could not do this their positions were

abandoned altogether. In this way ten thousand men were added to the

Army of the James from South Carolina alone, with General Gillmore in

command. It was not contemplated that General Gillmore should leave his

department; but as most of his troops were taken, presumably for active

service, he asked to accompany them and was permitted to do so.

Officers and soldiers on furlough, of whom there were many thousands,

were ordered to their proper commands; concentration was the order of

the day, and to have it accomplished in time to advance at the earliest

moment the roads would permit was the problem.

As a reinforcement to the Army of the Potomac, or to act in support of

it, the 9th army corps, over twenty thousand strong, under General

Burnside, had been rendezvoused at Annapolis, Maryland. This was an

admirable position for such a reinforcement. The corps could be brought

at the last moment as a reinforcement to the Army of the Potomac, or it

could be thrown on the sea-coast, south of Norfolk, in Virginia or North

Carolina, to operate against Richmond from that direction. In fact

Burnside and the War Department both thought the 9th corps was intended

for such an expedition up to the last moment.

My general plan now was to concentrate all the force possible against

the Confederate armies in the field. There were but two such, as we

have seen, east of the Mississippi River and facing north. The Army of

Northern Virginia, General Robert E. Lee commanding, was on the south

bank of the Rapidan, confronting the Army of the Potomac; the second,

under General Joseph E. Johnston, was at Dalton, Georgia, opposed to

Sherman who was still at Chattanooga. Beside these main armies the

Confederates had to guard the Shenandoah Valley, a great storehouse to

feed their armies from, and their line of communications from Richmond

to Tennessee. Forrest, a brave and intrepid cavalry general, was in the

West with a large force; making a larger command necessary to hold what

we had gained in Middle and West Tennessee. We could not abandon any

territory north of the line held by the enemy because it would lay the

Northern States open to invasion. But as the Army of the Potomac was

the principal garrison for the protection of Washington even while it

was moving on Lee, so all the forces to the west, and the Army of the

James, guarded their special trusts when advancing from them as well as

when remaining at them. Better indeed, for they forced the enemy to

guard his own lines and resources at a greater distance from ours, and

with a greater force. Little expeditions could not so well be sent out

to destroy a bridge or tear up a few miles of railroad track, burn a

storehouse, or inflict other little annoyances. Accordingly I arranged

for a simultaneous movement all along the line. Sherman was to move

from Chattanooga, Johnston's army and Atlanta being his objective

points. (*23) Crook, commanding in West Virginia, was to move from the

mouth of the Gauley River with a cavalry force and some artillery, the

Virginia and Tennessee Railroad to be his objective. Either the enemy

would have to keep a large force to protect their communications, or see

them destroyed and a large amount of forage and provision, which they so

much needed, fall into our hands. Sigel was in command in the Valley of

Virginia. He was to advance up the valley, covering the North from an

invasion through that channel as well while advancing as by remaining

near Harper's Ferry. Every mile he advanced also gave us possession of

stores on which Lee relied. Butler was to advance by the James River,

having Richmond and Petersburg as his objective.

Before the advance commenced I visited Butler at Fort Monroe. This was

the first time I had ever met him. Before giving him any order as to

the part he was to play in the approaching campaign I invited his views.

They were very much such as I intended to direct, and as I did direct

(*24), in writing, before leaving.

General W. F. Smith, who had been promoted to the rank of major-general

shortly after the battle of Chattanooga on my recommendation, had not

yet been confirmed. I found a decided prejudice against his

confirmation by a majority of the Senate, but I insisted that his

services had been such that he should be rewarded. My wishes were now

reluctantly complied with, and I assigned him to the command of one of

the corps under General Butler. I was not long in finding out that the

objections to Smith's promotion were well founded.

In one of my early interviews with the President I expressed my

dissatisfaction with the little that had been accomplished by the

cavalry so far in the war, and the belief that it was capable of

accomplishing much more than it had done if under a thorough leader. I

said I wanted the very best man in the army for that command. Halleck

was present and spoke up, saying: "How would Sheridan do?" I replied:

"The very man I want." The President said I could have anybody I wanted.

Sheridan was telegraphed for that day, and on his arrival was assigned

to the command of the cavalry corps with the Army of the Potomac. This

relieved General Alfred Pleasonton. It was not a reflection on that

officer, however, for I did not know but that he had been as efficient

as any other cavalry commander.

Banks in the Department of the Gulf was ordered to assemble all the

troops he had at New Orleans in time to join in the general move, Mobile

to be his objective.

At this time I was not entirely decided as to whether I should move the

Army of the Potomac by the right flank of the enemy, or by his left.

Each plan presented advantages. (*25) If by his right--my left--the

Potomac, Chesapeake Bay and tributaries would furnish us an easy hauling

distance of every position the army could occupy from the Rapidan to the

James River. But Lee could, if he chose, detach or move his whole army

north on a line rather interior to the one I would have to take in

following. A movement by his left--our right--would obviate this; but

all that was done would have to be done with the supplies and ammunition

we started with. All idea of adopting this latter plan was abandoned

when the limited quantity of supplies possible to take with us was

considered. The country over which we would have to pass was so

exhausted of all food or forage that we would be obliged to carry

everything with us.

While these preparations were going on the enemy was not entirely idle.

In the West Forrest made a raid in West Tennessee up to the northern

border, capturing the garrison of four or five hundred men at Union

City, and followed it up by an attack on Paducah, Kentucky, on the banks

of the Ohio. While he was able to enter the city he failed to capture

the forts or any part of the garrison. On the first intelligence of

Forrest's raid I telegraphed Sherman to send all his cavalry against

him, and not to let him get out of the trap he had put himself into.

Sherman had anticipated me by sending troops against him before he got

my order.

Forrest, however, fell back rapidly, and attacked the troops at Fort

Pillow, a station for the protection of the navigation of the

Mississippi River. The garrison consisted of a regiment of colored

troops, infantry, and a detachment of Tennessee cavalry. These troops

fought bravely, but were overpowered. I will leave Forrest in his

dispatches to tell what he did with them.

"The river was dyed," he says, "with the blood of the slaughtered for

two hundred yards. The approximate loss was upward of five hundred

killed, but few of the officers escaping. My loss was about twenty

killed. It is hoped that these facts will demonstrate to the Northern

people that negro soldiers cannot cope with Southerners." Subsequently

Forrest made a report in which he left out the part which shocks

humanity to read.

At the East, also, the rebels were busy. I had said to Halleck that

Plymouth and Washington, North Carolina, were unnecessary to hold. It

would be better to have the garrisons engaged there added to Butler's

command. If success attended our arms both places, and others too,

would fall into our hands naturally. These places had been occupied by

Federal troops before I took command of the armies, and I knew that the

Executive would be reluctant to abandon them, and therefore explained my

views; but before my views were carried out the rebels captured the

garrison at Plymouth. I then ordered the abandonment of Washington, but

directed the holding of New Berne at all hazards. This was essential

because New Berne was a port into which blockade runners could enter.

General Banks had gone on an expedition up the Red River long before my

promotion to general command. I had opposed the movement strenuously,

but acquiesced because it was the order of my superior at the time. By

direction of Halleck I had reinforced Banks with a corps of about ten

thousand men from Sherman's command. This reinforcement was wanted back

badly before the forward movement commenced. But Banks had got so far

that it seemed best that he should take Shreveport on the Red River, and

turn over the line of that river to Steele, who commanded in Arkansas,

to hold instead of the line of the Arkansas. Orders were given

accordingly, and with the expectation that the campaign would be ended

in time for Banks to return A. J. Smith's command to where it belonged

and get back to New Orleans himself in time to execute his part in the

general plan. But the expedition was a failure. Banks did not get back

in time to take part in the programme as laid down. Nor was Smith

returned until long after the movements of May, 1864, had been begun.

The services of forty thousand veteran troops, over and above the number

required to hold all that was necessary in the Department of the Gulf,

were thus paralyzed. It is but just to Banks, however, to say that his

expedition was ordered from Washington and he was in no way responsible

except for the conduct of it. I make no criticism on this point. He

opposed the expedition.

By the 27th of April spring had so far advanced as to justify me in

fixing a day for the great move. On that day Burnside left Annapolis to

occupy Meade's position between Bull Run and the Rappahannock. Meade

was notified and directed to bring his troops forward to his advance.

On the following day Butler was notified of my intended advance on the

4th of May, and he was directed to move the night of the same day and

get as far up the James River as possible by daylight, and push on from

there to accomplish the task given him. He was also notified that

reinforcements were being collected in Washington City, which would be

forwarded to him should the enemy fall back into the trenches at

Richmond. The same day Sherman was directed to get his forces up ready

to advance on the 5th. Sigel was in Winchester and was notified to move

in conjunction with the others.

The criticism has been made by writers on the campaign from the Rapidan

to the James River that all the loss of life could have been obviated by

moving the army there on transports. Richmond was fortified and

intrenched so perfectly that one man inside to defend was more than

equal to five outside besieging or assaulting. To get possession of

Lee's army was the first great object. With the capture of his army

Richmond would necessarily follow. It was better to fight him outside

of his stronghold than in it. If the Army of the Potomac had been moved

bodily to the James River by water Lee could have moved a part of his

forces back to Richmond, called Beauregard from the south to reinforce

it, and with the balance moved on to Washington. Then, too, I ordered a

move, simultaneous with that of the Army of the Potomac, up the James

River by a formidable army already collected at the mouth of the river.

While my headquarters were at Culpeper, from the 26th of March to the

4th of May, I generally visited Washington once a week to confer with

the Secretary of War and President. On the last occasion, a few days

before moving, a circumstance occurred which came near postponing my

part in the campaign altogether. Colonel John S. Mosby had for a long

time been commanding a partisan corps, or regiment, which operated in

the rear of the Army of the Potomac. On my return to the field on this

occasion, as the train approached Warrenton Junction, a heavy cloud of

dust was seen to the east of the road as if made by a body of cavalry on

a charge. Arriving at the junction the train was stopped and inquiries

made as to the cause of the dust. There was but one man at the station,

and he informed us that Mosby had crossed a few minutes before at full

speed in pursuit of Federal cavalry. Had he seen our train coming, no

doubt he would have let his prisoners escape to capture the train. I

was on a special train, if I remember correctly, without any guard.

Since the close of the war I have come to know Colonel Mosby personally,

and somewhat intimately. He is a different man entirely from what I had

supposed. He is slender, not tall, wiry, and looks as if he could

endure any amount of physical exercise. He is able, and thoroughly

honest and truthful. There were probably but few men in the South who

could have commanded successfully a separate detachment in the rear of

an opposing army, and so near the border of hostilities, as long as he

did without losing his entire command.

On this same visit to Washington I had my last interview with the

President before reaching the James River. He had of course become

acquainted with the fact that a general movement had been ordered all

along the line, and seemed to think it a new feature in war. I

explained to him that it was necessary to have a great number of troops

to guard and hold the territory we had captured, and to prevent

incursions into the Northern States. These troops could perform this

service just as well by advancing as by remaining still; and by

advancing they would compel the enemy to keep detachments to hold them

back, or else lay his own territory open to invasion. His answer was:

"Oh, yes! I see that. As we say out West, if a man can't skin he must

hold a leg while somebody else does."

There was a certain incident connected with the Wilderness campaign of

which it may not be out of place to speak; and to avoid a digression

further on I will mention it here.

A few days before my departure from Culpeper the Honorable E. B.

Washburne visited me there, and remained with my headquarters for some

distance south, through the battle in the Wilderness and, I think, to

Spottsylvania. He was accompanied by a Mr. Swinton, whom he presented as

a literary gentleman who wished to accompany the army with a view of

writing a history of the war when it was over. He assured me--and I

have no doubt Swinton gave him the assurance--that he was not present as

a correspondent of the press. I expressed an entire willingness to have

him (Swinton) accompany the army, and would have allowed him to do so as

a correspondent, restricted, however, in the character of the

information he could give. We received Richmond papers with about as

much regularity as if there had been no war, and knew that our papers

were received with equal regularity by the Confederates. It was

desirable, therefore, that correspondents should not be privileged spies

of the enemy within our lines.

Probably Mr. Swinton expected to be an invited guest at my headquarters,

and was disappointed that he was not asked to become so. At all events

he was not invited, and soon I found that he was corresponding with some

paper (I have now forgotten which one), thus violating his word either

expressed or implied. He knew of the assurance Washburne had given as

to the character of his mission. I never saw the man from the day of

our introduction to the present that I recollect. He accompanied us,

however, for a time at least.

The second night after crossing the Rapidan (the night of the 5th of

May) Colonel W. R. Rowley, of my staff, was acting as night officer at

my headquarters. A short time before midnight I gave him verbal

instructions for the night. Three days later I read in a Richmond paper

a verbatim report of these instructions.

A few nights still later (after the first, and possibly after the

second, day's fighting in the Wilderness) General Meade came to my tent

for consultation, bringing with him some of his staff officers. Both

his staff and mine retired to the camp-fire some yards in front of the

tent, thinking our conversation should be private. There was a stump a

little to one side, and between the front of the tent and camp-fire.

One of my staff, Colonel T. S. Bowers, saw what he took to be a man

seated on the ground and leaning against the stump, listening to the

conversation between Meade and myself. He called the attention of

Colonel Rowley to it. The latter immediately took the man by the

shoulder and asked him, in language more forcible than polite, what he

was doing there. The man proved to be Swinton, the "historian," and his

replies to the question were evasive and unsatisfactory, and he was

warned against further eaves-dropping.

The next I heard of Mr. Swinton was at Cold Harbor. General Meade came

to my headquarters saying that General Burnside had arrested Swinton,

who at some previous time had given great offence, and had ordered him

to be shot that afternoon. I promptly ordered the prisoner to be

released, but that he must be expelled from the lines of the army not to

return again on pain of punishment.

CHAPTER XLVIII.

COMMENCEMENT OF THE GRAND CAMPAIGN--GENERAL BUTLER'S POSITION

--SHERIDAN'S FIRST RAID.

The armies were now all ready to move for the accomplishment of a single

object. They were acting as a unit so far as such a thing was possible

over such a vast field. Lee, with the capital of the Confederacy, was

the main end to which all were working. Johnston, with Atlanta, was an

important obstacle in the way of our accomplishing the result aimed at,

and was therefore almost an independent objective. It was of less

importance only because the capture of Johnston and his army would not

produce so immediate and decisive a result in closing the rebellion as

would the possession of Richmond, Lee and his army. All other troops

were employed exclusively in support of these two movements. This was

the plan; and I will now endeavor to give, as concisely as I can, the

method of its execution, outlining first the operations of minor

detached but co-operative columns.

As stated before, Banks failed to accomplish what he had been sent to do

on the Red River, and eliminated the use of forty thousand veterans

whose cooperation in the grand campaign had been expected--ten thousand

with Sherman and thirty thousand against Mobile.

Sigel's record is almost equally brief. He moved out, it is true,

according to programme; but just when I was hoping to hear of good work

being done in the valley I received instead the following announcement

from Halleck: "Sigel is in full retreat on Strasburg. He will do

nothing but run; never did anything else." The enemy had intercepted

him about New Market and handled him roughly, leaving him short six

guns, and some nine hundred men out of his six thousand.

The plan had been for an advance of Sigel's forces in two columns.

Though the one under his immediate command failed ingloriously the other

proved more fortunate. Under Crook and Averell his western column

advanced from the Gauley in West Virginia at the appointed time, and

with more happy results. They reached the Virginia and Tennessee

Railroad at Dublin and destroyed a depot of supplies, besides tearing up

several miles of road and burning the bridge over New River. Having

accomplished this they recrossed the Alleghanies to Meadow Bluffs and

there awaited further orders.

Butler embarked at Fort Monroe with all his command, except the cavalry

and some artillery which moved up the south bank of the James River.

His steamers moved first up Chesapeake Bay and York River as if

threatening the rear of Lee's army. At midnight they turned back, and

Butler by daylight was far up the James River. He seized City Point and

Bermuda Hundred early in the day, without loss and, no doubt, very much

to the surprise of the enemy.

This was the accomplishment of the first step contemplated in my

instructions to Butler. He was to act from here, looking to Richmond as

his objective point. I had given him to understand that I should aim to

fight Lee between the Rapidan and Richmond if he would stand; but should

Lee fall back into Richmond I would follow up and make a junction of the

armies of the Potomac and the James on the James River. He was directed

to secure a footing as far up the south side of the river as he could at

as early a date as possible.

Butler was in position by the 6th of May and had begun intrenching, and

on the 7th he sent out his cavalry from Suffolk to cut the Weldon

Railroad. He also sent out detachments to destroy the railroad between

Petersburg and Richmond, but no great success attended these latter

efforts. He made no great effort to establish himself on that road and

neglected to attack Petersburg, which was almost defenceless. About the

11th he advanced slowly until he reached the works at Drury's Bluff,

about half way between Bermuda Hundred and Richmond. In the mean time

Beauregard had been gathering reinforcements. On the 16th he attacked

Butler with great vigor, and with such success as to limit very

materially the further usefulness of the Army of the James as a distinct

factor in the campaign. I afterward ordered a portion of it to join the

Army of the Potomac, leaving a sufficient force with Butler to man his

works, hold securely the footing he had already gained and maintain a

threatening front toward the rear of the Confederate capital.

The position which General Butler had chosen between the two rivers, the

James and Appomattox, was one of great natural strength, one where a

large area of ground might be thoroughly inclosed by means of a single

intrenched line, and that a very short one in comparison with the extent

of territory which it thoroughly protected. His right was protected by

the James River, his left by the Appomattox, and his rear by their

junction--the two streams uniting near by. The bends of the two streams

shortened the line that had been chosen for intrenchments, while it

increased the area which the line inclosed.

Previous to ordering any troops from Butler I sent my chief engineer,

General Barnard, from the Army of the Potomac to that of the James to

inspect Butler's position and ascertain whether I could again safely

make an order for General Butler's movement in co-operation with mine,

now that I was getting so near Richmond; or, if I could not, whether his

position was strong enough to justify me in withdrawing some of his

troops and having them brought round by water to White House to join me

and reinforce the Army of the Potomac. General Barnard reported the

position very strong for defensive purposes, and that I could do the

latter with great security; but that General Butler could not move from

where he was, in co-operation, to produce any effect. He said that the

general occupied a place between the James and Appomattox rivers which

was of great strength, and where with an inferior force he could hold it

for an indefinite length of time against a superior; but that he could

do nothing offensively. I then asked him why Butler could not move out

from his lines and push across the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad to

the rear and on the south side of Richmond. He replied that it was

impracticable, because the enemy had substantially the same line across

the neck of land that General Butler had. He then took out his pencil

and drew a sketch of the locality, remarking that the position was like

a bottle and that Butler's line of intrenchments across the neck

represented the cork; that the enemy had built an equally strong line

immediately in front of him across the neck; and it was therefore as if

Butler was in a bottle. He was perfectly safe against an attack; but,

as Barnard expressed it, the enemy had corked the bottle and with a

small force could hold the cork in its place. This struck me as being

very expressive of his position, particularly when I saw the hasty

sketch which General Barnard had drawn; and in making my subsequent

report I used that expression without adding quotation marks, never

thinking that anything had been said that would attract attention--as

this did, very much to the annoyance, no doubt, of General Butler and, I

know, very much to my own. I found afterwards that this was mentioned

in the notes of General Badeau's book, which, when they were shown to

me, I asked to have stricken out; yet it was retained there, though

against my wishes.

I make this statement here because, although I have often made it

before, it has never been in my power until now to place it where it

will correct history; and I desire to rectify all injustice that I may

have done to individuals, particularly to officers who were gallantly

serving their country during the trying period of the war for the

preservation of the Union. General Butler certainly gave his very

earnest support to the war; and he gave his own best efforts personally

to the suppression of the rebellion.

The further operations of the Army of the James can best be treated of

in connection with those of the Army of the Potomac, the two being so

intimately associated and connected as to be substantially one body in

which the individuality of the supporting wing is merged.

Before giving the reader a summary of Sherman's great Atlanta campaign,

which must conclude my description of the various co-operative movements

preparatory to proceeding with that of the operations of the centre, I

will briefly mention Sheridan's first raid upon Lee's communications

which, though an incident of the operations on the main line and not

specifically marked out in the original plan, attained in its brilliant

execution and results all the proportions of an independent campaign.

By thus anticipating, in point of time, I will be able to more perfectly

observe the continuity of events occurring in my immediate front when I

shall have undertaken to describe our advance from the Rapidan.

On the 8th of May, just after the battle of the Wilderness and when we

were moving on Spottsylvania I directed Sheridan verbally to cut loose

from the Army of the Potomac, pass around the left of Lee's army and

attack his cavalry: to cut the two roads--one running west through

Gordonsville, Charlottesville and Lynchburg, the other to Richmond, and,

when compelled to do so for want of forage and rations, to move on to

the James River and draw these from Butler's supplies. This move took

him past the entire rear of Lee's army. These orders were also given in

writing through Meade.

The object of this move was three-fold. First, if successfully

executed, and it was, he would annoy the enemy by cutting his line of

supplies and telegraphic communications, and destroy or get for his own

use supplies in store in the rear and coming up. Second, he would draw

the enemy's cavalry after him, and thus better protect our flanks, rear

and trains than by remaining with the army. Third, his absence would

save the trains drawing his forage and other supplies from

Fredericksburg, which had now become our base. He started at daylight

the next morning, and accomplished more than was expected. It was

sixteen days before he got back to the Army of the Potomac.

The course Sheridan took was directly to Richmond. Before night Stuart,

commanding the Confederate cavalry, came on to the rear of his command.

But the advance kept on, crossed the North Anna, and at Beaver Dam, a

station on the Virginia Central Railroad, recaptured four hundred Union

prisoners on their way to Richmond, destroyed the road and used and

destroyed a large amount of subsistence and medical stores.

Stuart, seeing that our cavalry was pushing towards Richmond, abandoned

the pursuit on the morning of the 10th and, by a detour and an

exhausting march, interposed between Sheridan and Richmond at Yellow

Tavern, only about six miles north of the city. Sheridan destroyed the

railroad and more supplies at Ashland, and on the 11th arrived in

Stuart's front. A severe engagement ensued in which the losses were

heavy on both sides, but the rebels were beaten, their leader mortally

wounded, and some guns and many prisoners were captured.

Sheridan passed through the outer defences of Richmond, and could, no

doubt, have passed through the inner ones. But having no supports near

he could not have remained. After caring for his wounded he struck for

the James River below the city, to communicate with Butler and to rest

his men and horses as well as to get food and forage for them.

He moved first between the Chickahominy and the James, but in the

morning (the 12th) he was stopped by batteries at Mechanicsville. He

then turned to cross to the north side of the Chickahominy by Meadow

Bridge. He found this barred, and the defeated Confederate cavalry,

reorganized, occupying the opposite side. The panic created by his

first entrance within the outer works of Richmond having subsided troops

were sent out to attack his rear.

He was now in a perilous position, one from which but few generals could

have extricated themselves. The defences of Richmond, manned, were to

the right, the Chickahominy was to the left with no bridge remaining and

the opposite bank guarded, to the rear was a force from Richmond. This

force was attacked and beaten by Wilson's and Gregg's divisions, while

Sheridan turned to the left with the remaining division and hastily

built a bridge over the Chickahominy under the fire of the enemy, forced

a crossing and soon dispersed the Confederates he found there. The enemy

was held back from the stream by the fire of the troops not engaged in

bridge building.

On the 13th Sheridan was at Bottom's Bridge, over the Chickahominy. On

the 14th he crossed this stream and on that day went into camp on the

James River at Haxall's Landing. He at once put himself into

communication with General Butler, who directed all the supplies he

wanted to be furnished.

Sheridan had left the Army of the Potomac at Spottsylvania, but did not

know where either this or Lee's army was now. Great caution therefore

had to be exercised in getting back. On the 17th, after resting his

command for three days, he started on his return. He moved by the way

of White House. The bridge over the Pamunkey had been burned by the

enemy, but a new one was speedily improvised and the cavalry crossed

over it. On the 22d he was at Aylett's on the Matapony, where he

learned the position of the two armies. On the 24th he joined us on the

march from North Anna to Cold Harbor, in the vicinity of Chesterfield.

Sheridan in this memorable raid passed entirely around Lee's army:

encountered his cavalry in four engagements, and defeated them in all;

recaptured four hundred Union prisoners and killed and captured many of

the enemy; destroyed and used many supplies and munitions of war;

destroyed miles of railroad and telegraph, and freed us from annoyance

by the cavalry of the enemy for more than two weeks.

CHAPTER XLIX.

SHERMAN'S CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA--SIEGE OF ATLANTA--DEATH OF GENERAL

MCPHERSON--ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE ANDERSONVILLE--CAPTURE OF ATLANTA.

After separating from Sherman in Cincinnati I went on to Washington, as

already stated, while he returned to Nashville to assume the duties of

his new command. His military division was now composed of four

departments and embraced all the territory west of the Alleghany

Mountains and east of the Mississippi River, together with the State of

Arkansas in the trans-Mississippi. The most easterly of these was the

Department of the Ohio, General Schofield commanding; the next was the

Department of the Cumberland, General Thomas commanding; the third the

Department of the Tennessee, General McPherson commanding; and General

Steele still commanded the trans-Mississippi, or Department of Arkansas.

The last-named department was so far away that Sherman could not

communicate with it very readily after starting on his spring campaign,

and it was therefore soon transferred from his military division to that

of the Gulf, where General Canby, who had relieved General Banks, was in

command.

The movements of the armies, as I have stated in a former chapter, were

to be simultaneous, I fixing the day to start when the season should be

far enough advanced, it was hoped, for the roads to be in a condition

for the troops to march.

General Sherman at once set himself to work preparing for the task which

was assigned him to accomplish in the spring campaign. McPherson lay at

Huntsville with about twenty-four thousand men, guarding those points of

Tennessee which were regarded as most worth holding; Thomas, with over

sixty thousand men of the Army of the Cumberland, was at Chattanooga;

and Schofield, with about fourteen thousand men, was at Knoxville. With

these three armies, numbering about one hundred thousand men in all,

Sherman was to move on the day fixed for the general advance, with a

view of destroying Johnston's army and capturing Atlanta. He visited

each of these commands to inform himself as to their condition, and it

was found to be, speaking generally, good.

One of the first matters to turn his attention to was that of getting,

before the time arrived for starting, an accumulation of supplies

forward to Chattanooga, sufficiently large to warrant a movement. He

found, when he got to that place, that the trains over the single-track

railroad, which was frequently interrupted for a day or two at a time,

were only sufficient to meet the daily wants of the troops without

bringing forward any surplus of any kind. He found, however, that

trains were being used to transport all the beef cattle, horses for the

cavalry, and even teams that were being brought to the front. He at

once changed all this, and required beef cattle, teams, cavalry horses,

and everything that could travel, even the troops, to be marched, and

used the road exclusively for transporting supplies. In this way he was

able to accumulate an abundance before the time finally fixed upon for

the move, the 4th of May.

As I have said already, Johnston was at Dalton, which was nearly

one-fourth of the way between Chattanooga and Atlanta. The country is

mountainous all the way to Atlanta, abounding in mountain streams, some

of them of considerable volume. Dalton is on ground where water drains

towards Atlanta and into one of the main streams rising north-east from

there and flowing south-west--this being the general direction which all

the main streams of that section take, with smaller tributaries entering

into them. Johnston had been preparing himself for this campaign during

the entire winter. The best positions for defence had been selected all

the way from Dalton back to Atlanta, and very strongly intrenched; so

that, as he might be forced to fall back from one position, he would

have another to fall into in his rear. His position at Dalton was so

very strongly intrenched that no doubt he expected, or at least hoped,

to hold Sherman there and prevent him from getting any further. With a

less skilful general, and one disposed to take no risks, I have no doubt

that he would have succeeded.

Sherman's plan was to start Schofield, who was farthest back, a few days

in advance from Knoxville, having him move on the direct road to Dalton.

Thomas was to move out to Ringgold. It had been Sherman's intention to

cross McPherson over the Tennessee River at Huntsville or Decatur, and

move him south from there so as to have him come into the road running

from Chattanooga to Atlanta a good distance to the rear of the point

Johnston was occupying; but when that was contemplated it was hoped that

McPherson alone would have troops enough to cope with Johnston, if the

latter should move against him while unsupported by the balance of the

army. In this he was disappointed. Two of McPherson's veteran

divisions had re-enlisted on the express provision that they were to

have a furlough. This furlough had not yet expired, and they were not

back.

Then, again, Sherman had lent Banks two divisions under A. J. Smith, the

winter before, to co-operate with the trans-Mississippi forces, and this

with the express pledge that they should be back by a time specified, so

as to be prepared for this very campaign. It is hardly necessary to say

they were not returned. That department continued to absorb troops to

no purpose to the end of the war. This left McPherson so weak that the

part of the plan above indicated had to be changed. He was therefore

brought up to Chattanooga and moved from there on a road to the right of

Thomas--the two coming together about Dalton. The three armies were

abreast, all ready to start promptly on time.

Sherman soon found that Dalton was so strongly fortified that it was

useless to make any attempt to carry it by assault; and even to carry it

by regular approaches was impracticable. There was a narrowing up in

the mountain, between the National and Confederate armies, through which

a stream, a wagon road and a railroad ran. Besides, the stream had been

dammed so that the valley was a lake. Through this gorge the troops

would have to pass. McPherson was therefore sent around by the right,

to come out by the way of Snake Creek Gap into the rear of the enemy.

This was a surprise to Johnston, and about the 13th he decided to

abandon his position at Dalton.

On the 15th there was very hard fighting about Resaca; but our cavalry

having been sent around to the right got near the road in the enemy's

rear. Again Johnston fell back, our army pursuing. The pursuit was

continued to Kingston, which was reached on the 19th with very little

fighting, except that Newton's division overtook the rear of Johnston's

army and engaged it. Sherman was now obliged to halt for the purpose of

bringing up his railroad trains. He was depending upon the railroad for

all of his supplies, and as of course the railroad was wholly destroyed

as Johnston fell back, it had to be rebuilt. This work was pushed

forward night and day, and caused much less delay than most persons

would naturally expect in a mountainous country where there were so many

bridges to be rebuilt.

The campaign to Atlanta was managed with the most consummate skill, the

enemy being flanked out of one position after another all the way there.

It is true this was not accomplished without a good deal of fighting

--some of it very hard fighting, rising to the dignity of very important

battles--neither were single positions gained in a day. On the

contrary, weeks were spent at some; and about Atlanta more than a month

was consumed.

It was the 23d of May before the road was finished up to the rear of

Sherman's army and the pursuit renewed. This pursuit brought him up to

the vicinity of Allatoona. This place was very strongly intrenched, and

naturally a very defensible position. An assault upon it was not thought

of, but preparations were made to flank the enemy out of it. This was

done by sending a large force around our right, by the way of Dallas, to

reach the rear of the enemy. Before reaching there, however, they found

the enemy fortified in their way, and there resulted hard fighting for

about a week at a place called New Hope Church. On the left our troops

also were fortified, and as close up to the enemy as they could get.

They kept working still farther around to the left toward the railroad.

This was the case more particularly with the cavalry. By the 4th of

June Johnston found that he was being hemmed in so rapidly that he drew

off and Allatoona was left in our possession.

Allatoona, being an important place, was strongly intrenched for

occupation by our troops before advancing farther, and made a secondary

base of supplies. The railroad was finished up to that point, the

intrenchments completed, storehouses provided for food, and the army got

in readiness for a further advance. The rains, however, were falling in

such torrents that it was impossible to move the army by the side roads

which they would have to move upon in order to turn Johnston out of his

new position.

While Sherman's army lay here, General F. P. Blair returned to it,

bringing with him the two divisions of veterans who had been on

furlough.

Johnston had fallen back to Marietta and Kenesaw Mountain, where strong

intrenchments awaited him. At this latter place our troops made an

assault upon the enemy's lines after having got their own lines up close

to him, and failed, sustaining considerable loss. But during the

progress of the battle Schofield was gaining ground to the left; and the

cavalry on his left were gaining still more toward the enemy's rear.

These operations were completed by the 3d of July, when it was found

that Johnston had evacuated the place. He was pursued at once. Sherman

had made every preparation to abandon the railroad, leaving a strong

guard in his intrenchments. He had intended, moving out with twenty

days' rations and plenty of ammunition, to come in on the railroad again

at the Chattahoochee River. Johnston frustrated this plan by himself

starting back as above stated. This time he fell back to the

Chattahoochee.

About the 5th of July he was besieged again, Sherman getting easy

possession of the Chattahoochee River both above and below him. The

enemy was again flanked out of his position, or so frightened by

flanking movements that on the night of the 9th he fell back across the

river.

Here Johnston made a stand until the 17th, when Sherman's old tactics

prevailed again and the final movement toward Atlanta began. Johnston

was now relieved of the command, and Hood superseded him.

Johnston's tactics in this campaign do not seem to have met with much

favor, either in the eyes of the administration at Richmond, or of the

people of that section of the South in which he was commanding. The

very fact of a change of commanders being ordered under such

circumstances was an indication of a change of policy, and that now they

would become the aggressors--the very thing our troops wanted.

For my own part, I think that Johnston's tactics were right. Anything

that could have prolonged the war a year beyond the time that it did

finally close, would probably have exhausted the North to such an extent

that they might then have abandoned the contest and agreed to a

separation.

Atlanta was very strongly intrenched all the way around in a circle

about a mile and a half outside of the city. In addition to this, there

were advanced intrenchments which had to be taken before a close siege

could be commenced.

Sure enough, as indicated by the change of commanders, the enemy was

about to assume the offensive. On the 20th he came out and attacked the

Army of the Cumberland most furiously. Hooker's corps, and Newton's and

Johnson's divisions were the principal ones engaged in this contest,

which lasted more than an hour; but the Confederates were then forced to

fall back inside their main lines. The losses were quite heavy on both

sides. On this day General Gresham, since our Postmaster-General, was

very badly wounded. During the night Hood abandoned his outer lines,

and our troops were advanced. The investment had not been relinquished

for a moment during the day.

During the night of the 21st Hood moved out again, passing by our left

flank, which was then in motion to get a position farther in rear of

him, and a desperate battle ensued, which lasted most of the day of the

22d. At first the battle went very much in favor of the Confederates,

our troops being somewhat surprised. While our troops were advancing

they were struck in flank, and their flank was enveloped. But they had

become too thorough veterans to be thrown into irreparable confusion by

an unexpected attack when off their guard, and soon they were in order

and engaging the enemy, with the advantage now of knowing where their

antagonist was. The field of battle continued to expand until it

embraced about seven miles of ground. Finally, however, and before

night, the enemy was driven back into the city (*26).

It was during this battle that McPherson, while passing from one column

to another, was instantly killed. In his death the army lost one of its

ablest, purest and best generals.

Garrard had been sent out with his cavalry to get upon the railroad east

of Atlanta and to cut it in the direction of Augusta. He was successful

in this, and returned about the time of the battle. Rousseau had also

come up from Tennessee with a small division of cavalry, having crossed

the Tennessee River about Decatur and made a raid into Alabama. Finally,

when hard pressed, he had come in, striking the railroad in rear of

Sherman, and reported to him about this time.

The battle of the 22d is usually known as the Battle of Atlanta,

although the city did not fall into our hands until the 2d of September.

Preparations went on, as before, to flank the enemy out of his position.

The work was tedious, and the lines that had to be maintained were very

long. Our troops were gradually worked around to the east until they

struck the road between Decatur and Atlanta. These lines were strongly

fortified, as were those to the north and west of the city--all as close

up to the enemy's lines as practicable--in order to hold them with the

smallest possible number of men, the design being to detach an army to

move by our right and try to get upon the railroad down south of

Atlanta.

On the 27th the movement by the right flank commenced. On the 28th the

enemy struck our right flank, General Logan commanding, with great

vigor. Logan intrenched himself hastily, and by that means was enabled

to resist all assaults and inflict a great deal of damage upon the

enemy. These assaults were continued to the middle of the afternoon,

and resumed once or twice still later in the day. The enemy's losses in

these unsuccessful assaults were fearful.

During that evening the enemy in Logan's front withdrew into the town.

This now left Sherman's army close up to the Confederate lines,

extending from a point directly east of the city around by the north and

west of it for a distance of fully ten miles; the whole of this line

being intrenched, and made stronger every day they remained there.

In the latter part of July Sherman sent Stoneman to destroy the

railroads to the south, about Macon. He was then to go east and, if

possible, release our prisoners about Andersonville. There were painful

stories current at the time about the great hardships these prisoners

had to endure in the way of general bad treatment, in the way in which

they were housed, and in the way in which they were fed. Great sympathy

was felt for them; and it was thought that even if they could be turned

loose upon the country it would be a great relief to them. But the

attempt proved a failure. McCook, who commanded a small brigade, was

first reported to have been captured; but he got back, having inflicted

a good deal of damage upon the enemy. He had also taken some prisoners;

but encountering afterwards a largely superior force of the enemy he was

obliged to drop his prisoners and get back as best he could with what

men he had left. He had lost several hundred men out of his small

command. On the 4th of August Colonel Adams, commanding a little

brigade of about a thousand men, returned reporting Stoneman and all but

himself as lost. I myself had heard around Richmond of the capture of

Stoneman, and had sent Sherman word, which he received. The rumor was

confirmed there, also, from other sources. A few days after Colonel

Adams's return Colonel Capron also got in with a small detachment and

confirmed the report of the capture of Stoneman with something less than

a thousand men.

It seems that Stoneman, finding the escape of all his force was

impossible, had made arrangements for the escape of two divisions. He

covered the movement of these divisions to the rear with a force of

about seven hundred men, and at length surrendered himself and this

detachment to the commanding Confederate. In this raid, however, much

damage was inflicted upon the enemy by the destruction of cars,

locomotives, army wagons, manufactories of military supplies, etc.

On the 4th and 5th Sherman endeavored to get upon the railroad to our

right, where Schofield was in command, but these attempts failed

utterly. General Palmer was charged with being the cause of this

failure, to a great extent, by both General Sherman and General

Schofield; but I am not prepared to say this, although a question seems

to have arisen with Palmer as to whether Schofield had any right to

command him. If he did raise this question while an action was going

on, that act alone was exceedingly reprehensible.

About the same time Wheeler got upon our railroad north of Resaca and

destroyed it nearly up to Dalton. This cut Sherman off from

communication with the North for several days. Sherman responded to

this attack on his lines of communication by directing one upon theirs.

Kilpatrick started on the night of the 18th of August to reach the Macon

road about Jonesboro. He succeeded in doing so, passed entirely around

the Confederate lines of Atlanta, and was back again in his former

position on our left by the 22d. These little affairs, however,

contributed but very little to the grand result. They annoyed, it is

true, but any damage thus done to a railroad by any cavalry expedition

is soon repaired.

Sherman made preparations for a repetition of his tactics; that is, for

a flank movement with as large a force as could be got together to some

point in the enemy's rear. Sherman commenced this last movement on the

25th of August, and on the 1st of September was well up towards the

railroad twenty miles south of Atlanta. Here he found Hardee

intrenched, ready to meet him. A battle ensued, but he was unable to

drive Hardee away before night set in. Under cover of the night,

however, Hardee left of his own accord. That night Hood blew up his

military works, such as he thought would be valuable in our hands, and

decamped.

The next morning at daylight General H. W. Slocum, who was commanding

north of the city, moved in and took possession of Atlanta, and notified

Sherman. Sherman then moved deliberately back, taking three days to

reach the city, and occupied a line extending from Decatur on the left

to Atlanta in the centre, with his troops extending out of the city for

some distance to the right.

The campaign had lasted about four months, and was one of the most

memorable in history. There was but little if anything in the whole

campaign, now that it is over, to criticise at all, and nothing to

criticise severely. It was creditable alike to the general who

commanded and the army which had executed it. Sherman had on this

campaign some bright, wide-awake division and brigade commanders whose

alertness added a host to the efficiency of his command.

The troops now went to work to make themselves comfortable, and to enjoy

a little rest after their arduous campaign. The city of Atlanta was

turned into a military base. The citizens were all compelled to leave.

Sherman also very wisely prohibited the assembling of the army of

sutlers and traders who always follow in the wake of an army in the

field, if permitted to do so, from trading with the citizens and getting

the money of the soldiers for articles of but little use to them, and

for which they are made to pay most exorbitant prices. He limited the

number of these traders to one for each of his three armies.

The news of Sherman's success reached the North instantaneously, and set

the country all aglow. This was the first great political campaign for

the Republicans in their canvass of 1864. It was followed later by

Sheridan's campaign in the Shenandoah Valley; and these two campaigns

probably had more effect in settling the election of the following

November than all the speeches, all the bonfires, and all the parading

with banners and bands of music in the North.

CHAPTER L.

GRAND MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC--CROSSING THE RAPIDAN

--ENTERING THE WILDERNESS--BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS.

Soon after midnight, May 3d-4th, the Army of the Potomac moved out from

its position north Rapidan, to start upon that memorable campaign,

destined to result in the capture of the Confederate capital and the

army defending it. This was not to be accomplished, however, without as

desperate fighting as the world has ever witnessed; not to be

consummated in a day, a week, a month, single season. The losses

inflicted, and endured, were destined to be severe; but the armies now

confronting each other had already been in deadly conflict for a period

of three years, with immense losses in killed, by death from sickness,

captured and wounded; and neither had made any real progress

accomplishing the final end. It is true the Confederates had, so far,

held their capital, and they claimed this to be their sole object. But

previously they had boldly proclaimed their intention to capture

Philadelphia, New York, and the National Capital, and had made several

attempts to do so, and once or twice had come fearfully near making

their boast good--too near for complacent contemplation by the loyal

North. They had also come near losing their own capital on at least one

occasion. So here was a stand-off. The campaign now begun was destined

to result in heavier losses, to both armies, in a given time, than any

previously suffered; but the carnage was to be limited to a single year,

and to accomplish all that had been anticipated or desired at the

beginning in that time. We had to have hard fighting to achieve this.

The two armies had been confronting each other so long, without any

decisive result, that they hardly knew which could whip.

Ten days' rations, with a supply of forage and ammunition were taken in

wagons. Beef cattle were driven with the trains, and butchered as

wanted. Three days rations in addition, in haversacks, and fifty rounds

of cartridges, were carried on the person of each soldier.

The country over which the army had to operate, from the Rapidan to the

crossing of the James River, is rather flat, and is cut by numerous

streams which make their way to the Chesapeake Bay. The crossings of

these streams by the army were generally made not far above tide-water,

and where they formed a considerable obstacle to the rapid advance of

troops even when the enemy did not appear in opposition. The country

roads were narrow and poor. Most of the country is covered with a dense

forest, in places, like the Wilderness and along the Chickahominy,

almost impenetrable even for infantry except along the roads. All

bridges were naturally destroyed before the National troops came to

them.

The Army of the Potomac was composed of three infantry and one cavalry

corps, commanded respectively by Generals W. S. Hancock, G. K. Warren,

(*27) John Sedgwick and P. H. Sheridan. The artillery was commanded by

General Henry J. Hunt. This arm was in such abundance that the fourth

of it could not be used to advantage in such a country as we were

destined to pass through. The surplus was much in the way, taking up as

it did so much of the narrow and bad roads, and consuming so much of the

forage and other stores brought up by the trains.

The 5th corps, General Warren commanding, was in advance on the right,

and marched directly for Germania Ford, preceded by one division of

cavalry, under General J. H. Wilson. General Sedgwick followed Warren

with the 6th corps. Germania Ford was nine or ten miles below the right

of Lee's line. Hancock, with the 2d corps, moved by another road,

farther east, directly upon Ely's Ford, six miles below Germania,

preceded by Gregg's division of cavalry, and followed by the artillery.

Torbert's division of cavalry was left north of the Rapidan, for the

time, to picket the river and prevent the enemy from crossing and

getting into our rear. The cavalry seized the two crossings before

daylight, drove the enemy's pickets guarding them away, and by six

o'clock A.M. had the pontoons laid ready for the crossing of the

infantry and artillery. This was undoubtedly a surprise to Lee. The

fact that the movement was unopposed proves this.

Burnside, with the 9th corps, was left back at Warrenton, guarding the

railroad from Bull Run forward to preserve control of it in case our

crossing the Rapidan should be long delayed. He was instructed, however,

to advance at once on receiving notice that the army had crossed; and a

dispatch was sent to him a little after one P.M. giving the information

that our crossing had been successful.

The country was heavily wooded at all the points of crossing,

particularly on the south side of the river. The battle-field from the

crossing of the Rapidan until the final movement from the Wilderness

toward Spottsylvania was of the same character. There were some

clearings and small farms within what might be termed the battle-field;

but generally the country was covered with a dense forest. The roads

were narrow and bad. All the conditions were favorable for defensive

operations.

There are two roads, good for that part of Virginia, running from Orange

Court House to the battle-field. The most southerly of these roads is

known as the Orange Court House Plank Road, the northern one as the

Orange Turnpike. There are also roads from east of the battle-field

running to Spottsylvania Court House, one from Chancellorsville,

branching at Aldrich's; the western branch going by Piney Branch Church,

Alsop's, thence by the Brock Road to Spottsylvania; the east branch goes

by Gates's, thence to Spottsylvania. The Brock Road runs from Germania

Ford through the battle-field and on to the Court House. As

Spottsylvania is approached the country is cut up with numerous roads,

some going to the town direct, and others crossing so as to connect the

farms with roads going there.

Lee's headquarters were at Orange Court House. From there to

Fredericksburg he had the use of the two roads above described running

nearly parallel to the Wilderness. This gave him unusual facilities,

for that country, for concentrating his forces to his right. These

roads strike the road from Germania Ford in the Wilderness.

As soon as the crossing of the infantry was assured, the cavalry pushed

forward, Wilson's division by Wilderness Tavern to Parker's store, on

the Orange Plank Road; Gregg to the left towards Chancellorsville.

Warren followed Wilson and reached the Wilderness Tavern by noon, took

position there and intrenched. Sedgwick followed Warren. He was across

the river and in camp on the south bank, on the right of Warren, by

sundown. Hancock, with the 2d corps, moved parallel with Warren and

camped about six miles east of him. Before night all the troops, and by

the evening of the 5th the trains of more than four thousand wagons,

were safely on the south side of the river.

There never was a corps better organized than was the quartermaster's

corps with the Army of the Potomac in 1864. With a wagon-train that

would have extended from the Rapidan to Richmond, stretched along in

single file and separated as the teams necessarily would be when moving,

we could still carry only three days' forage and about ten to twelve

days' rations, besides a supply of ammunition. To overcome all

difficulties, the chief quartermaster, General Rufus Ingalls, had marked

on each wagon the corps badge with the division color and the number of

the brigade. At a glance, the particular brigade to which any wagon

belonged could be told. The wagons were also marked to note the

contents: if ammunition, whether for artillery or infantry; if forage,

whether grain or hay; if rations, whether, bread, pork, beans, rice,

sugar, coffee or whatever it might be. Empty wagons were never allowed

to follow the army or stay in camp. As soon as a wagon was empty it

would return to the base of supply for a load of precisely the same

article that had been taken from it. Empty trains were obliged to leave

the road free for loaded ones. Arriving near the army they would be

parked in fields nearest to the brigades they belonged to. Issues,

except of ammunition, were made at night in all cases. By this system

the hauling of forage for the supply train was almost wholly dispensed

with. They consumed theirs at the depots.

I left Culpeper Court House after all the troops had been put in motion,

and passing rapidly to the front, crossed the Rapidan in advance of

Sedgwick's corps; and established headquarters for the afternoon and

night in a deserted house near the river.

Orders had been given, long before this movement began, to cut down the

baggage of officers and men to the lowest point possible.

Notwithstanding this I saw scattered along the road from Culpeper to

Germania Ford wagon-loads of new blankets and overcoats, thrown away by

the troops to lighten their knapsacks; an improvidence I had never

witnessed before.

Lee, while his pickets and signal corps must have discovered at a very

early hour on the morning of the 4th of May, that the Army of the

Potomac was moving, evidently did not learn until about one o'clock in

the afternoon by what route we would confront his army. This I judge

from the fact that at 1.15 P.M., an hour and a quarter after Warren had

reached Old Wilderness Tavern, our officers took off rebel signals

which, when translated, were seen to be an order to his troops to occupy

their intrenchments at Mine Run.

Here at night dispatches were received announcing that Sherman, Butler

and Crook had moved according to programme.

On discovering the advance of the Army of the Potomac, Lee ordered Hill,

Ewell and Longstreet, each commanding corps, to move to the right to

attack us, Hill on the Orange Plank Road, Longstreet to follow on the

same road. Longstreet was at this time--middle of the afternoon--at

Gordonsville, twenty or more miles away. Ewell was ordered by the

Orange Pike. He was near by and arrived some four miles east of Mine

Run before bivouacking for the night.

My orders were given through General Meade for an early advance on the

morning of the 5th. Warren was to move to Parker's store, and Wilson's

cavalry--then at Parker's store--to move on to Craig's meeting-house.

Sedgwick followed Warren, closing in on his right. The Army of the

Potomac was facing to the west, though our advance was made to the

south, except when facing the enemy. Hancock was to move south-westward

to join on the left of Warren, his left to reach to Shady Grove Church.

At six o'clock, before reaching Parker's store, Warren discovered the

enemy. He sent word back to this effect, and was ordered to halt and

prepare to meet and attack him. Wright, with his division of Sedgwick's

corps, was ordered, by any road he could find, to join on to Warren's

right, and Getty with his division, also of Sedgwick's corps, was

ordered to move rapidly by Warren's rear and get on his left. This was

the speediest way to reinforce Warren who was confronting the enemy on

both the Orange plank and turnpike roads.

Burnside had moved promptly on the 4th, on receiving word that the Army

of the Potomac had safely crossed the Rapidan. By making a night march,

although some of his troops had to march forty miles to reach the river,

he was crossing with the head of his column early on the morning of the

5th. Meade moved his headquarters on to Old Wilderness Tavern, four

miles south of the river, as soon as it was light enough to see the

road. I remained to hasten Burnside's crossing and to put him in

position. Burnside at this time was not under Meade's command, and was

his senior in rank. Getting information of the proximity of the enemy,

I informed Meade, and without waiting to see Burnside, at once moved

forward my headquarters to where Meade was.

It was my plan then, as it was on all other occasions, to take the

initiative whenever the enemy could be drawn from his intrenchments if

we were not intrenched ourselves. Warren had not yet reached the point

where he was to halt, when he discovered the enemy near by. Neither

party had any advantage of position. Warren was, therefore, ordered to

attack as soon as he could prepare for it. At nine o'clock Hancock was

ordered to come up to the support of Getty. He himself arrived at

Getty's front about noon, but his troops were yet far in the rear.

Getty was directed to hold his position at all hazards until relieved.

About this hour Warren was ready, and attacked with favorable though not

decisive results. Getty was somewhat isolated from Warren and was in a

precarious condition for a time. Wilson, with his division of cavalry,

was farther south, and was cut off from the rest of the army. At two

o'clock Hancock's troops began to arrive, and immediately he was ordered

to join Getty and attack the enemy. But the heavy timber and narrow

roads prevented him from getting into position for attack as promptly as

he generally did when receiving such orders. At four o'clock he again

received his orders to attack, and General Getty received orders from

Meade a few minutes later to attack whether Hancock was ready or not.

He met the enemy under Heth within a few hundred yards.

Hancock immediately sent two divisions, commanded by Birney and Mott,

and later two brigades, Carroll's and Owen's, to the support of Getty.

This was timely and saved Getty. During the battle Getty and Carroll

were wounded, but remained on the field. One of Birney's most gallant

brigade commanders--Alexander Hays--was killed.

I had been at West Point with Hays for three years, and had served with

him through the Mexican war, a portion of the time in the same regiment.

He was a most gallant officer, ready to lead his command wherever

ordered. With him it was "Come, boys," not "Go."

Wadsworth's division and Baxter's brigade of the 2d division were sent

to reinforce Hancock and Getty; but the density of the intervening

forest was such that, there being no road to march upon, they did not

get up with the head of column until night, and bivouacked where they

were without getting into position.

During the afternoon Sheridan sent Gregg's division of cavalry to Todd's

Tavern in search of Wilson. This was fortunate. He found Wilson

engaged with a superior force under General Rosser, supported by

infantry, and falling back before it. Together they were strong enough

to turn the tables upon the enemy and themselves become aggressive.

They soon drove the rebel cavalry back beyond Corbin's Bridge.

Fighting between Hancock and Hill continued until night put a close to

it. Neither side made any special progress.

After the close of the battle of the 5th of May my orders were given for

the following morning. We knew Longstreet with 12,000 men was on his

way to join Hill's right, near the Brock Road, and might arrive during

the night. I was anxious that the rebels should not take the initiative

in the morning, and therefore ordered Hancock to make an assault at 4.30

o'clock. Meade asked to have the hour changed to six. Deferring to his

wishes as far as I was willing, the order was modified and five was

fixed as the hour to move.

Hancock had now fully one-half of the Army of the Potomac. Wadsworth

with his division, which had arrived the night before, lay in a line

perpendicular to that held by Hill, and to the right of Hancock. He was

directed to move at the same time, and to attack Hill's left.

Burnside, who was coming up with two divisions, was directed to get in

between Warren and Wadsworth, and attack as soon as he could get in

position to do so. Sedgwick and Warren were to make attacks in their

front, to detain as many of the enemy as they could and to take

advantage of any attempt to reinforce Hill from that quarter. Burnside

was ordered if he should succeed in breaking the enemy's centre, to

swing around to the left and envelop the right of Lee's army. Hancock

was informed of all the movements ordered.

Burnside had three divisions, but one of them--a colored division--was

sent to guard the wagon train, and he did not see it again until July.

Lee was evidently very anxious that there should be no battle on his

right until Longstreet got up. This is evident from the fact that

notwithstanding the early hour at which I had ordered the assault, both

for the purpose of being the attacking party and to strike before

Longstreet got up, Lee was ahead in his assault on our right. His

purpose was evident, but he failed.

Hancock was ready to advance by the hour named, but learning in time

that Longstreet was moving a part of his corps by the Catharpin Road,

thus threatening his left flank, sent a division of infantry, commanded

by General Barlow, with all his artillery, to cover the approaches by

which Longstreet was expected. This disposition was made in time to

attack as ordered. Hancock moved by the left of the Orange Plank Road,

and Wadsworth by the right of it. The fighting was desperate for about

an hour, when the enemy began to break up in great confusion.

I believed then, and see no reason to change that opinion now, that if

the country had been such that Hancock and his command could have seen

the confusion and panic in the lines of the enemy, it would have been

taken advantage of so effectually that Lee would not have made another

stand outside of his Richmond defences.

Gibbon commanded Hancock's left, and was ordered to attack, but was not

able to accomplish much.

On the morning of the 6th Sheridan was sent to connect with Hancock's

left and attack the enemy's cavalry who were trying to get on our left

and rear. He met them at the intersection of the Furnace and Brock

roads and at Todd's Tavern, and defeated them at both places. Later he

was attacked, and again the enemy was repulsed.

Hancock heard the firing between Sheridan and Stuart, and thinking the

enemy coming by that road, still further reinforced his position

guarding the entrance to the Brock Road. Another incident happened

during the day to further induce Hancock to weaken his attacking column.

Word reached him that troops were seen moving towards him from the

direction of Todd's Tavern, and Brooke's brigade was detached to meet

this new enemy; but the troops approaching proved to be several hundred

convalescents coming from Chancellorsville, by the road Hancock had

advanced upon, to join their respective commands. At 6.50 o'clock A.M.,

Burnside, who had passed Wilderness Tavern at six o'clock, was ordered

to send a division to the support of Hancock, but to continue with the

remainder of his command in the execution of his previous order. The

difficulty of making a way through the dense forests prevented Burnside

from getting up in time to be of any service on the forenoon of the

sixth.

Hancock followed Hill's retreating forces, in the morning, a mile or

more. He maintained this position until, along in the afternoon,

Longstreet came upon him. The retreating column of Hill meeting

reinforcements that had not yet been engaged, became encouraged and

returned with them. They were enabled, from the density of the forest,

to approach within a few hundred yards of our advance before being

discovered. Falling upon a brigade of Hancock's corps thrown to the

advance, they swept it away almost instantly. The enemy followed up his

advantage and soon came upon Mott's division, which fell back in great

confusion. Hancock made dispositions to hold his advanced position, but

after holding it for a time, fell back into the position that he had

held in the morning, which was strongly intrenched. In this engagement

the intrepid Wadsworth while trying to rally his men was mortally

wounded and fell into the hands of the enemy. The enemy followed up,

but made no immediate attack.

The Confederate General Jenkins was killed and Longstreet seriously

wounded in this engagement. Longstreet had to leave the field, not to

resume command for many weeks. His loss was a severe one to Lee, and

compensated in a great measure for the mishap, or misapprehensions,

which had fallen to our lot during the day.

After Longstreet's removal from the field Lee took command of his right

in person. He was not able, however, to rally his men to attack

Hancock's position, and withdrew from our front for the purpose of

reforming. Hancock sent a brigade to clear his front of all remnants

that might be left of Longstreet's or Hill's commands. This brigade

having been formed at right angles to the intrenchments held by

Hancock's command, swept down the whole length of them from left to

right. A brigade of the enemy was encountered in this move; but it

broke and disappeared without a contest.

Firing was continued after this, but with less fury. Burnside had not

yet been able to get up to render any assistance. But it was now only

about nine in the morning, and he was getting into position on Hancock's

right.

At 4.15 in the afternoon Lee attacked our left. His line moved up to

within a hundred yards of ours and opened a heavy fire. This status was

maintained for about half an hour. Then a part of Mott's division and

Ward's brigade of Birney's division gave way and retired in disorder.

The enemy under R. H. Anderson took advantage of this and pushed through

our line, planting their flags on a part of the intrenchments not on

fire. But owing to the efforts of Hancock, their success was but

temporary. Carroll, of Gibbon's division, moved at a double quick with

his brigade and drove back the enemy, inflicting great loss. Fighting

had continued from five in the morning sometimes along the whole line,

at other times only in places. The ground fought over had varied in

width, but averaged three-quarters of a mile. The killed, and many of

the severely wounded, of both armies, lay within this belt where it was

impossible to reach them. The woods were set on fire by the bursting

shells, and the conflagration raged. The wounded who had not strength

to move themselves were either suffocated or burned to death. Finally

the fire communicated with our breastworks, in places. Being

constructed of wood, they burned with great fury. But the battle still

raged, our men firing through the flames until it became too hot to

remain longer.

Lee was now in distress. His men were in confusion, and his personal

efforts failed to restore order. These facts, however, were learned

subsequently, or we would have taken advantage of his condition and no

doubt gained a decisive success. His troops were withdrawn now, but I

revoked the order, which I had given previously to this assault, for

Hancock to attack, because his troops had exhausted their ammunition and

did not have time to replenish from the train, which was at some

distance.

Burnside, Sedgwick, and Warren had all kept up an assault during all

this time; but their efforts had no other effect than to prevent the

enemy from reinforcing his right from the troops in their front.

I had, on the 5th, ordered all the bridges over the Rapidan to be taken

up except one at Germania Ford.

The troops on Sedgwick's right had been sent to enforce our left. This

left our right in danger of being turned, and us of being cut off from

all present base of supplies. Sedgwick had refused his right and

intrenched it for protection against attack. But late in the afternoon

of the 6th Early came out from his lines in considerable force and got

in upon Sedgwick's right, notwithstanding the precautions taken, and

created considerable confusion. Early captured several hundred

prisoners, among them two general officers. The defence, however, was

vigorous; and night coming on, the enemy was thrown into as much

confusion as our troops, engaged, were. Early says in his Memoirs that

if we had discovered the confusion in his lines we might have brought

fresh troops to his great discomfort. Many officers, who had not been

attacked by Early, continued coming to my headquarters even after

Sedgwick had rectified his lines a little farther to the rear, with news

of the disaster, fully impressed with the idea that the enemy was

pushing on and would soon be upon me.

During the night all of Lee's army withdrew within their intrenchments.

On the morning of the 7th General Custer drove the enemy's cavalry from

Catharpin Furnace to Todd's Tavern. Pickets and skirmishers were sent

along our entire front to find the position of the enemy. Some went as

far as a mile and a half before finding him. But Lee showed no

disposition to come out of his Works. There was no battle during the

day, and but little firing except in Warren's front; he being directed

about noon to make a reconnoissance in force. This drew some sharp

firing, but there was no attempt on the part of Lee to drive him back.

This ended the Battle of the Wilderness.

CHAPTER LI.

AFTER THE BATTLE--TELEGRAPH AND SIGNAL SERVICE--MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT

FLANK.

More desperate fighting has not been witnessed on this continent than

that of the 5th and 6th of May. Our victory consisted in having

successfully crossed a formidable stream, almost in the face of an

enemy, and in getting the army together as a unit. We gained an

advantage on the morning of the 6th, which, if it had been followed up,

must have proven very decisive. In the evening the enemy gained an

advantage; but was speedily repulsed. As we stood at the close, the two

armies were relatively in about the same condition to meet each other as

when the river divided them. But the fact of having safely crossed was

a victory.

Our losses in the Wilderness were very severe. Those of the

Confederates must have been even more so; but I have no means of

speaking with accuracy upon this point. The Germania Ford bridge was

transferred to Ely's Ford to facilitate the transportation of the

wounded to Washington.

It may be as well here as elsewhere to state two things connected with

all movements of the Army of the Potomac: first, in every change of

position or halt for the night, whether confronting the enemy or not,

the moment arms were stacked the men intrenched themselves. For this

purpose they would build up piles of logs or rails if they could be

found in their front, and dig a ditch, throwing the dirt forward on the

timber. Thus the digging they did counted in making a depression to

stand in, and increased the elevation in front of them. It was

wonderful how quickly they could in this way construct defences of

considerable strength. When a halt was made with the view of assaulting

the enemy, or in his presence, these would be strengthened or their

positions changed under the direction of engineer officers. The second

was, the use made of the telegraph and signal corps. Nothing could be

more complete than the organization and discipline of this body of brave

and intelligent men. Insulated wires--insulated so that they would

transmit messages in a storm, on the ground or under water--were wound

upon reels, making about two hundred pounds weight of wire to each reel.

Two men and one mule were detailed to each reel. The pack-saddle on

which this was carried was provided with a rack like a sawbuck placed

crosswise of the saddle, and raised above it so that the reel, with its

wire, would revolve freely. There was a wagon, supplied with a

telegraph operator, battery and telegraph instruments for each division,

each corps, each army, and one for my headquarters. There were wagons

also loaded with light poles, about the size and length of a wall tent

pole, supplied with an iron spike in one end, used to hold the wires up

when laid, so that wagons and artillery would not run over them. The

mules thus loaded were assigned to brigades, and always kept with the

command they were assigned to. The operators were also assigned to

particular headquarters, and never changed except by special orders.

The moment the troops were put in position to go into camp all the men

connected with this branch of service would proceed to put up their

wires. A mule loaded with a coil of wire would be led to the rear of

the nearest flank of the brigade he belonged to, and would be led in a

line parallel thereto, while one man would hold an end of the wire and

uncoil it as the mule was led off. When he had walked the length of the

wire the whole of it would be on the ground. This would be done in rear

of every brigade at the same time. The ends of all the wires would then

be joined, making a continuous wire in the rear of the whole army. The

men, attached to brigades or divisions, would all commence at once

raising the wires with their telegraph poles. This was done by making a

loop in the wire and putting it over the spike and raising the pole to a

perpendicular position. At intervals the wire would be attached to

trees, or some other permanent object, so that one pole was sufficient

at a place. In the absence of such a support two poles would have to be

used, at intervals, placed at an angle so as to hold the wire firm in

its place. While this was being done the telegraph wagons would take

their positions near where the headquarters they belonged to were to be

established, and would connect with the wire. Thus, in a few minutes

longer time than it took a mule to walk the length of its coil,

telegraphic communication would be effected between all the headquarters

of the army. No orders ever had to be given to establish the telegraph.

The signal service was used on the march. The men composing this corps

were assigned to specified commands. When movements were made, they

would go in advance, or on the flanks, and seize upon high points of

ground giving a commanding view of the country, if cleared, or would

climb tall trees on the highest points if not cleared, and would denote,

by signals, the positions of different parts of our own army, and often

the movements of the enemy. They would also take off the signals of the

enemy and transmit them. It would sometimes take too long a time to

make translations of intercepted dispatches for us to receive any

benefit from them. But sometimes they gave useful information.

On the afternoon of the 7th I received news from Washington announcing

that Sherman had probably attacked Johnston that day, and that Butler

had reached City Point safely and taken it by surprise on the 5th. I

had given orders for a movement by the left flank, fearing that Lee

might move rapidly to Richmond to crush Butler before I could get there.

My order for this movement was as follows:

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE U. S., May 7, 1864, 6.30 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, Commanding A. P.

Make all preparations during the day for a night march to take position

at Spottsylvania C. H. with one army corps, at Todd's Tavern with one,

and another near the intersection of the Piney Branch and Spottsylvania

road with the road from Alsop's to Old Court House. If this move is

made the trains should be thrown forward early in the morning to the Ny

River.

I think it would be advisable in making the change to leave Hancock

where he is until Warren passes him. He could then follow and become

the right of the new line. Burnside will move to Piney Branch Church.

Sedgwick can move along the pike to Chancellorsville and on to his

destination. Burnside will move on the plank road to the intersection

of it with the Orange and Fredericksburg plank road, then follow

Sedgwick to his place of destination.

All vehicles should be got out of hearing of the enemy before the troops

move, and then move off quietly.

It is more than probable that the enemy concentrate for a heavy attack

on Hancock this afternoon. In case they do we must be prepared to

resist them, and follow up any success we may gain, with our whole

force. Such a result would necessarily modify these instructions.

All the hospitals should be moved to-day to Chancellorsville.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

During the 7th Sheridan had a fight with the rebel cavalry at Todd's

Tavern, but routed them, thus opening the way for the troops that were

to go by that route at night. Soon after dark Warren withdrew from the

front of the enemy, and was soon followed by Sedgwick. Warren's march

carried him immediately behind the works where Hancock's command lay on

the Brock Road. With my staff and a small escort of cavalry I preceded

the troops. Meade with his staff accompanied me. The greatest

enthusiasm was manifested by Hancock's men as we passed by. No doubt it

was inspired by the fact that the movement was south. It indicated to

them that they had passed through the "beginning of the end" in the

battle just fought. The cheering was so lusty that the enemy must have

taken it for a night attack. At all events it drew from him a furious

fusillade of artillery and musketry, plainly heard but not felt by us.

Meade and I rode in advance. We had passed but a little way beyond our

left when the road forked. We looked to see, if we could, which road

Sheridan had taken with his cavalry during the day. It seemed to be the

right-hand one, and accordingly we took it. We had not gone far,

however, when Colonel C. B. Comstock, of my staff, with the instinct of

the engineer, suspecting that we were on a road that would lead us into

the lines of the enemy, if he, too, should be moving, dashed by at a

rapid gallop and all alone. In a few minutes he returned and reported

that Lee was moving, and that the road we were on would bring us into

his lines in a short distance. We returned to the forks of the road,

left a man to indicate the right road to the head of Warren's column

when it should come up, and continued our journey to Todd's Tavern,

where we arrived after midnight.

My object in moving to Spottsylvania was two-fold: first, I did not

want Lee to get back to Richmond in time to attempt to crush Butler

before I could get there; second, I wanted to get between his army and

Richmond if possible; and, if not, to draw him into the open field. But

Lee, by accident, beat us to Spottsylvania. Our wagon trains had been

ordered easterly of the roads the troops were to march upon before the

movement commenced. Lee interpreted this as a semi-retreat of the Army

of the Potomac to Fredericksburg, and so informed his government.

Accordingly he ordered Longstreet's corps--now commanded by Anderson--to

move in the morning (the 8th) to Spottsylvania. But the woods being

still on fire, Anderson could not go into bivouac, and marched directly

on to his destination that night. By this accident Lee got possession

of Spottsylvania. It is impossible to say now what would have been the

result if Lee's orders had been obeyed as given; but it is certain that

we would have been in Spottsylvania, and between him and his capital.

My belief is that there would have been a race between the two armies to

see which could reach Richmond first, and the Army of the Potomac would

have had the shorter line. Thus, twice since crossing the Rapidan we

came near closing the campaign, so far as battles were concerned, from

the Rapidan to the James River or Richmond. The first failure was

caused by our not following up the success gained over Hill's corps on

the morning of the 6th, as before described: the second, when fires

caused by that battle drove Anderson to make a march during the night of

the 7th-8th which he was ordered to commence on the morning of the 8th.

But accident often decides the fate of battle.

Sheridan's cavalry had had considerable fighting during the afternoon of

the 7th, lasting at Todd's Tavern until after night, with the field his

at the close. He issued the necessary orders for seizing Spottsylvania

and holding the bridge over the Po River, which Lee's troops would have

to cross to get to Spottsylvania. But Meade changed Sheridan's orders

to Merritt--who was holding the bridge--on his arrival at Todd's Tavern,

and thereby left the road free for Anderson when he came up. Wilson,

who was ordered to seize the town, did so, with his division of cavalry;

but he could not hold it against the Confederate corps which had not

been detained at the crossing of the Po, as it would have been but for

the unfortunate change in Merritt's orders. Had he been permitted to

execute the orders Sheridan gave him, he would have been guarding with

two brigades of cavalry the bridge over the Po River which Anderson had

to cross, and must have detained him long enough to enable Warren to

reinforce Wilson and hold the town.

Anderson soon intrenched himself--if indeed the intrenchments were not

already made--immediately across Warren's front. Warren was not aware of

his presence, but probably supposed it was the cavalry which Merritt had

engaged earlier in the day. He assaulted at once, but was repulsed. He

soon organized his men, as they were not pursued by the enemy, and made

a second attack, this time with his whole corps. This time he succeeded

in gaining a position immediately in the enemy's front, where he

intrenched. His right and left divisions--the former Crawford's, the

latter Wadsworth's, now commanded by Cutler--drove the enemy back some

distance.

At this time my headquarters had been advanced to Piney Branch Church.

I was anxious to crush Anderson before Lee could get a force to his

support. To this end Sedgwick who was at Piney Branch Church, was

ordered to Warren's support. Hancock, who was at Todd's Tavern, was

notified of Warren's engagement, and was directed to be in readiness to

come up. Burnside, who was with the wagon trains at Aldrich's on our

extreme left, received the same instructions. Sedgwick was slow in

getting up for some reason--probably unavoidable, because he was never

at fault when serious work was to be done--so that it was near night

before the combined forces were ready to attack. Even then all of

Sedgwick's command did not get into the engagement. Warren led the last

assault, one division at a time, and of course it failed.

Warren's difficulty was twofold: when he received an order to do

anything, it would at once occur to his mind how all the balance of the

army should be engaged so as properly to co-operate with him. His ideas

were generally good, but he would forget that the person giving him

orders had thought of others at the time he had of him. In like manner,

when he did get ready to execute an order, after giving most intelligent

instructions to division commanders, he would go in with one division,

holding the others in reserve until he could superintend their movements

in person also, forgetting that division commanders could execute an

order without his presence. His difficulty was constitutional and

beyond his control. He was an officer of superior ability, quick

perceptions, and personal courage to accomplish anything that could be

done with a small command.

Lee had ordered Hill's corps--now commanded by Early--to move by the

very road we had marched upon. This shows that even early in the

morning of the 8th Lee had not yet become acquainted with my move, but

still thought that the Army of the Potomac had gone to Fredericksburg.

Indeed, he informed the authorities at Richmond he had possession of

Spottsylvania and was on my flank. Anderson was in possession of

Spottsylvania, through no foresight of Lee, however. Early only found

that he had been following us when he ran against Hancock at Todd's

Tavern. His coming detained Hancock from the battle-field of

Spottsylvania for that day; but he, in like manner, kept Early back and

forced him to move by another route.

Had I ordered the movement for the night of the 7th by my left flank, it

would have put Hancock in the lead. It would also have given us an hour

or earlier start. It took all that time for Warren to get the head of

his column to the left of Hancock after he had got his troops out of

their line confronting the enemy. This hour, and Hancock's capacity to

use his whole force when necessary, would, no doubt, have enabled him to

crush Anderson before he could be reinforced. But the movement made was

tactical. It kept the troops in mass against a possible assault by the

enemy. Our left occupied its intrenchments while the two corps to the

right passed. If an attack had been made by the enemy he would have

found the 2d corps in position, fortified, and, practically, the 5th and

6th corps in position as reserves, until his entire front was passed.

By a left flank movement the army would have been scattered while still

passing the front of the enemy, and before the extreme right had got by

it would have been very much exposed. Then, too, I had not yet learned

the special qualifications of the different corps commanders. At that

time my judgment was that Warren was the man I would suggest to succeed

Meade should anything happen to that gallant soldier to take him from

the field. As I have before said, Warren was a gallant soldier, an able

man; and he was beside thoroughly imbued with the solemnity and

importance of the duty he had to perform.

CHAPTER LII.

BATTLE OF SPOTTSYLVANIA--HANCOCK'S POSITION--ASSAULT OF WARREN'S AND

WRIGHT'S CORPS--UPTON PROMOTED ON THE FIELD--GOOD NEWS FROM BUTLER AND

SHERIDAN.

The Mattapony River is formed by the junction of the Mat, the Ta, the Po

and the Ny rivers, the last being the northernmost of the four. It

takes its rise about a mile south and a little east of the Wilderness

Tavern. The Po rises south-west of the place, but farther away.

Spottsylvania is on the ridge dividing these two streams, and where they

are but a few miles apart. The Brock Road reaches Spottsylvania without

crossing either of these streams. Lee's army coming up by the Catharpin

Road, had to cross the Po at Wooden Bridge. Warren and Hancock came by

the Brock Road. Sedgwick crossed the Ny at Catharpin Furnace. Burnside

coming by Aldrich's to Gates's house, had to cross the Ny near the

enemy. He found pickets at the bridge, but they were soon driven off by

a brigade of Willcox's division, and the stream was crossed. This

brigade was furiously attacked; but the remainder of the division coming

up, they were enabled to hold their position, and soon fortified it.

About the time I received the news of this attack, word came from

Hancock that Early had left his front. He had been forced over to the

Catharpin Road, crossing the Po at Corbin's and again at Wooden Bridge.

These are the bridges Sheridan had given orders to his cavalry to occupy

on the 8th, while one division should occupy Spottsylvania. These

movements of the enemy gave me the idea that Lee was about to make the

attempt to get to, or towards, Fredericksburg to cut off my supplies. I

made arrangements to attack his right and get between him and Richmond

if he should try to execute this design. If he had any such intention

it was abandoned as soon as Burnside was established south of the Ny.

The Po and the Ny are narrow little streams, but deep, with abrupt

banks, and bordered by heavily wooded and marshy bottoms--at the time we

were there--and difficult to cross except where bridged. The country

about was generally heavily timbered, but with occasional clearings. It

was a much better country to conduct a defensive campaign in than an

offensive one.

By noon of the 9th the position of the two armies was as follows: Lee

occupied a semicircle facing north, north-west and north-east, inclosing

the town. Anderson was on his left extending to the Po, Ewell came

next, then Early. Warren occupied our right, covering the Brock and

other roads converging at Spottsylvania; Sedgwick was to his left and

Burnside on our extreme left. Hancock was yet back at Todd's Tavern,

but as soon as it was known that Early had left Hancock's front the

latter was ordered up to Warren's right. He formed a line with three

divisions on the hill overlooking the Po early in the afternoon, and was

ordered to cross the Po and get on the enemy's flank. The fourth

division of Hancock's corps, Mott commanding, was left at Todd's when

the corps first came up; but in the afternoon it was brought up and

placed to the left of Sedgwick's--now Wright's--6th corps. In the

morning General Sedgwick had been killed near the right of his

intrenchments by rebel sharpshooters. His loss was a severe one to the

Army of the Potomac and to the Nation. General H. G. Wright succeeded

him in the command of his corps.

Hancock was now, nine P.M. of the 9th of May, across the left flank of

Lee's army, but separated from it, and also from the remainder of

Meade's army, by the Po River. But for the lateness of the hour and the

darkness of the night he would have attempted to cross the river again

at Wooden Bridge, thus bringing himself on the same side with both

friend and foe.

The Po at the points where Hancock's corps crossed runs nearly due east.

Just below his lower crossing--the troops crossed at three points--it

turns due south, and after passing under Wooden Bridge soon resumes a

more easterly direction. During the night this corps built three

bridges over the Po; but these were in rear.

The position assumed by Hancock's corps forced Lee to reinforce his left

during the night. Accordingly on the morning of the 10th, when Hancock

renewed his effort to get over the Po to his front, he found himself

confronted by some of Early's command, which had been brought from the

extreme right of the enemy during the night. He succeeded in effecting

a crossing with one brigade, however, but finding the enemy intrenched

in his front, no more were crossed.

Hancock reconnoitred his front on the morning of the 10th, with the view

of forcing a crossing, if it was found that an advantage could be

gained. The enemy was found strongly intrenched on the high ground

overlooking the river, and commanding the Wooden Bridge with artillery.

Anderson's left rested on the Po, where it turns south; therefore, for

Hancock to cross over--although it would bring him to the same side of

the stream with the rest of the army--would still farther isolate him

from it. The stream would have to be crossed twice in the face of the

enemy to unite with the main body. The idea of crossing was therefore

abandoned.

Lee had weakened the other parts of his line to meet this movement of

Hancock's, and I determined to take advantage of it. Accordingly in the

morning, orders were issued for an attack in the afternoon on the centre

by Warren's and Wright's corps, Hancock to command all the attacking

force. Two of his divisions were brought to the north side of the Po.

Gibbon was placed to the right of Warren, and Birney in his rear as a

reserve. Barlow's division was left south of the stream, and Mott of

the same corps was still to the left of Wright's corps. Burnside was

ordered to reconnoitre his front in force, and, if an opportunity

presented, to attack with vigor. The enemy seeing Barlow's division

isolated from the rest of the army, came out and attacked with fury.

Barlow repulsed the assault with great slaughter, and with considerable

loss to himself. But the enemy reorganized and renewed the assault.

Birney was now moved to the high ground overlooking the river crossings

built by our troops, and covered the crossings. The second assault was

repulsed, again with severe loss to the enemy, and Barlow was withdrawn

without further molestation. General T. G. Stevenson was killed in this

move.

Between the lines, where Warren's assault was to take place, there was a

ravine grown up with large trees and underbrush, making it almost

impenetrable by man. The slopes on both sides were also covered with a

heavy growth of timber. Warren, before noon, reconnoitred his front

twice, the first time with one and the second with two divisions. He

was repulsed on both occasions, but gained such information of the

ground as to induce him to report recommending the assault.

Wright also reconnoitred his front and gained a considerably advanced

position from the one he started from. He then organized a storming

party, consisting of twelve regiments, and assigned Colonel Emory Upton,

of the 121st New York Volunteers, to the command of it. About four

o'clock in the afternoon the assault was ordered, Warren's and Wright's

corps, with Mott's division of Hancock's corps, to move simultaneously.

The movement was prompt, and in a few minutes the fiercest of struggles

began. The battle-field was so densely covered with forest that but

little could be seen, by any one person, as to the progress made. Meade

and I occupied the best position we could get, in rear of Warren.

Warren was repulsed with heavy loss, General J. C. Rice being among the

killed. He was not followed, however, by the enemy, and was thereby

enabled to reorganize his command as soon as covered from the guns of

the enemy. To the left our success was decided, but the advantage was

lost by the feeble action of Mott. Upton with his assaulting party

pushed forward and crossed the enemy's intrenchments. Turning to the

right and left he captured several guns and some hundreds of prisoners.

Mott was ordered to his assistance but failed utterly. So much time was

lost in trying to get up the troops which were in the right position to

reinforce, that I ordered Upton to withdraw; but the officers and men of

his command were so averse to giving up the advantage they had gained

that I withdrew the order. To relieve them, I ordered a renewal of the

assault. By this time Hancock, who had gone with Birney's division to

relieve Barlow, had returned, bringing the division with him. His corps

was now joined with Warren's and Wright's in this last assault. It was

gallantly made, many men getting up to, and over, the works of the

enemy; but they were not able to hold them. At night they were

withdrawn. Upton brought his prisoners with him, but the guns he had

captured he was obliged to abandon. Upton had gained an important

advantage, but a lack in others of the spirit and dash possessed by him

lost it to us. Before leaving Washington I had been authorized to

promote officers on the field for special acts of gallantry. By this

authority I conferred the rank of brigadier-general upon Upton on the

spot, and this act was confirmed by the President. Upton had been badly

wounded in this fight.

Burnside on the left had got up to within a few hundred yards of

Spottsylvania Court House, completely turning Lee's right. He was not

aware of the importance of the advantage he had gained, and I, being

with the troops where the heavy fighting was, did not know of it at the

time. He had gained his position with but little fighting, and almost

without loss. Burnside's position now separated him widely from

Wright's corps, the corps nearest to him. At night he was ordered to

join on to this. This brought him back about a mile, and lost to us an

important advantage. I attach no blame to Burnside for this, but I do

to myself for not having had a staff officer with him to report to me

his position.

The enemy had not dared to come out of his line at any point to follow

up his advantage, except in the single instance of his attack on Barlow.

Then he was twice repulsed with heavy loss, though he had an entire

corps against two brigades. Barlow took up his bridges in the presence

of this force.

On the 11th there was no battle and but little firing; none except by

Mott who made a reconnoissance to ascertain if there was a weak point in

the enemy's line.

I wrote the following letter to General Halleck:

NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H., May 11, 1864--8.30 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington, D. C.

We have now ended the 6th day of very hard fighting. The result up to

this time is much in our favor. But our losses have been heavy as well

as those of the enemy. We have lost to this time eleven general

officers killed, wounded and missing, and probably twenty thousand men.

I think the loss of the enemy must be greater--we having taken over four

thousand prisoners in battle, whilst he has taken from us but few except

a few stragglers. I am now sending back to Belle Plain all my wagons

for a fresh supply of provisions and ammunition, and purpose to fight it

out on this line if it takes all summer.

The arrival of reinforcements here will be very encouraging to the men,

and I hope they will be sent as fast as possible, and in as great

numbers. My object in having them sent to Belle Plain was to use them

as an escort to our supply trains. If it is more convenient to send

them out by train to march from the railroad to Belle Plain or

Fredericksburg, send them so.

I am satisfied the enemy are very shaky, and are only kept up to the

mark by the greatest exertions on the part of their officers, and by

keeping them intrenched in every position they take.

Up to this time there is no indication of any portion of Lee's army

being detached for the defence of Richmond.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

And also, I received information, through the War Department, from

General Butler that his cavalry under Kautz had cut the railroad south

of Petersburg, separating Beauregard from Richmond, and had whipped

Hill, killing, wounding and capturing many. Also that he was

intrenched, and could maintain himself. On this same day came news from

Sheridan to the effect that he had destroyed ten miles of the railroad

and telegraph between Lee and Richmond, one and a half million rations,

and most of the medical stores for his army.

On the 8th I had directed Sheridan verbally to cut loose from the Army

of the Potomac and pass around the left of Lee's army and attack his

cavalry and communications, which was successfully executed in the

manner I have already described.

CHAPTER LIII.

HANCOCK'S ASSAULT-LOSSES OF THE CONFEDERATES--PROMOTIONS RECOMMENDED

--DISCOMFITURE OF THE ENEMY--EWELL'S ATTACK-REDUCING THE ARTILLERY.

In the reconnoissance made by Mott on the 11th, a salient was discovered

at the right centre. I determined that an assault should be made at that

point. (*28) Accordingly in the afternoon Hancock was ordered to move

his command by the rear of Warren and Wright, under cover of night, to

Wright's left, and there form it for an assault at four o'clock the next

morning. The night was dark, it rained heavily, and the road was

difficult, so that it was midnight when he reached the point where he

was to halt. It took most of the night to get the men in position for

their advance in the morning. The men got but little rest. Burnside

was ordered to attack (*29) on the left of the salient at the same hour.

I sent two of my staff officers to impress upon him the importance of

pushing forward vigorously. Hancock was notified of this. Warren and

Wright were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to join in the

assault if circumstances made it advisable. I occupied a central

position most convenient for receiving information from all points.

Hancock put Barlow on his left, in double column, and Birney to his

right. Mott followed Birney, and Gibbon was held in reserve.

The morning of the 12th opened foggy, delaying the start more than half

an hour.

The ground over which Hancock had to pass to reach the enemy, was

ascending and heavily wooded to within two or three hundred yards of the

enemy's intrenchments. In front of Birney there was also a marsh to

cross. But, notwithstanding all these difficulties, the troops pushed

on in quick time without firing a gun, and when within four or five

hundred yards of the enemy's line broke out in loud cheers, and with a

rush went up to and over the breastworks. Barlow and Birney entered

almost simultaneously. Here a desperate hand-to-hand conflict took

place. The men of the two sides were too close together to fire, but

used their guns as clubs. The hand conflict was soon over. Hancock's

corps captured some four thousand prisoners among them a division and a

brigade commander twenty or more guns with their horses, caissons, and

ammunition, several thousand stand of arms, and many colors. Hancock,

as soon as the hand-to-hand conflict was over, turned the guns of the

enemy against him and advanced inside the rebel lines. About six

o'clock I ordered Warren's corps to the support of Hancock's. Burnside,

on the left, had advanced up east of the salient to the very parapet of

the enemy. Potter, commanding one of his divisions, got over but was

not able to remain there. However, he inflicted a heavy loss upon the

enemy; but not without loss in return.

This victory was important, and one that Lee could not afford to leave

us in full possession of. He made the most strenuous efforts to regain

the position he had lost. Troops were brought up from his left and

attacked Hancock furiously. Hancock was forced to fall back: but he

did so slowly, with his face to the enemy, inflicting on him heavy loss,

until behind the breastworks he had captured. These he turned, facing

them the other way, and continued to hold. Wright was ordered up to

reinforce Hancock, and arrived by six o'clock. He was wounded soon

after coming up but did not relinquish the command of his corps,

although the fighting lasted until one o'clock the next morning. At

eight o'clock Warren was ordered up again, but was so slow in making his

dispositions that his orders were frequently repeated, and with

emphasis. At eleven o'clock I gave Meade written orders to relieve

Warren from his command if he failed to move promptly. Hancock placed

batteries on high ground in his rear, which he used against the enemy,

firing over the heads of his own troops.

Burnside accomplished but little on our left of a positive nature, but

negatively a great deal. He kept Lee from reinforcing his centre from

that quarter. If the 5th corps, or rather if Warren, had been as prompt

as Wright was with the 6th corps, better results might have been

obtained.

Lee massed heavily from his left flank on the broken point of his line.

Five times during the day he assaulted furiously, but without dislodging

our troops from their new position. His losses must have been fearful.

Sometimes the belligerents would be separated by but a few feet. In one

place a tree, eighteen inches in diameter, was cut entirely down by

musket balls. All the trees between the lines were very much cut to

pieces by artillery and musketry. It was three o'clock next morning

before the fighting ceased. Some of our troops had then been twenty

hours under fire. In this engagement we did not lose a single

organization, not even a company. The enemy lost one division with its

commander, one brigade and one regiment, with heavy losses

elsewhere.(*30) Our losses were heavy, but, as stated, no whole company

was captured. At night Lee took a position in rear of his former one,

and by the following morning he was strongly intrenched in it.

Warren's corps was now temporarily broken up, Cutler's division sent to

Wright, and Griffin's to Hancock. Meade ordered his chief of staff,

General Humphreys, to remain with Warren and the remaining division, and

authorized him to give it orders in his name.

During the day I was passing along the line from wing to wing

continuously. About the centre stood a house which proved to be

occupied by an old lady and her daughter. She showed such unmistakable

signs of being strongly Union that I stopped. She said she had not seen

a Union flag for so long a time that it did her heart good to look upon

it again. She said her husband and son, being, Union men, had had to

leave early in the war, and were now somewhere in the Union army, if

alive. She was without food or nearly so, so I ordered rations issued

to her, and promised to find out if I could where the husband and son

were.

There was no fighting on the 13th, further than a little skirmishing

between Mott's division and the enemy. I was afraid that Lee might be

moving out, and I did not want him to go without my knowing it. The

indications were that he was moving, but it was found that he was only

taking his new position back from the salient that had been captured.

Our dead were buried this day. Mott's division was reduced to a

brigade, and assigned to Birney's division.

During this day I wrote to Washington recommending Sherman and Meade

(*31) for promotion to the grade of Major-General in the regular army;

Hancock for Brigadier-General; Wright, Gibbon and Humphreys to be

Major-Generals of Volunteers; and Upton and Carroll to be Brigadiers.

Upton had already been named as such, but the appointment had to be

confirmed by the Senate on the nomination of the President.

The night of the 13th Warren and Wright were moved by the rear to the

left of Burnside. The night was very dark and it rained heavily, the

roads were so bad that the troops had to cut trees and corduroy the road

a part of the way, to get through. It was midnight before they got to

the point where they were to halt, and daylight before the troops could

be organized to advance to their position in line. They gained their

position in line, however, without any fighting, except a little in

Wright's front. Here Upton had to contend for an elevation which we

wanted and which the enemy was not disposed to yield. Upton first drove

the enemy, and was then repulsed in turn. Ayres coming to his support

with his brigade (of Griffin's division, Warren's corps), the position

was secured and fortified. There was no more battle during the 14th.

This brought our line east of the Court House and running north and

south and facing west.

During the night of the 14th-15th Lee moved to cover this new front.

This left Hancock without an enemy confronting him. He was brought to

the rear of our new centre, ready to be moved in any direction he might

be wanted.

On the 15th news came from Butler and Averill. The former reported the

capture of the outer works at Drury's Bluff, on the James River, and

that his cavalry had cut the railroad and telegraph south of Richmond on

the Danville road: and the latter, the destruction of a depot of

supplies at Dublin, West Virginia, and the breaking of New River Bridge

on the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad. The next day news came from

Sherman and Sheridan. Sherman had forced Johnston out of Dalton,

Georgia, and was following him south. The report from Sheridan embraced

his operations up to his passing the outer defences of Richmond. The

prospect must now have been dismal in Richmond. The road and telegraph

were cut between the capital and Lee. The roads and wires were cut in

every direction from the rebel capital. Temporarily that city was cut

off from all communication with the outside except by courier. This

condition of affairs, however, was of but short duration.

I wrote Halleck:

NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H., May 16, 1864, 8 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Washington, D. C.:

We have had five days almost constant rain without any prospect yet of

it clearing up. The roads have now become so impassable that ambulances

with wounded men can no longer run between here and Fredericksburg. All

offensive operations necessarily cease until we can have twenty-four

hours of dry weather. The army is in the best of spirits, and feel the

greatest confidence of ultimate success. * * * *

* * You can assure the President and Secretary of War that the

elements alone have suspended hostilities, and that it is in no manner

due to weakness or exhaustion on our part.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

The condition of the roads was such that nothing was done on the 17th.

But that night Hancock and Wright were to make a night march back to

their old positions, and to make an assault at four o'clock in the

morning. Lee got troops back in time to protect his old line, so the

assault was unsuccessful. On this day (18th) the news was almost as

discouraging to us as it had been two days before in the rebel capital.

As stated above, Hancock's and Wright's corps had made an unsuccessful

assault. News came that Sigel had been defeated at New Market, badly,

and was retreating down the valley. Not two hours before, I had sent

the inquiry to Halleck whether Sigel could not get to Staunton to stop

supplies coming from there to Lee. I asked at once that Sigel might be

relieved, and some one else put in his place. Hunter's name was

suggested, and I heartily approved. Further news from Butler reported

him driven from Drury's Bluff, but still in possession of the Petersburg

road. Banks had been defeated in Louisiana, relieved, and Canby put in

his place. This change of commander was not on my suggestion. All this

news was very discouraging. All of it must have been known by the enemy

before it was by me. In fact, the good news (for the enemy) must have

been known to him at the moment I thought he was in despair, and his

anguish had been already relieved when we were enjoying his supposed

discomfiture, But this was no time for repining. I immediately gave

orders for a movement by the left flank, on towards Richmond, to

commence on the night of the 19th. I also asked Halleck to secure the

cooperation of the navy in changing our base of supplies from

Fredericksburg to Port Royal, on the Rappahannock.

Up to this time I had received no reinforcements, except six thousand

raw troops under Brigadier General Robert O. Tyler, just arrived. They

had not yet joined their command, Hancock's corps, but were on our

right. This corps had been brought to the rear of the centre, ready to

move in any direction. Lee, probably suspecting some move on my part,

and seeing our right entirely abandoned, moved Ewell's corps about five

o'clock in the afternoon, with Early's as a reserve, to attack us in

that quarter. Tyler had come up from Fredericksburg, and had been

halted on the road to the right of our line, near Kitching's brigade of

Warren's corps. Tyler received the attack with his raw troops, and they

maintained their position, until reinforced, in a manner worthy of

veterans.

Hancock was in a position to reinforce speedily, and was the soldier to

do it without waiting to make dispositions. Birney was thrown to

Tyler's right and Crawford to his left, with Gibbon as a reserve; and

Ewell was whirled back speedily and with heavy loss.

Warren had been ordered to get on Ewell's flank and in his rear, to cut

him off from his intrenchments. But his efforts were so feeble that

under the cover of night Ewell got back with only the loss of a few

hundred prisoners, besides his killed and wounded. The army being

engaged until after dark, I rescinded the order for the march by our

left flank that night.

As soon as it was discovered that the enemy were coming out to attack, I

naturally supposed they would detach a force to destroy our trains. The

withdrawal of Hancock from the right uncovered one road from

Spottsylvania to Fredericksburg over which trains drew our supplies.

This was guarded by a division of colored troops, commanded by General

Ferrero, belonging to Burnside's corps. Ferrero was therefore promptly

notified, and ordered to throw his cavalry pickets out to the south and

be prepared to meet the enemy if he should come; if he had to retreat to

do so towards Fredericksburg. The enemy did detach as expected, and

captured twenty-five or thirty wagons which, however, were soon retaken.

In consequence of the disasters that had befallen us in the past few

days, Lee could be reinforced largely, and I had no doubt he would be.

Beauregard had come up from the south with troops to guard the

Confederate capital when it was in danger. Butler being driven back,

most of the troops could be sent to Lee. Hoke was no longer needed in

North Carolina; and Sigel's troops having gone back to Cedar Creek,

whipped, many troops could be spared from the valley.

The Wilderness and Spottsylvania battles convinced me that we had more

artillery than could ever be brought into action at any one time. It

occupied much of the road in marching, and taxed the trains in bringing

up forage. Artillery is very useful when it can be brought into action,

but it is a very burdensome luxury where it cannot be used. Before

leaving Spottsylvania, therefore, I sent back to the defences of

Washington over one hundred pieces of artillery, with the horses and

caissons. This relieved the roads over which we were to march of more

than two hundred six-horse teams, and still left us more artillery than

could be advantageously used. In fact, before reaching the James River

I again reduced the artillery with the army largely.

I believed that, if one corps of the army was exposed on the road to

Richmond, and at a distance from the main army, Lee would endeavor to

attack the exposed corps before reinforcements could come up; in which

case the main army could follow Lee up and attack him before he had time

to intrench. So I issued the following orders:

NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H., VA., May 18, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac.

Before daylight to-morrow morning I propose to draw Hancock and Burnside

from the position they now hold, and put Burnside to the left of Wright.

Wright and Burnside should then force their way up as close to the enemy

as they can get without a general engagement, or with a general

engagement if the enemy will come out of their works to fight, and

intrench. Hancock should march and take up a position as if in support

of the two left corps. To-morrow night, at twelve or one o'clock, he

will be moved south-east with all his force and as much cavalry as can

be given to him, to get as far towards Richmond on the line of the

Fredericksburg Railroad as he can make, fighting the enemy in whatever

force he can find him. If the enemy make a general move to meet this,

they will be followed by the other three corps of the army, and

attacked, if possible, before time is given to intrench.

Suitable directions will at once be given for all trains and surplus

artillery to conform to this movement.

U. S. GRANT.

On the 20th, Lee showing no signs of coming out of his lines, orders

were renewed for a left-flank movement, to commence after night.

CHAPTER LIV.

MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT FLANK--BATTLE OF NORTH ANNA--AN INCIDENT OF THE

MARCH--MOVING ON RICHMOND--SOUTH OF THE PAMUNKEY--POSITION OF THE

NATIONAL ARMY.

We were now to operate in a different country from any we had before

seen in Virginia. The roads were wide and good, and the country well

cultivated. No men were seen except those bearing arms, even the black

man having been sent away. The country, however, was new to us, and we

had neither guides nor maps to tell us where the roads were, or where

they led to. Engineer and staff officers were put to the dangerous duty

of supplying the place of both maps and guides. By reconnoitring they

were enabled to locate the roads in the vicinity of each army corps.

Our course was south, and we took all roads leading in that direction

which would not separate the army too widely.

Hancock who had the lead had marched easterly to Guiney's Station, on

the Fredericksburg Railroad, thence southerly to Bowling Green and

Milford. He was at Milford by the night of the 21st. Here he met a

detachment of Pickett's division coming from Richmond to reinforce Lee.

They were speedily driven away, and several hundred captured. Warren

followed on the morning of the 21st, and reached Guiney's Station that

night without molestation. Burnside and Wright were retained at

Spottsylvania to keep up the appearance of an intended assault, and to

hold Lee, if possible, while Hancock and Warren should get start enough

to interpose between him and Richmond.

Lee had now a superb opportunity to take the initiative either by

attacking Wright and Burnside alone, or by following by the Telegraph

Road and striking Hancock's and Warren's corps, or even Hancock's alone,

before reinforcements could come up. But he did not avail himself of

either opportunity. He seemed really to be misled as to my designs; but

moved by his interior line--the Telegraph Road--to make sure of keeping

between his capital and the Army of the Potomac. He never again had

such an opportunity of dealing a heavy blow.

The evening of the 21st Burnside, 9th corps, moved out followed by

Wright, 6th corps. Burnside was to take the Telegraph Road; but finding

Stanard's Ford, over the Po, fortified and guarded, he turned east to

the road taken by Hancock and Warren without an attempt to dislodge the

enemy. The night of the 21st I had my headquarters near the 6th corps,

at Guiney's Station, and the enemy's cavalry was between us and Hancock.

There was a slight attack on Burnside's and Wright's corps as they moved

out of their lines; but it was easily repulsed. The object probably was

only to make sure that we were not leaving a force to follow upon the

rear of the Confederates.

By the morning of the 22d Burnside and Wright were at Guiney's Station.

Hancock's corps had now been marching and fighting continuously for

several days, not having had rest even at night much of the time. They

were, therefore, permitted to rest during the 22d. But Warren was

pushed to Harris's Store, directly west of Milford, and connected with

it by a good road, and Burnside was sent to New Bethel Church. Wright's

corps was still back at Guiney's Station.

I issued the following order for the movement of the troops the next

day:

NEW BETHEL, VA., May 22, 1864

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac.

Direct corps commanders to hold their troops in readiness to march at

five A.M. to-morrow. At that hour each command will send out cavalry

and infantry on all roads to their front leading south, and ascertain,

if possible, where the enemy is. If beyond the South Anna, the 5th and

6th corps will march to the forks of the road, where one branch leads to

Beaver Dam Station, the other to Jericho Bridge, then south by roads

reaching the Anna, as near to and east of Hawkins Creek as they can be

found.

The 2d corps will move to Chesterfield Ford. The 9th corps will be

directed to move at the same time to Jericho Bridge. The map only shows

two roads for the four corps to march upon, but, no doubt, by the use of

plantation roads, and pressing in guides, others can be found, to give

one for each corps.

The troops will follow their respective reconnoitring parties. The

trains will be moved at the same time to Milford Station.

Headquarters will follow the 9th corps.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

Warren's corps was moved from Harris's Store to Jericho Ford, Wright's

following. Warren arrived at the ford early in the afternoon, and by

five o'clock effected a crossing under the protection of sharpshooters.

The men had to wade in water up to their waists. As soon as enough

troops were over to guard the ford, pontoons were laid and the artillery

and the rest of the troops crossed. The line formed was almost

perpendicular to the course of the river--Crawford on the left, next to

the river, Griffin in the centre, and Cutler on the right. Lee was

found intrenched along the front of their line. The whole of Hill's

corps was sent against Warren's right before it had got in position. A

brigade of Cutler's division was driven back, the enemy following, but

assistance coming up the enemy was in turn driven back into his trenches

with heavy loss in killed and wounded, with about five hundred prisoners

left in our hands. By night Wright's corps was up ready to reinforce

Warren.

On the 23d Hancock's corps was moved to the wooden bridge which spans

the North Anna River just west of where the Fredericksburg Railroad

crosses. It was near night when the troops arrived. They found the

bridge guarded, with troops intrenched, on the north side. Hancock sent

two brigades, Egan's and Pierce's, to the right and left, and when

properly disposed they charged simultaneously. The bridge was carried

quickly, the enemy retreating over it so hastily that many were shoved

into the river, and some of them were drowned. Several hundred

prisoners were captured. The hour was so late that Hancock did not

cross until next morning.

Burnside's corps was moved by a middle road running between those

described above, and which strikes the North Anna at Ox Ford, midway

between Telegraph Road and Jericho Ford. The hour of its arrival was

too late to cross that night.

On the 24th Hancock's corps crossed to the south side of the river

without opposition, and formed line facing nearly west. The railroad in

rear was taken possession of and destroyed as far as possible. Wright's

corps crossed at Jericho early the same day, and took position to the

right of Warren's corps, extending south of the Virginia Central

Railroad. This road was torn up for a considerable distance to the rear

(west), the ties burned, and the rails bent and twisted by heating them

over the burning ties. It was found, however, that Burnside's corps

could not cross at Ox Ford. Lee had taken a position with his centre on

the river at this point, with the two wings thrown back, his line making

an acute angle where it overlooked the river.

Before the exact position of the whole of Lee's line was accurately

known, I directed Hancock and Warren each to send a brigade to Ox Ford

by the south side of the river. They found the enemy too strong to

justify a serious attack. A third ford was found between Ox Ford and

Jericho. Burnside was directed to cross a division over this ford, and

to send one division to Hancock. Crittenden was crossed by this

newly-discovered ford, and formed up the river to connect with

Crawford's left. Potter joined Hancock by way of the wooden bridge.

Crittenden had a severe engagement with some of Hill's corps on his

crossing the river, and lost heavily. When joined to Warren's corps he

was no further molested. Burnside still guarded Ox Ford from the north

side.

Lee now had his entire army south of the North Anna. Our lines covered

his front, with the six miles separating the two wings guarded by but a

single division. To get from one wing to the other the river would have

to be crossed twice. Lee could reinforce any part of his line from all

points of it in a very short march; or could concentrate the whole of it

wherever he might choose to assault. We were, for the time, practically

two armies besieging.

Lee had been reinforced, and was being reinforced, largely. About this

time the very troops whose coming I had predicted, had arrived or were

coming in. Pickett with a full division from Richmond was up; Hoke from

North Carolina had come with a brigade; and Breckinridge was there: in

all probably not less than fifteen thousand men. But he did not attempt

to drive us from the field.

On the 22d or 23d I received dispatches from Washington saying that

Sherman had taken Kingston, crossed the Etowah River and was advancing

into Georgia.

I was seated at the time on the porch of a fine plantation house waiting

for Burnside's corps to pass. Meade and his staff, besides my own

staff, were with me. The lady of the house, a Mrs. Tyler, and an

elderly lady, were present. Burnside seeing us, came up on the porch,

his big spurs and saber rattling as he walked. He touched his hat

politely to the ladies, and remarked that he supposed they had never

seen so many "live Yankees" before in their lives. The elderly lady

spoke up promptly saying, "Oh yes, I have; many more." "Where?" said

Burnside. "In Richmond." Prisoners, of course, was understood.

I read my dispatch aloud, when it was received. This threw the younger

lady into tears. I found the information she had received (and I suppose

it was the information generally in circulation through the South) was

that Lee was driving us from the State in the most demoralized condition

and that in the South-west our troops were but little better than

prisoners of war. Seeing our troops moving south was ocular proof that

a part of her information was incorrect, and she asked me if my news

from Sherman was true. I assured her that there was no doubt about it.

I left a guard to protect the house from intrusion until the troops

should have all passed, and assured her that if her husband was in

hiding she could bring him in and he should be protected also. But I

presume he was in the Confederate army.

On the 25th I gave orders, through Halleck, to Hunter, who had relieved

Sigel, to move up the Valley of Virginia, cross over the Blue Ridge to

Charlottesville and go as far as Lynchburg if possible, living upon the

country and cutting the railroads and canal as he went. After doing

this he could find his way back to his base, or join me.

On the same day news was received that Lee was falling back on Richmond.

This proved not to be true. But we could do nothing where we were

unless Lee would assume the offensive. I determined, therefore, to draw

out of our present position and make one more effort to get between him

and Richmond. I had no expectation now, however, of succeeding in this;

but I did expect to hold him far enough west to enable me to reach the

James River high up. Sheridan was now again with the Army of the

Potomac.

On the 26th I informed the government at Washington of the position of

the two armies; of the reinforcements the enemy had received; of the

move I proposed to make (*32); and directed that our base of supplies

should be shifted to White House, on the Pamunkey. The wagon train and

guards moved directly from Port Royal to White House. Supplies moved

around by water, guarded by the navy. Orders had previously been sent,

through Halleck, for Butler to send Smith's corps to White House. This

order was repeated on the 25th, with directions that they should be

landed on the north side of the Pamunkey, and marched until they joined

the Army of the Potomac.

It was a delicate move to get the right wing of the Army of the Potomac

from its position south of the North Anna in the presence of the enemy.

To accomplish it, I issued the following order:

QUARLES' MILLS, VA., May 25, 1864.

MAJOR GENERAL MEADE, Commanding A. P.

Direct Generals Warren and Wright to withdraw all their teams and

artillery, not in position, to the north side of the river to-morrow.

Send that belonging to General Wright's corps as far on the road to

Hanover Town as it can go, without attracting attention to the fact.

Send with it Wright's best division or division under his ablest

commander. Have their places filled up in the line so if possible the

enemy will not notice their withdrawal. Send the cavalry to-morrow

afternoon, or as much of it as you may deem necessary, to watch and

seize, if they can, Littlepage's Bridge and Taylor's Ford, and to remain

on one or other side of the river at these points until the infantry and

artillery all pass. As soon as it is dark to-morrow night start the

division which you withdraw first from Wright's corps to make a forced

march to Hanover Town, taking with them no teams to impede their march.

At the same time this division starts commence withdrawing all of the

5th and 6th corps from the south side of the river, and march them for

the same place. The two divisions of the 9th corps not now with

Hancock, may be moved down the north bank of the river where they will

be handy to support Hancock if necessary, or will be that much on their

road to follow the 5th and 6th corps. Hancock should hold his command

in readiness to follow as soon as the way is clear for him. To-morrow it

will leave nothing for him to do, but as soon as he can he should get

all his teams and spare artillery on the road or roads which he will

have to take. As soon as the troops reach Hanover Town they should get

possession of all the crossings they can in that neighborhood. I think

it would be well to make a heavy cavalry demonstration on the enemy's

left, to-morrow afternoon, also.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

Wilson's division of cavalry was brought up from the left and moved by

our right south to Little River. Here he manoeuvred to give the

impression that we were going to attack the left flank of Lee's army.

Under cover of night our right wing was withdrawn to the north side of

the river, Lee being completely deceived by Wilson's feint. On the

afternoon of the 26th Sheridan moved, sending Gregg's and Torbert's

cavalry to Taylor's and Littlepage's fords towards Hanover. As soon as

it was dark both divisions moved quietly to Hanover Ferry, leaving small

guards behind to keep up the impression that crossings were to be

attempted in the morning. Sheridan was followed by a division of

infantry under General Russell. On the morning of the 27th the crossing

was effected with but little loss, the enemy losing thirty or forty,

taken prisoners. Thus a position was secured south of the Pamunkey.

Russell stopped at the crossing while the cavalry pushed on to Hanover

Town. Here Barringer's, formerly Gordon's, brigade of rebel cavalry was

encountered, but it was speedily driven away.

Warren's and Wright's corps were moved by the rear of Burnside's and

Hancock's corps. When out of the way these latter corps followed,

leaving pickets confronting the enemy. Wilson's cavalry followed last,

watching all the fords until everything had recrossed; then taking up

the pontoons and destroying other bridges, became the rear-guard.

Two roads were traversed by the troops in this move. The one nearest to

and north of the North Anna and Pamunkey was taken by Wright, followed

by Hancock. Warren, followed by Burnside, moved by a road farther

north, and longer. The trains moved by a road still farther north, and

had to travel a still greater distance. All the troops that had crossed

the Pamunkey on the morning of the 27th remained quiet during the rest

of the day, while the troops north of that stream marched to reach the

crossing that had been secured for them.

Lee had evidently been deceived by our movement from North Anna; for on

the morning of the 27th he telegraphed to Richmond: "Enemy crossed to

north side, and cavalry and infantry crossed at Hanover Town." The

troops that had then crossed left his front the night of the 25th.

The country we were now in was a difficult one to move troops over. The

streams were numerous, deep and sluggish, sometimes spreading out into

swamps grown up with impenetrable growths of trees and underbrush. The

banks were generally low and marshy, making the streams difficult to

approach except where there were roads and bridges.

Hanover Town is about twenty miles from Richmond. There are two roads

leading there; the most direct and shortest one crossing the

Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge, near the Virginia Central Railroad, the

second going by New and Old Cold Harbor. A few miles out from Hanover

Town there is a third road by way of Mechanicsville to Richmond. New

Cold Harbor was important to us because while there we both covered the

roads back to White House (where our supplies came from), and the roads

south-east over which we would have to pass to get to the James River

below the Richmond defences.

On the morning of the 28th the army made an early start, and by noon all

had crossed except Burnside's corps. This was left on the north side

temporarily to guard the large wagon train. A line was at once formed

extending south from the river, Wright's corps on the right, Hancock's

in the centre, and Warren's on the left, ready to meet the enemy if he

should come.

At the same time Sheridan was directed to reconnoitre towards

Mechanicsville to find Lee's position. At Hawes' Shop, just where the

middle road leaves the direct road to Richmond, he encountered the

Confederate cavalry dismounted and partially intrenched. Gregg attacked

with his division, but was unable to move the enemy. In the evening

Custer came up with a brigade. The attack was now renewed, the cavalry

dismounting and charging as infantry. This time the assault was

successful, both sides losing a considerable number of men. But our

troops had to bury the dead, and found that more Confederate than Union

soldiers had been killed. The position was easily held, because our

infantry was near.

On the 29th a reconnoissance was made in force, to find the position of

Lee. Wright's corps pushed to Hanover Court House. Hancock's corps

pushed toward Totopotomoy Creek; Warren's corps to the left on the Shady

Grove Church Road, while Burnside was held in reserve. Our advance was

pushed forward three miles on the left with but little fighting. There

was now an appearance of a movement past our left flank, and Sheridan

was sent to meet it.

On the 30th Hancock moved to the Totopotomoy, where he found the enemy

strongly fortified. Wright was moved to the right of Hancock's corps,

and Burnside was brought forward and crossed, taking position to the

left of Hancock. Warren moved up near Huntley Corners on the Shady

Grove Church Road. There was some skirmishing along the centre, and in

the evening Early attacked Warren with some vigor, driving him back at

first, and threatening to turn our left flank. As the best means of

reinforcing the left, Hancock was ordered to attack in his front. He

carried and held the rifle-pits. While this was going on Warren got his

men up, repulsed Early, and drove him more than a mile.

On this day I wrote to Halleck ordering all the pontoons in Washington

to be sent to City Point.

In the evening news was received of the arrival of Smith with his corps

at White House. I notified Meade, in writing, as follows:

NEAR HAWES' SHOP, VA., 6.40 P.M., May 30, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, Commanding A. P.

General Smith will debark his force at the White House tonight and start

up the south bank of the Pamunkey at an early hour, probably at 3 A.M.

in the morning. It is not improbable that the enemy, being aware of

Smith's movement, will be feeling to get on our left flank for the

purpose of cutting him off, or by a dash to crush him and get back

before we are aware of it. Sheridan ought to be notified to watch the

enemy's movements well out towards Cold Harbor, and also on the

Mechanicsville road. Wright should be got well massed on Hancock's

right, so that, if it becomes necessary, he can take the place of the

latter readily whilst troops are being thrown east of the Totopotomoy if

necessary.

I want Sheridan to send a cavalry force of at least half a brigade, if

not a whole brigade, at 5 A.M. in the morning, to communicate with Smith

and to return with him. I will send orders for Smith by the messenger

you send to Sheridan with his orders.

U. S. GRANT.

I also notified Smith of his danger, and the precautions that would be

taken to protect him.

The night of the 30th Lee's position was substantially from Atlee's

Station on the Virginia Central Railroad south and east to the vicinity

of Cold Harbor. Ours was: The left of Warren's corps was on the Shady

Grove Road, extending to the Mechanicsville Road and about three miles

south of the Totopotomoy. Burnside to his right, then Hancock, and

Wright on the extreme right, extending towards Hanover Court House, six

miles south-east of it. Sheridan with two divisions of cavalry was

watching our left front towards Cold Harbor. Wilson with his division

on our right was sent to get on the Virginia Central Railroad and

destroy it as far back as possible. He got possession of Hanover Court

House the next day after a skirmish with Young's cavalry brigade. The

enemy attacked Sheridan's pickets, but reinforcements were sent up and

the attack was speedily repulsed and the enemy followed some distance

towards Cold Harbor.

CHAPTER LV.

ADVANCE ON COLD HARBOR--AN ANECDOTE OF THE WAR--BATTLE OF COLD HARBOR

--CORRESPONDENCE WITH LEE--RETROSPECTIVE.

On the 31st Sheridan advanced to near Old Cold Harbor. He found it

intrenched and occupied by cavalry and infantry. A hard fight ensued

but the place was carried. The enemy well knew the importance of Cold

Harbor to us, and seemed determined that we should not hold it. He

returned with such a large force that Sheridan was about withdrawing

without making any effort to hold it against such odds; but about the

time he commenced the evacuation he received orders to hold the place at

all hazards, until reinforcements could be sent to him. He speedily

turned the rebel works to face against them and placed his men in

position for defence. Night came on before the enemy was ready for

assault.

Wright's corps was ordered early in the evening to march directly to

Cold Harbor passing by the rear of the army. It was expected to arrive

by daylight or before; but the night was dark and the distance great, so

that it was nine o'clock the 1st of June before it reached its

destination. Before the arrival of Wright the enemy had made two

assaults on Sheridan, both of which were repulsed with heavy loss to the

enemy. Wright's corps coming up, there was no further assault on Cold

Harbor.

Smith, who was coming up from White House, was also directed to march

directly to Cold Harbor, and was expected early on the morning of the

1st of June; but by some blunder the order which reached Smith directed

him to Newcastle instead of Cold Harbor. Through this blunder Smith did

not reach his destination until three o'clock in the afternoon, and then

with tired and worn-out men from their long and dusty march. He landed

twelve thousand five hundred men from Butler's command, but a division

was left at White House temporarily and many men had fallen out of ranks

in their long march.

Before the removal of Wright's corps from our right, after dark on the

31st, the two lines, Federal and Confederate, were so close together at

that point that either side could detect directly any movement made by

the other. Finding at daylight that Wright had left his front, Lee

evidently divined that he had gone to our left. At all events, soon

after light on the 1st of June Anderson, who commanded the corps on

Lee's left, was seen moving along Warren's front. Warren was ordered to

attack him vigorously in flank, while Wright was directed to move out

and get on his front. Warren fired his artillery at the enemy; but lost

so much time in making ready that the enemy got by, and at three o'clock

he reported the enemy was strongly intrenched in his front, and besides

his lines were so long that he had no mass of troops to move with. He

seemed to have forgotten that lines in rear of an army hold themselves

while their defenders are fighting in their front. Wright reconnoitred

some distance to his front: but the enemy finding Old Cold Harbor

already taken had halted and fortified some distance west.

By six o'clock in the afternoon Wright and Smith were ready to make an

assault. In front of both the ground was clear for several hundred

yards and then became wooded. Both charged across this open space and

into the wood, capturing and holding the first line of rifle-pits of the

enemy, and also capturing seven or eight hundred prisoners.

While this was going on, the enemy charged Warren three separate times

with vigor, but were repulsed each time with loss. There was no officer

more capable, nor one more prompt in acting, than Warren when the enemy

forced him to it. There was also an attack upon Hancock's and

Burnside's corps at the same time; but it was feeble and probably only

intended to relieve Anderson who was being pressed by Wright and Smith.

During the night the enemy made frequent attacks with the view of

dispossessing us of the important position we had gained, but without

effecting their object.

Hancock was moved from his place in line during the night and ordered to

the left of Wright. I expected to take the offensive on the morning of

the 2d, but the night was so dark, the heat and dust so excessive and

the roads so intricate and hard to keep, that the head of column only

reached Old Cold Harbor at six o'clock, but was in position at 7.30 A.M.

Preparations were made for an attack in the afternoon, but did not take

place until the next morning. Warren's corps was moved to the left to

connect with Smith: Hancock's corps was got into position to the left

of Wright's, and Burnside was moved to Bethesda Church in reserve. While

Warren and Burnside were making these changes the enemy came out several

times and attacked them, capturing several hundred prisoners. The

attacks were repulsed, but not followed up as they should have been. I

was so annoyed at this that I directed Meade to instruct his corps

commanders that they should seize all such opportunities when they

occurred, and not wait for orders, all of our manoeuvres being made for

the very purpose of getting the enemy out of his cover.

On this day Wilson returned from his raid upon the Virginia Central

Railroad, having damaged it considerably. But, like ourselves, the

rebels had become experts in repairing such damage. Sherman, in his

memoirs, relates an anecdote of his campaign to Atlanta that well

illustrates this point. The rebel cavalry lurking in his rear to burn

bridges and obstruct his communications had become so disgusted at

hearing trains go whistling by within a few hours after a bridge had

been burned, that they proposed to try blowing up some of the tunnels.

One of them said, "No use, boys, Old Sherman carries duplicate tunnels

with him, and will replace them as fast as you can blow them up; better

save your powder."

Sheridan was engaged reconnoitring the banks of the Chickahominy, to

find crossings and the condition of the roads. He reported favorably.

During the night Lee moved his left up to make his line correspond to

ours. His lines extended now from the Totopotomoy to New Cold Harbor.

Mine from Bethesda Church by Old Cold Harbor to the Chickahominy, with a

division of cavalry guarding our right. An assault was ordered for the

3d, to be made mainly by the corps of Hancock, Wright and Smith; but

Warren and Burnside were to support it by threatening Lee's left, and to

attack with great earnestness if he should either reinforce more

threatened points by drawing from that quarter or if a favorable

opportunity should present itself.

The corps commanders were to select the points in their respective

fronts where they would make their assaults. The move was to commence

at half-past four in the morning. Hancock sent Barlow and Gibbon

forward at the appointed hour, with Birney as a reserve. Barlow pushed

forward with great vigor, under a heavy fire of both artillery and

musketry, through thickets and swamps. Notwithstanding all the

resistance of the enemy and the natural obstructions to overcome, he

carried a position occupied by the enemy outside their main line where

the road makes a deep cut through a bank affording as good a shelter for

troops as if it had been made for that purpose. Three pieces of

artillery had been captured here, and several hundred prisoners. The

guns were immediately turned against the men who had just been using

them. No (*33) assistance coming to him, he (Barlow) intrenched under

fire and continued to hold his place. Gibbon was not so fortunate in

his front. He found the ground over which he had to pass cut up with

deep ravines, and a morass difficult to cross. But his men struggled on

until some of them got up to the very parapet covering the enemy.

Gibbon gained ground much nearer the enemy than that which he left, and

here he intrenched and held fast.

Wright's corps moving in two lines captured the outer rifle-pits in

their front, but accomplished nothing more. Smith's corps also gained

the outer rifle-pits in its front. The ground over which this corps

(18th) had to move was the most exposed of any over which charges were

made. An open plain intervened between the contending forces at this

point, which was exposed both to a direct and a cross fire. Smith,

however, finding a ravine running towards his front, sufficiently deep

to protect men in it from cross fire, and somewhat from a direct fire,

put Martindale's division in it, and with Brooks supporting him on the

left and Devens on the right succeeded in gaining the outer--probably

picket--rifle-pits. Warren and Burnside also advanced and gained

ground--which brought the whole army on one line.

This assault cost us heavily and probably without benefit to compensate:

but the enemy was not cheered by the occurrence sufficiently to induce

him to take the offensive. In fact, nowhere after the battle of the

Wilderness did Lee show any disposition to leave his defences far behind

him.

Fighting was substantially over by half-past seven in the morning. At

eleven o'clock I started to visit all the corps commanders to see for

myself the different positions gained and to get their opinion of the

practicability of doing anything more in their respective fronts.

Hancock gave the opinion that in his front the enemy was too strong to

make any further assault promise success. Wright thought he could gain

the lines of the enemy, but it would require the cooperation of

Hancock's and Smith's corps. Smith thought a lodgment possible, but was

not sanguine: Burnside thought something could be done in his front,

but Warren differed. I concluded, therefore to make no more assaults,

and a little after twelve directed in the following letter that all

offensive action should cease.

COLD HARBOR, June 3, 1864.-12.30 P.M. MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,

Commanding A. P.

The opinion of corps commanders not being sanguine of success in case an

assault is ordered, you may direct a suspension of farther advance for

the present. Hold our most advanced positions and strengthen them.

Whilst on the defensive our line may be contracted from the right if

practicable.

Reconnoissances should be made in front of every corps and advances made

to advantageous positions by regular approaches. To aid the expedition

under General Hunter it is necessary that we should detain all the army

now with Lee until the former gets well on his way to Lynchburg. To do

this effectually it will be better to keep the enemy out of the

intrenchments of Richmond than to have them go back there.

Wright and Hancock should be ready to assault in case the enemy should

break through General Smith's lines, and all should be ready to resist

an assault.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

The remainder of the day was spent in strengthening the line we now

held. By night we were as strong against Lee as he was against us.

During the night the enemy quitted our right front, abandoning some of

their wounded, and without burying their dead. These we were able to

care for. But there were many dead and wounded men between the lines of

the contending forces, which were now close together, who could not be

cared for without a cessation of hostilities.

So I wrote the following:

COLD HARBOR, VA., June 5, 1864.

GENERAL R. E. LEE, Commanding Confederate Army.

It is reported to me that there are wounded men, probably of both

armies, now lying exposed and suffering between the lines occupied

respectively by the two armies. Humanity would dictate that some

provision should be made to provide against such hardships. I would

propose, therefore, that hereafter, when no battle is raging, either

party be authorized to send to any point between the pickets or skirmish

lines, unarmed men bearing litters to pick up their dead or wounded,

without being fired upon by the other party. Any other method, equally

fair to both parties, you may propose for meeting the end desired will

be accepted by me.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

Lee replied that he feared such an arrangement would lead to

misunderstanding, and proposed that in future, when either party wished

to remove their dead and wounded, a flag of truce be sent. I answered

this immediately by saying:

COLD HARBOR, VA., June 6, 1864.

GENERAL R. E. LEE, Commanding Army of N. Va.

Your communication of yesterday's date is received. I will send

immediately, as you propose, to collect the dead and wounded between the

lines of the two armies, and will also instruct that you be allowed to

do the same. I propose that the time for doing this be between the

hours of 12 M. and 3 P.M. to-day. I will direct all parties going out

to bear a white flag, and not to attempt to go beyond where we have dead

or wounded, and not beyond or on ground occupied by your troops.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

Lee's response was that he could not consent to the burial of the dead

and removal of the wounded in the way I proposed, but when either party

desired such permission it should be asked for by flag of truce and he

had directed that any parties I may have sent out, as mentioned in my

letter, to be turned back. I answered:

COLD HARBOR, VA, June 6, 1864.

GENERAL R. E. LEE. Commanding Army, N. Va.

The knowledge that wounded men are now suffering from want of attention,

between the two armies, compels me to ask a suspension of hostilities

for sufficient time to collect them in, say two hours. Permit me to say

that the hours you may fix upon for this will be agreeable to me, and

the same privilege will be extended to such parties as you may wish to

send out on the same duty without further application.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

Lee acceded to this; but delays in transmitting the correspondence

brought it to the 7th of June--forty-eight hours after it commenced

--before parties were got out to collect the men left upon the field.

In the meantime all but two of the wounded had died. And I wrote to

Lee:

COLD HARBOR, VA., June 7, 1864. 10.30 A.M.

GEN. R. E. LEE, Commanding Army of N. Va.

I regret that your note of seven P.M. yesterday should have been

received at the nearest corps headquarters, to where it was delivered,

after the hour which had been given for the removal of the dead and

wounded had expired; 10.45 P.M. was the hour at which it was received at

corps headquarters, and between eleven and twelve it reached my

headquarters. As a consequence, it was not understood by the troops of

this army that there was a cessation of hostilities for the purpose of

collecting the dead and wounded, and none were collected. Two officers

and six men of the 8th and 25th North Carolina Regts., who were out in

search of the bodies of officers of their respective regiments, were

captured and brought into our lines, owing to this want of

understanding. I regret this, but will state that as soon as I learned

the fact, I directed that they should not be held as prisoners, but must

be returned to their commands. These officers and men having been

carelessly brought through our lines to the rear have not determined

whether they will be sent back the way they came, or whether they will

be sent by some other route.

Regretting that all my efforts for alleviating the sufferings of wounded

men left upon the battle-field have been rendered nugatory, I remain,

&c.,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor was ever

made. I might say the same thing of the assault of the 22d of May,

1863, at Vicksburg. At Cold Harbor no advantage whatever was gained to

compensate for the heavy loss we sustained. Indeed, the advantages

other than those of relative losses, were on the Confederate side.

Before that, the Army of Northern Virginia seemed to have acquired a

wholesome regard for the courage, endurance, and soldierly qualities

generally of the Army of the Potomac. They no longer wanted to fight

them "one Confederate to five Yanks." Indeed, they seemed to have given

up any idea of gaining any advantage of their antagonist in the open

field. They had come to much prefer breastworks in their front to the

Army of the Potomac. This charge seemed to revive their hopes

temporarily; but it was of short duration. The effect upon the Army of

the Potomac was the reverse. When we reached the James River, however,

all effects of the battle of Cold Harbor seemed to have disappeared.

There was more justification for the assault at Vicksburg. We were in a

Southern climate, at the beginning of the hot season. The Army of the

Tennessee had won five successive victories over the garrison of

Vicksburg in the three preceding weeks. They had driven a portion of

that army from Port Gibson with considerable loss, after having flanked

them out of their stronghold at Grand Gulf. They had attacked another

portion of the same army at Raymond, more than fifty miles farther in

the interior of the State, and driven them back into Jackson with great

loss in killed, wounded, captured and missing, besides loss of large and

small arms: they had captured the capital of the State of Mississippi,

with a large amount of materials of war and manufactures. Only a few

days before, they had beaten the enemy then penned up in the town first

at Champion's Hill, next at Big Black River Bridge, inflicting upon him

a loss of fifteen thousand or more men (including those cut off from

returning) besides large losses in arms and ammunition. The Army of the

Tennessee had come to believe that they could beat their antagonist

under any circumstances. There was no telling how long a regular siege

might last. As I have stated, it was the beginning of the hot season in

a Southern climate. There was no telling what the casualties might be

among Northern troops working and living in trenches, drinking surface

water filtered through rich vegetation, under a tropical sun. If

Vicksburg could have been carried in May, it would not only have saved

the army the risk it ran of a greater danger than from the bullets of

the enemy, but it would have given us a splendid army, well equipped and

officered, to operate elsewhere with. These are reasons justifying the

assault. The only benefit we gained--and it was a slight one for so

great a sacrifice--was that the men worked cheerfully in the trenches

after that, being satisfied with digging the enemy out. Had the assault

not been made, I have no doubt that the majority of those engaged in the

siege of Vicksburg would have believed that had we assaulted it would

have proven successful, and would have saved life, health and comfort.

CHAPTER LVI.

LEFT FLANK MOVEMENT ACROSS THE CHICKAHOMINY AND JAMES--GENERAL LEE

--VISIT TO BUTLER--THE MOVEMENT ON PETERSBURG--THE INVESTMENT OF

PETERSBURG.

Lee's position was now so near Richmond, and the intervening swamps of

the Chickahominy so great an obstacle to the movement of troops in the

face of an enemy, that I determined to make my next left flank move

carry the Army of the Potomac south of the James River. (*34)

Preparations for this were promptly commenced. The move was a hazardous

one to make: the Chickahominy River, with its marshy and heavily

timbered approaches, had to be crossed; all the bridges over it east of

Lee were destroyed; the enemy had a shorter line and better roads to

travel on to confront me in crossing; more than fifty miles intervened

between me and Butler, by the roads I should have to travel, with both

the James and the Chickahominy unbridged to cross; and last, the Army of

the Potomac had to be got out of a position but a few hundred yards from

the enemy at the widest place. Lee, if he did not choose to follow me,

might, with his shorter distance to travel and his bridges over the

Chickahominy and the James, move rapidly on Butler and crush him before

the army with me could come to his relief. Then too he might spare

troops enough to send against Hunter who was approaching Lynchburg,

living upon the country he passed through, and without ammunition

further than what he carried with him.

But the move had to be made, and I relied upon Lee's not seeing my

danger as I saw it. Besides we had armies on both sides of the James

River and not far from the Confederate capital. I knew that its safety

would be a matter of the first consideration with the executive,

legislative and judicial branches of the so-called Confederate

government, if it was not with the military commanders. But I took all

the precaution I knew of to guard against all dangers.

Sheridan was sent with two divisions, to communicate with Hunter and to

break up the Virginia Central Railroad and the James River Canal, on the

7th of June, taking instructions to Hunter to come back with him (*35).

Hunter was also informed by way of Washington and the Valley that

Sheridan was on the way to meet him. The canal and Central Road, and

the regions penetrated by them, were of vast importance to the enemy,

furnishing and carrying a large per cent. of all the supplies for the

Army of Northern Virginia and the people of Richmond. Before Sheridan

got off on the 7th news was received from Hunter reporting his advance

to Staunton and successful engagement with the enemy near that place on

the 5th, in which the Confederate commander, W. S. Jones, was killed.

On the 4th of June the enemy having withdrawn his left corps, Burnside

on our right was moved up between Warren and Smith. On the 5th Birney

returned to Hancock, which extended his left now to the Chickahominy,

and Warren was withdrawn to Cold Harbor. Wright was directed to send

two divisions to the left to extend down the banks of that stream to

Bottom's Bridge. The cavalry extended still farther east to Jones's

Bridge.

On the 7th Abercrombie--who was in command at White House, and who had

been in command at our base of supplies in all the changes made from the

start--was ordered to take up the iron from the York River Railroad and

put it on boats, and to be in readiness to move by water to City Point.

On the 8th Meade was directed to fortify a line down the bank

overlooking the Chickahominy, under cover of which the army could move.

On the 9th Abercrombie was directed to send all organized troops

arriving at White House, without debarking from their transports, to

report to Butler. Halleck was at this time instructed to send all

reinforcements to City Point.

On the 11th I wrote:

COLD HARBOR, VA., June 11, 1864.

MAJOR-GEN. B. F. BUTLER, Commanding Department of Va. and N. C.

The movement to transfer this army to the south side of the James River

will commence after dark to-morrow night. Col. Comstock, of my staff,

was sent specially to ascertain what was necessary to make your position

secure in the interval during which the enemy might use most of his

force against you, and also, to ascertain what point on the river we

should reach to effect a crossing if it should not be practicable to

reach this side of the river at Bermuda Hundred. Colonel Comstock has

not yet returned, so that I cannot make instructions as definite as I

would wish, but the time between this and Sunday night being so short in

which to get word to you, I must do the best I can. Colonel Dent goes

to the Chickahominy to take to you the 18th corps. The corps will leave

its position in the trenches as early in the evening, tomorrow, as

possible, and make a forced march to Cole's Landing or Ferry, where it

should reach by ten A.M. the following morning. This corps numbers now

15,300 men. They take with them neither wagons nor artillery; these

latter marching with the balance of the army to the James River. The

remainder of the army will cross the Chickahominy at Long Bridge and at

Jones's, and strike the river at the most practicable crossing below

City Point.

I directed several days ago that all reinforcements for the army should

be sent to you. I am not advised of the number that may have gone, but

suppose you have received from six to ten thousand. General Smith will

also reach you as soon as the enemy could, going by the way of Richmond.

The balance of the force will not be more than one day behind, unless

detained by the whole of Lee's army, in which case you will be strong

enough.

I wish you would direct the proper staff officers, your chief-engineer

and your chief-quartermaster, to commence at once the collection of all

the means in their reach for crossing the army on its arrival. If there

is a point below City Point where a pontoon bridge can be thrown, have

it laid.

Expecting the arrival of the 18th corps by Monday night, if you deem it

practicable from the force you have to seize and hold Petersburg, you

may prepare to start, on the arrival of troops to hold your present

lines. I do not want Petersburg visited, however, unless it is held,

nor an attempt to take it, unless you feel a reasonable degree of

confidence of success. If you should go there, I think troops should

take nothing with them except what they can carry, depending upon

supplies being sent after the place is secured. If Colonel Dent should

not succeed in securing the requisite amount of transportation for the

18th corps before reaching you, please have the balance supplied.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

P. S.--On reflection I will send the 18th corps by way of White House.

The distance which they will have to march will be enough shorter to

enable them to reach you about the same time, and the uncertainty of

navigation on the Chickahominy will be avoided.

U. S. GRANT.

COLD HARBOR, VA., June 11,1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL G. G. MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac.

Colonel Comstock, who visited the James River for the purpose of

ascertaining the best point below Bermuda Hundred to which to march the

army has not yet returned. It is now getting so late, however, that all

preparations may be made for the move to-morrow night without waiting

longer.

The movement will be made as heretofore agreed upon, that is, the 18th

corps make a rapid march with the infantry alone, their wagons and

artillery accompanying the balance of the army to Cole's Landing or

Ferry, and there embark for City Point, losing no time for rest until

they reach the latter point.

The 5th corps will seize Long Bridge and move out on the Long Bridge

Road to its junction with Quaker Road, or until stopped by the enemy.

The other three corps will follow in such order as you may direct, one

of them crossing at Long Bridge, and two at Jones's Bridge. After the

crossing is effected, the most practicable roads will be taken to reach

about Fort Powhattan. Of course, this is supposing the enemy makes no

opposition to our advance. The 5th corps, after securing the passage of

the balance of the army, will join or follow in rear of the corps which

crosses the same bridge with themselves. The wagon trains should be

kept well east of the troops, and if a crossing can be found, or made

lower down than Jones's they should take it.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

P. S.--In view of the long march to reach Cole's Landing, and the

uncertainty of being able to embark a large number of men there, the

direction of the 18th corps may be changed to White House. They should

be directed to load up transports, and start them as fast as loaded

without waiting for the whole corps or even whole divisions to go

together.

U. S. GRANT.

About this time word was received (through the Richmond papers of the

11th) that Crook and Averell had united and were moving east. This,

with the news of Hunter's successful engagement near Staunton, was no

doubt known to Lee before it was to me. Then Sheridan leaving with two

divisions of cavalry, looked indeed threatening, both to Lee's

communications and supplies. Much of his cavalry was sent after

Sheridan, and Early with Ewell's entire corps was sent to the Valley.

Supplies were growing scarce in Richmond, and the sources from which to

draw them were in our hands. People from outside began to pour into

Richmond to help eat up the little on hand. Consternation reigned

there.

On the 12th Smith was ordered to move at night to White House, not to

stop until he reached there, and to take boats at once for City Point,

leaving his trains and artillery to move by land.

Soon after dark some of the cavalry at Long Bridge effected a crossing

by wading and floundering through the water and mud, leaving their

horses behind, and drove away the cavalry pickets. A pontoon bridge was

speedily thrown across, over which the remainder of the army soon passed

and pushed out for a mile or two to watch and detain any advance that

might be made from the other side. Warren followed the cavalry, and by

the morning of the 13th had his whole corps over. Hancock followed

Warren. Burnside took the road to Jones's Bridge, followed by Wright.

Ferrero's division, with the wagon train, moved farther east, by Window

Shades and Cole's Ferry, our rear being covered by cavalry.

It was known that the enemy had some gunboats at Richmond. These might

run down at night and inflict great damage upon us before they could be

sunk or captured by our navy. General Butler had, in advance, loaded

some vessels with stone ready to be sunk so as to obstruct the channel

in an emergency. On the 13th I sent orders to have these sunk as high

up the river as we could guard them, and prevent their removal by the

enemy.

As soon as Warren's corps was over the Chickahominy it marched out and

joined the cavalry in holding the roads from Richmond while the army

passed. No attempt was made by the enemy to impede our march, however,

but Warren and Wilson reported the enemy strongly fortified in their

front. By the evening of the 13th Hancock's corps was at Charles City

Court House on the James River. Burnside's and Wright's corps were on

the Chickahominy, and crossed during the night, Warren's corps and the

cavalry still covering the army. The material for a pontoon bridge was

already at hand and the work of laying it was commenced immediately,

under the superintendence of Brigadier-General Benham, commanding the

engineer brigade. On the evening of the 14th the crossing commenced,

Hancock in advance, using both the bridge and boats.

When the Wilderness campaign commenced the Army of the Potomac,

including Burnside's--which was a separate command until the 24th of May

when it was incorporated with the main army--numbered about 116,000 men.

During the progress of the campaign about 40,000 reinforcements were

received. At the crossing of the James River June 14th-15th the army

numbered about 115,000. Besides the ordinary losses incident to a

campaign of six weeks' nearly constant fighting or skirmishing, about

one-half of the artillery was sent back to Washington, and many men were

discharged by reason of the expiration of their term of service.* In

estimating our strength every enlisted man and every commissioned

officer present is included, no matter how employed; in bands, sick in

field hospitals, hospital attendants, company cooks and all. Operating

in an enemy's country, and being supplied always from a distant base,

large detachments had at all times to be sent from the front, not only

to guard the base of supplies and the roads to it, but all the roads

leading to our flanks and rear. We were also operating in a country

unknown to us, and without competent guides or maps showing the roads

accurately.

The manner of estimating numbers in the two armies differs materially.

In the Confederate army often only bayonets are taken into account,

never, I believe, do they estimate more than are handling the guns of

the artillery and armed with muskets (*36) or carbines. Generally the

latter are far enough away to be excluded from the count in any one

field. Officers and details of enlisted men are not included. In the

Northern armies the estimate is most liberal, taking in all connected

with the army and drawing pay.

Estimated in the same manner as ours, Lee had not less than 80,000 men

at the start. His reinforcements were about equal to ours during the

campaign, deducting the discharged men and those sent back. He was on

the defensive, and in a country in which every stream, every road, every

obstacle to the movement of troops and every natural defence was

familiar to him and his army. The citizens were all friendly to him and

his cause, and could and did furnish him with accurate reports of our

every move. Rear guards were not necessary for him, and having always a

railroad at his back, large wagon trains were not required. All

circumstances considered we did not have any advantage in numbers.

General Lee, who had led the Army of Northern Virginia in all these

contests, was a very highly estimated man in the Confederate army and

States, and filled also a very high place in the estimation of the

people and press of the Northern States. His praise was sounded

throughout the entire North after every action he was engaged in: the

number of his forces was always lowered and that of the National forces

exaggerated. He was a large, austere man, and I judge difficult of

approach to his subordinates. To be extolled by the entire press of the

South after every engagement, and by a portion of the press North with

equal vehemence, was calculated to give him the entire confidence of his

troops and to make him feared by his antagonists. It was not an

uncommon thing for my staff-officers to hear from Eastern officers,

"Well, Grant has never met Bobby Lee yet." There were good and true

officers who believe now that the Army of Northern Virginia was superior

to the Army of the Potomac man to man. I do not believe so, except as

the advantages spoken of above made them so. Before the end I believe

the difference was the other way. The Army of Northern Virginia became

despondent and saw the end. It did not please them. The National army

saw the same thing, and were encouraged by it.

The advance of the Army of the Potomac reached the James on the 14th of

June. Preparations were at once commenced for laying the pontoon

bridges and crossing the river. As already stated, I had previously

ordered General Butler to have two vessels loaded with stone and carried

up the river to a point above that occupied by our gunboats, where the

channel was narrow, and sunk there so as to obstruct the passage and

prevent Confederate gunboats from coming down the river. Butler had had

these boats filled and put in position, but had not had them sunk before

my arrival. I ordered this done, and also directed that he should turn

over all material and boats not then in use in the river to be used in

ferrying the troops across.

I then, on the 14th, took a steamer and ran up to Bermuda Hundred to see

General Butler for the purpose of directing a movement against

Petersburg, while our troops of the Army of the Potomac were crossing.

I had sent General W. F. Smith back from Cold Harbor by the way of White

House, thence on steamers to City Point for the purpose of giving

General Butler more troops with which to accomplish this result.

General Butler was ordered to send Smith with his troops reinforced, as

far as that could be conveniently done, from other parts of the Army of

the James. He gave Smith about six thousand reinforcements, including

some twenty-five hundred cavalry under Kautz, and about thirty-five

hundred colored infantry under Hinks.

The distance which Smith had to move to reach the enemy's lines was

about six miles, and the Confederate advance line of works was but two

miles outside of Petersburg. Smith was to move under cover of night, up

close to the enemy's works, and assault as soon as he could after

daylight. I believed then, and still believe, that Petersburg could

have been easily captured at that time. It only had about 2,500 men in

the defences besides some irregular troops, consisting of citizens and

employees in the city who took up arms in case of emergency. Smith

started as proposed, but his advance encountered a rebel force

intrenched between City Point and their lines outside of Petersburg.

This position he carried, with some loss to the enemy; but there was so

much delay that it was daylight before his troops really got off from

there. While there I informed General Butler that Hancock's corps would

cross the river and move to Petersburg to support Smith in case the

latter was successful, and that I could reinforce there more rapidly

than Lee could reinforce from his position.

I returned down the river to where the troops of the Army of the Potomac

now were, communicated to General Meade, in writing, the directions I

had given to General Butler and directed him (Meade) to cross Hancock's

corps over under cover of night, and push them forward in the morning to

Petersburg; halting them, however, at a designated point until they

could hear from Smith. I also informed General Meade that I had ordered

rations from Bermuda Hundred for Hancock's corps, and desired him to

issue them speedily, and to lose no more time than was absolutely

necessary. The rations did not reach him, however, and Hancock, while

he got all his corps over during the night, remained until half-past ten

in the hope of receiving them. He then moved without them, and on the

road received a note from General W. F. Smith, asking him to come on.

This seems to be the first information that General Hancock had received

of the fact that he was to go to Petersburg, or that anything particular

was expected of him. Otherwise he would have been there by four o'clock

in the afternoon.

Smith arrived in front of the enemy's lines early in the forenoon of the

15th, and spent the day until after seven o'clock in the evening in

reconnoitering what appeared to be empty works. The enemy's line

consisted of redans occupying commanding positions, with rifle-pits

connecting them. To the east side of Petersburg, from the Appomattox

back, there were thirteen of these redans extending a distance of

several miles, probably three. If they had been properly manned they

could have held out against any force that could have attacked them, at

least until reinforcements could have got up from the north of Richmond.

Smith assaulted with the colored troops, and with success. By nine

o'clock at night he was in possession of five of these redans and, of

course, of the connecting lines of rifle-pits. All of them contained

artillery, which fell into our hands. Hancock came up and proposed to

take any part assigned to him; and Smith asked him to relieve his men

who were in the trenches.

Next morning, the 16th, Hancock himself was in command, and captured

another redan. Meade came up in the afternoon and succeeded Hancock,

who had to be relieved, temporarily, from the command of his corps on

account of the breaking out afresh of the wound he had received at

Gettysburg. During the day Meade assaulted and carried one more redan

to his right and two to his left. In all this we lost very heavily.

The works were not strongly manned, but they all had guns in them which

fell into our hands, together with the men who were handling them in the

effort to repel these assaults.

Up to this time Beauregard, who had commanded south of Richmond, had

received no reinforcements, except Hoke's division from Drury's

Bluff,(*37) which had arrived on the morning of the 16th; though he had

urged the authorities very strongly to send them, believing, as he did,

that Petersburg would be a valuable prize which we might seek.

During the 17th the fighting was very severe and the losses heavy; and

at night our troops occupied about the same position they had occupied

in the morning, except that they held a redan which had been captured by

Potter during the day. During the night, however, Beauregard fell back

to the line which had been already selected, and commenced fortifying

it. Our troops advanced on the 18th to the line which he had abandoned,

and found that the Confederate loss had been very severe, many of the

enemy's dead still remaining in the ditches and in front of them.

Colonel J. L. Chamberlain, of the 20th Maine, was wounded on the 18th.

He was gallantly leading his brigade at the time, as he had been in

the habit of doing in all the engagements in which he had previously

been engaged. He had several times been recommended for a

brigadier-generalcy for gallant and meritorious conduct. On this

occasion, however, I promoted him on the spot, and forwarded a copy of

my order to the War Department, asking that my act might be confirmed

and Chamberlain's name sent to the Senate for confirmation without any

delay. This was done, and at last a gallant and meritorious officer

received partial justice at the hands of his government, which he had

served so faithfully and so well.

If General Hancock's orders of the 15th had been communicated to him,

that officer, with his usual promptness, would undoubtedly have been

upon the ground around Petersburg as early as four o'clock in the

afternoon of the 15th. The days were long and it would have given him

considerable time before night. I do not think there is any doubt that

Petersburg itself could have been carried without much loss; or, at

least, if protected by inner detached works, that a line could have been

established very much in rear of the one then occupied by the enemy.

This would have given us control of both the Weldon and South Side

railroads. This would also have saved an immense amount of hard

fighting which had to be done from the 15th to the 18th, and would have

given us greatly the advantage in the long siege which ensued.

I now ordered the troops to be put under cover and allowed some of the

rest which they had so long needed. They remained quiet, except that

there was more or less firing every day, until the 22d, when General

Meade ordered an advance towards the Weldon Railroad. We were very

anxious to get to that road, and even round to the South Side Railroad

if possible.

Meade moved Hancock's corps, now commanded by Birney, to the left, with

a view to at least force the enemy to stay within the limits of his own

line. General Wright, with the 6th corps, was ordered by a road farther

south, to march directly for the Weldon road. The enemy passed in

between these two corps and attacked vigorously, and with very serious

results to the National troops, who were then withdrawn from their

advanced position.

The Army of the Potomac was given the investment of Petersburg, while

the Army of the James held Bermuda Hundred and all the ground we

possessed north of the James River. The 9th corps, Burnside's, was

placed upon the right at Petersburg; the 5th, Warren's, next; the 2d,

Birney's, next; then the 6th, Wright's, broken off to the left and

south. Thus began the siege of Petersburg.

CHAPTER LVII.

RAID ON THE VIRGINIA CENTRAL RAILROAD--RAID ON THE WELDON RAILROAD

--EARLY 'S MOVEMENT UPON WASHINGTON--MINING THE WORKS BEFORE PETERSBURG

--EXPLOSION OF THE MINE BEFORE PETERSBURG--CAMPAIGN IN THE SHENANDOAH

VALLEY--CAPTURE OF THE WELDON RAILROAD.

On the 7th of June, while at Cold Harbor, I had as already indicated

sent Sheridan with two divisions of cavalry to destroy as much as he

could of the Virginia Central Railroad. General Hunter had been

operating up the Shenandoah Valley with some success, having fought a

battle near Staunton where he captured a great many prisoners, besides

killing and wounding a good many men. After the battle he formed a

junction at Staunton with Averell and Crook, who had come up from the

Kanawha, or Gauley River. It was supposed, therefore, that General

Hunter would be about Charlottesville, Virginia, by the time Sheridan

could get there, doing on the way the damage that he was sent to do.

I gave Sheridan instructions to have Hunter, in case he should meet him

about Charlottesville, join and return with him to the Army of the

Potomac. Lee, hearing of Hunter's success in the valley, started

Breckinridge out for its defence at once. Learning later of Sheridan's

going with two divisions, he also sent Hampton with two divisions of

cavalry, his own and Fitz-Hugh Lee's.

Sheridan moved to the north side of the North Anna to get out west, and

learned of the movement of these troops to the south side of the same

stream almost as soon as they had started. He pushed on to get to

Trevilian Station to commence his destruction at that point. On the

night of the 10th he bivouacked some six or seven miles east of

Trevilian, while Fitz-Hugh Lee was the same night at Trevilian Station

and Hampton but a few miles away.

During the night Hampton ordered an advance on Sheridan, hoping, no

doubt, to surprise and very badly cripple him. Sheridan, however, by a

counter move sent Custer on a rapid march to get between the two

divisions of the enemy and into their rear. This he did successfully, so

that at daylight, when the assault was made, the enemy found himself at

the same time resisted in front and attacked in rear, and broke in some

confusion. The losses were probably very light on both sides in killed

and wounded, but Sheridan got away with some five hundred prisoners and

sent them to City Point.

During that day, the 11th, Sheridan moved into Trevilian Station, and

the following day proceeded to tear up the road east and west. There

was considerable fighting during the whole of the day, but the work of

destruction went on. In the meantime, at night, the enemy had taken

possession of the crossing which Sheridan had proposed to take to go

north when he left Trevilian. Sheridan learned, however, from some of

the prisoners he had captured here, that General Hunter was about

Lynchburg, and therefore that there was no use of his going on to

Charlottesville with a view to meet him.

Sheridan started back during the night of the 12th, and made his way

north and farther east, coming around by the north side of White House,

and arriving there on the 21st. Here he found an abundance of forage

for his animals, food for his men, and security while resting. He had

been obliged to leave about ninety of his own men in the field-hospital

which he had established near Trevilian, and these necessarily fell into

the hands of the enemy.

White House up to this time had been a depot; but now that our troops

were all on the James River, it was no longer wanted as a store of

supplies. Sheridan was, therefore, directed to break it up; which he

did on the 22d of June, bringing the garrison and an immense wagon train

with him. All these were over the James River by the 26th of the month,

and Sheridan ready to follow.

In the meantime Meade had sent Wilson's division on a raid to destroy

the Weldon and South Side roads. Now that Sheridan was safe and Hampton

free to return to Richmond with his cavalry, Wilson's position became

precarious. Meade therefore, on the 27th, ordered Sheridan over the

river to make a demonstration in favor of Wilson. Wilson got back,

though not without severe loss, having struck both roads, but the damage

done was soon repaired.

After these events comparative quiet reigned about Petersburg until late

in July. The time, however, was spent in strengthening the

intrenchments and making our position generally more secure against a

sudden attack. In the meantime I had to look after other portions of my

command, where things had not been going on so favorably, always, as I

could have wished.

General Hunter who had been appointed to succeed Sigel in the Shenandoah

Valley immediately took up the offensive. He met the enemy on the 5th

of June at Piedmont, and defeated him. On the 8th he formed a junction

with Crook and Averell at Staunton, from which place he moved direct on

Lynchburg, via Lexington, which he reached and invested on the 16th. Up

to this time he was very successful; and but for the difficulty of

taking with him sufficient ordnance stores over so long a march, through

a hostile country, he would, no doubt, have captured Lynchburg. The

destruction of the enemy's supplies and manufactories had been very

great. To meet this movement under General Hunter, General Lee sent

Early with his corps, a part of which reached Lynchburg before Hunter.

After some skirmishing on the 17th and 18th, General Hunter, owing to a

want of ammunition to give battle, retired from before the place.

Unfortunately, this want of ammunition left him no choice of route for

his return but by the way of the Gauley and Kanawha rivers, thence up

the Ohio River, returning to Harper's Ferry by way of the Baltimore and

Ohio Railroad. A long time was consumed in making this movement.

Meantime the valley was left open to Early's troops, and others in that

quarter; and Washington also was uncovered. Early took advantage of this

condition of affairs and moved on Washington.

In the absence of Hunter, General Lew Wallace, with headquarters at

Baltimore, commanded the department in which the Shenandoah lay. His

surplus of troops with which to move against the enemy was small in

number. Most of these were raw and, consequently, very much inferior to

our veterans and to the veterans which Early had with him; but the

situation of Washington was precarious, and Wallace moved with

commendable promptitude to meet the enemy at the Monocacy. He could

hardly have expected to defeat him badly, but he hoped to cripple and

delay him until Washington could be put into a state of preparation for

his reception. I had previously ordered General Meade to send a

division to Baltimore for the purpose of adding to the defences of

Washington, and he had sent Ricketts's division of the 6th corps

(Wright's), which arrived in Baltimore on the 8th of July. Finding that

Wallace had gone to the front with his command, Ricketts immediately

took the cars and followed him to the Monocacy with his entire division.

They met the enemy and, as might have been expected, were defeated; but

they succeeded in stopping him for the day on which the battle took

place. The next morning Early started on his march to the capital of

the Nation, arriving before it on the 11th.

Learning of the gravity of the situation I had directed General Meade to

also order Wright with the rest of his corps directly to Washington for

the relief of that place, and the latter reached there the very day that

Early arrived before it. The 19th corps, which had been stationed in

Louisiana, having been ordered up to reinforce the armies about

Richmond, had about this time arrived at Fortress Monroe, on their way

to join us. I diverted them from that point to Washington, which place

they reached, almost simultaneously with Wright, on the 11th. The 19th

corps was commanded by Major-General Emory.

Early made his reconnoissance with a view of attacking on the following

morning, the 12th; but the next morning he found our intrenchments,

which were very strong, fully manned. He at once commenced to retreat,

Wright following. There is no telling how much this result was

contributed to by General Lew Wallace's leading what might well be

considered almost a forlorn hope. If Early had been but one day earlier

he might have entered the capital before the arrival of the

reinforcements I had sent. Whether the delay caused by the battle

amounted to a day or not, General Wallace contributed on this occasion,

by the defeat of the troops under him a greater benefit to the cause

than often falls to the lot of a commander of an equal force to render

by means of a victory.

Farther west also the troubles were threatening. Some time before,

Forrest had met Sturgis in command of some of our cavalry in Mississippi

and handled him very roughly, gaining a very great victory over him.

This left Forrest free to go almost where he pleased, and to cut the

roads in rear of Sherman who was then advancing. Sherman was abundantly

able to look after the army that he was immediately with, and all of his

military division so long as he could communicate with it; but it was my

place to see that he had the means with which to hold his rear. Two

divisions under A. J. Smith had been sent to Banks in Louisiana some

months before. Sherman ordered these back, with directions to attack

Forrest. Smith met and defeated him very badly. I then directed that

Smith should hang to Forrest and not let him go; and to prevent by all

means his getting upon the Memphis and Nashville Railroad. Sherman had

anticipated me in this matter, and given the same orders in substance;

but receiving my directions for this order to Smith, he repeated it.

On the 25th of June General Burnside had commenced running a mine from

about the centre of his front under the Confederate works confronting

him. He was induced to do this by Colonel Pleasants, of the

Pennsylvania Volunteers, whose regiment was mostly composed of miners,

and who was himself a practical miner. Burnside had submitted the

scheme to Meade and myself, and we both approved of it, as a means of

keeping the men occupied. His position was very favorable for carrying

on this work, but not so favorable for the operations to follow its

completion. The position of the two lines at that point were only about

a hundred yards apart with a comparatively deep ravine intervening. In

the bottom of this ravine the work commenced. The position was

unfavorable in this particular: that the enemy's line at that point was

re-entering, so that its front was commanded by their own lines both to

the right and left. Then, too, the ground was sloping upward back of

the Confederate line for a considerable distance, and it was presumable

that the enemy had, at least, a detached work on this highest point.

The work progressed, and on the 23d of July the mine was finished ready

for charging; but I had this work of charging deferred until we were

ready for it.

On the 17th of July several deserters came in and said that there was

great consternation in Richmond, and that Lee was coming out to make an

attack upon us the object being to put us on the defensive so that he

might detach troops to go to Georgia where the army Sherman was

operating against was said to be in great trouble. I put the army

commanders, Meade and Butler, on the lookout, but the attack was not

made.

I concluded, then, a few days later, to do something in the way of

offensive movement myself, having in view something of the same object

that Lee had had. Wright's and Emory's corps were in Washington, and

with this reduction of my force Lee might very readily have spared some

troops from the defences to send West. I had other objects in view,

however, besides keeping Lee where he was. The mine was constructed and

ready to be exploded, and I wanted to take that occasion to carry

Petersburg if I could. It was the object, therefore, to get as many of

Lee's troops away from the south side of the James River as possible.

Accordingly, on the 26th, we commenced a movement with Hancock's corps

and Sheridan's cavalry to the north side by the way of Deep Bottom,

where Butler had a pontoon bridge laid. The plan, in the main, was to

let the cavalry cut loose and, joining with Kautz's cavalry of the Army

of the James, get by Lee's lines and destroy as much as they could of

the Virginia Central Railroad, while, in the mean time, the infantry was

to move out so as to protect their rear and cover their retreat back

when they should have got through with their work. We were successful

in drawing the enemy's troops to the north side of the James as I

expected. The mine was ordered to be charged, and the morning of the

30th of July was the time fixed for its explosion. I gave Meade minute

orders (*38) on the 24th directing how I wanted the assault conducted,

which orders he amplified into general instructions for the guidance of

the troops that were to be engaged.

Meade's instructions, which I, of course, approved most heartily, were

all that I can see now was necessary. The only further precaution which

he could have taken, and which he could not foresee, would have been to

have different men to execute them.

The gallery to the mine was over five hundred feet long from where it

entered the ground to the point where it was under the enemy's works,

and with a cross gallery of something over eighty feet running under

their lines. Eight chambers had been left, requiring a ton of powder

each to charge them. All was ready by the time I had prescribed; and on

the 29th Hancock and Sheridan were brought back near the James River

with their troops. Under cover of night they started to recross the

bridge at Deep Bottom, and to march directly for that part of our lines

in front of the mine.

Warren was to hold his line of intrenchments with a sufficient number of

men and concentrate the balance on the right next to Burnside's corps,

while Ord, now commanding the 18th corps, temporarily under Meade, was

to form in the rear of Burnside to support him when he went in. All

were to clear off the parapets and the _abatis_ in their front so as to

leave the space as open as possible, and be able to charge the moment

the mine had been sprung and Burnside had taken possession. Burnside's

corps was not to stop in the crater at all but push on to the top of the

hill, supported on the right and left by Ord's and Warren's corps.

Warren and Ord fulfilled their instructions perfectly so far as making

ready was concerned. Burnside seemed to have paid no attention whatever

to the instructions, and left all the obstruction in his own front for

his troops to get over in the best way they could. The four divisions

of his corps were commanded by Generals Potter, Willcox, Ledlie and

Ferrero. The last was a colored division; and Burnside selected it to

make the assault. Meade interfered with this. Burnside then took

Ledlie's division--a worse selection than the first could have been. In

fact, Potter and Willcox were the only division commanders Burnside had

who were equal to the occasion. Ledlie besides being otherwise

inefficient, proved also to possess disqualification less common among

soldiers.

There was some delay about the explosion of the mine so that it did not

go off until about five o'clock in the morning. When it did explode it

was very successful, making a crater twenty feet deep and something like

a hundred feet in length. Instantly one hundred and ten cannon and

fifty mortars, which had been placed in the most commanding positions

covering the ground to the right and left of where the troops were to

enter the enemy's lines, commenced playing. Ledlie's division marched

into the crater immediately on the explosion, but most of the men

stopped there in the absence of any one to give directions; their

commander having found some safe retreat to get into before they

started. There was some delay on the left and right in advancing, but

some of the troops did get in and turn to the right and left, carrying

the rifle-pits as I expected they would do.

There had been great consternation in Petersburg, as we were well aware,

about a rumored mine that we were going to explode. They knew we were

mining, and they had failed to cut our mine off by countermining, though

Beauregard had taken the precaution to run up a line of intrenchments to

the rear of that part of their line fronting where they could see that

our men were at work. We had learned through deserters who had come in

that the people had very wild rumors about what was going on on our

side. They said that we had undermined the whole of Petersburg; that

they were resting upon a slumbering volcano and did not know at what

moment they might expect an eruption. I somewhat based my calculations

upon this state of feeling, and expected that when the mine was exploded

the troops to the right and left would flee in all directions, and that

our troops, if they moved promptly, could get in and strengthen

themselves before the enemy had come to a realization of the true

situation. It was just as I expected it would be. We could see the men

running without any apparent object except to get away. It was half an

hour before musketry firing, to amount to anything, was opened upon our

men in the crater. It was an hour before the enemy got artillery up to

play upon them; and it was nine o'clock before Lee got up reinforcements

from his right to join in expelling our troops.

The effort was a stupendous failure. It cost us about four thousand

men, mostly, however, captured; and all due to inefficiency on the part

of the corps commander and the incompetency of the division commander

who was sent to lead the assault.

After being fully assured of the failure of the mine, and finding that

most of that part of Lee's army which had been drawn north of the James

River were still there, I gave Meade directions to send a corps of

infantry and the cavalry next morning, before Lee could get his forces

back, to destroy fifteen or twenty miles of the Weldon Railroad. But

misfortunes never come singly. I learned during that same afternoon

that Wright's pursuit of Early was feeble because of the constant and

contrary orders he had been receiving from Washington, while I was cut

off from immediate communication by reason of our cable across

Chesapeake Bay being broken. Early, however, was not aware of the fact

that Wright was not pursuing until he had reached Strasburg. Finding

that he was not pursued he turned back to Winchester, where Crook was

stationed with a small force, and drove him out. He then pushed north

until he had reached the Potomac, then he sent McCausland across to

Chambersburg, Pa., to destroy that town. Chambersburg was a purely

defenceless town with no garrison whatever, and no fortifications; yet

McCausland, under Early's orders, burned the place and left about three

hundred families houseless. This occurred on the 30th of July. I

rescinded my orders for the troops to go out to destroy the Weldon

Railroad, and directed them to embark for Washington City. After

burning Chambersburg McCausland retreated, pursued by our cavalry,

towards Cumberland. They were met and defeated by General Kelley and

driven into Virginia.

The Shenandoah Valley was very important to the Confederates, because it

was the principal storehouse they now had for feeding their armies about

Richmond. It was well known that they would make a desperate struggle

to maintain it. It had been the source of a great deal of trouble to us

heretofore to guard that outlet to the north, partly because of the

incompetency of some of the commanders, but chiefly because of

interference from Washington.

It seemed to be the policy of General Halleck and Secretary Stanton to

keep any force sent there, in pursuit of the invading army, moving right

and left so as to keep between the enemy and our capital; and, generally

speaking, they pursued this policy until all knowledge of the

whereabouts of the enemy was lost. They were left, therefore, free to

supply themselves with horses, beef cattle, and such provisions as they

could carry away from Western Maryland and Pennsylvania. I determined

to put a stop to this. I started Sheridan at once for that field of

operation, and on the following day sent another division of his

cavalry.

I had previously asked to have Sheridan assigned to that command, but

Mr. Stanton objected, on the ground that he was too young for so

important a command. On the 1st of August when I sent reinforcements

for the protection of Washington, I sent the following orders:

CITY POINT, VA.,

August 1, 1864, 11.30 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Washington D. C.

I am sending General Sheridan for temporary duty whilst the enemy is

being expelled from the border. Unless General Hunter is in the field

in person, I want Sheridan put in command of all the troops in the

field, with instructions to put himself south of the enemy and follow

him to the death. Wherever the enemy goes let our troops go also. Once

started up the valley they ought to be followed until we get possession

of the Virginia Central Railroad. If General Hunter is in the field,

give Sheridan direct command of the 6th corps and cavalry division. All

the cavalry, I presume, will reach Washington in the course of

to-morrow.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

The President in some way or other got to see this dispatch of mine

directing certain instructions to be given to the commanders in the

field, operating against Early, and sent me the following very

characteristic dispatch:

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY TELEGRAPH, WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.,

August 3, 1864.

Cypher. 6 P.M.,

LT. GENERAL GRANT, City Point, Va.

I have seen your despatch in which you say, "I want Sheridan put in

command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself

south of the enemy, and follow him to the death. Wherever the enemy

goes, let our troops go also." This, I think, is exactly right, as to

how our forces should move. But please look over the despatches you may

have received from here, even since you made that order, and discover,

if you can, that there is any idea in the head of any one here, of

"putting our army south of the enemy," or of "following him to the

death" in any direction. I repeat to you it will neither be done nor

attempted unless you watch it every day, and hour, and force it.

A. LINCOLN.

I replied to this that "I would start in two hours for Washington," and

soon got off, going directly to the Monocacy without stopping at

Washington on my way. I found General Hunter's army encamped there,

scattered over the fields along the banks of the Monocacy, with many

hundreds of cars and locomotives, belonging to the Baltimore and Ohio

Railroad, which he had taken the precaution to bring back and collect at

that point. I asked the general where the enemy was. He replied that

he did not know. He said the fact was, that he was so embarrassed with

orders from Washington moving him first to the right and then to the

left that he had lost all trace of the enemy.

I then told the general that I would find out where the enemy was, and

at once ordered steam got up and trains made up, giving directions to

push for Halltown, some four miles above Harper's Ferry, in the

Shenandoah Valley. The cavalry and the wagon trains were to march, but

all the troops that could be transported by the cars were to go in that

way. I knew that the valley was of such importance to the enemy that,

no matter how much he was scattered at that time, he would in a very

short time be found in front of our troops moving south.

I then wrote out General Hunter's instructions. (*39) I told him that

Sheridan was in Washington, and still another division was on its way;

and suggested that he establish the headquarters of the department at

any point that would suit him best, Cumberland, Baltimore, or elsewhere,

and give Sheridan command of the troops in the field. The general

replied to this, that he thought he had better be relieved entirely. He

said that General Halleck seemed so much to distrust his fitness for the

position he was in that he thought somebody else ought to be there. He

did not want, in any way, to embarrass the cause; thus showing a

patriotism that was none too common in the army. There were not many

major-generals who would voluntarily have asked to have the command of a

department taken from them on the supposition that for some particular

reason, or for any reason, the service would be better performed. I

told him, "very well then," and telegraphed at once for Sheridan to come

to the Monocacy, and suggested that I would wait and meet him there.

Sheridan came at once by special train, but reached there after the

troops were all off. I went to the station and remained there until he

arrived. Myself and one or two of my staff were about all the Union

people, except General Hunter and his staff, who were left at the

Monocacy when Sheridan arrived. I hastily told Sheridan what had been

done and what I wanted him to do, giving him, at the same time, the

written instructions which had been prepared for General Hunter and

directed to that officer.

Sheridan now had about 30,000 men to move with, 8,000 of them being

cavalry. Early had about the same number, but the superior ability of

the National commander over the Confederate commander was so great that

all the latter's advantage of being on the defensive was more than

counterbalanced by this circumstance. As I had predicted, Early was

soon found in front of Sheridan in the valley, and Pennsylvania and

Maryland were speedily freed from the invaders. The importance of the

valley was so great to the Confederates that Lee reinforced Early, but

not to the extent that we thought and feared he would.

To prevent as much as possible these reinforcements from being sent out

from Richmond, I had to do something to compel Lee to retain his forces

about his capital. I therefore gave orders for another move to the

north side of the James River, to threaten Richmond. Hancock's corps,

part of the 10th corps under Birney, and Gregg's division of cavalry

were crossed to the north side of the James during the night of the

13th-14th of August. A threatening position was maintained for a number

of days, with more or less skirmishing, and some tolerably hard

fighting; although it was my object and my instructions that anything

like a battle should be avoided, unless opportunities should present

themselves which would insure great success. General Meade was left in

command of the few troops around Petersburg, strongly intrenched; and

was instructed to keep a close watch upon the enemy in that quarter, and

himself to take advantage of any weakening that might occur through an

effort on the part of the enemy to reinforce the north side. There was

no particular victory gained on either side; but during that time no

more reinforcements were sent to the valley.

I informed Sheridan of what had been done to prevent reinforcements

being sent from Richmond against him, and also that the efforts we had

made had proven that one of the divisions which we supposed had gone to

the valley was still at Richmond, because we had captured six or seven

hundred prisoners from that division, each of its four brigades having

contributed to our list of captures. I also informed him that but one

division had gone, and it was possible that I should be able to prevent

the going of any more.

To add to my embarrassment at this time Sherman, who was now near

Atlanta, wanted reinforcements. He was perfectly willing to take the

raw troops then being raised in the North-west, saying that he could

teach them more soldiering in one day among his troops than they would

learn in a week in a camp of instruction. I therefore asked that all

troops in camps of instruction in the North-west be sent to him.

Sherman also wanted to be assured that no Eastern troops were moving out

against him. I informed him of what I had done and assured him that I

would hold all the troops there that it was possible for me to hold, and

that up to that time none had gone. I also informed him that his real

danger was from Kirby Smith, who commanded the trans-Mississippi

Department. If Smith should escape Steele, and get across the

Mississippi River, he might move against him. I had, therefore, asked

to have an expedition ready to move from New Orleans against Mobile in

case Kirby Smith should get across. This would have a tendency to draw

him to the defence of that place, instead of going against Sherman.

Right in the midst of all these embarrassments Halleck informed me that

there was an organized scheme on foot in the North to resist the draft,

and suggested that it might become necessary to draw troops from the

field to put it down. He also advised taking in sail, and not going too

fast.

The troops were withdrawn from the north side of the James River on the

night of the 20th. Before they were withdrawn, however, and while most

of Lee's force was on that side of the river, Warren had been sent with

most of the 5th corps to capture the Weldon Railroad. He took up his

line of march well back to the rear, south of the enemy, while the

troops remaining in the trenches extended so as to cover that part of

the line which he had vacated by moving out. From our left, near the

old line, it was about three miles to the Weldon Railroad. A division

was ordered from the right of the Petersburg line to reinforce Warren,

while a division was brought back from the north side of the James River

to take its place.

This road was very important to the enemy. The limits from which his

supplies had been drawn were already very much contracted, and I knew

that he must fight desperately to protect it. Warren carried the road,

though with heavy loss on both sides. He fortified his new position,

and our trenches were then extended from the left of our main line to

connect with his new one. Lee made repeated attempts to dislodge

Warren's corps, but without success, and with heavy loss.

As soon as Warren was fortified and reinforcements reached him, troops

were sent south to destroy the bridges on the Weldon Railroad; and with

such success that the enemy had to draw in wagons, for a distance of

about thirty miles, all the supplies they got thereafter from that

source. It was on the 21st that Lee seemed to have given up the Weldon

Railroad as having been lost to him; but along about the 24th or 25th he

made renewed attempts to recapture it; again he failed and with very

heavy losses to him as compared with ours.

On the night of the 20th our troops on the north side of the James were

withdrawn, and Hancock and Gregg were sent south to destroy the Weldon

Railroad. They were attacked on the 25th at Reams's Station, and after

desperate fighting a part of our line gave way, losing five pieces of

artillery. But the Weldon Railroad never went out of our possession

from the 18th of August to the close of the war.

CHAPTER LVIII.

SHERIDAN'S ADVANCE--VISIT TO SHERIDAN--SHERIDAN'S VICTORY IN THE

SHENANDOAH--SHERIDAN'S RIDE TO WINCHESTER--CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE

WINTER.

We had our troops on the Weldon Railroad contending against a large

force that regarded this road of so much importance that they could

afford to expend many lives in retaking it; Sherman just getting through

to Atlanta with great losses of men from casualties, discharges and

detachments left along as guards to occupy and hold the road in rear of

him; Washington threatened but a short time before, and now Early being

strengthened in the valley so as, probably, to renew that attempt. It

kept me pretty active in looking after all these points.

On the 10th of August Sheridan had advanced on Early up the Shenandoah

Valley, Early falling back to Strasburg. On the 12th I learned that Lee

had sent twenty pieces of artillery, two divisions of infantry and a

considerable cavalry force to strengthen Early. It was important that

Sheridan should be informed of this, so I sent the information to

Washington by telegraph, and directed a courier to be sent from there to

get the message to Sheridan at all hazards, giving him the information.

The messenger, an officer of the army, pushed through with great energy

and reached Sheridan just in time. The officer went through by way of

Snicker's Gap, escorted by some cavalry. He found Sheridan just making

his preparations to attack Early in his chosen position. Now, however,

he was thrown back on the defensive.

On the 15th of September I started to visit General Sheridan in the

Shenandoah Valley. My purpose was to have him attack Early, or drive

him out of the valley and destroy that source of supplies for Lee's

army. I knew it was impossible for me to get orders through Washington

to Sheridan to make a move, because they would be stopped there and such

orders as Halleck's caution (and that of the Secretary of War) would

suggest would be given instead, and would, no doubt, be contradictory to

mine. I therefore, without stopping at Washington, went directly

through to Charlestown, some ten miles above Harper's Ferry, and waited

there to see General Sheridan, having sent a courier in advance to

inform him where to meet me.

When Sheridan arrived I asked him if he had a map showing the positions

of his army and that of the enemy. He at once drew one out of his side

pocket, showing all roads and streams, and the camps of the two armies.

He said that if he had permission he would move so and so (pointing out

how) against the Confederates, and that he could "whip them." Before

starting I had drawn up a plan of campaign for Sheridan, which I had

brought with me; but, seeing that he was so clear and so positive in his

views and so confident of success, I said nothing about this and did not

take it out of my pocket.

Sheridan's wagon trains were kept at Harper's Ferry, where all of his

stores were. By keeping the teams at that place, their forage did not

have to be hauled to them. As supplies of ammunition, provisions and

rations for the men were wanted, trains would be made up to deliver the

stores to the commissaries and quartermasters encamped at Winchester.

Knowing that he, in making preparations to move at a given day, would

have to bring up wagons trains from Harper's Ferry, I asked him if he

could be ready to get off by the following Tuesday. This was on Friday.

"O Yes," he said, he "could be off before daylight on Monday." I told

him then to make the attack at that time and according to his own plan;

and I immediately started to return to the army about Richmond. After

visiting Baltimore and Burlington, New Jersey, I arrived at City Point

on the 19th.

On the way out to Harper's Ferry I had met Mr. Robert Garrett, President

of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. He seemed very anxious to know when

workmen might be put upon the road again so as to make repairs and put

it in shape for running. It was a large piece of property to have

standing idle. I told him I could not answer then positively but would

try and inform him before a great while. On my return Mr. Garrett met

me again with the same and I told him I thought that by the Wednesday he

might send his workmen out on his road. I gave him no further

information however, and he had no suspicion of how I expected to have

the road cleared for his workmen.

Sheridan moved at the time he had fixed upon. He met Early at the

crossing of Opequon Creek, a most decisive victory--one which the

country. Early had invited this attack himself by his bad generalship

and made the victory easy. He had sent G. T. Anderson's division east

of the Blue Ridge before I went to Harper's Ferry; and about the time I

arrived there he started other divisions (leaving but two in their

camps) to march to Martinsburg for the purpose destroying the Baltimore

and Ohio Railroad at that point. Early here learned that I had been

with Sheridan and, supposing there was some movement on foot, started

back as soon as he got the information. But his forces were separated

and, as I have said, he was very badly defeated. He fell back to

Fisher's Hill, Sheridan following.

The valley is narrow at that point, and Early made another stand there,

behind works which extended across. But Sheridan turned both his flanks

and again sent him speeding up the valley, following in hot pursuit.

The pursuit was continued up the valley to Mount Jackson and New Market.

Sheridan captured about eleven hundred prisoners and sixteen guns. The

houses which he passed all along the route were found to be filled with

Early's wounded, and the country swarmed with his deserters. Finally,

on the 25th, Early turned from the valley eastward, leaving Sheridan at

Harrisonburg in undisputed possession.

Now one of the main objects of the expedition began to be accomplished.

Sheridan went to work with his command, gathering in the crops, cattle,

and everything in the upper part of the valley required by our troops;

and especially taking what might be of use to the enemy. What he could

not take away he destroyed, so that the enemy would not be invited to

come back there. I congratulated Sheridan upon his recent great victory

and had a salute of a hundred guns fired in honor of it, the guns being

aimed at the enemy around Petersburg. I also notified the other

commanders throughout the country, who also fired salutes in honor of

his victory.

I had reason to believe that the administration was a little afraid to

have a decisive battle at that time, for fear it might go against us and

have a bad effect on the November elections. The convention which had

met and made its nomination of the Democratic candidate for the

presidency had declared the war a failure. Treason was talked as boldly

in Chicago at that convention as ever been in Charleston. It was a

question whether the government would then have had the power to make

arrests and punish those who talked treason. But this decisive victory

was the most effective campaign argument made in the canvass.

Sheridan, in his pursuit, got beyond where they could hear from him in

Washington, and the President became very much frightened about him. He

was afraid that the hot pursuit had been a little like that of General

Cass was said to have been, in one of our Indian wars, when he was an

officer of army. Cass was pursuing the Indians so closely that the

first thing he knew he found himself in front, and the Indians pursuing

him. The President was afraid that Sheridan had got on the other side

of Early and that Early was in behind him. He was afraid that Sheridan

was getting so far away that reinforcements would be sent out from

Richmond to enable Early to beat him. I replied to the President that I

had taken steps to prevent Lee from sending reinforcements to Early, by

attacking the former where he was.

On the 28th of September, to retain Lee in his position, I sent Ord with

the 18th corps and Birney with the 10th corps to make an advance on

Richmond, to threaten it. Ord moved with the left wing up to Chaffin's

Bluff; Birney with the 10th corps took a road farther north; while Kautz

with the cavalry took the Darby road, still farther to the north. They

got across the river by the next morning, and made an effort to surprise

the enemy. In that, however, they were unsuccessful.

The enemy's lines were very strong and very intricate. Stannard's

division of the 18th corps with General Burnham's brigade leading, tried

an assault against Fort Harrison and captured it with sixteen guns and a

good many prisoners. Burnham was killed in the assault. Colonel Stevens

who succeeded him was badly wounded; and his successor also fell in the

same way. Some works to the right and left were also carried with the

guns in them--six in number--and a few more prisoners. Birney's troops

to the right captured the enemy's intrenched picket-lines, but were

unsuccessful in their efforts upon the main line.

Our troops fortified their new position, bringing Fort Harrison into the

new line and extending it to the river. This brought us pretty close to

the enemy on the north side of the James, and the two opposing lines

maintained their relative positions to the close of the siege.

In the afternoon a further attempt was made to advance, but it failed.

Ord fell badly wounded, and had to be relieved; the command devolved

upon General Heckman, and later General Weitzel was assigned to the

command of the 18th corps. During the night Lee reinforced his troops

about Fort Gilmer, which was at the right of Fort Harrison, by eight

additional brigades from Petersburg, and attempted to retake the works

which we had captured by concentrating ten brigades against them. All

their efforts failed, their attacks being all repulsed with very heavy

loss. In one of these assaults upon us General Stannard, a gallant

officer who was defending Fort Harrison, lost an arm. Our casualties

during these operations amounted to 394 killed, I,554 wounded and 324

missing.

Whilst this was going on General Meade was instructed to keep up an

appearance of moving troops to our extreme left. Parke and Warren were

kept with two divisions, each under arms, ready to move leaving their

enclosed batteries manned, with a scattering line on the other

intrenchments. The object of this was to prevent reinforcements from

going to the north side of the river. Meade was instructed to watch the

enemy closely and, if Lee weakened his lines, to make an attack.

On the 30th these troops moved out, under Warren, and captured an

advanced intrenched camp at Peeble's farm, driving the enemy back to the

main line. Our troops followed and made an attack in the hope of

carrying the enemy's main line; but in this they were unsuccessful and

lost a large number of men, mostly captured. The number of killed and

wounded was not large. The next day our troops advanced again and

established themselves, intrenching a new line about a mile in front of

the enemy. This advanced Warren's position on the Weldon Railroad very

considerably.

Sheridan having driven the enemy out of the valley, and taken the

productions of the valley so that instead of going there for supplies

the enemy would have to bring his provisions with him if he again

entered it, recommended a reduction of his own force, the surplus to be

sent where it could be of more use. I approved of his suggestion, and

ordered him to send Wright's corps back to the James River. I further

directed him to repair the railroad up the Shenandoah Valley towards the

advanced position which we would hold with a small force. The troops

were to be sent to Washington by the way of Culpeper, in order to watch

the east side of the Blue Ridge, and prevent the enemy from getting into

the rear of Sheridan while he was still doing his work of destruction.

The valley was so very important, however, to the Confederate army that,

contrary to our expectations, they determined to make one more strike,

and save it if possible before the supplies should be all destroyed.

Reinforcements were sent therefore to Early, and this before any of our

troops had been withdrawn. Early prepared to strike Sheridan at

Harrisonburg; but the latter had not remained there.

On the 6th of October Sheridan commenced retiring down the valley,

taking or destroying all the food and forage and driving the cattle

before him, Early following. At Fisher's Hill Sheridan turned his

cavalry back on that of Early, which, under the lead of Rosser, was

pursuing closely, and routed it most completely, capturing eleven guns

and a large number of prisoners. Sheridan lost only about sixty men.

His cavalry pursued the enemy back some twenty-five miles. On the 10th

of October the march down the valley was again resumed, Early again

following.

I now ordered Sheridan to halt, and to improve the opportunity if

afforded by the enemy's having been sufficiently weakened, to move back

again and cut the James River Canal and Virginia Central Railroad. But

this order had to go through Washington where it was intercepted; and

when Sheridan received what purported to be a statement of what I wanted

him to do it was something entirely different. Halleck informed

Sheridan that it was my wish for him to hold a forward position as a

base from which to act against Charlottesville and Gordonsville; that he

should fortify this position and provision it.

Sheridan objected to this most decidedly; and I was impelled to

telegraph him, on the 14th, as follows:

CITY POINT, VA., October 14, 1864.--12.30 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN, Cedar Creek, Va.

What I want is for you to threaten the Virginia Central Railroad and

canal in the manner your judgment tells you is best, holding yourself

ready to advance, if the enemy draw off their forces. If you make the

enemy hold a force equal to your own for the protection of those

thoroughfares, it will accomplish nearly as much as their destruction.

If you cannot do this, then the next best thing to do is to send here

all the force you can. I deem a good cavalry force necessary for your

offensive, as well as defensive operations. You need not therefore send

here more than one division of cavalry.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

Sheridan having been summoned to Washington City, started on the 15th

leaving Wright in command. His army was then at Cedar Creek, some

twenty miles south of Winchester. The next morning while at Front

Royal, Sheridan received a dispatch from Wright, saying that a dispatch

from Longstreet to Early had been intercepted. It directed the latter

to be ready to move and to crush Sheridan as soon as he, Longstreet,

arrived. On the receipt of this news Sheridan ordered the cavalry up

the valley to join Wright.

On the 18th of October Early was ready to move, and during the night

succeeded in getting his troops in the rear of our left flank, which

fled precipitately and in great confusion down the valley, losing

eighteen pieces of artillery and a thousand or more prisoners. The

right under General Getty maintained a firm and steady front, falling

back to Middletown where it took a position and made a stand. The

cavalry went to the rear, seized the roads leading to Winchester and

held them for the use of our troops in falling back, General Wright

having ordered a retreat back to that place.

Sheridan having left Washington on the 18th, reached Winchester that

night. The following morning he started to join his command. He had

scarcely got out of town, when he met his men returning in panic from

the front and also heard heavy firing to the south. He immediately

ordered the cavalry at Winchester to be deployed across the valley to

stop the stragglers. Leaving members of his staff to take care of

Winchester and the public property there, he set out with a small escort

directly for the scene of battle. As he met the fugitives he ordered

them to turn back, reminding them that they were going the wrong way.

His presence soon restored confidence. Finding themselves worse

frightened than hurt the men did halt and turn back. Many of those who

had run ten miles got back in time to redeem their reputation as gallant

soldiers before night.

When Sheridan got to the front he found Getty and Custer still holding

their ground firmly between the Confederates and our retreating troops.

Everything in the rear was now ordered up. Sheridan at once proceeded to

intrench his position; and he awaited an assault from the enemy. This

was made with vigor, and was directed principally against Emory's corps,

which had sustained the principal loss in the first attack. By one

o'clock the attack was repulsed. Early was so badly damaged that he

seemed disinclined to make another attack, but went to work to intrench

himself with a view to holding the position he had already gained. He

thought, no doubt, that Sheridan would be glad enough to leave him

unmolested; but in this he was mistaken.

About the middle of the afternoon Sheridan advanced. He sent his

cavalry by both flanks, and they penetrated to the enemy's rear. The

contest was close for a time, but at length the left of the enemy broke,

and disintegration along the whole line soon followed. Early tried to

rally his men, but they were followed so closely that they had to give

way very quickly every time they attempted to make a stand. Our

cavalry, having pushed on and got in the rear of the Confederates,

captured twenty-four pieces of artillery, besides retaking what had been

lost in the morning. This victory pretty much closed the campaigning in

the Valley of Virginia. All the Confederate troops were sent back to

Richmond with the exception of one division of infantry and a little

cavalry. Wright's corps was ordered back to the Army of the Potomac,

and two other divisions were withdrawn from the valley. Early had lost

more men in killed, wounded and captured in the valley than Sheridan had

commanded from first to last.

On more than one occasion in these engagements General R. B. Hayes, who

succeeded me as President of the United States, bore a very honorable

part. His conduct on the field was marked by conspicuous gallantry as

well as the display of qualities of a higher order than that of mere

personal daring. This might well have been expected of one who could

write at the time he is said to have done so: "Any officer fit for duty

who at this crisis would abandon his post to electioneer for a seat in

Congress, ought to be scalped." Having entered the army as a Major of

Volunteers at the beginning of the war, General Hayes attained by

meritorious service the rank of Brevet Major-General before its close.

On the north side of the James River the enemy attacked Kautz's cavalry

on the 7th of October, and drove it back with heavy loss in killed,

wounded and prisoners, and the loss of all the artillery. This was

followed up by an attack on our intrenched infantry line, but was

repulsed with severe slaughter. On the 13th a reconnoissance was sent

out by General Butler, with a view to drive the enemy from some new

works he was constructing, which resulted in heavy loss to us.

On the 24th I ordered General Meade to attempt to get possession of the

South Side Railroad, and for that purpose to advance on the 27th. The

attempt proved a failure, however, the most advanced of our troops not

getting nearer than within six miles of the point aimed for. Seeing the

impossibility of its accomplishment I ordered the troops to withdraw,

and they were all back in their former positions the next day.

Butler, by my directions, also made a demonstration on the north side of

the James River in order to support this move, by detaining there the

Confederate troops who were on that side. He succeeded in this, but

failed of further results by not marching past the enemy's left before

turning in on the Darby road and by reason of simply coming up against

their lines in place.

This closed active operations around Richmond for the winter. Of course

there was frequent skirmishing between pickets, but no serious battle

was fought near either Petersburg or Richmond. It would prolong this

work to give a detailed account of all that took place from day to day

around Petersburg and at other parts of my command, and it would not

interest the general reader if given. All these details can be found by

the military student in a series of books published by the Scribners,

Badeau's history of my campaigns, and also in the publications of the

War Department, including both the National and Confederate reports.

In the latter part of November General Hancock was relieved from the

command of the 2d corps by the Secretary of War and ordered to

Washington, to organize and command a corps of veteran troops to be

designated the 1st corps. It was expected that this would give him a

large command to co-operate with in the spring. It was my expectation,

at the time, that in the final operations Hancock should move either up

the valley, or else east of the Blue Ridge to Lynchburg; the idea being

to make the spring campaign the close of the war. I expected, with

Sherman coming up from the South, Meade south of Petersburg and around

Richmond, and Thomas's command in Tennessee with depots of supplies

established in the eastern part of that State, to move from the

direction of Washington or the valley towards Lynchburg. We would then

have Lee so surrounded that his supplies would be cut off entirely,

making it impossible for him to support his army.

General Humphreys, chief-of-staff of the Army of the Potomac, was

assigned to the command of the 2d corps, to succeed Hancock.

CHAPTER LIX.

THE CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA--SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA--WAR ANECDOTES--THE

MARCH ON SAVANNAH--INVESTMENT OF SAVANNAH--CAPTURE OF SAVANNAH.

Let us now return to the operations in the military division of the

Mississippi, and accompany Sherman in his march to the sea.

The possession of Atlanta by us narrowed the territory of the enemy very

materially and cut off one of his two remaining lines of roads from east

to west.

A short time after the fall of Atlanta Mr. Davis visited Palmetto and

Macon and made speeches at each place. He spoke at Palmetto on the 20th

of September, and at Macon on the 22d. Inasmuch as he had relieved

Johnston and appointed Hood, and Hood had immediately taken the

initiative, it is natural to suppose that Mr. Davis was disappointed

with General Johnston's policy. My own judgment is that Johnston acted

very wisely: he husbanded his men and saved as much of his territory as

he could, without fighting decisive battles in which all might be lost.

As Sherman advanced, as I have show, his army became spread out, until,

if this had been continued, it would have been easy to destroy it in

detail. I know that both Sherman and I were rejoiced when we heard of

the change. Hood was unquestionably a brave, gallant soldier and not

destitute of ability; but unfortunately his policy was to fight the

enemy wherever he saw him, without thinking much of the consequences of

defeat.

In his speeches Mr. Davis denounced Governor Brown, of Georgia, and

General Johnston in unmeasured terms, even insinuating that their

loyalty to the Southern cause was doubtful. So far as General Johnston

is concerned, I think Davis did him a great injustice in this

particular. I had know the general before the war and strongly believed

it would be impossible for him to accept a high commission for the

purpose of betraying the cause he had espoused. There, as I have said,

I think that his policy was the best one that could have been pursued by

the whole South--protract the war, which was all that was necessary to

enable them to gain recognition in the end. The North was already

growing weary, as the South evidently was also, but with this

difference. In the North the people governed, and could stop

hostilities whenever they chose to stop supplies. The South was a

military camp, controlled absolutely by the government with soldiers to

back it, and the war could have been protracted, no matter to what

extent the discontent reached, up to the point of open mutiny of the

soldiers themselves. Mr. Davis's speeches were frank appeals to the

people of Georgia and that portion of the South to come to their relief.

He tried to assure his frightened hearers that the Yankees were rapidly

digging their own graves; that measures were already being taken to cut

them off from supplies from the North; and that with a force in front,

and cut off from the rear, they must soon starve in the midst of a

hostile people. Papers containing reports of these speeches immediately

reached the Northern States, and they were republished. Of course, that

caused no alarm so long as telegraphic communication was kept up with

Sherman.

When Hood was forced to retreat from Atlanta he moved to the south-west

and was followed by a portion of Sherman's army. He soon appeared upon

the railroad in Sherman's rear, and with his whole army began destroying

the road. At the same time also the work was begun in Tennessee and

Kentucky which Mr. Davis had assured his hearers at Palmetto and Macon

would take place. He ordered Forrest (about the ablest cavalry general

in the South) north for this purpose; and Forrest and Wheeler carried

out their orders with more or less destruction, occasionally picking up

a garrison. Forrest indeed performed the very remarkable feat of

capturing, with cavalry, two gunboats and a number of transports,

something the accomplishment of which is very hard to account for.

Hood's army had been weakened by Governor Brown's withdrawing the

Georgia State troops for the purpose of gathering in the season's crops

for the use of the people and for the use of the army. This not only

depleted Hood's forces but it served a most excellent purpose in

gathering in supplies of food and forage for the use of our army in its

subsequent march. Sherman was obliged to push on with his force and go

himself with portions of it hither and thither, until it was clearly

demonstrated to him that with the army he then had it would be

impossible to hold the line from Atlanta back and leave him any force

whatever with which to take the offensive. Had that plan been adhered

to, very large reinforcements would have been necessary; and Mr. Davis's

prediction of the destruction of the army would have been realized, or

else Sherman would have been obliged to make a successful retreat, which

Mr. Davis said in his speeches would prove more disastrous than

Napoleon's retreat from Moscow.

These speeches of Mr. Davis were not long in reaching Sherman. He took

advantage of the information they gave, and made all the preparation

possible for him to make to meet what now became expected, attempts to

break his communications. Something else had to be done: and to

Sherman's sensible and soldierly mind the idea was not long in dawning

upon him, not only that something else had to be done, but what that

something else should be.

On September 10th I telegraphed Sherman as follows:

CITY POINT, VA., Sept. 10, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN, Atlanta, Georgia.

So soon as your men are sufficiently rested, and preparations can be

made, it is desirable that another campaign should be commenced. We

want to keep the enemy constantly pressed to the end of the war. If we

give him no peace whilst the war lasts, the end cannot be distant. Now

that we have all of Mobile Bay that is valuable, I do not know but it

will be the best move to transfer Canby's troops to act upon Savannah,

whilst you move on Augusta. I should like to hear from you, however, in

this matter.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

Sherman replied promptly:

"If I could be sure of finding provisions and ammunition at Augusta, or

Columbus, Georgia, I can march to Milledgeville, and compel Hood to give

up Augusta or Macon, and then turn on the other. * * * If you can

manage to take the Savannah River as high up as Augusta, or the

Chattahoochee as far up as Columbus, I can sweep the whole State of

Georgia."

On the 12th I sent a special messenger, one of my own staff, with a

letter inviting Sherman's views about the next campaign.

CITY POINT, VA., Sept. 12, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN, Commanding Mill Division of the

Mississippi.

I send Lieutenant-Colonel Porter, of my staff, with this. Colonel Porter

will explain to you the exact condition of affairs here better than I

can do in the limits of a letter. Although I feel myself strong enough

for offensive operations, I am holding on quietly to get advantage of

recruits and convalescents, who are coming forward very rapidly. My

lines are necessarily very long, extending from Deep Bottom north of the

James across the peninsula formed by the Appomattox and the James, and

south of the Appomattox to the Weldon Road. This line is very strongly

fortified, and can be held with comparatively few men, but from its

great length takes many in the aggregate. I propose, when I do move, to

extend my left so as to control what is known as the South Side, or

Lynchburg and Petersburg Road, then if possible to keep the Danville

Road cut. At the same time this move is made, I want to send a force of

from six to ten thousand men against Wilmington.

The way I propose to do this is to land the men north of Fort Fisher,

and hold that point. At the same time a large naval fleet will be

assembled there, and the iron-clads will run the batteries as they did

at Mobile. This will give us the same control of the harbor of

Wilmington that we now have of the harbor of Mobile. What you are to do

with the forces at your command, I do not see. The difficulties of

supplying your army, except when you are constantly moving, beyond where

you are, I plainly see. If it had not been for Price's movements Canby

would have sent twelve thousand more men to Mobile. From your command

on the Mississippi an equal number could have been taken. With these

forces my idea would have been to divide them, sending one half to

Mobile and the other half to Savannah. You could then move as proposed

in your telegram, so as to threaten Macon and Augusta equally.

Whichever was abandoned by the enemy you could take and open up a new

base of supplies. My object now in sending a staff officer is not so

much to suggest operations for you, as to get your views and have plans

matured by the time everything can be got ready. It will probably be

the 5th of October before any of the plans herein indicated will be

executed.

If you have any promotions to recommend, send the names forward and I

will approve them. * * *

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

This reached Sherman on September 20th.

On the 25th of September Sherman reported to Washington that Hood's

troops were in his rear. He had provided against this by sending a

division to Chattanooga and a division to Rome, Georgia, which was in

the rear of Hood, supposing that Hood would fall back in the direction

from which he had come to reach the railroad. At the same time Sherman

and Hood kept up a correspondence relative to the exchange of prisoners,

the treatment of citizens, and other matters suitable to be arranged

between hostile commanders in the field. On the 27th of September I

telegraphed Sherman as follows:

CITY POINT, VA., September 27, 1864--10.30 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN:

I have directed all recruits and new troops from the Western States to

be sent to Nashville, to receive their further orders from you. * * *

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

On the 29th Sherman sent Thomas back to Chattanooga, and afterwards to

Nashville, with another division (Morgan's) of the advanced army.

Sherman then suggested that, when he was prepared, his movements should

take place against Milledgeville and then to Savannah. His expectation

at that time was, to make this movement as soon as he could get up his

supplies. Hood was moving in his own country, and was moving light so

that he could make two miles to Sherman's one. He depended upon the

country to gather his supplies, and so was not affected by delays.

As I have said, until this unexpected state of affairs happened, Mobile

had been looked upon as the objective point of Sherman's army. It had

been a favorite move of mine from 1862, when I first suggested to the

then commander-in-chief that the troops in Louisiana, instead of

frittering away their time in the trans-Mississippi, should move

against Mobile. I recommended this from time to time until I came into

command of the army, the last of March 1864. Having the power in my own

hands, I now ordered the concentration of supplies, stores and troops,

in the department of the Gulf about New Orleans, with a view to a move

against Mobile, in support of, and in conjunction with, the other armies

operating in the field. Before I came into command, these troops had

been scattered over the trans-Mississippi department in such a way that

they could not be, or were not, gotten back in time to take any part in

the original movement; hence the consideration, which had caused Mobile

to be selected as the objective point for Sherman's army to find his

next base of supplies after having cut loose from Atlanta, no longer

existed.

General G. M. Dodge, an exceedingly efficient officer, having been badly

wounded, had to leave the army about the first of October. He was in

command of two divisions of the 16th corps, consolidated into one.

Sherman then divided his army into the right and left wings the right

commanded by General O. O. Howard and the left by General Slocum.

General Dodge's two divisions were assigned, one to each of these wings.

Howard's command embraced the 15th and 17th corps, and Slocum's the 14th

and 20th corps, commanded by Generals Jeff. C. Davis and A. S. Williams.

Generals Logan and Blair commanded the two corps composing the right

wing. About this time they left to take part in the presidential

election, which took place that year, leaving their corps to Osterhaus

and Ransom. I have no doubt that their leaving was at the earnest

solicitation of the War Department. General Blair got back in time to

resume his command and to proceed with it throughout the march to the

sea and back to the grand review at Washington. General Logan did not

return to his command until after it reached Savannah.

Logan felt very much aggrieved at the transfer of General Howard from

that portion of the Army of the Potomac which was then with the Western

Army, to the command of the Army of the Tennessee, with which army

General Logan had served from the battle of Belmont to the fall of

Atlanta--having passed successively through all grades from colonel

commanding a regiment to general commanding a brigade, division and army

corps, until upon the death of McPherson the command of the entire Army

of the Tennessee devolved upon him in the midst of a hotly contested

battle. He conceived that he had done his full duty as commander in

that engagement; and I can bear testimony, from personal observation,

that he had proved himself fully equal to all the lower positions which

he had occupied as a soldier. I will not pretend to question the motive

which actuated Sherman in taking an officer from another army to

supersede General Logan. I have no doubt, whatever, that he did this

for what he considered would be to the good of the service, which was

more important than that the personal feelings of any individual should

not be aggrieved; though I doubt whether he had an officer with him who

could have filled the place as Logan would have done. Differences of

opinion must exist between the best of friends as to policies in war,

and of judgment as to men's fitness. The officer who has the command,

however, should be allowed to judge of the fitness of the officers under

him, unless he is very manifestly wrong.

Sherman's army, after all the depletions, numbered about sixty thousand

effective men. All weak men had been left to hold the rear, and those

remaining were not only well men, but strong and hardy, so that he had

sixty thousand as good soldiers as ever trod the earth; better than any

European soldiers, because they not only worked like a machine but the

machine thought. European armies know very little what they are fighting

for, and care less. Included in these sixty thousand troops, there were

two small divisions of cavalry, numbering altogether about four thousand

men. Hood had about thirty-five to forty thousand men, independent of

Forrest, whose forces were operating in Tennessee and Kentucky, as Mr.

Davis had promised they should. This part of Mr. Davis's military plan

was admirable, and promised the best results of anything he could have

done, according to my judgment. I say this because I have criticised his

military judgment in the removal of Johnston, and also in the

appointment of Hood. I am aware, however, that there was high feeling

existing at that time between Davis and his subordinate, whom I regarded

as one of his ablest lieutenants.

On the 5th of October the railroad back from Atlanta was again very

badly broken, Hood having got on the track with his army. Sherman saw

after night, from a high point, the road burning for miles. The defence

of the railroad by our troops was very gallant, but they could not hold

points between their intrenched positions against Hood's whole army; in

fact they made no attempt to do so; but generally the intrenched

positions were held, as well as important bridges, and store located at

them. Allatoona, for instance, was defended by a small force of men

under the command of General Corse, one of the very able and efficient

volunteer officers produced by the war. He, with a small force, was cut

off from the remainder of the National army and was attacked with great

vigor by many times his own number. Sherman from his high position could

see the battle raging, with the Confederate troops between him and his

subordinate. He sent men, of course, to raise the temporary siege, but

the time that would be necessarily consumed in reaching Corse, would be

so great that all occupying the intrenchments might be dead. Corse was

a man who would never surrender. From a high position some of Sherman's

signal corps discovered a signal flag waving from a hole in the block

house at Allatoona. It was from Corse. He had been shot through the

face, but he signalled to his chief a message which left no doubt of his

determination to hold his post at all hazards. It was at this point

probably, that Sherman first realized that with the forces at his

disposal, the keeping open of his line of communication with the North

would be impossible if he expected to retain any force with which to

operate offensively beyond Atlanta. He proposed, therefore, to destroy

the roads back to Chattanooga, when all ready to move, and leave the

latter place garrisoned. Yet, before abandoning the railroad, it was

necessary that he should repair damages already done, and hold the road

until he could get forward such supplies, ordnance stores and small

rations, as he wanted to carry with him on his proposed march, and to

return to the north his surplus artillery; his object being to move

light and to have no more artillery than could be used to advantage on

the field.

Sherman thought Hood would follow him, though he proposed to prepare for

the contingency of the latter moving the other way while he was moving

south, by making Thomas strong enough to hold Tennessee and Kentucky.

I, myself, was thoroughly satisfied that Hood would go north, as he did.

On the 2d of November I telegraphed Sherman authorizing him definitely

to move according to the plan he had proposed: that is, cutting loose

from his base, giving up Atlanta and the railroad back to Chattanooga.

To strengthen Thomas he sent Stanley (4th corps) back, and also ordered

Schofield, commanding the Army of the Ohio, twelve thousand strong, to

report to him. In addition to this, A. J. Smith, who, with two

divisions of Sherman's army, was in Missouri aiding Rosecrans in driving

the enemy from that State, was under orders to return to Thomas and,

under the most unfavorable circumstances, might be expected to arrive

there long before Hood could reach Nashville.

In addition to this, the new levies of troops that were being raised in

the North-west went to Thomas as rapidly as enrolled and equipped.

Thomas, without any of these additions spoken of, had a garrison at

Chattanooga which had been strengthened by one division and garrisons at

Bridgeport, Stevenson, Decatur, Murfreesboro, and Florence. There were

already with him in Nashville ten thousand soldiers in round numbers,

and many thousands of employees in the quartermaster's and other

departments who could be put in the intrenchments in front of Nashville,

for its defence. Also, Wilson was there with ten thousand dismounted

cavalrymen, who were being equipped for the field. Thomas had at this

time about forty-five thousand men without any of the reinforcements

here above enumerated. These reinforcements gave him altogether about

seventy thousand men, without counting what might be added by the new

levies already spoken of.

About this time Beauregard arrived upon the field, not to supersede Hood

in command, but to take general charge over the entire district in which

Hood and Sherman were, or might be, operating. He made the most frantic

appeals to the citizens for assistance to be rendered in every way: by

sending reinforcements, by destroying supplies on the line of march of

the invaders, by destroying the bridges over which they would have to

cross, and by, in every way, obstructing the roads to their front. But

it was hard to convince the people of the propriety of destroying

supplies which were so much needed by themselves, and each one hoped

that his own possessions might escape.

Hood soon started north, and went into camp near Decatur, Alabama, where

he remained until the 29th of October, but without making an attack on

the garrison of that place.

The Tennessee River was patrolled by gunboats, from Muscle Shoals east;

and, also, below the second shoals out to the Ohio River. These, with

the troops that might be concentrated from the garrisons along the river

at any point where Hood might choose to attempt to cross, made it

impossible for him to cross the Tennessee at any place where it was

navigable. But Muscle Shoals is not navigable, and below them again is

another shoal which also obstructs navigation. Hood therefore moved

down to a point nearly opposite Florence, Alabama, crossed over and

remained there for some time, collecting supplies of food, forage and

ammunition. All of these had to come from a considerable distance south,

because the region in which he was then situated was mountainous, with

small valleys which produced but little, and what they had produced had

long since been exhausted. On the 1st of November I suggested to

Sherman, and also asked his views thereon, the propriety of destroying

Hood before he started on his campaign.

On the 2d of November, as stated, I approved definitely his making his

proposed campaign through Georgia, leaving Hood behind to the tender

mercy of Thomas and the troops in his command. Sherman fixed the 10th

of November as the day of starting.

Sherman started on that day to get back to Atlanta, and on the 15th the

real march to the sea commenced. The right wing, under Howard, and the

cavalry went to Jonesboro, Milledgeville, then the capital of Georgia,

being Sherman's objective or stopping place on the way to Savannah. The

left wing moved to Stone Mountain, along roads much farther east than

those taken by the right wing. Slocum was in command, and threatened

Augusta as the point to which he was moving, but he was to turn off and

meet the right wing at Milledgeville.

Atlanta was destroyed so far as to render it worthless for military

purposes before starting, Sherman himself remaining over a day to

superintend the work, and see that it was well done. Sherman's orders

for this campaign were perfect. Before starting, he had sent back all

sick, disabled and weak men, retaining nothing but the hardy,

well-inured soldiers to accompany him on his long march in prospect.

His artillery was reduced to sixty-five guns. The ammunition carried

with them was two hundred rounds for musket and gun. Small rations were

taken in a small wagon train, which was loaded to its capacity for rapid

movement. The army was expected to live on the country, and to always

keep the wagons full of forage and provisions against a possible delay

of a few days.

The troops, both of the right and left wings, made most of their advance

along the line of railroads, which they destroyed. The method adopted

to perform this work, was to burn and destroy all the bridges and

culverts, and for a long distance, at places, to tear up the track and

bend the rails. Soldiers to do this rapidly would form a line along one

side of the road with crowbars and poles, place these under the rails

and, hoisting all at once, turn over many rods of road at one time. The

ties would then be placed in piles, and the rails, as they were

loosened, would be carried and put across these log heaps. When a

sufficient number of rails were placed upon a pile of ties it would be

set on fire. This would heat the rails very much more in the middle,

that being over the main part of the fire, than at the ends, so that

they would naturally bend of their own weight; but the soldiers, to

increase the damage, would take tongs and, one or two men at each end of

the rail, carry it with force against the nearest tree and twist it

around, thus leaving rails forming bands to ornament the forest trees of

Georgia. All this work was going on at the same time, there being a

sufficient number of men detailed for that purpose. Some piled the logs

and built the fire; some put the rails upon the fire; while others would

bend those that were sufficiently heated: so that, by the time the last

bit of road was torn up, that it was designed to destroy at a certain

place, the rails previously taken up were already destroyed.

The organization for supplying the army was very complete. Each brigade

furnished a company to gather supplies of forage and provisions for the

command to which they belonged. Strict injunctions were issued against

pillaging, or otherwise unnecessarily annoying the people; but

everything in shape of food for man and forage for beast was taken. The

supplies were turned over to the brigade commissary and quartermaster,

and were issued by them to their respective commands precisely the same

as if they had been purchased. The captures consisted largely of

cattle, sheep, poultry, some bacon, cornmeal, often molasses, and

occasionally coffee or other small rations.

The skill of these men, called by themselves and the army "bummers," in

collecting their loads and getting back to their respective commands,

was marvellous. When they started out in the morning, they were always

on foot; but scarcely one of them returned in the evening without being

mounted on a horse or mule. These would be turned in for the general use

of the army, and the next day these men would start out afoot and return

again in the evening mounted.

Many of the exploits of these men would fall under the head of romance;

indeed, I am afraid that in telling some of their experiences, the

romance got the better of the truth upon which the story was founded,

and that, in the way many of these anecdotes are told, very little of

the foundation is left. I suspect that most of them consist chiefly of

the fiction added to make the stories better. In one instance it was

reported that a few men of Sherman's army passed a house where they

discovered some chickens under the dwelling. They immediately proceeded

to capture them, to add to the army's supplies. The lady of the house,

who happened to be at home, made piteous appeals to have these spared,

saying they were a few she had put away to save by permission of other

parties who had preceded and who had taken all the others that she had.

The soldiers seemed moved at her appeal; but looking at the chickens

again they were tempted and one of them replied: "The rebellion must be

suppressed if it takes the last chicken in the Confederacy," and

proceeded to appropriate the last one.

Another anecdote characteristic of these times has been told. The South,

prior to the rebellion, kept bloodhounds to pursue runaway slaves who

took refuge in the neighboring swamps, and also to hunt convicts.

Orders were issued to kill all these animals as they were met with. On

one occasion a soldier picked up a poodle, the favorite pet of its

mistress, and was carrying it off to execution when the lady made a

strong appeal to him to spare it. The soldier replied, "Madam, our

orders are to kill every bloodhound." "But this is not a bloodhound,"

said the lady. "Well, madam, we cannot tell what it will grow into if

we leave it behind," said the soldier as he went off with it.

Notwithstanding these anecdotes, and the necessary hardship they would

seem to imply, I do not believe there was much unwarrantable pillaging

considering that we were in the enemy's territory and without any

supplies except such as the country afforded.

On the 23d Sherman, with the left wing, reached Milledgeville. The right

wing was not far off: but proceeded on its way towards Savannah

destroying the road as it went. The troops at Milledgeville remained

over a day to destroy factories, buildings used for military purposes,

etc., before resuming its march.

The governor, who had been almost defying Mr. Davis before this, now

fled precipitately, as did the legislature of the State and all the

State officers. The governor, Sherman says, was careful to carry away

even his garden vegetables, while he left the archives of the State to

fall into our hands. The only military force that was opposed to

Sherman's forward march was the Georgia militia, a division under the

command of General G. W. Smith, and a battalion under Harry Wayne.

Neither the quality of the forces nor their numbers was sufficient to

even retard the progress of Sherman's army.

The people at the South became so frantic at this time at the successful

invasion of Georgia that they took the cadets from the military college

and added them to the ranks of the militia. They even liberated the

State convicts under promise from them that they would serve in the

army. I have but little doubt that the worst acts that were attributed

to Sherman's army were committed by these convicts, and by other

Southern people who ought to have been under sentence--such people as

could be found in every community, North and South--who took advantage

of their country being invaded to commit crime. They were in but little

danger of detection, or of arrest even if detected.

The Southern papers in commenting upon Sherman's movements pictured him

as in the most deplorable condition: stating that his men were

starving, that they were demoralized and wandering about almost without

object, aiming only to reach the sea coast and get under the protection

of our navy. These papers got to the North and had more or less effect

upon the minds of the people, causing much distress to all loyal persons

particularly to those who had husbands, sons or brothers with Sherman.

Mr. Lincoln seeing these accounts, had a letter written asking me if I

could give him anything that he could say to the loyal people that would

comfort them. I told him there was not the slightest occasion for

alarm; that with 60,000 such men as Sherman had with him, such a

commanding officer as he was could not be cut off in the open country.

He might possibly be prevented from reaching the point he had started

out to reach, but he would get through somewhere and would finally get

to his chosen destination: and even if worst came to worst he could

return North. I heard afterwards of Mr. Lincoln's saying, to those who

would inquire of him as to what he thought about the safety of Sherman's

army, that Sherman was all right: "Grant says they are safe with such a

general, and that if they cannot get out where they want to, they can

crawl back by the hole they went in at."

While at Milledgeville the soldiers met at the State House, organized a

legislature, and proceeded to business precisely as if they were the

legislative body belonging to the State of Georgia. The debates were

exciting, and were upon the subject of the situation the South was in at

that time, particularly the State of Georgia. They went so far as to

repeal, after a spirited and acrimonious debate, the ordinance of

secession.

The next day (24th) Sherman continued his march, going by the way of

Waynesboro and Louisville, Millen being the next objective and where the

two columns (the right and left wings) were to meet. The left wing

moved to the left of the direct road, and the cavalry still farther off

so as to make it look as though Augusta was the point they were aiming

for. They moved on all the roads they could find leading in that

direction. The cavalry was sent to make a rapid march in hope of

surprising Millen before the Union prisoners could be carried away; but

they failed in this.

The distance from Milledgeville to Millen was about one hundred miles.

At this point Wheeler, who had been ordered from Tennessee, arrived and

swelled the numbers and efficiency of the troops confronting Sherman.

Hardee, a native of Georgia, also came, but brought no troops with him.

It was intended that he should raise as large an army as possible with

which to intercept Sherman's march. He did succeed in raising some

troops, and with these and those under the command of Wheeler and Wayne,

had an army sufficient to cause some annoyance but no great detention.

Our cavalry and Wheeler's had a pretty severe engagement, in which

Wheeler was driven towards Augusta, thus giving the idea that Sherman

was probably making for that point.

Millen was reached on the 3d of December, and the march was resumed the

following day for Savannah, the final objective. Bragg had now been sent

to Augusta with some troops. Wade Hampton was there also trying to

raise cavalry sufficient to destroy Sherman's army. If he ever raised a

force it was too late to do the work expected of it. Hardee's whole

force probably numbered less than ten thousand men.

From Millen to Savannah the country is sandy and poor, and affords but

very little forage other than rice straw, which was then growing. This

answered a very good purpose as forage, and the rice grain was an

addition to the soldier's rations. No further resistance worthy of note

was met with, until within a few miles of Savannah. This place was

found to be intrenched and garrisoned. Sherman proceeded at once on his

arrival to invest the place, and found that the enemy had placed

torpedoes in the ground, which were to explode when stepped on by man or

beast. One of these exploded under an officer's horse, blowing the

animal to pieces and tearing one of the legs of the officer so badly

that it had to be amputated. Sherman at once ordered his prisoners to

the front, moving them in a compact body in advance, to either explode

the torpedoes or dig them up. No further explosion took place.

On the 10th of December the siege of Savannah commenced. Sherman then,

before proceeding any further with operations for the capture of the

place, started with some troops to open communication with our fleet,

which he expected to find in the lower harbor or as near by as the forts

of the enemy would permit. In marching to the coast he encountered Fort

McAllister, which it was necessary to reduce before the supplies he

might find on shipboard could be made available. Fort McAllister was

soon captured by an assault made by General Hazen's division.

Communication was then established with the fleet. The capture of

Savannah then only occupied a few days, and involved no great loss of

life. The garrison, however, as we shall see, was enabled to escape by

crossing the river and moving eastward.

When Sherman had opened communication with the fleet he found there a

steamer, which I had forwarded to him, carrying the accumulated mails

for his army, also supplies which I supposed he would be in need of.

General J. G. Foster, who commanded all the troops south of North

Carolina on the Atlantic sea-board, visited General Sherman before he

had opened communication with the fleet, with the view of ascertaining

what assistance he could be to him. Foster returned immediately to his

own headquarters at Hilton Head, for the purpose of sending Sherman

siege guns, and also if he should find he had them to spare, supplies of

clothing, hard bread, etc., thinking that these articles might not be

found outside. The mail on the steamer which I sent down, had been

collected by Colonel A. H. Markland of the Post Office Department, who

went in charge of it. On this same vessel I sent an officer of my staff

(Lieutenant Dunn) with the following letter to General Sherman:

CITY POINT, VA., Dec. 3, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN, Commanding Armies near Savannah, Ga.

The little information gleaned from the Southern press, indicating no

great obstacle to your progress, I have directed your mails (which had

been previously collected at Baltimore by Colonel Markland, Special

Agent of the Post Office Department) to be sent as far as the blockading

squadron off Savannah, to be forwarded to you as soon as heard from on

the coast.

Not liking to rejoice before the victory is assured, I abstain from

congratulating you and those under your command, until bottom has been

struck. I have never had a fear, however, for the result.

Since you left Atlanta, no very great progress has been made here. The

enemy has been closely watched though, and prevented from detaching

against you. I think not one man has gone from here, except some twelve

or fifteen hundred dismounted cavalry. Bragg has gone from Wilmington.

I am trying to take advantage of his absence to get possession of that

place. Owing to some preparations Admiral Porter and General Butler are

making to blow up Fort Fisher (which, while hoping for the best, I do

not believe a particle in), there is a delay in getting this expedition

off. I hope they will be ready to start by the 7th, and that Bragg will

not have started back by that time.

In this letter I do not intend to give you anything like directions for

future action, but will state a general idea I have, and will get your

views after you have established yourself on the sea-coast. With your

veteran army I hope to get control of the only two through routes from

east to west possessed by the enemy before the fall of Atlanta. The

condition will be filled by holding Savannah and Augusta, or by holding

any other port to the east of Savannah and Branchville. If Wilmington

falls, a force from there can co-operate with you.

Thomas has got back into the defences of Nashville, with Hood close upon

him. Decatur has been abandoned, and so have all the roads except the

main one leading to Chattanooga. Part of this falling back was

undoubtedly necessary and all of it may have been. It did not look so,

however, to me. In my opinion, Thomas far outnumbers Hood in infantry.

In cavalry, Hood has the advantage in morale and numbers. I hope yet

that Hood will be badly crippled if not destroyed. The general news you

will learn from the papers better than I could give it.

After all becomes quiet, and roads become so bad up here that there is

likely to be a week or two when nothing can be done, I will run down the

coast to see you. If you desire it, I will ask Mrs. Sherman to go with

me.

Yours truly, U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General

I quote this letter because it gives the reader a full knowledge of the

events of that period.

Sherman now (the 15th) returned to Savannah to complete its investment

and insure the surrender of the garrison. The country about Savannah is

low and marshy, and the city was well intrenched from the river above to

the river below; and assaults could not be made except along a

comparatively narrow causeway. For this reason assaults must have

resulted in serious destruction of life to the Union troops, with the

chance of failing altogether. Sherman therefore decided upon a complete

investment of the place. When he believed this investment completed, he

summoned the garrison to surrender. General Hardee, who was in command,

replied in substance that the condition of affairs was not such as

Sherman had described. He said he was in full communication with his

department and was receiving supplies constantly.

Hardee, however, was cut off entirely from all communication with the

west side of the river, and by the river itself to the north and south.

On the South Carolina side the country was all rice fields, through

which it would have been impossible to bring supplies so that Hardee had

no possible communication with the outside world except by a dilapidated

plank road starting from the west bank of the river. Sherman, receiving

this reply, proceeded in person to a point on the coast, where General

Foster had troops stationed under General Hatch, for the purpose of

making arrangements with the latter officer to go through by one of the

numerous channels running inland along that part of the coast of South

Carolina, to the plank road which General Hardee still possessed, and

thus to cut him off from the last means he had of getting supplies, if

not of communication.

While arranging for this movement, and before the attempt to execute the

plan had been commenced, Sherman received information through one of his

staff officers that the enemy had evacuated Savannah the night before.

This was the night of the 21st of December. Before evacuating the place

Hardee had blown up the navy yard. Some iron-clads had been destroyed,

as well as other property that might have been valuable to us; but he

left an immense amount of stores untouched, consisting of cotton,

railroad cars, workshops, numerous pieces of artillery, and several

thousand stands of small arms.

A little incident occurred, soon after the fall of Savannah, which

Sherman relates in his Memoirs, and which is worthy of repetition.

Savannah was one of the points where blockade runners entered. Shortly

after the city fell into our possession, a blockade runner came sailing

up serenely, not doubting but the Confederates were still in possession.

It was not molested, and the captain did not find out his mistake until

he had tied up and gone to the Custom House, where he found a new

occupant of the building, and made a less profitable disposition of his

vessel and cargo than he had expected.

As there was some discussion as to the authorship of Sherman's march to

the sea, by critics of his book when it appeared before the public, I

want to state here that no question upon that subject was ever raised

between General Sherman and myself. Circumstances made the plan on which

Sherman expected to act impracticable, as as commander of the forces he

necessarily had to devise a new on which would give more promise of

success: consequently he recommended the destruction of the railroad

back to Chattanooga, and that he should be authorized then to move, as

he did, from Atlanta forward. His suggestions were finally approved,

although they did not immediately find favor in Washington. Even when

it came to the time of starting, the greatest apprehension, as to the

propriety of the campaign he was about commence, filled the mind of the

President, induced no doubt by his advisers. This went so far as to

move the President to ask me to suspend Sherman's march for a day or two

until I could think the matter over. My recollection is, though I find

no record to show it, that out of deference to the President's wish I

did send a dispatch to Sherman asking him to wait a day or two, or else

the connections between us were already cut so that I could not do so.

However this may be, the question of who devised the plan of march from

Atlanta to Savannah is easily answered: it was clearly Sherman, and to

him also belongs the credit of its brilliant execution. It was hardly

possible that any one else than those on the spot could have devised a

new plan of campaign to supersede one that did not promise success.

(*40)

I was in favor of Sherman's plan from the time it was first submitted to

me. My chief of staff, however, was very bitterly opposed to it and, as

I learned subsequently, finding that he could not move me, he appealed

to the authorities at Washington to stop it.

CHAPTER LX.

THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN--THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE.

As we have seen, Hood succeeded in crossing the Tennessee River between

Muscle Shoals and the lower shoals at the end of October, 1864. Thomas

sent Schofield with the 4th and 23d corps, together with three brigades

of Wilson's cavalry to Pulaski to watch him. On the 17th of November

Hood started and moved in such a manner as to avoid Schofield, thereby

turning his position. Hood had with him three infantry corps, commanded

respectively by Stephen D. Lee, Stewart and Cheatham. These, with his

cavalry, numbered about forty-five thousand men. Schofield had, of all

arms, about thirty thousand. Thomas's orders were, therefore, for

Schofield to watch the movements of the enemy, but not to fight a battle

if he could avoid it; but to fall back in case of an advance on

Nashville, and to fight the enemy, as he fell back, so as to retard the

enemy's movements until he could be reinforced by Thomas himself. As

soon as Schofield saw this movement of Hood's, he sent his trains to the

rear, but did not fall back himself until the 21st, and then only to

Columbia. At Columbia there was a slight skirmish but no battle. From

this place Schofield then retreated to Franklin. He had sent his wagons

in advance, and Stanley had gone with them with two divisions to protect

them. Cheatham's corps of Hood's army pursued the wagon train and went

into camp at Spring Hill, for the night of the 29th.

Schofield retreating from Columbia on the 29th, passed Spring Hill,

where Cheatham was bivouacked, during the night without molestation,

though within half a mile of where the Confederates were encamped. On

the morning of the 30th he had arrived at Franklin.

Hood followed closely and reached Franklin in time to make an attack the

same day. The fight was very desperate and sanguinary. The Confederate

generals led their men in the repeated charges, and the loss among them

was of unusual proportions. This fighting continued with great severity

until long after the night closed in, when the Confederates drew off.

General Stanley, who commanded two divisions of the Union troops, and

whose troops bore the brunt of the battle, was wounded in the fight, but

maintained his position.

The enemy's loss at Franklin, according to Thomas's report, was 1,750

buried upon the field by our troops, 3,800 in the hospital, and 702

prisoners besides. Schofield's loss, as officially reported, was 189

killed, 1,033 wounded, and 1,104 captured and missing.

Thomas made no effort to reinforce Schofield at Franklin, as it seemed

to me at the time he should have done, and fight out the battle there.

He simply ordered Schofield to continue his retreat to Nashville, which

the latter did during that night and the next day.

Thomas, in the meantime, was making his preparations to receive Hood.

The road to Chattanooga was still well guarded with strong garrisons at

Murfreesboro, Stevenson, Bridgeport and Chattanooga. Thomas had

previously given up Decatur and had been reinforced by A. J. Smith's two

divisions just returned from Missouri. He also had Steedman's division

and R. S. Granger's, which he had drawn from the front. His

quartermaster's men, about ten thousand in number, had been organized

and armed under the command of the chief quartermaster, General J. L.

Donaldson, and placed in the fortifications under the general

supervision of General Z. B. Tower, of the United States Engineers.

Hood was allowed to move upon Nashville, and to invest that place almost

without interference. Thomas was strongly fortified in his position, so

that he would have been safe against the attack of Hood. He had troops

enough even to annihilate him in the open field. To me his delay was

unaccountable--sitting there and permitting himself to be invested, so

that, in the end, to raise the siege he would have to fight the enemy

strongly posted behind fortifications. It is true the weather was very

bad. The rain was falling and freezing as it fell, so that the ground

was covered with a sheet of ice, that made it very difficult to move.

But I was afraid that the enemy would find means of moving, elude Thomas

and manage to get north of the Cumberland River. If he did this, I

apprehended most serious results from the campaign in the North, and was

afraid we might even have to send troops from the East to head him off

if he got there, General Thomas's movements being always so deliberate

and so slow, though effective in defence.

I consequently urged Thomas in frequent dispatches sent from City

Point(*41) to make the attack at once. The country was alarmed, the

administration was alarmed, and I was alarmed lest the very thing would

take place which I have just described that is, Hood would get north.

It was all without avail further than to elicit dispatches from Thomas

saying that he was getting ready to move as soon as he could, that he

was making preparations, etc. At last I had to say to General Thomas

that I should be obliged to remove him unless he acted promptly. He

replied that he was very sorry, but he would move as soon as he could.

General Logan happening to visit City Point about that time, and knowing

him as a prompt, gallant and efficient officer, I gave him an order to

proceed to Nashville to relieve Thomas. I directed him, however, not to

deliver the order or publish it until he reached there, and if Thomas

had moved, then not to deliver it at all, but communicate with me by

telegraph. After Logan started, in thinking over the situation, I

became restless, and concluded to go myself. I went as far as

Washington City, when a dispatch was received from General Thomas

announcing his readiness at last to move, and designating the time of

his movement. I concluded to wait until that time. He did move, and was

successful from the start. This was on the 15th of December. General

Logan was at Louisville at the time this movement was made, and

telegraphed the fact to Washington, and proceeded no farther himself.

The battle during the 15th was severe, but favorable to the Union

troops, and continued until night closed in upon the combat. The next

day the battle was renewed. After a successful assault upon Hood's men

in their intrenchments the enemy fled in disorder, routed and broken,

leaving their dead, their artillery and small arms in great numbers on

the field, besides the wounded that were captured. Our cavalry had

fought on foot as infantry, and had not their horses with them; so that

they were not ready to join in the pursuit the moment the enemy

retreated. They sent back, however, for their horses, and endeavored to

get to Franklin ahead of Hood's broken army by the Granny White Road,

but too much time was consumed in getting started. They had got but a

few miles beyond the scene of the battle when they found the enemy's

cavalry dismounted and behind intrenchments covering the road on which

they were advancing. Here another battle ensued, our men dismounting and

fighting on foot, in which the Confederates were again routed and driven

in great disorder. Our cavalry then went into bivouac, and renewed the

pursuit on the following morning. They were too late. The enemy

already had possession of Franklin, and was beyond them. It now became a

chase in which the Confederates had the lead.

Our troops continued the pursuit to within a few miles of Columbia,

where they found the rebels had destroyed the railroad bridge as well as

all other bridges over Duck River. The heavy rains of a few days before

had swelled the stream into a mad torrent, impassable except on bridges.

Unfortunately, either through a mistake in the wording of the order or

otherwise, the pontoon bridge which was to have been sent by rail out to

Franklin, to be taken thence with the pursuing column, had gone toward

Chattanooga. There was, consequently, a delay of some four days in

building bridges out of the remains of the old railroad bridge. Of

course Hood got such a start in this time that farther pursuit was

useless, although it was continued for some distance, but without coming

upon him again.

CHAPTER LXI.

EXPEDITION AGAINST FORT FISHER--ATTACK ON THE FORT--FAILURE OF THE

EXPEDITION--SECOND EXPEDITION AGAINST THE FORT--CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER.

Up to January, 1865, the enemy occupied Fort Fisher, at the mouth of

Cape Fear River and below the City of Wilmington. This port was of

immense importance to the Confederates, because it formed their

principal inlet for blockade runners by means of which they brought in

from abroad such supplies and munitions of war as they could not produce

at home. It was equally important to us to get possession of it, not

only because it was desirable to cut off their supplies so as to insure

a speedy termination of the war, but also because foreign governments,

particularly the British Government, were constantly threatening that

unless ours could maintain the blockade of that coast they should cease

to recognize any blockade. For these reasons I determined, with the

concurrence of the Navy Department, in December, to send an expedition

against Fort Fisher for the purpose of capturing it.

To show the difficulty experienced in maintaining the blockade, I will

mention a circumstance that took place at Fort Fisher after its fall.

Two English blockade runners came in at night. Their commanders, not

supposing the fort had fallen, worked their way through all our fleet

and got into the river unobserved. They then signalled the fort,

announcing their arrival. There was a colored man in the fort who had

been there before and who understood these signals. He informed General

Terry what reply he should make to have them come in, and Terry did as

he advised. The vessels came in, their officers entirely unconscious

that they were falling into the hands of the Union forces. Even after

they were brought in to the fort they were entertained in conversation

for some little time before suspecting that the Union troops were

occupying the fort. They were finally informed that their vessels and

cargoes were prizes.

I selected General Weitzel, of the Army of the James, to go with the

expedition, but gave instructions through General Butler. He commanded

the department within whose geographical limits Fort Fisher was

situated, as well as Beaufort and other points on that coast held by our

troops; he was, therefore, entitled to the right of fitting out the

expedition against Fort Fisher.

General Butler conceived the idea that if a steamer loaded heavily with

powder could be run up to near the shore under the fort and exploded, it

would create great havoc and make the capture an easy matter. Admiral

Porter, who was to command the naval squadron, seemed to fall in with

the idea, and it was not disapproved of in Washington; the navy was

therefore given the task of preparing the steamer for this purpose. I

had no confidence in the success of the scheme, and so expressed myself;

but as no serious harm could come of the experiment, and the authorities

at Washington seemed desirous to have it tried, I permitted it. The

steamer was sent to Beaufort, North Carolina, and was there loaded with

powder and prepared for the part she was to play in the reduction of

Fort Fisher.

General Butler chose to go in command of the expedition himself, and was

all ready to sail by the 9th of December (1864). Very heavy storms

prevailed, however, at that time along that part of the sea-coast, and

prevented him from getting off until the 13th or 14th. His advance

arrived off Fort Fisher on the 15th. The naval force had been already

assembled, or was assembling, but they were obliged to run into Beaufort

for munitions, coal, etc.; then, too, the powder-boat was not yet fully

prepared. The fleet was ready to proceed on the 18th; but Butler, who

had remained outside from the 15th up to that time, now found himself

out of coal, fresh water, etc., and had to put into Beaufort to

replenish. Another storm overtook him, and several days more were lost

before the army and navy were both ready at the same time to co-operate.

On the night of the 23d the powder-boat was towed in by a gunboat as

near to the fort as it was safe to run. She was then propelled by her

own machinery to within about five hundred yards of the shore. There

the clockwork, which was to explode her within a certain length of time,

was set and she was abandoned. Everybody left, and even the vessels put

out to sea to prevent the effect of the explosion upon them. At two

o'clock in the morning the explosion took place--and produced no more

effect on the fort, or anything else on land, than the bursting of a

boiler anywhere on the Atlantic Ocean would have done. Indeed when the

troops in Fort Fisher heard the explosion they supposed it was the

bursting of a boiler in one of the Yankee gunboats.

Fort Fisher was situated upon a low, flat peninsula north of Cape Fear

River. The soil is sandy. Back a little the peninsula is very heavily

wooded, and covered with fresh-water swamps. The fort ran across this

peninsula, about five hundred yards in width, and extended along the sea

coast about thirteen hundred yards. The fort had an armament of 21 guns

and 3 mortars on the land side, and 24 guns on the sea front. At that

time it was only garrisoned by four companies of infantry, one light

battery and the gunners at the heavy guns less than seven hundred men

with a reserve of less than a thousand men five miles up the peninsula.

General Whiting of the Confederate army was in command, and General

Bragg was in command of the force at Wilmington. Both commenced calling

for reinforcements the moment they saw our troops landing. The Governor

of North Carolina called for everybody who could stand behind a parapet

and shoot a gun, to join them. In this way they got two or three

hundred additional men into Fort Fisher; and Hoke's division, five or

six thousand strong, was sent down from Richmond. A few of these troops

arrived the very day that Butler was ready to advance.

On the 24th the fleet formed for an attack in arcs of concentric

circles, their heavy iron-clads going in very close range, being nearest

the shore, and leaving intervals or spaces so that the outer vessels

could fire between them. Porter was thus enabled to throw one hundred

and fifteen shells per minute. The damage done to the fort by these

shells was very slight, only two or three cannon being disabled in the

fort. But the firing silenced all the guns by making it too hot for the

men to maintain their positions about them and compelling them to seek

shelter in the bomb-proofs.

On the next day part of Butler's troops under General Adelbert Ames

effected a landing out of range of the fort without difficulty. This

was accomplished under the protection of gunboats sent for the purpose,

and under cover of a renewed attack upon the fort by the fleet. They

formed a line across the peninsula and advanced, part going north and

part toward the fort, covering themselves as they did so. Curtis pushed

forward and came near to Fort Fisher, capturing the small garrison at

what was called the Flag Pond Battery. Weitzel accompanied him to

within a half a mile of the works. Here he saw that the fort had not

been injured, and so reported to Butler, advising against an assault.

Ames, who had gone north in his advance, captured 228 of the reserves.

These prisoners reported to Butler that sixteen hundred of Hoke's

division of six thousand from Richmond had already arrived and the rest

would soon be in his rear.

Upon these reports Butler determined to withdraw his troops from the

peninsula and return to the fleet. At that time there had not been a

man on our side injured except by one of the shells from the fleet.

Curtis had got within a few yards of the works. Some of his men had

snatched a flag from the parapet of the fort, and others had taken a

horse from the inside of the stockade. At night Butler informed Porter

of his withdrawal, giving the reasons above stated, and announced his

purpose as soon as his men could embark to start for Hampton Roads.

Porter represented to him that he had sent to Beaufort for more

ammunition. He could fire much faster than he had been doing, and would

keep the enemy from showing himself until our men were within twenty

yards of the fort, and he begged that Butler would leave some brave

fellows like those who had snatched the flag from the parapet and taken

the horse from the fort.

Butler was unchangeable. He got all his troops aboard, except Curtis's

brigade, and started back. In doing this, Butler made a fearful

mistake. My instructions to him, or to the officer who went in command

of the expedition, were explicit in the statement that to effect a

landing would be of itself a great victory, and if one should be

effected, the foothold must not be relinquished; on the contrary, a

regular siege of the fort must be commenced and, to guard against

interference by reason of storms, supplies of provisions must be laid in

as soon as they could be got on shore. But General Butler seems to have

lost sight of this part of his instructions, and was back at Fort Monroe

on the 28th.

I telegraphed to the President as follows:

CITY POINT, VA., Dec. 28, 1864.--8.30 P.M.

The Wilmington expedition has proven a gross and culpable failure. Many

of the troops are back here. Delays and free talk of the object of the

expedition enabled the enemy to move troops to Wilmington to defeat it.

After the expedition sailed from Fort Monroe, three days of fine weather

were squandered, during which the enemy was without a force to protect

himself. Who is to blame will, I hope, be known.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

Porter sent dispatches to the Navy Department in which he complained

bitterly of having been abandoned by the army just when the fort was

nearly in our possession, and begged that our troops might be sent back

again to cooperate, but with a different commander. As soon as I heard

this I sent a messenger to Porter with a letter asking him to hold on.

I assured him that I fully sympathized with him in his disappointment,

and that I would send the same troops back with a different commander,

with some reinforcements to offset those which the enemy had received.

I told him it would take some little time to get transportation for the

additional troops; but as soon as it could be had the men should be on

their way to him, and there would be no delay on my part. I selected A.

H. Terry to command.

It was the 6th of January before the transports could be got ready and

the troops aboard. They sailed from Fortress Monroe on that day. The

object and destination of the second expedition were at the time kept a

secret to all except a few in the Navy Department and in the army to

whom it was necessary to impart the information. General Terry had not

the slightest idea of where he was going or what he was to do. He

simply knew that he was going to sea and that he had his orders with

him, which were to be opened when out at sea.

He was instructed to communicate freely with Porter and have entire

harmony between army and navy, because the work before them would

require the best efforts of both arms of service. They arrived off

Beaufort on the 8th. A heavy storm, however, prevented a landing at

Forth Fisher until the 13th. The navy prepared itself for attack about

as before, and the same time assisted the army in landing, this time

five miles away. Only iron-clads fired at first; the object being to

draw the fire of the enemy's guns so as to ascertain their positions.

This object being accomplished, they then let in their shots thick and

fast. Very soon the guns were all silenced, and the fort showed evident

signs of being much injured.

Terry deployed his men across the peninsula as had been done before, and

at two o'clock on the following morning was up within two miles of the

fort with a respectable abatis in front of his line. His artillery was

all landed on that day, the 14th. Again Curtis's brigade of Ame's

division had the lead. By noon they had carried an unfinished work less

than a half mile from the fort, and turned it so as to face the other

way.

Terry now saw Porter and arranged for an assault on the following day.

The two commanders arranged their signals so that they could communicate

with each other from time to time as they might have occasion. At day

light the fleet commenced its firing. The time agreed upon for the

assault was the middle of the afternoon, and Ames who commanded the

assaulting column moved at 3.30. Porter landed a force of sailors and

marines to move against the sea-front in co-operation with Ames's

assault. They were under Commander Breese of the navy. These sailors

and marines had worked their way up to within a couple of hundred yards

of the fort before the assault. The signal was given and the assault

was made; but the poor sailors and marines were repulsed and very badly

handled by the enemy, losing 280 killed and wounded out of their number.

Curtis's brigade charged successfully though met by a heavy fire, some

of the men having to wade through the swamp up to their waists to reach

the fort. Many were wounded, of course, and some killed; but they soon

reached the palisades. These they cut away, and pushed on through. The

other troops then came up, Pennypacker's following Curtis, and Bell, who

commanded the 3d brigade of Ames's division, following Pennypacker. But

the fort was not yet captured though the parapet was gained.

The works were very extensive. The large parapet around the work would

have been but very little protection to those inside except when they

were close up under it. Traverses had, therefore, been run until really

the work was a succession of small forts enclosed by a large one. The

rebels made a desperate effort to hold the fort, and had to be driven

from these traverses one by one. The fight continued till long after

night. Our troops gained first one traverse and then another, and by 10

o'clock at night the place was carried. During this engagement the

sailors, who had been repulsed in their assault on the bastion, rendered

the best service they could by reinforcing Terry's northern line--thus

enabling him to send a detachment to the assistance of Ames. The fleet

kept up a continuous fire upon that part of the fort which was still

occupied by the enemy. By means of signals they could be informed where

to direct their shots.

During the succeeding nights the enemy blew up Fort Caswell on the

opposite side of Cape Fear River, and abandoned two extensive works on

Smith's Island in the river.

Our captures in all amounted to 169 guns, besides small-arms, with full

supplies of ammunition, and 2,083 prisoners. In addition to these,

there were about 700 dead and wounded left there. We had lost 110

killed and 536 wounded.

In this assault on Fort Fisher, Bell, one of the brigade commanders, was

killed, and two, Curtis and Pennypacker, were badly wounded.

Secretary Stanton, who was on his way back from Savannah, arrived off

Fort Fisher soon after it fell. When he heard the good news he promoted

all the officers of any considerable rank for their conspicuous

gallantry. Terry had been nominated for major-general, but had not been

confirmed. This confirmed him; and soon after I recommended him for a

brigadier-generalcy in the regular army, and it was given to him for

this victory.

CHAPTER LXII.

SHERMAN'S MARCH NORTH--SHERIDAN ORDERED TO LYNCHBURG--CANBY ORDERED TO

MOVE AGAINST MOBILE--MOVEMENTS OF SCHOFIELD AND THOMAS--CAPTURE OF

COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA--SHERMAN IN THE CAROLINAS.

When news of Sherman being in possession of Savannah reached the North,

distinguished statesmen and visitors began to pour in to see him. Among

others who went was the Secretary of War, who seemed much pleased at the

result of his campaign. Mr. Draper, the collector of customs of New

York, who was with Mr. Stanton's party, was put in charge of the public

property that had been abandoned and captured. Savannah was then turned

over to General Foster's command to hold, so that Sherman might have his

own entire army free to operate as might be decided upon in the future.

I sent the chief engineer of the Army of the Potomac (General Barnard)

with letters to General Sherman. He remained some time with the

general, and when he returned brought back letters, one of which

contained suggestions from Sherman as to what ought to be done in

co-operation with him, when he should have started upon his march

northward.

I must not neglect to state here the fact that I had no idea originally

of having Sherman march from Savannah to Richmond, or even to North

Carolina. The season was bad, the roads impassable for anything except

such an army as he had, and I should not have thought of ordering such a

move. I had, therefore, made preparations to collect transports to

carry Sherman and his army around to the James River by water, and so

informed him. On receiving this letter he went to work immediately to

prepare for the move, but seeing that it would require a long time to

collect the transports, he suggested the idea then of marching up north

through the Carolinas. I was only too happy to approve this; for if

successful, it promised every advantage. His march through Georgia had

thoroughly destroyed all lines of transportation in that State, and had

completely cut the enemy off from all sources of supply to the west of

it. If North and South Carolina were rendered helpless so far as

capacity for feeding Lee's army was concerned, the Confederate garrison

at Richmond would be reduced in territory, from which to draw supplies,

to very narrow limits in the State of Virginia; and, although that

section of the country was fertile, it was already well exhausted of

both forage and food. I approved Sherman's suggestion therefore at

once.

The work of preparation was tedious, because supplies, to load the

wagons for the march, had to be brought from a long distance. Sherman

would now have to march through a country furnishing fewer provisions

than that he had previously been operating in during his march to the

sea. Besides, he was confronting, or marching toward, a force of the

enemy vastly superior to any his troops had encountered on their

previous march; and the territory through which he had to pass had now

become of such vast importance to the very existence of the Confederate

army, that the most desperate efforts were to be expected in order to

save it.

Sherman, therefore, while collecting the necessary supplies to start

with, made arrangements with Admiral Dahlgren, who commanded that part

of the navy on the South Carolina and Georgia coast, and General Foster,

commanding the troops, to take positions, and hold a few points on the

sea coast, which he (Sherman) designated, in the neighborhood of

Charleston.

This provision was made to enable him to fall back upon the sea coast,

in case he should encounter a force sufficient to stop his onward

progress. He also wrote me a letter, making suggestions as to what he

would like to have done in support of his movement farther north. This

letter was brought to City Point by General Barnard at a time when I

happened to be going to Washington City, where I arrived on the 21st of

January. I cannot tell the provision I had already made to co-operate

with Sherman, in anticipation of his expected movement, better than by

giving my reply to this letter.

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D. C., Jan. 21,

1865.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN, Commanding Mill Div. of the Mississippi.

GENERAL:--Your letters brought by General Barnard were received at City

Point, and read with interest. Not having them with me, however, I

cannot say that in this I will be able to satisfy you on all points of

recommendation. As I arrived here at one P.M., and must leave at six

P.M., having in the meantime spent over three hours with the Secretary

and General Halleck, I must be brief. Before your last request to have

Thomas make a campaign into the heart of Alabama, I had ordered

Schofield to Annapolis, Md., with his corps. The advance (six thousand)

will reach the seaboard by the 23d, the remainder following as rapidly

as railroad transportation can be procured from Cincinnati. The corps

numbers over twenty-one thousand men. I was induced to do this because

I did not believe Thomas could possibly be got off before spring. His

pursuit of Hood indicated a sluggishness that satisfied me that he would

never do to conduct one of your campaigns. The command of the advance

of the pursuit was left to subordinates, whilst Thomas followed far

behind. When Hood had crossed the Tennessee, and those in pursuit had

reached it, Thomas had not much more than half crossed the State, from

whence he returned to Nashville to take steamer for Eastport. He is

possessed of excellent judgment, great coolness and honesty, but he is

not good on a pursuit. He also reported his troops fagged, and that it

was necessary to equip up. This report and a determination to give the

enemy no rest determined me to use his surplus troops elsewhere.

Thomas is still left with a sufficient force surplus to go to Selma

under an energetic leader. He has been telegraphed to, to know whether

he could go, and, if so, which of the several routes he would select.

No reply is yet received. Canby has been ordered to act offensively

from the sea-coast to the interior, towards Montgomery and Selma.

Thomas's forces will move from the north at an early day, or some of his

troops will be sent to Canby. Without further reinforcements Canby will

have a moving column of twenty thousand men.

Fort Fisher, you are aware, has been captured. We have a force there of

eight thousand effective. At New Bern about half the number. It is

rumored, through deserters, that Wilmington also has fallen. I am

inclined to believe the rumor, because on the 17th we knew the enemy

were blowing up their works about Fort Caswell, and that on the 18th

Terry moved on Wilmington.

If Wilmington is captured, Schofield will go there. If not, he will be

sent to New Bern. In either event, all the surplus forces at the two

points will move to the interior toward Goldsboro' in co-operation with

your movements. From either point, railroad communications can be run

out, there being here abundance of rolling-stock suited to the gauge of

those roads.

There have been about sixteen thousand men sent from Lee's army south.

Of these, you will have fourteen thousand against you, if Wilmington is

not held by the enemy, casualties at Fort Fisher having overtaken about

two thousand.

All these troops are subject to your orders as you come in communication

with them. They will be so instructed. From about Richmond I will

watch Lee closely, and if he detaches much more, or attempts to

evacuate, will pitch in. In the meantime, should you be brought to a

halt anywhere, I can send two corps of thirty thousand effective men to

your support, from the troops about Richmond.

To resume: Canby is ordered to operate to the interior from the Gulf.

A. J. Smith may go from the north, but I think it doubtful. A force of

twenty-eight or thirty thousand will co-operate with you from New Bern

or Wilmington, or both. You can call for reinforcements.

This will be handed you by Captain Hudson, of my staff, who will return

with any message you may have for me. If there is anything I can do for

you in the way of having supplies on ship-board, at any point on the

sea-coast, ready for you, let me know it.

Yours truly, U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

I had written on the 18th of January to General Sherman, giving him the

news of the battle of Nashville. He was much pleased at the result,

although, like myself, he had been very much disappointed at Thomas for

permitting Hood to cross the Tennessee River and nearly the whole State

of Tennessee, and come to Nashville to be attacked there. He, however,

as I had done, sent Thomas a warm congratulatory letter.

On the 10th of January, 1865, the resolutions of thanks to Sherman and

his army passed by Congress were approved.

Sherman, after the capture, at once had the debris cleared up,

commencing the work by removing the piling and torpedoes from the river,

and taking up all obstructions. He had then intrenched the city, so

that it could be held by a small garrison. By the middle of January all

his work was done, except the accumulation of supplies to commence his

movement with.

He proposed to move in two columns, one from Savannah, going along by

the river of the same name, and the other by roads farther east,

threatening Charleston. He commenced the advance by moving his right

wing to Beaufort, South Carolina, then to Pocotaligo by water. This

column, in moving north, threatened Charleston, and, indeed, it was not

determined at first that they would have a force visit Charleston.

South Carolina had done so much to prepare the public mind of the South

for secession, and had been so active in precipitating the decision of

the question before the South was fully prepared to meet it, that there

was, at that time, a feeling throughout the North and also largely

entertained by people of the South, that the State of South Carolina,

and Charleston, the hot-bed of secession in particular, ought to have a

heavy hand laid upon them. In fact, nothing but the decisive results

that followed, deterred the radical portion of the people from

condemning the movement, because Charleston had been left out. To pass

into the interior would, however, be to insure the evacuation of the

city, and its possession by the navy and Foster's troops. It is so

situated between two formidable rivers that a small garrison could have

held it against all odds as long as their supplies would hold out.

Sherman therefore passed it by.

By the first of February all preparations were completed for the final

march, Columbia, South Carolina, being the first objective;

Fayetteville, North Carolina, the second; and Goldsboro, or

neighborhood, the final one, unless something further should be

determined upon. The right wing went from Pocotaligo, and the left from

about Hardeeville on the Savannah River, both columns taking a pretty

direct route for Columbia. The cavalry, however, were to threaten

Charleston on the right, and Augusta on the left.

On the 15th of January Fort Fisher had fallen, news of which Sherman had

received before starting out on his march. We already had New Bern and

had soon Wilmington, whose fall followed that of Fort Fisher; as did

other points on the sea coast, where the National troops were now in

readiness to co-operate with Sherman's advance when he had passed

Fayetteville.

On the 18th of January I ordered Canby, in command at New Orleans, to

move against Mobile, Montgomery and Selma, Alabama, for the purpose of

destroying roads, machine shops, etc. On the 8th of February I ordered

Sheridan, who was in the Valley of Virginia, to push forward as soon as

the weather would permit and strike the canal west of Richmond at or

about Lynchburg; and on the 20th I made the order to go to Lynchburg as

soon as the roads would permit, saying: "As soon as it is possible to

travel, I think you will have no difficulty about reaching Lynchburg

with a cavalry force alone. From there you could destroy the railroad

and canal in every direction, so as to be of no further use to the

rebellion. * * * This additional raid, with one starting from East

Tennessee under Stoneman, numbering about four or five thousand cavalry;

one from Eastport, Mississippi, ten thousand cavalry; Canby, from Mobile

Bay, with about eighteen thousand mixed troops--these three latter

pushing for Tuscaloosa, Selma and Montgomery; and Sherman with a large

army eating out the vitals of South Carolina--is all that will be wanted

to leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon. I would advise you to

overcome great obstacles to accomplish this. Charleston was evacuated

on Tuesday last."

On the 27th of February, more than a month after Canby had received his

orders, I again wrote to him, saying that I was extremely anxious to

hear of his being in Alabama. I notified him, also, that I had sent

Grierson to take command of his cavalry, he being a very efficient

officer. I further suggested that Forrest was probably in Mississippi,

and if he was there, he would find him an officer of great courage and

capacity whom it would be difficult to get by. I still further informed

him that Thomas had been ordered to start a cavalry force into

Mississippi on the 20th of February, or as soon as possible thereafter.

This force did not get off however.

All these movements were designed to be in support of Sherman's march,

the object being to keep the Confederate troops in the West from leaving

there. But neither Canby nor Thomas could be got off in time. I had

some time before depleted Thomas's army to reinforce Canby, for the

reason that Thomas had failed to start an expedition which he had been

ordered to send out, and to have the troops where they might do

something. Canby seemed to be equally deliberate in all of his

movements. I ordered him to go in person; but he prepared to send a

detachment under another officer. General Granger had got down to New

Orleans, in some way or other, and I wrote Canby that he must not put

him in command of troops. In spite of this he asked the War Department

to assign Granger to the command of a corps.

Almost in despair of having adequate service rendered to the cause in

that quarter, I said to Canby: "I am in receipt of a dispatch * * *

informing me that you have made requisitions for a construction corps

and material to build seventy miles of railroad. I have directed that

none be sent. Thomas's army has been depleted to send a force to you

that they might be where they could act in winter, and at least detain

the force the enemy had in the West. If there had been any idea of

repairing railroads, it could have been done much better from the North,

where we already had the troops. I expected your movements to be

co-operative with Sherman's last. This has now entirely failed. I

wrote to you long ago, urging you to push promptly and to live upon the

country, and destroy railroads, machine shops, etc., not to build them.

Take Mobile and hold it, and push your forces to the interior--to

Montgomery and to Selma. Destroy railroads, rolling stock, and

everything useful for carrying on war, and, when you have done this,

take such positions as can be supplied by water. By this means alone

you can occupy positions from which the enemy's roads in the interior

can be kept broken."

Most of these expeditions got off finally, but too late to render any

service in the direction for which they were designed.

The enemy, ready to intercept his advance, consisted of Hardee's troops

and Wheeler's cavalry, perhaps less than fifteen thousand men in all;

but frantic efforts were being made in Richmond, as I was sure would be

the case, to retard Sherman's movements. Everything possible was being

done to raise troops in the South. Lee dispatched against Sherman the

troops which had been sent to relieve Fort Fisher, which, including

those of the other defences of the harbor and its neighborhood,

amounted, after deducting the two thousand killed, wounded and captured,

to fourteen thousand men. After Thomas's victory at Nashville what

remained, of Hood's army were gathered together and forwarded as rapidly

as possible to the east to co-operate with these forces; and, finally,

General Joseph E. Johnston, one of the ablest commanders of the South

though not in favor with the administration (or at least with Mr.

Davis), was put in command of all the troops in North and South

Carolina.

Schofield arrived at Annapolis in the latter part of January, but before

sending his troops to North Carolina I went with him down the coast to

see the situation of affairs, as I could give fuller directions after

being on the ground than I could very well have given without. We soon

returned, and the troops were sent by sea to Cape Fear River. Both New

Bern and Wilmington are connected with Raleigh by railroads which unite

at Goldsboro. Schofield was to land troops at Smithville, near the

mouth of the Cape Fear River on the west side, and move up to secure the

Wilmington and Charlotteville Railroad. This column took their pontoon

bridges with them, to enable them to cross over to the island south of

the city of Wilmington. A large body was sent by the north side to

co-operate with them. They succeeded in taking the city on the 22d of

February. I took the precaution to provide for Sherman's army, in case

he should be forced to turn in toward the sea coast before reaching

North Carolina, by forwarding supplies to every place where he was

liable to have to make such a deflection from his projected march. I

also sent railroad rolling stock, of which we had a great abundance, now

that we were not operating the roads in Virginia. The gauge of the

North Carolina railroads being the same as the Virginia railroads had

been altered too; these cars and locomotives were ready for use there

without any change.

On the 31st of January I countermanded the orders given to Thomas to

move south to Alabama and Georgia. (I had previously reduced his force

by sending a portion of it to Terry.) I directed in lieu of this

movement, that he should send Stoneman through East Tennessee, and push

him well down toward Columbia, South Carolina, in support of Sherman.

Thomas did not get Stoneman off in time, but, on the contrary, when I

had supposed he was on his march in support of Sherman I heard of his

being in Louisville, Kentucky. I immediately changed the order, and

directed Thomas to send him toward Lynchburg. Finally, however, on the

12th of March, he did push down through the north-western end of South

Carolina, creating some consternation. I also ordered Thomas to send

the 4th corps (Stanley's) to Bull Gap and to destroy no more roads east

of that. I also directed him to concentrate supplies at Knoxville, with

a view to a probable movement of his army through that way toward

Lynchburg.

Goldsboro is four hundred and twenty-five miles from Savannah. Sherman's

march was without much incident until he entered Columbia, on the 17th

of February. He was detained in his progress by having to repair and

corduroy the roads, and rebuild the bridges. There was constant

skirmishing and fighting between the cavalry of the two armies, but this

did not retard the advance of the infantry. Four days, also, were lost

in making complete the destruction of the most important railroads south

of Columbia; there was also some delay caused by the high water, and the

destruction of the bridges on the line of the road. A formidable river

had to be crossed near Columbia, and that in the face of a small

garrison under General Wade Hampton. There was but little delay,

however, further than that caused by high water in the stream. Hampton

left as Sherman approached, and the city was found to be on fire.

There has since been a great deal of acrimony displayed in discussions

of the question as to who set Columbia on fire. Sherman denies it on the

part of his troops, and Hampton denies it on the part of the

Confederates. One thing is certain: as soon as our troops took

possession, they at once proceeded to extinguish the flames to the best

of their ability with the limited means at hand. In any case, the

example set by the Confederates in burning the village of Chambersburg,

Pa., a town which was not garrisoned, would seem to make a defence of

the act of firing the seat of government of the State most responsible

for the conflict then raging, not imperative.

The Confederate troops having vacated the city, the mayor took

possession, and sallied forth to meet the commander of the National

forces for the purpose of surrendering the town, making terms for the

protection of property, etc. Sherman paid no attention at all to the

overture, but pushed forward and took the town without making any

conditions whatever with its citizens. He then, however, co-operated

with the mayor in extinguishing the flames and providing for the people

who were rendered destitute by this destruction of their homes. When he

left there he even gave the mayor five hundred head of cattle to be

distributed among the citizens, to tide them over until some arrangement

could be made for their future supplies. He remained in Columbia until

the roads, public buildings, workshops and everything that could be