The Federalist Papers

THE FEDERALIST PAPERS

By Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison

FEDERALIST No. 1

General Introduction

For the Independent Journal. Saturday, October 27, 1787

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

AFTER an unequivocal experience of the inefficacy of the subsisting

federal government, you are called upon to deliberate on a new

Constitution for the United States of America. The subject speaks its

own importance; comprehending in its consequences nothing less than the

existence of the UNION, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it

is composed, the fate of an empire in many respects the most interesting

in the world. It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been

reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example,

to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really

capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and

choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their

political constitutions on accident and force. If there be any truth

in the remark, the crisis at which we are arrived may with propriety be

regarded as the era in which that decision is to be made; and a wrong

election of the part we shall act may, in this view, deserve to be

considered as the general misfortune of mankind.

This idea will add the inducements of philanthropy to those of

patriotism, to heighten the solicitude which all considerate and good

men must feel for the event. Happy will it be if our choice should be

directed by a judicious estimate of our true interests, unperplexed and

unbiased by considerations not connected with the public good. But this

is a thing more ardently to be wished than seriously to be expected. The

plan offered to our deliberations affects too many particular interests,

innovates upon too many local institutions, not to involve in its

discussion a variety of objects foreign to its merits, and of views,

passions and prejudices little favorable to the discovery of truth.

Among the most formidable of the obstacles which the new Constitution

will have to encounter may readily be distinguished the obvious interest

of a certain class of men in every State to resist all changes which

may hazard a diminution of the power, emolument, and consequence of

the offices they hold under the State establishments; and the perverted

ambition of another class of men, who will either hope to aggrandize

themselves by the confusions of their country, or will flatter

themselves with fairer prospects of elevation from the subdivision of

the empire into several partial confederacies than from its union under

one government.

It is not, however, my design to dwell upon observations of this

nature. I am well aware that it would be disingenuous to resolve

indiscriminately the opposition of any set of men (merely because their

situations might subject them to suspicion) into interested or ambitious

views. Candor will oblige us to admit that even such men may be actuated

by upright intentions; and it cannot be doubted that much of the

opposition which has made its appearance, or may hereafter make its

appearance, will spring from sources, blameless at least, if not

respectable--the honest errors of minds led astray by preconceived

jealousies and fears. So numerous indeed and so powerful are the causes

which serve to give a false bias to the judgment, that we, upon many

occasions, see wise and good men on the wrong as well as on the right

side of questions of the first magnitude to society. This circumstance,

if duly attended to, would furnish a lesson of moderation to those

who are ever so much persuaded of their being in the right in any

controversy. And a further reason for caution, in this respect, might

be drawn from the reflection that we are not always sure that those

who advocate the truth are influenced by purer principles than their

antagonists. Ambition, avarice, personal animosity, party opposition,

and many other motives not more laudable than these, are apt to operate

as well upon those who support as those who oppose the right side of a

question. Were there not even these inducements to moderation, nothing

could be more ill-judged than that intolerant spirit which has, at all

times, characterized political parties. For in politics, as in religion,

it is equally absurd to aim at making proselytes by fire and sword.

Heresies in either can rarely be cured by persecution.

And yet, however just these sentiments will be allowed to be, we have

already sufficient indications that it will happen in this as in all

former cases of great national discussion. A torrent of angry and

malignant passions will be let loose. To judge from the conduct of the

opposite parties, we shall be led to conclude that they will mutually

hope to evince the justness of their opinions, and to increase the

number of their converts by the loudness of their declamations and the

bitterness of their invectives. An enlightened zeal for the energy

and efficiency of government will be stigmatized as the offspring of a

temper fond of despotic power and hostile to the principles of liberty.

An over-scrupulous jealousy of danger to the rights of the people,

which is more commonly the fault of the head than of the heart, will be

represented as mere pretense and artifice, the stale bait for popularity

at the expense of the public good. It will be forgotten, on the one

hand, that jealousy is the usual concomitant of love, and that the noble

enthusiasm of liberty is apt to be infected with a spirit of narrow and

illiberal distrust. On the other hand, it will be equally forgotten that

the vigor of government is essential to the security of liberty; that,

in the contemplation of a sound and well-informed judgment, their

interest can never be separated; and that a dangerous ambition more

often lurks behind the specious mask of zeal for the rights of the

people than under the forbidden appearance of zeal for the firmness and

efficiency of government. History will teach us that the former has been

found a much more certain road to the introduction of despotism than

the latter, and that of those men who have overturned the liberties

of republics, the greatest number have begun their career by paying

an obsequious court to the people; commencing demagogues, and ending

tyrants.

In the course of the preceding observations, I have had an eye, my

fellow-citizens, to putting you upon your guard against all attempts,

from whatever quarter, to influence your decision in a matter of the

utmost moment to your welfare, by any impressions other than those which

may result from the evidence of truth. You will, no doubt, at the same

time, have collected from the general scope of them, that they

proceed from a source not unfriendly to the new Constitution. Yes,

my countrymen, I own to you that, after having given it an attentive

consideration, I am clearly of opinion it is your interest to adopt it.

I am convinced that this is the safest course for your liberty, your

dignity, and your happiness. I affect not reserves which I do not feel.

I will not amuse you with an appearance of deliberation when I have

decided. I frankly acknowledge to you my convictions, and I will freely

lay before you the reasons on which they are founded. The consciousness

of good intentions disdains ambiguity. I shall not, however, multiply

professions on this head. My motives must remain in the depository of

my own breast. My arguments will be open to all, and may be judged of by

all. They shall at least be offered in a spirit which will not disgrace

the cause of truth.

I propose, in a series of papers, to discuss the following interesting

particulars:

THE UTILITY OF THE UNION TO YOUR POLITICAL PROSPERITY THE INSUFFICIENCY

OF THE PRESENT CONFEDERATION TO PRESERVE THAT UNION THE NECESSITY OF

A GOVERNMENT AT LEAST EQUALLY ENERGETIC WITH THE ONE PROPOSED, TO THE

ATTAINMENT OF THIS OBJECT THE CONFORMITY OF THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION

TO THE TRUE PRINCIPLES OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT ITS ANALOGY TO YOUR

OWN STATE CONSTITUTION and lastly, THE ADDITIONAL SECURITY WHICH ITS

ADOPTION WILL AFFORD TO THE PRESERVATION OF THAT SPECIES OF GOVERNMENT,

TO LIBERTY, AND TO PROPERTY.

In the progress of this discussion I shall endeavor to give a

satisfactory answer to all the objections which shall have made their

appearance, that may seem to have any claim to your attention.

It may perhaps be thought superfluous to offer arguments to prove the

utility of the UNION, a point, no doubt, deeply engraved on the hearts

of the great body of the people in every State, and one, which it may be

imagined, has no adversaries. But the fact is, that we already hear

it whispered in the private circles of those who oppose the new

Constitution, that the thirteen States are of too great extent for

any general system, and that we must of necessity resort to separate

confederacies of distinct portions of the whole.(1) This doctrine will,

in all probability, be gradually propagated, till it has votaries enough

to countenance an open avowal of it. For nothing can be more evident,

to those who are able to take an enlarged view of the subject, than the

alternative of an adoption of the new Constitution or a dismemberment

of the Union. It will therefore be of use to begin by examining the

advantages of that Union, the certain evils, and the probable dangers,

to which every State will be exposed from its dissolution. This shall

accordingly constitute the subject of my next address.

PUBLIUS

1. The same idea, tracing the arguments to their consequences, is held

out in several of the late publications against the new Constitution.

FEDERALIST No. 2

Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence

For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, October 31, 1787

JAY

To the People of the State of New York:

WHEN the people of America reflect that they are now called upon to

decide a question, which, in its consequences, must prove one of the

most important that ever engaged their attention, the propriety of their

taking a very comprehensive, as well as a very serious, view of it, will

be evident.

Nothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of government,

and it is equally undeniable, that whenever and however it is

instituted, the people must cede to it some of their natural rights

in order to vest it with requisite powers. It is well worthy of

consideration therefore, whether it would conduce more to the interest

of the people of America that they should, to all general purposes, be

one nation, under one federal government, or that they should divide

themselves into separate confederacies, and give to the head of each

the same kind of powers which they are advised to place in one national

government.

It has until lately been a received and uncontradicted opinion that the

prosperity of the people of America depended on their continuing firmly

united, and the wishes, prayers, and efforts of our best and wisest

citizens have been constantly directed to that object. But politicians

now appear, who insist that this opinion is erroneous, and that instead

of looking for safety and happiness in union, we ought to seek it in

a division of the States into distinct confederacies or sovereignties.

However extraordinary this new doctrine may appear, it nevertheless

has its advocates; and certain characters who were much opposed to it

formerly, are at present of the number. Whatever may be the arguments

or inducements which have wrought this change in the sentiments and

declarations of these gentlemen, it certainly would not be wise in the

people at large to adopt these new political tenets without being fully

convinced that they are founded in truth and sound policy.

It has often given me pleasure to observe that independent America

was not composed of detached and distant territories, but that one

connected, fertile, wide-spreading country was the portion of our western

sons of liberty. Providence has in a particular manner blessed it with

a variety of soils and productions, and watered it with innumerable

streams, for the delight and accommodation of its inhabitants. A

succession of navigable waters forms a kind of chain round its borders,

as if to bind it together; while the most noble rivers in the world,

running at convenient distances, present them with highways for the

easy communication of friendly aids, and the mutual transportation and

exchange of their various commodities.

With equal pleasure I have as often taken notice that Providence has

been pleased to give this one connected country to one united people--a

people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language,

professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of

government, very similar in their manners and customs, and who, by their

joint counsels, arms, and efforts, fighting side by side throughout

a long and bloody war, have nobly established general liberty and

independence.

This country and this people seem to have been made for each other, and

it appears as if it was the design of Providence, that an inheritance

so proper and convenient for a band of brethren, united to each other

by the strongest ties, should never be split into a number of unsocial,

jealous, and alien sovereignties.

Similar sentiments have hitherto prevailed among all orders and

denominations of men among us. To all general purposes we have uniformly

been one people each individual citizen everywhere enjoying the same

national rights, privileges, and protection. As a nation we have made

peace and war; as a nation we have vanquished our common enemies; as

a nation we have formed alliances, and made treaties, and entered into

various compacts and conventions with foreign states.

A strong sense of the value and blessings of union induced the people,

at a very early period, to institute a federal government to preserve

and perpetuate it. They formed it almost as soon as they had a political

existence; nay, at a time when their habitations were in flames, when

many of their citizens were bleeding, and when the progress of hostility

and desolation left little room for those calm and mature inquiries

and reflections which must ever precede the formation of a wise and

well-balanced government for a free people. It is not to be wondered

at, that a government instituted in times so inauspicious, should on

experiment be found greatly deficient and inadequate to the purpose it

was intended to answer.

This intelligent people perceived and regretted these defects. Still

continuing no less attached to union than enamored of liberty, they

observed the danger which immediately threatened the former and more

remotely the latter; and being persuaded that ample security for both

could only be found in a national government more wisely framed, they

as with one voice, convened the late convention at Philadelphia, to take

that important subject under consideration.

This convention composed of men who possessed the confidence of the

people, and many of whom had become highly distinguished by their

patriotism, virtue and wisdom, in times which tried the minds and hearts

of men, undertook the arduous task. In the mild season of peace, with

minds unoccupied by other subjects, they passed many months in cool,

uninterrupted, and daily consultation; and finally, without having

been awed by power, or influenced by any passions except love for their

country, they presented and recommended to the people the plan produced

by their joint and very unanimous councils.

Admit, for so is the fact, that this plan is only RECOMMENDED, not

imposed, yet let it be remembered that it is neither recommended to

BLIND approbation, nor to BLIND reprobation; but to that sedate and

candid consideration which the magnitude and importance of the subject

demand, and which it certainly ought to receive. But this (as was

remarked in the foregoing number of this paper) is more to be wished

than expected, that it may be so considered and examined. Experience on

a former occasion teaches us not to be too sanguine in such hopes. It

is not yet forgotten that well-grounded apprehensions of imminent danger

induced the people of America to form the memorable Congress of 1774.

That body recommended certain measures to their constituents, and the

event proved their wisdom; yet it is fresh in our memories how soon the

press began to teem with pamphlets and weekly papers against those very

measures. Not only many of the officers of government, who obeyed the

dictates of personal interest, but others, from a mistaken estimate of

consequences, or the undue influence of former attachments, or whose

ambition aimed at objects which did not correspond with the public good,

were indefatigable in their efforts to persuade the people to reject

the advice of that patriotic Congress. Many, indeed, were deceived

and deluded, but the great majority of the people reasoned and decided

judiciously; and happy they are in reflecting that they did so.

They considered that the Congress was composed of many wise and

experienced men. That, being convened from different parts of the

country, they brought with them and communicated to each other a variety

of useful information. That, in the course of the time they passed

together in inquiring into and discussing the true interests of their

country, they must have acquired very accurate knowledge on that

head. That they were individually interested in the public liberty and

prosperity, and therefore that it was not less their inclination than

their duty to recommend only such measures as, after the most mature

deliberation, they really thought prudent and advisable.

These and similar considerations then induced the people to rely greatly

on the judgment and integrity of the Congress; and they took their

advice, notwithstanding the various arts and endeavors used to deter

them from it. But if the people at large had reason to confide in the

men of that Congress, few of whom had been fully tried or generally

known, still greater reason have they now to respect the judgment and

advice of the convention, for it is well known that some of the most

distinguished members of that Congress, who have been since tried and

justly approved for patriotism and abilities, and who have grown old in

acquiring political information, were also members of this convention,

and carried into it their accumulated knowledge and experience.

It is worthy of remark that not only the first, but every succeeding

Congress, as well as the late convention, have invariably joined with

the people in thinking that the prosperity of America depended on its

Union. To preserve and perpetuate it was the great object of the people

in forming that convention, and it is also the great object of the plan

which the convention has advised them to adopt. With what propriety,

therefore, or for what good purposes, are attempts at this particular

period made by some men to depreciate the importance of the Union? Or

why is it suggested that three or four confederacies would be better

than one? I am persuaded in my own mind that the people have always

thought right on this subject, and that their universal and uniform

attachment to the cause of the Union rests on great and weighty reasons,

which I shall endeavor to develop and explain in some ensuing papers.

They who promote the idea of substituting a number of distinct

confederacies in the room of the plan of the convention, seem clearly to

foresee that the rejection of it would put the continuance of the

Union in the utmost jeopardy. That certainly would be the case, and I

sincerely wish that it may be as clearly foreseen by every good citizen,

that whenever the dissolution of the Union arrives, America will have

reason to exclaim, in the words of the poet: "FAREWELL! A LONG FAREWELL

TO ALL MY GREATNESS."

PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 3

The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and

Influence)

For the Independent Journal. Saturday, November 3, 1787

JAY

To the People of the State of New York:

IT IS not a new observation that the people of any country (if, like

the Americans, intelligent and wellinformed) seldom adopt and steadily

persevere for many years in an erroneous opinion respecting their

interests. That consideration naturally tends to create great respect

for the high opinion which the people of America have so long and

uniformly entertained of the importance of their continuing firmly

united under one federal government, vested with sufficient powers for

all general and national purposes.

The more attentively I consider and investigate the reasons which appear

to have given birth to this opinion, the more I become convinced that

they are cogent and conclusive.

Among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it necessary

to direct their attention, that of providing for their SAFETY seems to

be the first. The SAFETY of the people doubtless has relation to a great

variety of circumstances and considerations, and consequently

affords great latitude to those who wish to define it precisely and

comprehensively.

At present I mean only to consider it as it respects security for the

preservation of peace and tranquillity, as well as against dangers from

FOREIGN ARMS AND INFLUENCE, as from dangers of the LIKE KIND arising

from domestic causes. As the former of these comes first in order, it

is proper it should be the first discussed. Let us therefore proceed to

examine whether the people are not right in their opinion that a cordial

Union, under an efficient national government, affords them the best

security that can be devised against HOSTILITIES from abroad.

The number of wars which have happened or will happen in the world will

always be found to be in proportion to the number and weight of the

causes, whether REAL or PRETENDED, which PROVOKE or INVITE them. If this

remark be just, it becomes useful to inquire whether so many JUST causes

of war are likely to be given by UNITED AMERICA as by DISUNITED America;

for if it should turn out that United America will probably give the

fewest, then it will follow that in this respect the Union tends most to

preserve the people in a state of peace with other nations.

The JUST causes of war, for the most part, arise either from violation

of treaties or from direct violence. America has already formed treaties

with no less than six foreign nations, and all of them, except Prussia,

are maritime, and therefore able to annoy and injure us. She has also

extensive commerce with Portugal, Spain, and Britain, and, with respect

to the two latter, has, in addition, the circumstance of neighborhood to

attend to.

It is of high importance to the peace of America that she observe the

laws of nations towards all these powers, and to me it appears evident

that this will be more perfectly and punctually done by one national

government than it could be either by thirteen separate States or by

three or four distinct confederacies.

Because when once an efficient national government is established, the

best men in the country will not only consent to serve, but also will

generally be appointed to manage it; for, although town or country,

or other contracted influence, may place men in State assemblies,

or senates, or courts of justice, or executive departments, yet more

general and extensive reputation for talents and other qualifications

will be necessary to recommend men to offices under the national

government,--especially as it will have the widest field for choice, and

never experience that want of proper persons which is not uncommon in

some of the States. Hence, it will result that the administration,

the political counsels, and the judicial decisions of the national

government will be more wise, systematical, and judicious than those of

individual States, and consequently more satisfactory with respect to

other nations, as well as more SAFE with respect to us.

Because, under the national government, treaties and articles of

treaties, as well as the laws of nations, will always be expounded in

one sense and executed in the same manner,--whereas, adjudications on

the same points and questions, in thirteen States, or in three or four

confederacies, will not always accord or be consistent; and that, as

well from the variety of independent courts and judges appointed by

different and independent governments, as from the different local laws

and interests which may affect and influence them. The wisdom of

the convention, in committing such questions to the jurisdiction and

judgment of courts appointed by and responsible only to one national

government, cannot be too much commended.

Because the prospect of present loss or advantage may often tempt the

governing party in one or two States to swerve from good faith and

justice; but those temptations, not reaching the other States, and

consequently having little or no influence on the national government,

the temptation will be fruitless, and good faith and justice be

preserved. The case of the treaty of peace with Britain adds great

weight to this reasoning.

Because, even if the governing party in a State should be disposed to

resist such temptations, yet as such temptations may, and commonly do,

result from circumstances peculiar to the State, and may affect a great

number of the inhabitants, the governing party may not always be

able, if willing, to prevent the injustice meditated, or to punish the

aggressors. But the national government, not being affected by those

local circumstances, will neither be induced to commit the wrong

themselves, nor want power or inclination to prevent or punish its

commission by others.

So far, therefore, as either designed or accidental violations of

treaties and the laws of nations afford JUST causes of war, they are

less to be apprehended under one general government than under several

lesser ones, and in that respect the former most favors the SAFETY of

the people.

As to those just causes of war which proceed from direct and unlawful

violence, it appears equally clear to me that one good national

government affords vastly more security against dangers of that sort

than can be derived from any other quarter.

Because such violences are more frequently caused by the passions and

interests of a part than of the whole; of one or two States than of the

Union. Not a single Indian war has yet been occasioned by aggressions of

the present federal government, feeble as it is; but there are several

instances of Indian hostilities having been provoked by the improper

conduct of individual States, who, either unable or unwilling to

restrain or punish offenses, have given occasion to the slaughter of

many innocent inhabitants.

The neighborhood of Spanish and British territories, bordering on some

States and not on others, naturally confines the causes of quarrel more

immediately to the borderers. The bordering States, if any, will be

those who, under the impulse of sudden irritation, and a quick sense of

apparent interest or injury, will be most likely, by direct violence,

to excite war with these nations; and nothing can so effectually obviate

that danger as a national government, whose wisdom and prudence will

not be diminished by the passions which actuate the parties immediately

interested.

But not only fewer just causes of war will be given by the national

government, but it will also be more in their power to accommodate and

settle them amicably. They will be more temperate and cool, and in that

respect, as well as in others, will be more in capacity to act advisedly

than the offending State. The pride of states, as well as of men,

naturally disposes them to justify all their actions, and opposes their

acknowledging, correcting, or repairing their errors and offenses. The

national government, in such cases, will not be affected by this pride,

but will proceed with moderation and candor to consider and decide on

the means most proper to extricate them from the difficulties which

threaten them.

Besides, it is well known that acknowledgments, explanations, and

compensations are often accepted as satisfactory from a strong united

nation, which would be rejected as unsatisfactory if offered by a State

or confederacy of little consideration or power.

In the year 1685, the state of Genoa having offended Louis XIV.,

endeavored to appease him. He demanded that they should send their Doge,

or chief magistrate, accompanied by four of their senators, to FRANCE,

to ask his pardon and receive his terms. They were obliged to submit to

it for the sake of peace. Would he on any occasion either have demanded

or have received the like humiliation from Spain, or Britain, or any

other POWERFUL nation?

PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 4

The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and

Influence)

For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, November 7, 1787

JAY

To the People of the State of New York:

MY LAST paper assigned several reasons why the safety of the people

would be best secured by union against the danger it may be exposed to

by JUST causes of war given to other nations; and those reasons show

that such causes would not only be more rarely given, but would also be

more easily accommodated, by a national government than either by the

State governments or the proposed little confederacies.

But the safety of the people of America against dangers from FOREIGN

force depends not only on their forbearing to give JUST causes of war

to other nations, but also on their placing and continuing themselves in

such a situation as not to INVITE hostility or insult; for it need not

be observed that there are PRETENDED as well as just causes of war.

It is too true, however disgraceful it may be to human nature, that

nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of

getting anything by it; nay, absolute monarchs will often make war when

their nations are to get nothing by it, but for the purposes and objects

merely personal, such as thirst for military glory, revenge for personal

affronts, ambition, or private compacts to aggrandize or support their

particular families or partisans. These and a variety of other motives,

which affect only the mind of the sovereign, often lead him to engage in

wars not sanctified by justice or the voice and interests of his people.

But, independent of these inducements to war, which are more prevalent

in absolute monarchies, but which well deserve our attention, there are

others which affect nations as often as kings; and some of them will

on examination be found to grow out of our relative situation and

circumstances.

With France and with Britain we are rivals in the fisheries, and can

supply their markets cheaper than they can themselves, notwithstanding

any efforts to prevent it by bounties on their own or duties on foreign

fish.

With them and with most other European nations we are rivals in

navigation and the carrying trade; and we shall deceive ourselves if we

suppose that any of them will rejoice to see it flourish; for, as

our carrying trade cannot increase without in some degree diminishing

theirs, it is more their interest, and will be more their policy, to

restrain than to promote it.

In the trade to China and India, we interfere with more than one nation,

inasmuch as it enables us to partake in advantages which they had in a

manner monopolized, and as we thereby supply ourselves with commodities

which we used to purchase from them.

The extension of our own commerce in our own vessels cannot give

pleasure to any nations who possess territories on or near this

continent, because the cheapness and excellence of our productions,

added to the circumstance of vicinity, and the enterprise and address

of our merchants and navigators, will give us a greater share in the

advantages which those territories afford, than consists with the wishes

or policy of their respective sovereigns.

Spain thinks it convenient to shut the Mississippi against us on the one

side, and Britain excludes us from the Saint Lawrence on the other; nor

will either of them permit the other waters which are between them and

us to become the means of mutual intercourse and traffic.

From these and such like considerations, which might, if consistent

with prudence, be more amplified and detailed, it is easy to see that

jealousies and uneasinesses may gradually slide into the minds and

cabinets of other nations, and that we are not to expect that they

should regard our advancement in union, in power and consequence by land

and by sea, with an eye of indifference and composure.

The people of America are aware that inducements to war may arise out of

these circumstances, as well as from others not so obvious at present,

and that whenever such inducements may find fit time and opportunity

for operation, pretenses to color and justify them will not be wanting.

Wisely, therefore, do they consider union and a good national government

as necessary to put and keep them in SUCH A SITUATION as, instead of

INVITING war, will tend to repress and discourage it. That situation

consists in the best possible state of defense, and necessarily depends

on the government, the arms, and the resources of the country.

As the safety of the whole is the interest of the whole, and cannot

be provided for without government, either one or more or many, let us

inquire whether one good government is not, relative to the object in

question, more competent than any other given number whatever.

One government can collect and avail itself of the talents and

experience of the ablest men, in whatever part of the Union they may be

found. It can move on uniform principles of policy. It can harmonize,

assimilate, and protect the several parts and members, and extend the

benefit of its foresight and precautions to each. In the formation of

treaties, it will regard the interest of the whole, and the particular

interests of the parts as connected with that of the whole. It can apply

the resources and power of the whole to the defense of any particular

part, and that more easily and expeditiously than State governments or

separate confederacies can possibly do, for want of concert and unity of

system. It can place the militia under one plan of discipline, and, by

putting their officers in a proper line of subordination to the Chief

Magistrate, will, as it were, consolidate them into one corps, and

thereby render them more efficient than if divided into thirteen or into

three or four distinct independent companies.

What would the militia of Britain be if the English militia obeyed the

government of England, if the Scotch militia obeyed the government

of Scotland, and if the Welsh militia obeyed the government of Wales?

Suppose an invasion; would those three governments (if they agreed at

all) be able, with all their respective forces, to operate against the

enemy so effectually as the single government of Great Britain would?

We have heard much of the fleets of Britain, and the time may come, if

we are wise, when the fleets of America may engage attention. But if one

national government, had not so regulated the navigation of Britain

as to make it a nursery for seamen--if one national government had not

called forth all the national means and materials for forming fleets,

their prowess and their thunder would never have been celebrated. Let

England have its navigation and fleet--let Scotland have its navigation

and fleet--let Wales have its navigation and fleet--let Ireland have

its navigation and fleet--let those four of the constituent parts of the

British empire be under four independent governments, and it is

easy to perceive how soon they would each dwindle into comparative

insignificance.

Apply these facts to our own case. Leave America divided into thirteen

or, if you please, into three or four independent governments--what

armies could they raise and pay--what fleets could they ever hope to

have? If one was attacked, would the others fly to its succor, and spend

their blood and money in its defense? Would there be no danger of their

being flattered into neutrality by its specious promises, or seduced by

a too great fondness for peace to decline hazarding their tranquillity

and present safety for the sake of neighbors, of whom perhaps they have

been jealous, and whose importance they are content to see diminished?

Although such conduct would not be wise, it would, nevertheless, be

natural. The history of the states of Greece, and of other countries,

abounds with such instances, and it is not improbable that what has so

often happened would, under similar circumstances, happen again.

But admit that they might be willing to help the invaded State or

confederacy. How, and when, and in what proportion shall aids of men and

money be afforded? Who shall command the allied armies, and from which

of them shall he receive his orders? Who shall settle the terms of

peace, and in case of disputes what umpire shall decide between them and

compel acquiescence? Various difficulties and inconveniences would be

inseparable from such a situation; whereas one government, watching over

the general and common interests, and combining and directing the powers

and resources of the whole, would be free from all these embarrassments,

and conduce far more to the safety of the people.

But whatever may be our situation, whether firmly united under one

national government, or split into a number of confederacies, certain

it is, that foreign nations will know and view it exactly as it is;

and they will act toward us accordingly. If they see that our national

government is efficient and well administered, our trade prudently

regulated, our militia properly organized and disciplined, our resources

and finances discreetly managed, our credit re-established, our

people free, contented, and united, they will be much more disposed to

cultivate our friendship than provoke our resentment. If, on the other

hand, they find us either destitute of an effectual government (each

State doing right or wrong, as to its rulers may seem convenient), or

split into three or four independent and probably discordant republics

or confederacies, one inclining to Britain, another to France, and a

third to Spain, and perhaps played off against each other by the three,

what a poor, pitiful figure will America make in their eyes! How liable

would she become not only to their contempt but to their outrage, and

how soon would dear-bought experience proclaim that when a people or

family so divide, it never fails to be against themselves.

PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 5

The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and

Influence)

For the Independent Journal. Saturday, November 10, 1787

JAY

To the People of the State of New York:

QUEEN ANNE, in her letter of the 1st July, 1706, to the Scotch

Parliament, makes some observations on the importance of the UNION then

forming between England and Scotland, which merit our attention. I shall

present the public with one or two extracts from it: "An entire and

perfect union will be the solid foundation of lasting peace: It will

secure your religion, liberty, and property; remove the animosities

amongst yourselves, and the jealousies and differences betwixt our two

kingdoms. It must increase your strength, riches, and trade; and by

this union the whole island, being joined in affection and free from all

apprehensions of different interest, will be ENABLED TO RESIST ALL ITS

ENEMIES." "We most earnestly recommend to you calmness and unanimity in

this great and weighty affair, that the union may be brought to a happy

conclusion, being the only EFFECTUAL way to secure our present and

future happiness, and disappoint the designs of our and your enemies,

who will doubtless, on this occasion, USE THEIR UTMOST ENDEAVORS TO

PREVENT OR DELAY THIS UNION."

It was remarked in the preceding paper, that weakness and divisions at

home would invite dangers from abroad; and that nothing would tend more

to secure us from them than union, strength, and good government within

ourselves. This subject is copious and cannot easily be exhausted.

The history of Great Britain is the one with which we are in general the

best acquainted, and it gives us many useful lessons. We may profit by

their experience without paying the price which it cost them. Although

it seems obvious to common sense that the people of such an island

should be but one nation, yet we find that they were for ages divided

into three, and that those three were almost constantly embroiled in

quarrels and wars with one another. Notwithstanding their true interest

with respect to the continental nations was really the same, yet by the

arts and policy and practices of those nations, their mutual jealousies

were perpetually kept inflamed, and for a long series of years they

were far more inconvenient and troublesome than they were useful and

assisting to each other.

Should the people of America divide themselves into three or four

nations, would not the same thing happen? Would not similar jealousies

arise, and be in like manner cherished? Instead of their being "joined

in affection" and free from all apprehension of different "interests,"

envy and jealousy would soon extinguish confidence and affection,

and the partial interests of each confederacy, instead of the general

interests of all America, would be the only objects of their policy and

pursuits. Hence, like most other BORDERING nations, they would always

be either involved in disputes and war, or live in the constant

apprehension of them.

The most sanguine advocates for three or four confederacies cannot

reasonably suppose that they would long remain exactly on an equal

footing in point of strength, even if it was possible to form them so at

first; but, admitting that to be practicable, yet what human contrivance

can secure the continuance of such equality? Independent of those local

circumstances which tend to beget and increase power in one part and to

impede its progress in another, we must advert to the effects of that

superior policy and good management which would probably distinguish the

government of one above the rest, and by which their relative equality

in strength and consideration would be destroyed. For it cannot be

presumed that the same degree of sound policy, prudence, and foresight

would uniformly be observed by each of these confederacies for a long

succession of years.

Whenever, and from whatever causes, it might happen, and happen it

would, that any one of these nations or confederacies should rise on the

scale of political importance much above the degree of her neighbors,

that moment would those neighbors behold her with envy and with fear.

Both those passions would lead them to countenance, if not to promote,

whatever might promise to diminish her importance; and would also

restrain them from measures calculated to advance or even to secure her

prosperity. Much time would not be necessary to enable her to discern

these unfriendly dispositions. She would soon begin, not only to lose

confidence in her neighbors, but also to feel a disposition equally

unfavorable to them. Distrust naturally creates distrust, and by nothing

is good-will and kind conduct more speedily changed than by invidious

jealousies and uncandid imputations, whether expressed or implied.

The North is generally the region of strength, and many local

circumstances render it probable that the most Northern of the proposed

confederacies would, at a period not very distant, be unquestionably

more formidable than any of the others. No sooner would this become

evident than the NORTHERN HIVE would excite the same ideas and

sensations in the more southern parts of America which it formerly

did in the southern parts of Europe. Nor does it appear to be a rash

conjecture that its young swarms might often be tempted to gather honey

in the more blooming fields and milder air of their luxurious and more

delicate neighbors.

They who well consider the history of similar divisions and

confederacies will find abundant reason to apprehend that those in

contemplation would in no other sense be neighbors than as they would

be borderers; that they would neither love nor trust one another, but on

the contrary would be a prey to discord, jealousy, and mutual injuries;

in short, that they would place us exactly in the situations in which

some nations doubtless wish to see us, viz., FORMIDABLE ONLY TO EACH

OTHER.

From these considerations it appears that those gentlemen are greatly

mistaken who suppose that alliances offensive and defensive might be

formed between these confederacies, and would produce that combination

and union of wills of arms and of resources, which would be necessary

to put and keep them in a formidable state of defense against foreign

enemies.

When did the independent states, into which Britain and Spain were

formerly divided, combine in such alliance, or unite their forces

against a foreign enemy? The proposed confederacies will be DISTINCT

NATIONS. Each of them would have its commerce with foreigners to

regulate by distinct treaties; and as their productions and commodities

are different and proper for different markets, so would those treaties

be essentially different. Different commercial concerns must create

different interests, and of course different degrees of political

attachment to and connection with different foreign nations. Hence it

might and probably would happen that the foreign nation with whom the

SOUTHERN confederacy might be at war would be the one with whom the

NORTHERN confederacy would be the most desirous of preserving peace and

friendship. An alliance so contrary to their immediate interest would

not therefore be easy to form, nor, if formed, would it be observed and

fulfilled with perfect good faith.

Nay, it is far more probable that in America, as in Europe, neighboring

nations, acting under the impulse of opposite interests and unfriendly

passions, would frequently be found taking different sides. Considering

our distance from Europe, it would be more natural for these

confederacies to apprehend danger from one another than from distant

nations, and therefore that each of them should be more desirous to

guard against the others by the aid of foreign alliances, than to guard

against foreign dangers by alliances between themselves. And here let us

not forget how much more easy it is to receive foreign fleets into our

ports, and foreign armies into our country, than it is to persuade or

compel them to depart. How many conquests did the Romans and others make

in the characters of allies, and what innovations did they under

the same character introduce into the governments of those whom they

pretended to protect.

Let candid men judge, then, whether the division of America into any

given number of independent sovereignties would tend to secure us

against the hostilities and improper interference of foreign nations.

PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 6

Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States

For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, November 14, 1787

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

THE three last numbers of this paper have been dedicated to an

enumeration of the dangers to which we should be exposed, in a state of

disunion, from the arms and arts of foreign nations. I shall now proceed

to delineate dangers of a different and, perhaps, still more alarming

kind--those which will in all probability flow from dissensions between

the States themselves, and from domestic factions and convulsions.

These have been already in some instances slightly anticipated; but they

deserve a more particular and more full investigation.

A man must be far gone in Utopian speculations who can seriously doubt

that, if these States should either be wholly disunited, or only united

in partial confederacies, the subdivisions into which they might be

thrown would have frequent and violent contests with each other. To

presume a want of motives for such contests as an argument against their

existence, would be to forget that men are ambitious, vindictive, and

rapacious. To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of

independent, unconnected sovereignties in the same neighborhood, would

be to disregard the uniform course of human events, and to set at

defiance the accumulated experience of ages.

The causes of hostility among nations are innumerable. There are some

which have a general and almost constant operation upon the collective

bodies of society. Of this description are the love of power or the

desire of pre-eminence and dominion--the jealousy of power, or the

desire of equality and safety. There are others which have a more

circumscribed though an equally operative influence within their

spheres. Such are the rivalships and competitions of commerce between

commercial nations. And there are others, not less numerous than either

of the former, which take their origin entirely in private passions;

in the attachments, enmities, interests, hopes, and fears of leading

individuals in the communities of which they are members. Men of this

class, whether the favorites of a king or of a people, have in too many

instances abused the confidence they possessed; and assuming the pretext

of some public motive, have not scrupled to sacrifice the national

tranquillity to personal advantage or personal gratification.

The celebrated Pericles, in compliance with the resentment of a

prostitute,(1) at the expense of much of the blood and treasure of

his countrymen, attacked, vanquished, and destroyed the city of

the SAMMIANS. The same man, stimulated by private pique against the

MEGARENSIANS,(2) another nation of Greece, or to avoid a prosecution

with which he was threatened as an accomplice of a supposed theft of

the statuary Phidias,(3) or to get rid of the accusations prepared to

be brought against him for dissipating the funds of the state in the

purchase of popularity,(4) or from a combination of all these causes,

was the primitive author of that famous and fatal war, distinguished in

the Grecian annals by the name of the PELOPONNESIAN war; which, after

various vicissitudes, intermissions, and renewals, terminated in the

ruin of the Athenian commonwealth.

The ambitious cardinal, who was prime minister to Henry VIII.,

permitting his vanity to aspire to the triple crown,(5) entertained

hopes of succeeding in the acquisition of that splendid prize by the

influence of the Emperor Charles V. To secure the favor and interest of

this enterprising and powerful monarch, he precipitated England into a

war with France, contrary to the plainest dictates of policy, and at the

hazard of the safety and independence, as well of the kingdom over which

he presided by his counsels, as of Europe in general. For if there

ever was a sovereign who bid fair to realize the project of universal

monarchy, it was the Emperor Charles V., of whose intrigues Wolsey was

at once the instrument and the dupe.

The influence which the bigotry of one female,(6) the petulance of

another,(7) and the cabals of a third,(8) had in the contemporary

policy, ferments, and pacifications, of a considerable part of Europe,

are topics that have been too often descanted upon not to be generally

known.

To multiply examples of the agency of personal considerations in

the production of great national events, either foreign or domestic,

according to their direction, would be an unnecessary waste of time.

Those who have but a superficial acquaintance with the sources from

which they are to be drawn, will themselves recollect a variety of

instances; and those who have a tolerable knowledge of human nature will

not stand in need of such lights to form their opinion either of the

reality or extent of that agency. Perhaps, however, a reference, tending

to illustrate the general principle, may with propriety be made to a

case which has lately happened among ourselves. If Shays had not been a

DESPERATE DEBTOR, it is much to be doubted whether Massachusetts would

have been plunged into a civil war.

But notwithstanding the concurring testimony of experience, in this

particular, there are still to be found visionary or designing men,

who stand ready to advocate the paradox of perpetual peace between the

States, though dismembered and alienated from each other. The genius of

republics (say they) is pacific; the spirit of commerce has a tendency

to soften the manners of men, and to extinguish those inflammable humors

which have so often kindled into wars. Commercial republics, like ours,

will never be disposed to waste themselves in ruinous contentions with

each other. They will be governed by mutual interest, and will cultivate

a spirit of mutual amity and concord.

Is it not (we may ask these projectors in politics) the true interest of

all nations to cultivate the same benevolent and philosophic spirit? If

this be their true interest, have they in fact pursued it? Has it not,

on the contrary, invariably been found that momentary passions, and

immediate interest, have a more active and imperious control over human

conduct than general or remote considerations of policy, utility or

justice? Have republics in practice been less addicted to war than

monarchies? Are not the former administered by MEN as well as the

latter? Are there not aversions, predilections, rivalships, and desires

of unjust acquisitions, that affect nations as well as kings? Are

not popular assemblies frequently subject to the impulses of rage,

resentment, jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular and violent

propensities? Is it not well known that their determinations are often

governed by a few individuals in whom they place confidence, and are,

of course, liable to be tinctured by the passions and views of those

individuals? Has commerce hitherto done anything more than change

the objects of war? Is not the love of wealth as domineering and

enterprising a passion as that of power or glory? Have there not been

as many wars founded upon commercial motives since that has become the

prevailing system of nations, as were before occasioned by the cupidity

of territory or dominion? Has not the spirit of commerce, in many

instances, administered new incentives to the appetite, both for the

one and for the other? Let experience, the least fallible guide of human

opinions, be appealed to for an answer to these inquiries.

Sparta, Athens, Rome, and Carthage were all republics; two of them,

Athens and Carthage, of the commercial kind. Yet were they as often

engaged in wars, offensive and defensive, as the neighboring monarchies

of the same times. Sparta was little better than a wellregulated camp;

and Rome was never sated of carnage and conquest.

Carthage, though a commercial republic, was the aggressor in the very

war that ended in her destruction. Hannibal had carried her arms into

the heart of Italy and to the gates of Rome, before Scipio, in turn,

gave him an overthrow in the territories of Carthage, and made a

conquest of the commonwealth.

Venice, in later times, figured more than once in wars of ambition,

till, becoming an object to the other Italian states, Pope Julius II.

found means to accomplish that formidable league,(9) which gave a deadly

blow to the power and pride of this haughty republic.

The provinces of Holland, till they were overwhelmed in debts and taxes,

took a leading and conspicuous part in the wars of Europe. They had

furious contests with England for the dominion of the sea, and were

among the most persevering and most implacable of the opponents of Louis

XIV.

In the government of Britain the representatives of the people compose

one branch of the national legislature. Commerce has been for ages the

predominant pursuit of that country. Few nations, nevertheless, have

been more frequently engaged in war; and the wars in which that kingdom

has been engaged have, in numerous instances, proceeded from the people.

There have been, if I may so express it, almost as many popular as

royal wars. The cries of the nation and the importunities of their

representatives have, upon various occasions, dragged their monarchs

into war, or continued them in it, contrary to their inclinations, and

sometimes contrary to the real interests of the State. In that memorable

struggle for superiority between the rival houses of AUSTRIA and

BOURBON, which so long kept Europe in a flame, it is well known that the

antipathies of the English against the French, seconding the ambition,

or rather the avarice, of a favorite leader,(10) protracted the war

beyond the limits marked out by sound policy, and for a considerable

time in opposition to the views of the court.

The wars of these two last-mentioned nations have in a great measure

grown out of commercial considerations,--the desire of supplanting and

the fear of being supplanted, either in particular branches of traffic

or in the general advantages of trade and navigation, and sometimes even

the more culpable desire of sharing in the commerce of other nations

without their consent.

The last war but between Britain and Spain sprang from the attempts of

the British merchants to prosecute an illicit trade with the Spanish

main. These unjustifiable practices on their part produced severity on

the part of the Spaniards toward the subjects of Great Britain which

were not more justifiable, because they exceeded the bounds of a just

retaliation and were chargeable with inhumanity and cruelty. Many of

the English who were taken on the Spanish coast were sent to dig in the

mines of Potosi; and by the usual progress of a spirit of resentment,

the innocent were, after a while, confounded with the guilty in

indiscriminate punishment. The complaints of the merchants kindled a

violent flame throughout the nation, which soon after broke out in the

House of Commons, and was communicated from that body to the ministry.

Letters of reprisal were granted, and a war ensued, which in its

consequences overthrew all the alliances that but twenty years before

had been formed with sanguine expectations of the most beneficial

fruits.

From this summary of what has taken place in other countries, whose

situations have borne the nearest resemblance to our own, what reason

can we have to confide in those reveries which would seduce us into an

expectation of peace and cordiality between the members of the present

confederacy, in a state of separation? Have we not already seen enough

of the fallacy and extravagance of those idle theories which have amused

us with promises of an exemption from the imperfections, weaknesses and

evils incident to society in every shape? Is it not time to awake from

the deceitful dream of a golden age, and to adopt as a practical maxim

for the direction of our political conduct that we, as well as the

other inhabitants of the globe, are yet remote from the happy empire of

perfect wisdom and perfect virtue?

Let the point of extreme depression to which our national dignity and

credit have sunk, let the inconveniences felt everywhere from a lax and

ill administration of government, let the revolt of a part of the State

of North Carolina, the late menacing disturbances in Pennsylvania, and

the actual insurrections and rebellions in Massachusetts, declare--!

So far is the general sense of mankind from corresponding with the

tenets of those who endeavor to lull asleep our apprehensions of discord

and hostility between the States, in the event of disunion, that it has

from long observation of the progress of society become a sort of axiom

in politics, that vicinity or nearness of situation, constitutes nations

natural enemies. An intelligent writer expresses himself on this subject

to this effect: "NEIGHBORING NATIONS (says he) are naturally enemies

of each other unless their common weakness forces them to league in a

CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC, and their constitution prevents the differences

that neighborhood occasions, extinguishing that secret jealousy which

disposes all states to aggrandize themselves at the expense of their

neighbors."(11) This passage, at the same time, points out the EVIL and

suggests the REMEDY.

PUBLIUS

1. Aspasia, vide "Plutarch's Life of Pericles."

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid. Phidias was supposed to have stolen some public gold, with the

connivance of Pericles, for the embellishment of the statue of Minerva.

5. Worn by the popes.

6. Madame de Maintenon.

7. Duchess of Marlborough.

8. Madame de Pompadour.

9. The League of Cambray, comprehending the Emperor, the King of France,

the King of Aragon, and most of the Italian princes and states.

10. The Duke of Marlborough.

11. Vide "Principes des Negociations" par l'Abbé de Mably.

FEDERALIST No. 7

The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between

the States)

For the Independent Journal. Thursday, November 15, 1787

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

IT IS sometimes asked, with an air of seeming triumph, what inducements

could the States have, if disunited, to make war upon each other? It

would be a full answer to this question to say--precisely the same

inducements which have, at different times, deluged in blood all the

nations in the world. But, unfortunately for us, the question admits

of a more particular answer. There are causes of differences within

our immediate contemplation, of the tendency of which, even under the

restraints of a federal constitution, we have had sufficient experience

to enable us to form a judgment of what might be expected if those

restraints were removed.

Territorial disputes have at all times been found one of the most

fertile sources of hostility among nations. Perhaps the greatest

proportion of wars that have desolated the earth have sprung from this

origin. This cause would exist among us in full force. We have a vast

tract of unsettled territory within the boundaries of the United States.

There still are discordant and undecided claims between several of them,

and the dissolution of the Union would lay a foundation for similar

claims between them all. It is well known that they have heretofore had

serious and animated discussion concerning the rights to the lands which

were ungranted at the time of the Revolution, and which usually went

under the name of crown lands. The States within the limits of whose

colonial governments they were comprised have claimed them as their

property, the others have contended that the rights of the crown in this

article devolved upon the Union; especially as to all that part of the

Western territory which, either by actual possession, or through the

submission of the Indian proprietors, was subjected to the jurisdiction

of the king of Great Britain, till it was relinquished in the treaty of

peace. This, it has been said, was at all events an acquisition to the

Confederacy by compact with a foreign power. It has been the prudent

policy of Congress to appease this controversy, by prevailing upon the

States to make cessions to the United States for the benefit of the

whole. This has been so far accomplished as, under a continuation of the

Union, to afford a decided prospect of an amicable termination of the

dispute. A dismemberment of the Confederacy, however, would revive this

dispute, and would create others on the same subject. At present, a

large part of the vacant Western territory is, by cession at least, if

not by any anterior right, the common property of the Union. If that

were at an end, the States which made the cession, on a principle

of federal compromise, would be apt when the motive of the grant had

ceased, to reclaim the lands as a reversion. The other States would no

doubt insist on a proportion, by right of representation. Their argument

would be, that a grant, once made, could not be revoked; and that the

justice of participating in territory acquired or secured by the joint

efforts of the Confederacy, remained undiminished. If, contrary to

probability, it should be admitted by all the States, that each had a

right to a share of this common stock, there would still be a difficulty

to be surmounted, as to a proper rule of apportionment. Different

principles would be set up by different States for this purpose; and as

they would affect the opposite interests of the parties, they might not

easily be susceptible of a pacific adjustment.

In the wide field of Western territory, therefore, we perceive an ample

theatre for hostile pretensions, without any umpire or common judge to

interpose between the contending parties. To reason from the past to

the future, we shall have good ground to apprehend, that the sword

would sometimes be appealed to as the arbiter of their differences.

The circumstances of the dispute between Connecticut and Pennsylvania,

respecting the land at Wyoming, admonish us not to be sanguine in

expecting an easy accommodation of such differences. The articles of

confederation obliged the parties to submit the matter to the decision

of a federal court. The submission was made, and the court decided

in favor of Pennsylvania. But Connecticut gave strong indications

of dissatisfaction with that determination; nor did she appear to be

entirely resigned to it, till, by negotiation and management, something

like an equivalent was found for the loss she supposed herself to have

sustained. Nothing here said is intended to convey the slightest censure

on the conduct of that State. She no doubt sincerely believed herself

to have been injured by the decision; and States, like individuals,

acquiesce with great reluctance in determinations to their disadvantage.

Those who had an opportunity of seeing the inside of the transactions

which attended the progress of the controversy between this State and

the district of Vermont, can vouch the opposition we experienced, as

well from States not interested as from those which were interested

in the claim; and can attest the danger to which the peace of the

Confederacy might have been exposed, had this State attempted to assert

its rights by force. Two motives preponderated in that opposition: one,

a jealousy entertained of our future power; and the other, the interest

of certain individuals of influence in the neighboring States, who had

obtained grants of lands under the actual government of that district.

Even the States which brought forward claims, in contradiction to ours,

seemed more solicitous to dismember this State, than to establish

their own pretensions. These were New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and

Connecticut. New Jersey and Rhode Island, upon all occasions, discovered

a warm zeal for the independence of Vermont; and Maryland, till alarmed

by the appearance of a connection between Canada and that State, entered

deeply into the same views. These being small States, saw with an

unfriendly eye the perspective of our growing greatness. In a review of

these transactions we may trace some of the causes which would be

likely to embroil the States with each other, if it should be their

unpropitious destiny to become disunited.

The competitions of commerce would be another fruitful source of

contention. The States less favorably circumstanced would be desirous

of escaping from the disadvantages of local situation, and of sharing

in the advantages of their more fortunate neighbors. Each State,

or separate confederacy, would pursue a system of commercial policy

peculiar to itself. This would occasion distinctions, preferences, and

exclusions, which would beget discontent. The habits of intercourse, on

the basis of equal privileges, to which we have been accustomed since

the earliest settlement of the country, would give a keener edge to

those causes of discontent than they would naturally have independent

of this circumstance. WE SHOULD BE READY TO DENOMINATE INJURIES THOSE

THINGS WHICH WERE IN REALITY THE JUSTIFIABLE ACTS OF INDEPENDENT

SOVEREIGNTIES CONSULTING A DISTINCT INTEREST. The spirit of enterprise,

which characterizes the commercial part of America, has left no occasion

of displaying itself unimproved. It is not at all probable that this

unbridled spirit would pay much respect to those regulations of trade by

which particular States might endeavor to secure exclusive benefits to

their own citizens. The infractions of these regulations, on one side,

the efforts to prevent and repel them, on the other, would naturally

lead to outrages, and these to reprisals and wars.

The opportunities which some States would have of rendering others

tributary to them by commercial regulations would be impatiently

submitted to by the tributary States. The relative situation of New

York, Connecticut, and New Jersey would afford an example of this

kind. New York, from the necessities of revenue, must lay duties on

her importations. A great part of these duties must be paid by the

inhabitants of the two other States in the capacity of consumers of what

we import. New York would neither be willing nor able to forego this

advantage. Her citizens would not consent that a duty paid by them

should be remitted in favor of the citizens of her neighbors; nor would

it be practicable, if there were not this impediment in the way, to

distinguish the customers in our own markets. Would Connecticut and New

Jersey long submit to be taxed by New York for her exclusive benefit?

Should we be long permitted to remain in the quiet and undisturbed

enjoyment of a metropolis, from the possession of which we derived

an advantage so odious to our neighbors, and, in their opinion, so

oppressive? Should we be able to preserve it against the incumbent

weight of Connecticut on the one side, and the co-operating pressure of

New Jersey on the other? These are questions that temerity alone will

answer in the affirmative.

The public debt of the Union would be a further cause of collision

between the separate States or confederacies. The apportionment, in the

first instance, and the progressive extinguishment afterward, would be

alike productive of ill-humor and animosity. How would it be possible

to agree upon a rule of apportionment satisfactory to all? There is

scarcely any that can be proposed which is entirely free from real

objections. These, as usual, would be exaggerated by the adverse

interest of the parties. There are even dissimilar views among the

States as to the general principle of discharging the public debt. Some

of them, either less impressed with the importance of national credit,

or because their citizens have little, if any, immediate interest in the

question, feel an indifference, if not a repugnance, to the payment of

the domestic debt at any rate. These would be inclined to magnify the

difficulties of a distribution. Others of them, a numerous body of whose

citizens are creditors to the public beyond proportion of the State

in the total amount of the national debt, would be strenuous for some

equitable and effective provision. The procrastinations of the former

would excite the resentments of the latter. The settlement of a rule

would, in the meantime, be postponed by real differences of opinion and

affected delays. The citizens of the States interested would clamour;

foreign powers would urge for the satisfaction of their just demands,

and the peace of the States would be hazarded to the double contingency

of external invasion and internal contention.

Suppose the difficulties of agreeing upon a rule surmounted, and the

apportionment made. Still there is great room to suppose that the rule

agreed upon would, upon experiment, be found to bear harder upon

some States than upon others. Those which were sufferers by it would

naturally seek for a mitigation of the burden. The others would as

naturally be disinclined to a revision, which was likely to end in an

increase of their own incumbrances. Their refusal would be too plausible

a pretext to the complaining States to withhold their contributions, not

to be embraced with avidity; and the non-compliance of these States

with their engagements would be a ground of bitter discussion and

altercation. If even the rule adopted should in practice justify the

equality of its principle, still delinquencies in payments on the part

of some of the States would result from a diversity of other causes--the

real deficiency of resources; the mismanagement of their finances;

accidental disorders in the management of the government; and, in

addition to the rest, the reluctance with which men commonly part with

money for purposes that have outlived the exigencies which produced

them, and interfere with the supply of immediate wants. Delinquencies,

from whatever causes, would be productive of complaints, recriminations,

and quarrels. There is, perhaps, nothing more likely to disturb the

tranquillity of nations than their being bound to mutual contributions

for any common object that does not yield an equal and coincident

benefit. For it is an observation, as true as it is trite, that there is

nothing men differ so readily about as the payment of money.

Laws in violation of private contracts, as they amount to aggressions

on the rights of those States whose citizens are injured by them, may

be considered as another probable source of hostility. We are not

authorized to expect that a more liberal or more equitable spirit would

preside over the legislations of the individual States hereafter, if

unrestrained by any additional checks, than we have heretofore seen in

too many instances disgracing their several codes. We have observed the

disposition to retaliation excited in Connecticut in consequence of

the enormities perpetrated by the Legislature of Rhode Island; and we

reasonably infer that, in similar cases, under other circumstances, a

war, not of PARCHMENT, but of the sword, would chastise such atrocious

breaches of moral obligation and social justice.

The probability of incompatible alliances between the different States

or confederacies and different foreign nations, and the effects of this

situation upon the peace of the whole, have been sufficiently unfolded

in some preceding papers. From the view they have exhibited of this part

of the subject, this conclusion is to be drawn, that America, if

not connected at all, or only by the feeble tie of a simple league,

offensive and defensive, would, by the operation of such jarring

alliances, be gradually entangled in all the pernicious labyrinths of

European politics and wars; and by the destructive contentions of the

parts into which she was divided, would be likely to become a prey to

the artifices and machinations of powers equally the enemies of them

all. Divide et impera(1) must be the motto of every nation that either

hates or fears us.(2)

PUBLIUS

1. Divide and command.

2. In order that the whole subject of these papers may as soon as

possible be laid before the public, it is proposed to publish them four

times a week--on Tuesday in the New York Packet and on Thursday in the

Daily Advertiser.

FEDERALIST No. 8

The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States

From the New York Packet. Tuesday, November 20, 1787.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

ASSUMING it therefore as an established truth that the several States,

in case of disunion, or such combinations of them as might happen to be

formed out of the wreck of the general Confederacy, would be subject to

those vicissitudes of peace and war, of friendship and enmity, with

each other, which have fallen to the lot of all neighboring nations not

united under one government, let us enter into a concise detail of some

of the consequences that would attend such a situation.

War between the States, in the first period of their separate existence,

would be accompanied with much greater distresses than it commonly is

in those countries where regular military establishments have long

obtained. The disciplined armies always kept on foot on the continent

of Europe, though they bear a malignant aspect to liberty and economy,

have, notwithstanding, been productive of the signal advantage of

rendering sudden conquests impracticable, and of preventing that

rapid desolation which used to mark the progress of war prior to their

introduction. The art of fortification has contributed to the same ends.

The nations of Europe are encircled with chains of fortified places,

which mutually obstruct invasion. Campaigns are wasted in reducing two

or three frontier garrisons, to gain admittance into an enemy's country.

Similar impediments occur at every step, to exhaust the strength and

delay the progress of an invader. Formerly, an invading army would

penetrate into the heart of a neighboring country almost as soon as

intelligence of its approach could be received; but now a comparatively

small force of disciplined troops, acting on the defensive, with the aid

of posts, is able to impede, and finally to frustrate, the enterprises

of one much more considerable. The history of war, in that quarter

of the globe, is no longer a history of nations subdued and empires

overturned, but of towns taken and retaken; of battles that decide

nothing; of retreats more beneficial than victories; of much effort and

little acquisition.

In this country the scene would be altogether reversed. The jealousy

of military establishments would postpone them as long as possible.

The want of fortifications, leaving the frontiers of one state open

to another, would facilitate inroads. The populous States would, with

little difficulty, overrun their less populous neighbors. Conquests

would be as easy to be made as difficult to be retained. War, therefore,

would be desultory and predatory. PLUNDER and devastation ever march in

the train of irregulars. The calamities of individuals would make the

principal figure in the events which would characterize our military

exploits.

This picture is not too highly wrought; though, I confess, it would not

long remain a just one. Safety from external danger is the most powerful

director of national conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty will,

after a time, give way to its dictates. The violent destruction of life

and property incident to war, the continual effort and alarm attendant

on a state of continual danger, will compel nations the most attached to

liberty to resort for repose and security to institutions which have a

tendency to destroy their civil and political rights. To be more safe,

they at length become willing to run the risk of being less free.

The institutions chiefly alluded to are STANDING ARMIES and the

correspondent appendages of military establishments. Standing armies,

it is said, are not provided against in the new Constitution; and it

is therefore inferred that they may exist under it.(1) Their existence,

however, from the very terms of the proposition, is, at most,

problematical and uncertain. But standing armies, it may be replied,

must inevitably result from a dissolution of the Confederacy. Frequent

war and constant apprehension, which require a state of as constant

preparation, will infallibly produce them. The weaker States or

confederacies would first have recourse to them, to put themselves upon

an equality with their more potent neighbors. They would endeavor to

supply the inferiority of population and resources by a more regular

and effective system of defense, by disciplined troops, and by

fortifications. They would, at the same time, be necessitated to

strengthen the executive arm of government, in doing which their

constitutions would acquire a progressive direction toward monarchy. It

is of the nature of war to increase the executive at the expense of the

legislative authority.

The expedients which have been mentioned would soon give the States or

confederacies that made use of them a superiority over their neighbors.

Small states, or states of less natural strength, under vigorous

governments, and with the assistance of disciplined armies, have often

triumphed over large states, or states of greater natural strength,

which have been destitute of these advantages. Neither the pride nor the

safety of the more important States or confederacies would permit them

long to submit to this mortifying and adventitious superiority. They

would quickly resort to means similar to those by which it had been

effected, to reinstate themselves in their lost pre-eminence. Thus, we

should, in a little time, see established in every part of this country

the same engines of despotism which have been the scourge of the Old

World. This, at least, would be the natural course of things; and our

reasonings will be the more likely to be just, in proportion as they are

accommodated to this standard.

These are not vague inferences drawn from supposed or speculative

defects in a Constitution, the whole power of which is lodged in the

hands of a people, or their representatives and delegates, but they

are solid conclusions, drawn from the natural and necessary progress of

human affairs.

It may, perhaps, be asked, by way of objection to this, why did

not standing armies spring up out of the contentions which so often

distracted the ancient republics of Greece? Different answers, equally

satisfactory, may be given to this question. The industrious habits of

the people of the present day, absorbed in the pursuits of gain,

and devoted to the improvements of agriculture and commerce, are

incompatible with the condition of a nation of soldiers, which was the

true condition of the people of those republics. The means of revenue,

which have been so greatly multiplied by the increase of gold and silver

and of the arts of industry, and the science of finance, which is the

offspring of modern times, concurring with the habits of nations, have

produced an entire revolution in the system of war, and have rendered

disciplined armies, distinct from the body of the citizens, the

inseparable companions of frequent hostility.

There is a wide difference, also, between military establishments in a

country seldom exposed by its situation to internal invasions, and in

one which is often subject to them, and always apprehensive of them.

The rulers of the former can have no good pretext, if they are even so

inclined, to keep on foot armies so numerous as must of necessity be

maintained in the latter. These armies being, in the first case, rarely,

if at all, called into activity for interior defense, the people are in

no danger of being broken to military subordination. The laws are not

accustomed to relaxations, in favor of military exigencies; the civil

state remains in full vigor, neither corrupted, nor confounded with the

principles or propensities of the other state. The smallness of the army

renders the natural strength of the community an overmatch for it;

and the citizens, not habituated to look up to the military power for

protection, or to submit to its oppressions, neither love nor fear the

soldiery; they view them with a spirit of jealous acquiescence in a

necessary evil, and stand ready to resist a power which they suppose may

be exerted to the prejudice of their rights.

The army under such circumstances may usefully aid the magistrate to

suppress a small faction, or an occasional mob, or insurrection; but it

will be unable to enforce encroachments against the united efforts of

the great body of the people.

In a country in the predicament last described, the contrary of all this

happens. The perpetual menacings of danger oblige the government to

be always prepared to repel it; its armies must be numerous enough for

instant defense. The continual necessity for their services enhances the

importance of the soldier, and proportionably degrades the condition of

the citizen. The military state becomes elevated above the civil. The

inhabitants of territories, often the theatre of war, are unavoidably

subjected to frequent infringements on their rights, which serve to

weaken their sense of those rights; and by degrees the people are

brought to consider the soldiery not only as their protectors, but

as their superiors. The transition from this disposition to that of

considering them masters, is neither remote nor difficult; but it is

very difficult to prevail upon a people under such impressions, to make

a bold or effectual resistance to usurpations supported by the military

power.

The kingdom of Great Britain falls within the first description. An

insular situation, and a powerful marine, guarding it in a great measure

against the possibility of foreign invasion, supersede the necessity

of a numerous army within the kingdom. A sufficient force to make head

against a sudden descent, till the militia could have time to rally and

embody, is all that has been deemed requisite. No motive of national

policy has demanded, nor would public opinion have tolerated, a larger

number of troops upon its domestic establishment. There has been, for a

long time past, little room for the operation of the other causes, which

have been enumerated as the consequences of internal war. This peculiar

felicity of situation has, in a great degree, contributed to preserve

the liberty which that country to this day enjoys, in spite of the

prevalent venality and corruption. If, on the contrary, Britain had been

situated on the continent, and had been compelled, as she would have

been, by that situation, to make her military establishments at home

coextensive with those of the other great powers of Europe, she, like

them, would in all probability be, at this day, a victim to the absolute

power of a single man. It is possible, though not easy, that the people

of that island may be enslaved from other causes; but it cannot be by

the prowess of an army so inconsiderable as that which has been usually

kept up within the kingdom.

If we are wise enough to preserve the Union we may for ages enjoy an

advantage similar to that of an insulated situation. Europe is at a

great distance from us. Her colonies in our vicinity will be likely to

continue too much disproportioned in strength to be able to give us any

dangerous annoyance. Extensive military establishments cannot, in this

position, be necessary to our security. But if we should be disunited,

and the integral parts should either remain separated, or, which is most

probable, should be thrown together into two or three confederacies,

we should be, in a short course of time, in the predicament of the

continental powers of Europe--our liberties would be a prey to the means

of defending ourselves against the ambition and jealousy of each other.

This is an idea not superficial or futile, but solid and weighty. It

deserves the most serious and mature consideration of every prudent and

honest man of whatever party. If such men will make a firm and

solemn pause, and meditate dispassionately on the importance of this

interesting idea; if they will contemplate it in all its attitudes, and

trace it to all its consequences, they will not hesitate to part with

trivial objections to a Constitution, the rejection of which would in

all probability put a final period to the Union. The airy phantoms that

flit before the distempered imaginations of some of its adversaries

would quickly give place to the more substantial forms of dangers, real,

certain, and formidable.

PUBLIUS

1. This objection will be fully examined in its proper place, and it

will be shown that the only natural precaution which could have been

taken on this subject has been taken; and a much better one than is to

be found in any constitution that has been heretofore framed in America,

most of which contain no guard at all on this subject.

FEDERALIST No. 9

The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection

For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, November 21, 1787

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

A FIRM Union will be of the utmost moment to the peace and liberty of

the States, as a barrier against domestic faction and insurrection. It

is impossible to read the history of the petty republics of Greece

and Italy without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the

distractions with which they were continually agitated, and at the

rapid succession of revolutions by which they were kept in a state of

perpetual vibration between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy. If they

exhibit occasional calms, these only serve as short-lived contrast to

the furious storms that are to succeed. If now and then intervals of

felicity open to view, we behold them with a mixture of regret, arising

from the reflection that the pleasing scenes before us are soon to be

overwhelmed by the tempestuous waves of sedition and party rage. If

momentary rays of glory break forth from the gloom, while they dazzle us

with a transient and fleeting brilliancy, they at the same time admonish

us to lament that the vices of government should pervert the direction

and tarnish the lustre of those bright talents and exalted endowments

for which the favored soils that produced them have been so justly

celebrated.

From the disorders that disfigure the annals of those republics the

advocates of despotism have drawn arguments, not only against the forms

of republican government, but against the very principles of civil

liberty. They have decried all free government as inconsistent with the

order of society, and have indulged themselves in malicious exultation

over its friends and partisans. Happily for mankind, stupendous fabrics

reared on the basis of liberty, which have flourished for ages, have, in

a few glorious instances, refuted their gloomy sophisms. And, I trust,

America will be the broad and solid foundation of other edifices, not

less magnificent, which will be equally permanent monuments of their

errors.

But it is not to be denied that the portraits they have sketched of

republican government were too just copies of the originals from which

they were taken. If it had been found impracticable to have devised

models of a more perfect structure, the enlightened friends to liberty

would have been obliged to abandon the cause of that species of

government as indefensible. The science of politics, however, like most

other sciences, has received great improvement. The efficacy of various

principles is now well understood, which were either not known at all,

or imperfectly known to the ancients. The regular distribution of power

into distinct departments; the introduction of legislative balances

and checks; the institution of courts composed of judges holding their

offices during good behavior; the representation of the people in the

legislature by deputies of their own election: these are wholly new

discoveries, or have made their principal progress towards perfection

in modern times. They are means, and powerful means, by which

the excellences of republican government may be retained and its

imperfections lessened or avoided. To this catalogue of circumstances

that tend to the amelioration of popular systems of civil government, I

shall venture, however novel it may appear to some, to add one more, on

a principle which has been made the foundation of an objection to the

new Constitution; I mean the ENLARGEMENT of the ORBIT within which such

systems are to revolve, either in respect to the dimensions of a single

State or to the consolidation of several smaller States into one great

Confederacy. The latter is that which immediately concerns the object

under consideration. It will, however, be of use to examine the

principle in its application to a single State, which shall be attended

to in another place.

The utility of a Confederacy, as well to suppress faction and to guard

the internal tranquillity of States, as to increase their external force

and security, is in reality not a new idea. It has been practiced upon

in different countries and ages, and has received the sanction of the

most approved writers on the subject of politics. The opponents of

the plan proposed have, with great assiduity, cited and circulated the

observations of Montesquieu on the necessity of a contracted territory

for a republican government. But they seem not to have been apprised of

the sentiments of that great man expressed in another part of his work,

nor to have adverted to the consequences of the principle to which they

subscribe with such ready acquiescence.

When Montesquieu recommends a small extent for republics, the standards

he had in view were of dimensions far short of the limits of

almost every one of these States. Neither Virginia, Massachusetts,

Pennsylvania, New York, North Carolina, nor Georgia can by any means be

compared with the models from which he reasoned and to which the terms

of his description apply. If we therefore take his ideas on this point

as the criterion of truth, we shall be driven to the alternative either

of taking refuge at once in the arms of monarchy, or of splitting

ourselves into an infinity of little, jealous, clashing, tumultuous

commonwealths, the wretched nurseries of unceasing discord, and the

miserable objects of universal pity or contempt. Some of the writers who

have come forward on the other side of the question seem to have been

aware of the dilemma; and have even been bold enough to hint at the

division of the larger States as a desirable thing. Such an infatuated

policy, such a desperate expedient, might, by the multiplication of

petty offices, answer the views of men who possess not qualifications to

extend their influence beyond the narrow circles of personal intrigue,

but it could never promote the greatness or happiness of the people of

America.

Referring the examination of the principle itself to another place, as

has been already mentioned, it will be sufficient to remark here that,

in the sense of the author who has been most emphatically quoted upon

the occasion, it would only dictate a reduction of the SIZE of the more

considerable MEMBERS of the Union, but would not militate against their

being all comprehended in one confederate government. And this is the

true question, in the discussion of which we are at present interested.

So far are the suggestions of Montesquieu from standing in opposition

to a general Union of the States, that he explicitly treats of a

confederate republic as the expedient for extending the sphere of

popular government, and reconciling the advantages of monarchy with

those of republicanism.

"It is very probable," (says he(1)) "that mankind would have been

obliged at length to live constantly under the government of a single

person, had they not contrived a kind of constitution that has all the

internal advantages of a republican, together with the external force of

a monarchical government. I mean a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC."

"This form of government is a convention by which several smaller STATES

agree to become members of a larger ONE, which they intend to form. It

is a kind of assemblage of societies that constitute a new one, capable

of increasing, by means of new associations, till they arrive to such a

degree of power as to be able to provide for the security of the united

body."

"A republic of this kind, able to withstand an external force, may

support itself without any internal corruptions. The form of this

society prevents all manner of inconveniences."

"If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme authority, he

could not be supposed to have an equal authority and credit in all the

confederate states. Were he to have too great influence over one, this

would alarm the rest. Were he to subdue a part, that which would still

remain free might oppose him with forces independent of those which

he had usurped and overpower him before he could be settled in his

usurpation."

"Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate states

the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one part, they

are reformed by those that remain sound. The state may be destroyed on

one side, and not on the other; the confederacy may be dissolved, and

the confederates preserve their sovereignty."

"As this government is composed of small republics, it enjoys the

internal happiness of each; and with respect to its external situation,

it is possessed, by means of the association, of all the advantages of

large monarchies."

I have thought it proper to quote at length these interesting passages,

because they contain a luminous abridgment of the principal arguments

in favor of the Union, and must effectually remove the false impressions

which a misapplication of other parts of the work was calculated to

make. They have, at the same time, an intimate connection with the more

immediate design of this paper; which is, to illustrate the tendency of

the Union to repress domestic faction and insurrection.

A distinction, more subtle than accurate, has been raised between

a CONFEDERACY and a CONSOLIDATION of the States. The essential

characteristic of the first is said to be, the restriction of its

authority to the members in their collective capacities, without

reaching to the individuals of whom they are composed. It is contended

that the national council ought to have no concern with any object

of internal administration. An exact equality of suffrage between

the members has also been insisted upon as a leading feature of a

confederate government. These positions are, in the main, arbitrary;

they are supported neither by principle nor precedent. It has indeed

happened, that governments of this kind have generally operated in the

manner which the distinction taken notice of, supposes to be inherent in

their nature; but there have been in most of them extensive exceptions

to the practice, which serve to prove, as far as example will go, that

there is no absolute rule on the subject. And it will be clearly

shown in the course of this investigation that as far as the principle

contended for has prevailed, it has been the cause of incurable disorder

and imbecility in the government.

The definition of a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC seems simply to be "an

assemblage of societies," or an association of two or more states

into one state. The extent, modifications, and objects of the federal

authority are mere matters of discretion. So long as the separate

organization of the members be not abolished; so long as it exists, by

a constitutional necessity, for local purposes; though it should be in

perfect subordination to the general authority of the union, it

would still be, in fact and in theory, an association of states, or

a confederacy. The proposed Constitution, so far from implying an

abolition of the State governments, makes them constituent parts of the

national sovereignty, by allowing them a direct representation in

the Senate, and leaves in their possession certain exclusive and very

important portions of sovereign power. This fully corresponds, in every

rational import of the terms, with the idea of a federal government.

In the Lycian confederacy, which consisted of twenty-three CITIES

or republics, the largest were entitled to THREE votes in the COMMON

COUNCIL, those of the middle class to TWO, and the smallest to ONE. The

COMMON COUNCIL had the appointment of all the judges and magistrates of

the respective CITIES. This was certainly the most, delicate species of

interference in their internal administration; for if there be any thing

that seems exclusively appropriated to the local jurisdictions, it is

the appointment of their own officers. Yet Montesquieu, speaking of this

association, says: "Were I to give a model of an excellent Confederate

Republic, it would be that of Lycia." Thus we perceive that the

distinctions insisted upon were not within the contemplation of this

enlightened civilian; and we shall be led to conclude, that they are the

novel refinements of an erroneous theory.

PUBLIUS

1. "Spirit of Laws," vol. i., book ix., chap. i.

FEDERALIST No. 10

The Same Subject Continued (The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic

Faction and Insurrection)

From the Daily Advertiser. Thursday, November 22, 1787.

MADISON

To the People of the State of New York:

AMONG the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed Union, none

deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and

control the violence of faction. The friend of popular governments never

finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he

contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail,

therefore, to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the

principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it.

The instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public

councils, have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular

governments have everywhere perished; as they continue to be the

favorite and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty

derive their most specious declamations. The valuable improvements made

by the American constitutions on the popular models, both ancient

and modern, cannot certainly be too much admired; but it would be an

unwarrantable partiality, to contend that they have as effectually

obviated the danger on this side, as was wished and expected. Complaints

are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens,

equally the friends of public and private faith, and of public and

personal liberty, that our governments are too unstable, that the public

good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures

are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the

rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested

and overbearing majority. However anxiously we may wish that these

complaints had no foundation, the evidence, of known facts will not

permit us to deny that they are in some degree true. It will be found,

indeed, on a candid review of our situation, that some of the distresses

under which we labor have been erroneously charged on the operation

of our governments; but it will be found, at the same time, that other

causes will not alone account for many of our heaviest misfortunes;

and, particularly, for that prevailing and increasing distrust of public

engagements, and alarm for private rights, which are echoed from one

end of the continent to the other. These must be chiefly, if not wholly,

effects of the unsteadiness and injustice with which a factious spirit

has tainted our public administrations.

By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a

majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some

common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of

other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the

community.

There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by

removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects.

There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the

one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the

other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions,

and the same interests.

It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was

worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an

aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less

folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because

it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of

air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its

destructive agency.

The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise.

As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty

to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the

connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions

and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the

former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The

diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property

originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of

interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of

government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of

acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of

property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the

sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of

the society into different interests and parties.

The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and

we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity,

according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for

different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many

other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to

different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or

to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting

to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties,

inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more

disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their

common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual

animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the

most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle

their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts. But

the most common and durable source of factions has been the various

and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are

without property have ever formed distinct interests in society.

Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a

like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a

mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests,

grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into

different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The

regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the

principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party

and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government.

No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest

would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his

integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit

to be both judges and parties at the same time; yet what are many of the

most important acts of legislation, but so many judicial determinations,

not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the

rights of large bodies of citizens? And what are the different classes

of legislators but advocates and parties to the causes which they

determine? Is a law proposed concerning private debts? It is a question

to which the creditors are parties on one side and the debtors on the

other. Justice ought to hold the balance between them. Yet the parties

are, and must be, themselves the judges; and the most numerous party,

or, in other words, the most powerful faction must be expected to

prevail. Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged, and in what degree,

by restrictions on foreign manufactures? are questions which would be

differently decided by the landed and the manufacturing classes, and

probably by neither with a sole regard to justice and the public good.

The apportionment of taxes on the various descriptions of property is

an act which seems to require the most exact impartiality; yet there is,

perhaps, no legislative act in which greater opportunity and temptation

are given to a predominant party to trample on the rules of justice.

Every shilling with which they overburden the inferior number, is a

shilling saved to their own pockets.

It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust

these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public

good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm. Nor, in many

cases, can such an adjustment be made at all without taking into view

indirect and remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the

immediate interest which one party may find in disregarding the rights

of another or the good of the whole.

The inference to which we are brought is, that the CAUSES of faction

cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the means of

controlling its EFFECTS.

If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the

republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister

views by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse

the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence

under the forms of the Constitution. When a majority is included in a

faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it

to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good

and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good and private

rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to

preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the

great object to which our inquiries are directed. Let me add that it is

the great desideratum by which this form of government can be rescued

from the opprobrium under which it has so long labored, and be

recommended to the esteem and adoption of mankind.

By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two only.

Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at

the same time must be prevented, or the majority, having such coexistent

passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and local

situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of

oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide,

we well know that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on

as an adequate control. They are not found to be such on the injustice

and violence of individuals, and lose their efficacy in proportion to

the number combined together, that is, in proportion as their efficacy

becomes needful.

From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy,

by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who

assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure

for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in

almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication

and concert result from the form of government itself; and there is

nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an

obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democracies have ever

been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found

incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have

in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in

their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species

of government, have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to

a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same

time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their

opinions, and their passions.

A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of

representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises

the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it

varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of

the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the Union.

The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic

are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small

number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of

citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be

extended.

The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and

enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen

body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of

their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least

likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under

such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced

by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the

public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for

the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may be inverted. Men of

factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may, by

intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages,

and then betray the interests, of the people. The question resulting is,

whether small or extensive republics are more favorable to the election

of proper guardians of the public weal; and it is clearly decided in

favor of the latter by two obvious considerations:

In the first place, it is to be remarked that, however small the

republic may be, the representatives must be raised to a certain number,

in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that, however large

it may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in order to

guard against the confusion of a multitude. Hence, the number of

representatives in the two cases not being in proportion to that of

the two constituents, and being proportionally greater in the small

republic, it follows that, if the proportion of fit characters be not

less in the large than in the small republic, the former will present a

greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice.

In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater

number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will

be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the

vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages

of the people being more free, will be more likely to centre in men who

possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established

characters.

It must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases, there is a

mean, on both sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie.

By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the

representatives too little acquainted with all their local circumstances

and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly

attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and

national objects. The federal Constitution forms a happy combination in

this respect; the great and aggregate interests being referred to the

national, the local and particular to the State legislatures.

The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens

and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of

republican than of democratic government; and it is this circumstance

principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded

in the former than in the latter. The smaller the society, the fewer

probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the

fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will

a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of

individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within

which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute

their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater

variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a

majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights

of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more

difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act

in unison with each other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked

that, where there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes,

communication is always checked by distrust in proportion to the number

whose concurrence is necessary.

Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a republic has

over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by

a large over a small republic,--is enjoyed by the Union over the

States composing it. Does the advantage consist in the substitution of

representatives whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render

them superior to local prejudices and schemes of injustice? It will not

be denied that the representation of the Union will be most likely

to possess these requisite endowments. Does it consist in the greater

security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the event of

any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal

degree does the increased variety of parties comprised within the

Union, increase this security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater

obstacles opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes

of an unjust and interested majority? Here, again, the extent of the

Union gives it the most palpable advantage.

The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their

particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration

through the other States. A religious sect may degenerate into a

political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects

dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the national councils

against any danger from that source. A rage for paper money, for an

abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other

improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body

of the Union than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as

such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district,

than an entire State.

In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold

a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican

government. And according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel

in being republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and

supporting the character of Federalists.

PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 11

The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy

For the Independent Journal. Saturday, November 24, 1787

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

THE importance of the Union, in a commercial light, is one of those

points about which there is least room to entertain a difference of

opinion, and which has, in fact, commanded the most general assent of

men who have any acquaintance with the subject. This applies as well to

our intercourse with foreign countries as with each other.

There are appearances to authorize a supposition that the adventurous

spirit, which distinguishes the commercial character of America, has

already excited uneasy sensations in several of the maritime powers of

Europe. They seem to be apprehensive of our too great interference in

that carrying trade, which is the support of their navigation and the

foundation of their naval strength. Those of them which have colonies in

America look forward to what this country is capable of becoming, with

painful solicitude. They foresee the dangers that may threaten their

American dominions from the neighborhood of States, which have all the

dispositions, and would possess all the means, requisite to the creation

of a powerful marine. Impressions of this kind will naturally indicate

the policy of fostering divisions among us, and of depriving us, as far

as possible, of an ACTIVE COMMERCE in our own bottoms. This would

answer the threefold purpose of preventing our interference in their

navigation, of monopolizing the profits of our trade, and of clipping

the wings by which we might soar to a dangerous greatness. Did not

prudence forbid the detail, it would not be difficult to trace, by

facts, the workings of this policy to the cabinets of ministers.

If we continue united, we may counteract a policy so unfriendly to our

prosperity in a variety of ways. By prohibitory regulations, extending,

at the same time, throughout the States, we may oblige foreign countries

to bid against each other, for the privileges of our markets. This

assertion will not appear chimerical to those who are able to appreciate

the importance of the markets of three millions of people--increasing

in rapid progression, for the most part exclusively addicted to

agriculture, and likely from local circumstances to remain so--to any

manufacturing nation; and the immense difference there would be to the

trade and navigation of such a nation, between a direct communication in

its own ships, and an indirect conveyance of its products and returns,

to and from America, in the ships of another country. Suppose, for

instance, we had a government in America, capable of excluding Great

Britain (with whom we have at present no treaty of commerce) from all

our ports; what would be the probable operation of this step upon her

politics? Would it not enable us to negotiate, with the fairest prospect

of success, for commercial privileges of the most valuable and extensive

kind, in the dominions of that kingdom? When these questions have been

asked, upon other occasions, they have received a plausible, but not a

solid or satisfactory answer. It has been said that prohibitions on our

part would produce no change in the system of Britain, because she could

prosecute her trade with us through the medium of the Dutch, who would

be her immediate customers and paymasters for those articles which were

wanted for the supply of our markets. But would not her navigation be

materially injured by the loss of the important advantage of being her

own carrier in that trade? Would not the principal part of its profits

be intercepted by the Dutch, as a compensation for their agency and

risk? Would not the mere circumstance of freight occasion a considerable

deduction? Would not so circuitous an intercourse facilitate the

competitions of other nations, by enhancing the price of British

commodities in our markets, and by transferring to other hands the

management of this interesting branch of the British commerce?

A mature consideration of the objects suggested by these questions will

justify a belief that the real disadvantages to Britain from such a

state of things, conspiring with the pre-possessions of a great part of

the nation in favor of the American trade, and with the importunities

of the West India islands, would produce a relaxation in her present

system, and would let us into the enjoyment of privileges in the markets

of those islands elsewhere, from which our trade would derive the most

substantial benefits. Such a point gained from the British government,

and which could not be expected without an equivalent in exemptions

and immunities in our markets, would be likely to have a correspondent

effect on the conduct of other nations, who would not be inclined to see

themselves altogether supplanted in our trade.

A further resource for influencing the conduct of European nations

toward us, in this respect, would arise from the establishment of a

federal navy. There can be no doubt that the continuance of the Union

under an efficient government would put it in our power, at a period not

very distant, to create a navy which, if it could not vie with those of

the great maritime powers, would at least be of respectable weight if

thrown into the scale of either of two contending parties. This would be

more peculiarly the case in relation to operations in the West Indies.

A few ships of the line, sent opportunely to the reinforcement of either

side, would often be sufficient to decide the fate of a campaign, on the

event of which interests of the greatest magnitude were suspended. Our

position is, in this respect, a most commanding one. And if to this

consideration we add that of the usefulness of supplies from this

country, in the prosecution of military operations in the West Indies,

it will readily be perceived that a situation so favorable would enable

us to bargain with great advantage for commercial privileges. A price

would be set not only upon our friendship, but upon our neutrality. By

a steady adherence to the Union we may hope, erelong, to become the

arbiter of Europe in America, and to be able to incline the balance

of European competitions in this part of the world as our interest may

dictate.

But in the reverse of this eligible situation, we shall discover that

the rivalships of the parts would make them checks upon each other,

and would frustrate all the tempting advantages which nature has kindly

placed within our reach. In a state so insignificant our commerce would

be a prey to the wanton intermeddlings of all nations at war with each

other; who, having nothing to fear from us, would with little scruple or

remorse, supply their wants by depredations on our property as often as

it fell in their way. The rights of neutrality will only be respected

when they are defended by an adequate power. A nation, despicable by its

weakness, forfeits even the privilege of being neutral.

Under a vigorous national government, the natural strength and resources

of the country, directed to a common interest, would baffle all the

combinations of European jealousy to restrain our growth. This situation

would even take away the motive to such combinations, by inducing

an impracticability of success. An active commerce, an extensive

navigation, and a flourishing marine would then be the offspring of

moral and physical necessity. We might defy the little arts of the

little politicians to control or vary the irresistible and unchangeable

course of nature.

But in a state of disunion, these combinations might exist and might

operate with success. It would be in the power of the maritime nations,

availing themselves of our universal impotence, to prescribe the

conditions of our political existence; and as they have a common

interest in being our carriers, and still more in preventing our

becoming theirs, they would in all probability combine to embarrass our

navigation in such a manner as would in effect destroy it, and confine

us to a PASSIVE COMMERCE. We should then be compelled to content

ourselves with the first price of our commodities, and to see the

profits of our trade snatched from us to enrich our enemies and

persecutors. That unequaled spirit of enterprise, which signalizes the

genius of the American merchants and navigators, and which is in itself

an inexhaustible mine of national wealth, would be stifled and lost,

and poverty and disgrace would overspread a country which, with wisdom,

might make herself the admiration and envy of the world.

There are rights of great moment to the trade of America which are

rights of the Union--I allude to the fisheries, to the navigation of the

Western lakes, and to that of the Mississippi. The dissolution of the

Confederacy would give room for delicate questions concerning the future

existence of these rights; which the interest of more powerful partners

would hardly fail to solve to our disadvantage. The disposition of Spain

with regard to the Mississippi needs no comment. France and Britain

are concerned with us in the fisheries, and view them as of the utmost

moment to their navigation. They, of course, would hardly remain long

indifferent to that decided mastery, of which experience has shown us

to be possessed in this valuable branch of traffic, and by which we are

able to undersell those nations in their own markets. What more natural

than that they should be disposed to exclude from the lists such

dangerous competitors?

This branch of trade ought not to be considered as a partial benefit.

All the navigating States may, in different degrees, advantageously

participate in it, and under circumstances of a greater extension of

mercantile capital, would not be unlikely to do it. As a nursery of

seamen, it now is, or when time shall have more nearly assimilated the

principles of navigation in the several States, will become, a universal

resource. To the establishment of a navy, it must be indispensable.

To this great national object, a NAVY, union will contribute in various

ways. Every institution will grow and flourish in proportion to the

quantity and extent of the means concentred towards its formation and

support. A navy of the United States, as it would embrace the resources

of all, is an object far less remote than a navy of any single State or

partial confederacy, which would only embrace the resources of a single

part. It happens, indeed, that different portions of confederated

America possess each some peculiar advantage for this essential

establishment. The more southern States furnish in greater abundance

certain kinds of naval stores--tar, pitch, and turpentine. Their wood

for the construction of ships is also of a more solid and lasting

texture. The difference in the duration of the ships of which the navy

might be composed, if chiefly constructed of Southern wood, would be of

signal importance, either in the view of naval strength or of national

economy. Some of the Southern and of the Middle States yield a greater

plenty of iron, and of better quality. Seamen must chiefly be drawn

from the Northern hive. The necessity of naval protection to external

or maritime commerce does not require a particular elucidation, no more

than the conduciveness of that species of commerce to the prosperity of

a navy.

An unrestrained intercourse between the States themselves will advance

the trade of each by an interchange of their respective productions, not

only for the supply of reciprocal wants at home, but for exportation

to foreign markets. The veins of commerce in every part will be

replenished, and will acquire additional motion and vigor from a free

circulation of the commodities of every part. Commercial enterprise

will have much greater scope, from the diversity in the productions of

different States. When the staple of one fails from a bad harvest or

unproductive crop, it can call to its aid the staple of another.

The variety, not less than the value, of products for exportation

contributes to the activity of foreign commerce. It can be conducted

upon much better terms with a large number of materials of a given value

than with a small number of materials of the same value; arising

from the competitions of trade and from the fluctuations of markets.

Particular articles may be in great demand at certain periods, and

unsalable at others; but if there be a variety of articles, it can

scarcely happen that they should all be at one time in the latter

predicament, and on this account the operations of the merchant would

be less liable to any considerable obstruction or stagnation.

The speculative trader will at once perceive the force of these

observations, and will acknowledge that the aggregate balance of the

commerce of the United States would bid fair to be much more favorable

than that of the thirteen States without union or with partial unions.

It may perhaps be replied to this, that whether the States are united

or disunited, there would still be an intimate intercourse between them

which would answer the same ends; this intercourse would be fettered,

interrupted, and narrowed by a multiplicity of causes, which in the

course of these papers have been amply detailed. A unity of commercial,

as well as political, interests, can only result from a unity of

government.

There are other points of view in which this subject might be placed, of

a striking and animating kind. But they would lead us too far into the

regions of futurity, and would involve topics not proper for a newspaper

discussion. I shall briefly observe, that our situation invites and our

interests prompt us to aim at an ascendant in the system of American

affairs. The world may politically, as well as geographically, be

divided into four parts, each having a distinct set of interests.

Unhappily for the other three, Europe, by her arms and by her

negotiations, by force and by fraud, has, in different degrees, extended

her dominion over them all. Africa, Asia, and America, have successively

felt her domination. The superiority she has long maintained has tempted

her to plume herself as the Mistress of the World, and to consider the

rest of mankind as created for her benefit. Men admired as profound

philosophers have, in direct terms, attributed to her inhabitants a

physical superiority, and have gravely asserted that all animals, and

with them the human species, degenerate in America--that even dogs cease

to bark after having breathed awhile in our atmosphere.(1) Facts have

too long supported these arrogant pretensions of the Europeans. It

belongs to us to vindicate the honor of the human race, and to teach

that assuming brother, moderation. Union will enable us to do it.

Disunion will will add another victim to his triumphs. Let Americans

disdain to be the instruments of European greatness! Let the thirteen

States, bound together in a strict and indissoluble Union, concur in

erecting one great American system, superior to the control of all

transatlantic force or influence, and able to dictate the terms of the

connection between the old and the new world!

PUBLIUS "Recherches philosophiques sur les Americains."

FEDERALIST No. 12

The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue

From the New York Packet. Tuesday, November 27, 1787.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

THE effects of Union upon the commercial prosperity of the States have

been sufficiently delineated. Its tendency to promote the interests of

revenue will be the subject of our present inquiry.

The prosperity of commerce is now perceived and acknowledged by

all enlightened statesmen to be the most useful as well as the most

productive source of national wealth, and has accordingly become a

primary object of their political cares. By multiplying the means of

gratification, by promoting the introduction and circulation of the

precious metals, those darling objects of human avarice and enterprise,

it serves to vivify and invigorate the channels of industry, and to make

them flow with greater activity and copiousness. The assiduous merchant,

the laborious husbandman, the active mechanic, and the industrious

manufacturer,--all orders of men, look forward with eager expectation

and growing alacrity to this pleasing reward of their toils. The

often-agitated question between agriculture and commerce has, from

indubitable experience, received a decision which has silenced the

rivalship that once subsisted between them, and has proved, to the

satisfaction of their friends, that their interests are intimately

blended and interwoven. It has been found in various countries that, in

proportion as commerce has flourished, land has risen in value. And how

could it have happened otherwise? Could that which procures a freer vent

for the products of the earth, which furnishes new incitements to the

cultivation of land, which is the most powerful instrument in increasing

the quantity of money in a state--could that, in fine, which is the

faithful handmaid of labor and industry, in every shape, fail to augment

that article, which is the prolific parent of far the greatest part

of the objects upon which they are exerted? It is astonishing that so

simple a truth should ever have had an adversary; and it is one, among

a multitude of proofs, how apt a spirit of ill-informed jealousy, or

of too great abstraction and refinement, is to lead men astray from the

plainest truths of reason and conviction.

The ability of a country to pay taxes must always be proportioned, in

a great degree, to the quantity of money in circulation, and to the

celerity with which it circulates. Commerce, contributing to both these

objects, must of necessity render the payment of taxes easier, and

facilitate the requisite supplies to the treasury. The hereditary

dominions of the Emperor of Germany contain a great extent of fertile,

cultivated, and populous territory, a large proportion of which is

situated in mild and luxuriant climates. In some parts of this territory

are to be found the best gold and silver mines in Europe. And yet, from

the want of the fostering influence of commerce, that monarch can

boast but slender revenues. He has several times been compelled to

owe obligations to the pecuniary succors of other nations for the

preservation of his essential interests, and is unable, upon the

strength of his own resources, to sustain a long or continued war.

But it is not in this aspect of the subject alone that Union will be

seen to conduce to the purpose of revenue. There are other points of

view, in which its influence will appear more immediate and decisive. It

is evident from the state of the country, from the habits of the

people, from the experience we have had on the point itself, that it is

impracticable to raise any very considerable sums by direct taxation.

Tax laws have in vain been multiplied; new methods to enforce the

collection have in vain been tried; the public expectation has been

uniformly disappointed, and the treasuries of the States have remained

empty. The popular system of administration inherent in the nature of

popular government, coinciding with the real scarcity of money incident

to a languid and mutilated state of trade, has hitherto defeated every

experiment for extensive collections, and has at length taught the

different legislatures the folly of attempting them.

No person acquainted with what happens in other countries will be

surprised at this circumstance. In so opulent a nation as that of

Britain, where direct taxes from superior wealth must be much more

tolerable, and, from the vigor of the government, much more practicable,

than in America, far the greatest part of the national revenue is

derived from taxes of the indirect kind, from imposts, and from

excises. Duties on imported articles form a large branch of this latter

description.

In America, it is evident that we must a long time depend for the means

of revenue chiefly on such duties. In most parts of it, excises must

be confined within a narrow compass. The genius of the people will ill

brook the inquisitive and peremptory spirit of excise laws. The pockets

of the farmers, on the other hand, will reluctantly yield but scanty

supplies, in the unwelcome shape of impositions on their houses and

lands; and personal property is too precarious and invisible a fund to

be laid hold of in any other way than by the imperceptible agency of

taxes on consumption.

If these remarks have any foundation, that state of things which will

best enable us to improve and extend so valuable a resource must be

best adapted to our political welfare. And it cannot admit of a serious

doubt, that this state of things must rest on the basis of a general

Union. As far as this would be conducive to the interests of commerce,

so far it must tend to the extension of the revenue to be drawn from

that source. As far as it would contribute to rendering regulations for

the collection of the duties more simple and efficacious, so far it

must serve to answer the purposes of making the same rate of duties

more productive, and of putting it into the power of the government to

increase the rate without prejudice to trade.

The relative situation of these States; the number of rivers with which

they are intersected, and of bays that wash their shores; the facility

of communication in every direction; the affinity of language

and manners; the familiar habits of intercourse;--all these are

circumstances that would conspire to render an illicit trade between

them a matter of little difficulty, and would insure frequent evasions

of the commercial regulations of each other. The separate States or

confederacies would be necessitated by mutual jealousy to avoid the

temptations to that kind of trade by the lowness of their duties. The

temper of our governments, for a long time to come, would not permit

those rigorous precautions by which the European nations guard the

avenues into their respective countries, as well by land as by

water; and which, even there, are found insufficient obstacles to the

adventurous stratagems of avarice.

In France, there is an army of patrols (as they are called) constantly

employed to secure their fiscal regulations against the inroads of the

dealers in contraband trade. Mr. Neckar computes the number of these

patrols at upwards of twenty thousand. This shows the immense difficulty

in preventing that species of traffic, where there is an inland

communication, and places in a strong light the disadvantages with which

the collection of duties in this country would be encumbered, if by

disunion the States should be placed in a situation, with respect to

each other, resembling that of France with respect to her neighbors. The

arbitrary and vexatious powers with which the patrols are necessarily

armed, would be intolerable in a free country.

If, on the contrary, there be but one government pervading all the

States, there will be, as to the principal part of our commerce, but

ONE SIDE to guard--the ATLANTIC COAST. Vessels arriving directly from

foreign countries, laden with valuable cargoes, would rarely choose to

hazard themselves to the complicated and critical perils which would

attend attempts to unlade prior to their coming into port. They would

have to dread both the dangers of the coast, and of detection, as well

after as before their arrival at the places of their final destination.

An ordinary degree of vigilance would be competent to the prevention

of any material infractions upon the rights of the revenue. A few armed

vessels, judiciously stationed at the entrances of our ports, might at

a small expense be made useful sentinels of the laws. And the government

having the same interest to provide against violations everywhere,

the co-operation of its measures in each State would have a powerful

tendency to render them effectual. Here also we should preserve by

Union, an advantage which nature holds out to us, and which would be

relinquished by separation. The United States lie at a great distance

from Europe, and at a considerable distance from all other places

with which they would have extensive connections of foreign trade.

The passage from them to us, in a few hours, or in a single night,

as between the coasts of France and Britain, and of other neighboring

nations, would be impracticable. This is a prodigious security against a

direct contraband with foreign countries; but a circuitous contraband to

one State, through the medium of another, would be both easy and safe.

The difference between a direct importation from abroad, and an indirect

importation through the channel of a neighboring State, in small

parcels, according to time and opportunity, with the additional

facilities of inland communication, must be palpable to every man of

discernment.

It is therefore evident, that one national government would be able, at

much less expense, to extend the duties on imports, beyond comparison,

further than would be practicable to the States separately, or to any

partial confederacies. Hitherto, I believe, it may safely be asserted,

that these duties have not upon an average exceeded in any State three

per cent. In France they are estimated to be about fifteen per cent.,

and in Britain they exceed this proportion.(1) There seems to be nothing

to hinder their being increased in this country to at least treble their

present amount. The single article of ardent spirits, under federal

regulation, might be made to furnish a considerable revenue. Upon a

ratio to the importation into this State, the whole quantity imported

into the United States may be estimated at four millions of gallons;

which, at a shilling per gallon, would produce two hundred thousand

pounds. That article would well bear this rate of duty; and if it should

tend to diminish the consumption of it, such an effect would be equally

favorable to the agriculture, to the economy, to the morals, and to the

health of the society. There is, perhaps, nothing so much a subject of

national extravagance as these spirits.

What will be the consequence, if we are not able to avail ourselves of

the resource in question in its full extent? A nation cannot long exist

without revenues. Destitute of this essential support, it must resign

its independence, and sink into the degraded condition of a province.

This is an extremity to which no government will of choice accede.

Revenue, therefore, must be had at all events. In this country, if the

principal part be not drawn from commerce, it must fall with oppressive

weight upon land. It has been already intimated that excises, in their

true signification, are too little in unison with the feelings of the

people, to admit of great use being made of that mode of taxation; nor,

indeed, in the States where almost the sole employment is agriculture,

are the objects proper for excise sufficiently numerous to permit very

ample collections in that way. Personal estate (as has been before

remarked), from the difficulty in tracing it, cannot be subjected to

large contributions, by any other means than by taxes on consumption. In

populous cities, it may be enough the subject of conjecture, to occasion

the oppression of individuals, without much aggregate benefit to the

State; but beyond these circles, it must, in a great measure, escape the

eye and the hand of the tax-gatherer. As the necessities of the State,

nevertheless, must be satisfied in some mode or other, the defect of

other resources must throw the principal weight of public burdens on

the possessors of land. And as, on the other hand, the wants of the

government can never obtain an adequate supply, unless all the sources

of revenue are open to its demands, the finances of the community, under

such embarrassments, cannot be put into a situation consistent with

its respectability or its security. Thus we shall not even have the

consolations of a full treasury, to atone for the oppression of that

valuable class of the citizens who are employed in the cultivation of

the soil. But public and private distress will keep pace with each

other in gloomy concert; and unite in deploring the infatuation of those

counsels which led to disunion.

PUBLIUS

1. If my memory be right they amount to twenty per cent.

FEDERALIST No. 13

Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government

For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, November 28, 1787

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

As CONNECTED with the subject of revenue, we may with propriety consider

that of economy. The money saved from one object may be usefully applied

to another, and there will be so much the less to be drawn from the

pockets of the people. If the States are united under one government,

there will be but one national civil list to support; if they are

divided into several confederacies, there will be as many different

national civil lists to be provided for--and each of them, as to the

principal departments, coextensive with that which would be necessary

for a government of the whole. The entire separation of the States into

thirteen unconnected sovereignties is a project too extravagant and

too replete with danger to have many advocates. The ideas of men who

speculate upon the dismemberment of the empire seem generally turned

toward three confederacies--one consisting of the four Northern, another

of the four Middle, and a third of the five Southern States. There is

little probability that there would be a greater number. According

to this distribution, each confederacy would comprise an extent

of territory larger than that of the kingdom of Great Britain. No

well-informed man will suppose that the affairs of such a confederacy

can be properly regulated by a government less comprehensive in

its organs or institutions than that which has been proposed by

the convention. When the dimensions of a State attain to a certain

magnitude, it requires the same energy of government and the same forms

of administration which are requisite in one of much greater extent.

This idea admits not of precise demonstration, because there is no rule

by which we can measure the momentum of civil power necessary to the

government of any given number of individuals; but when we consider that

the island of Britain, nearly commensurate with each of the supposed

confederacies, contains about eight millions of people, and when we

reflect upon the degree of authority required to direct the passions of

so large a society to the public good, we shall see no reason to doubt

that the like portion of power would be sufficient to perform the same

task in a society far more numerous. Civil power, properly organized and

exerted, is capable of diffusing its force to a very great extent; and

can, in a manner, reproduce itself in every part of a great empire by a

judicious arrangement of subordinate institutions.

The supposition that each confederacy into which the States would be

likely to be divided would require a government not less comprehensive

than the one proposed, will be strengthened by another supposition, more

probable than that which presents us with three confederacies as the

alternative to a general Union. If we attend carefully to geographical

and commercial considerations, in conjunction with the habits and

prejudices of the different States, we shall be led to conclude that in

case of disunion they will most naturally league themselves under two

governments. The four Eastern States, from all the causes that form

the links of national sympathy and connection, may with certainty be

expected to unite. New York, situated as she is, would never be unwise

enough to oppose a feeble and unsupported flank to the weight of that

confederacy. There are other obvious reasons that would facilitate her

accession to it. New Jersey is too small a State to think of being a

frontier, in opposition to this still more powerful combination; nor

do there appear to be any obstacles to her admission into it. Even

Pennsylvania would have strong inducements to join the Northern league.

An active foreign commerce, on the basis of her own navigation, is her

true policy, and coincides with the opinions and dispositions of her

citizens. The more Southern States, from various circumstances, may not

think themselves much interested in the encouragement of navigation.

They may prefer a system which would give unlimited scope to all nations

to be the carriers as well as the purchasers of their commodities.

Pennsylvania may not choose to confound her interests in a connection so

adverse to her policy. As she must at all events be a frontier, she may

deem it most consistent with her safety to have her exposed side turned

towards the weaker power of the Southern, rather than towards the

stronger power of the Northern, Confederacy. This would give her the

fairest chance to avoid being the Flanders of America. Whatever may be

the determination of Pennsylvania, if the Northern Confederacy includes

New Jersey, there is no likelihood of more than one confederacy to the

south of that State.

Nothing can be more evident than that the thirteen States will be able

to support a national government better than one half, or one third, or

any number less than the whole. This reflection must have great weight

in obviating that objection to the proposed plan, which is founded on

the principle of expense; an objection, however, which, when we come

to take a nearer view of it, will appear in every light to stand on

mistaken ground.

If, in addition to the consideration of a plurality of civil lists, we

take into view the number of persons who must necessarily be employed

to guard the inland communication between the different confederacies

against illicit trade, and who in time will infallibly spring up out of

the necessities of revenue; and if we also take into view the military

establishments which it has been shown would unavoidably result from the

jealousies and conflicts of the several nations into which the States

would be divided, we shall clearly discover that a separation would be

not less injurious to the economy, than to the tranquillity, commerce,

revenue, and liberty of every part.

PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 14

Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory

Answered

From the New York Packet. Friday, November 30, 1787.

MADISON

To the People of the State of New York:

WE HAVE seen the necessity of the Union, as our bulwark against foreign

danger, as the conservator of peace among ourselves, as the guardian

of our commerce and other common interests, as the only substitute for

those military establishments which have subverted the liberties of the

Old World, and as the proper antidote for the diseases of faction, which

have proved fatal to other popular governments, and of which alarming

symptoms have been betrayed by our own. All that remains, within this

branch of our inquiries, is to take notice of an objection that may be

drawn from the great extent of country which the Union embraces. A few

observations on this subject will be the more proper, as it is perceived

that the adversaries of the new Constitution are availing themselves

of the prevailing prejudice with regard to the practicable sphere

of republican administration, in order to supply, by imaginary

difficulties, the want of those solid objections which they endeavor in

vain to find.

The error which limits republican government to a narrow district has

been unfolded and refuted in preceding papers. I remark here only that

it seems to owe its rise and prevalence chiefly to the confounding of a

republic with a democracy, applying to the former reasonings drawn from

the nature of the latter. The true distinction between these forms was

also adverted to on a former occasion. It is, that in a democracy, the

people meet and exercise the government in person; in a republic,

they assemble and administer it by their representatives and agents. A

democracy, consequently, will be confined to a small spot. A republic

may be extended over a large region.

To this accidental source of the error may be added the artifice of some

celebrated authors, whose writings have had a great share in forming

the modern standard of political opinions. Being subjects either of

an absolute or limited monarchy, they have endeavored to heighten

the advantages, or palliate the evils of those forms, by placing in

comparison the vices and defects of the republican, and by citing as

specimens of the latter the turbulent democracies of ancient Greece and

modern Italy. Under the confusion of names, it has been an easy task to

transfer to a republic observations applicable to a democracy only; and

among others, the observation that it can never be established but among

a small number of people, living within a small compass of territory.

Such a fallacy may have been the less perceived, as most of the popular

governments of antiquity were of the democratic species; and even in

modern Europe, to which we owe the great principle of representation, no

example is seen of a government wholly popular, and founded, at the same

time, wholly on that principle. If Europe has the merit of discovering

this great mechanical power in government, by the simple agency of which

the will of the largest political body may be concentred, and its force

directed to any object which the public good requires, America can claim

the merit of making the discovery the basis of unmixed and extensive

republics. It is only to be lamented that any of her citizens should

wish to deprive her of the additional merit of displaying its full

efficacy in the establishment of the comprehensive system now under her

consideration.

As the natural limit of a democracy is that distance from the central

point which will just permit the most remote citizens to assemble as

often as their public functions demand, and will include no greater

number than can join in those functions; so the natural limit of a

republic is that distance from the centre which will barely allow

the representatives to meet as often as may be necessary for the

administration of public affairs. Can it be said that the limits of the

United States exceed this distance? It will not be said by those who

recollect that the Atlantic coast is the longest side of the Union, that

during the term of thirteen years, the representatives of the States

have been almost continually assembled, and that the members from the

most distant States are not chargeable with greater intermissions of

attendance than those from the States in the neighborhood of Congress.

That we may form a juster estimate with regard to this interesting

subject, let us resort to the actual dimensions of the Union. The

limits, as fixed by the treaty of peace, are: on the east the Atlantic,

on the south the latitude of thirty-one degrees, on the west the

Mississippi, and on the north an irregular line running in some

instances beyond the forty-fifth degree, in others falling as low as the

forty-second. The southern shore of Lake Erie lies below that latitude.

Computing the distance between the thirty-first and forty-fifth degrees,

it amounts to nine hundred and seventy-three common miles; computing it

from thirty-one to forty-two degrees, to seven hundred and sixty-four

miles and a half. Taking the mean for the distance, the amount will be

eight hundred and sixty-eight miles and three-fourths. The mean distance

from the Atlantic to the Mississippi does not probably exceed seven

hundred and fifty miles. On a comparison of this extent with that of

several countries in Europe, the practicability of rendering our system

commensurate to it appears to be demonstrable. It is not a great deal

larger than Germany, where a diet representing the whole empire is

continually assembled; or than Poland before the late dismemberment,

where another national diet was the depositary of the supreme power.

Passing by France and Spain, we find that in Great Britain, inferior as

it may be in size, the representatives of the northern extremity of the

island have as far to travel to the national council as will be required

of those of the most remote parts of the Union.

Favorable as this view of the subject may be, some observations remain

which will place it in a light still more satisfactory.

In the first place it is to be remembered that the general government is

not to be charged with the whole power of making and administering laws.

Its jurisdiction is limited to certain enumerated objects, which concern

all the members of the republic, but which are not to be attained by

the separate provisions of any. The subordinate governments, which can

extend their care to all those other subjects which can be separately

provided for, will retain their due authority and activity. Were it

proposed by the plan of the convention to abolish the governments of

the particular States, its adversaries would have some ground for their

objection; though it would not be difficult to show that if they were

abolished the general government would be compelled, by the principle of

self-preservation, to reinstate them in their proper jurisdiction.

A second observation to be made is that the immediate object of the

federal Constitution is to secure the union of the thirteen primitive

States, which we know to be practicable; and to add to them such other

States as may arise in their own bosoms, or in their neighborhoods,

which we cannot doubt to be equally practicable. The arrangements that

may be necessary for those angles and fractions of our territory which

lie on our northwestern frontier, must be left to those whom further

discoveries and experience will render more equal to the task.

Let it be remarked, in the third place, that the intercourse throughout

the Union will be facilitated by new improvements. Roads will everywhere

be shortened, and kept in better order; accommodations for travelers

will be multiplied and meliorated; an interior navigation on our eastern

side will be opened throughout, or nearly throughout, the whole extent

of the thirteen States. The communication between the Western and

Atlantic districts, and between different parts of each, will be

rendered more and more easy by those numerous canals with which the

beneficence of nature has intersected our country, and which art finds

it so little difficult to connect and complete.

A fourth and still more important consideration is, that as almost every

State will, on one side or other, be a frontier, and will thus find, in

regard to its safety, an inducement to make some sacrifices for the

sake of the general protection; so the States which lie at the greatest

distance from the heart of the Union, and which, of course, may partake

least of the ordinary circulation of its benefits, will be at the same

time immediately contiguous to foreign nations, and will consequently

stand, on particular occasions, in greatest need of its strength and

resources. It may be inconvenient for Georgia, or the States forming our

western or northeastern borders, to send their representatives to the

seat of government; but they would find it more so to struggle alone

against an invading enemy, or even to support alone the whole expense of

those precautions which may be dictated by the neighborhood of continual

danger. If they should derive less benefit, therefore, from the Union

in some respects than the less distant States, they will derive greater

benefit from it in other respects, and thus the proper equilibrium will

be maintained throughout.

I submit to you, my fellow-citizens, these considerations, in full

confidence that the good sense which has so often marked your decisions

will allow them their due weight and effect; and that you will never

suffer difficulties, however formidable in appearance, or however

fashionable the error on which they may be founded, to drive you into

the gloomy and perilous scene into which the advocates for disunion

would conduct you. Hearken not to the unnatural voice which tells you

that the people of America, knit together as they are by so many cords

of affection, can no longer live together as members of the same family;

can no longer continue the mutual guardians of their mutual happiness;

can no longer be fellow citizens of one great, respectable, and

flourishing empire. Hearken not to the voice which petulantly tells you

that the form of government recommended for your adoption is a novelty

in the political world; that it has never yet had a place in the

theories of the wildest projectors; that it rashly attempts what it is

impossible to accomplish. No, my countrymen, shut your ears against

this unhallowed language. Shut your hearts against the poison which

it conveys; the kindred blood which flows in the veins of American

citizens, the mingled blood which they have shed in defense of their

sacred rights, consecrate their Union, and excite horror at the idea

of their becoming aliens, rivals, enemies. And if novelties are to be

shunned, believe me, the most alarming of all novelties, the most wild

of all projects, the most rash of all attempts, is that of rendering us

in pieces, in order to preserve our liberties and promote our happiness.

But why is the experiment of an extended republic to be rejected, merely

because it may comprise what is new? Is it not the glory of the people

of America, that, whilst they have paid a decent regard to the opinions

of former times and other nations, they have not suffered a blind

veneration for antiquity, for custom, or for names, to overrule

the suggestions of their own good sense, the knowledge of their own

situation, and the lessons of their own experience? To this manly

spirit, posterity will be indebted for the possession, and the world

for the example, of the numerous innovations displayed on the American

theatre, in favor of private rights and public happiness. Had no

important step been taken by the leaders of the Revolution for which a

precedent could not be discovered, no government established of which

an exact model did not present itself, the people of the United States

might, at this moment have been numbered among the melancholy victims of

misguided councils, must at best have been laboring under the weight

of some of those forms which have crushed the liberties of the rest of

mankind. Happily for America, happily, we trust, for the whole human

race, they pursued a new and more noble course. They accomplished a

revolution which has no parallel in the annals of human society. They

reared the fabrics of governments which have no model on the face of

the globe. They formed the design of a great Confederacy, which it is

incumbent on their successors to improve and perpetuate. If their works

betray imperfections, we wonder at the fewness of them. If they erred

most in the structure of the Union, this was the work most difficult to

be executed; this is the work which has been new modelled by the act of

your convention, and it is that act on which you are now to deliberate

and to decide.

PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 15

The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union

For the Independent Journal. Saturday, December 1, 1787

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York.

IN THE course of the preceding papers, I have endeavored, my fellow

citizens, to place before you, in a clear and convincing light, the

importance of Union to your political safety and happiness. I have

unfolded to you a complication of dangers to which you would be exposed,

should you permit that sacred knot which binds the people of America

together be severed or dissolved by ambition or by avarice, by jealousy

or by misrepresentation. In the sequel of the inquiry through which

I propose to accompany you, the truths intended to be inculcated

will receive further confirmation from facts and arguments hitherto

unnoticed. If the road over which you will still have to pass should in

some places appear to you tedious or irksome, you will recollect that

you are in quest of information on a subject the most momentous which

can engage the attention of a free people, that the field through which

you have to travel is in itself spacious, and that the difficulties of

the journey have been unnecessarily increased by the mazes with which

sophistry has beset the way. It will be my aim to remove the obstacles

from your progress in as compendious a manner as it can be done, without

sacrificing utility to despatch.

In pursuance of the plan which I have laid down for the discussion

of the subject, the point next in order to be examined is the

"insufficiency of the present Confederation to the preservation of the

Union." It may perhaps be asked what need there is of reasoning or proof

to illustrate a position which is not either controverted or doubted, to

which the understandings and feelings of all classes of men assent,

and which in substance is admitted by the opponents as well as by the

friends of the new Constitution. It must in truth be acknowledged that,

however these may differ in other respects, they in general appear

to harmonize in this sentiment, at least, that there are material

imperfections in our national system, and that something is necessary to

be done to rescue us from impending anarchy. The facts that support

this opinion are no longer objects of speculation. They have forced

themselves upon the sensibility of the people at large, and have at

length extorted from those, whose mistaken policy has had the principal

share in precipitating the extremity at which we are arrived, a

reluctant confession of the reality of those defects in the scheme of

our federal government, which have been long pointed out and regretted

by the intelligent friends of the Union.

We may indeed with propriety be said to have reached almost the last

stage of national humiliation. There is scarcely anything that can wound

the pride or degrade the character of an independent nation which we do

not experience. Are there engagements to the performance of which we

are held by every tie respectable among men? These are the subjects of

constant and unblushing violation. Do we owe debts to foreigners and

to our own citizens contracted in a time of imminent peril for the

preservation of our political existence? These remain without any

proper or satisfactory provision for their discharge. Have we valuable

territories and important posts in the possession of a foreign

power which, by express stipulations, ought long since to have

been surrendered? These are still retained, to the prejudice of our

interests, not less than of our rights. Are we in a condition to resent

or to repel the aggression? We have neither troops, nor treasury, nor

government.(1) Are we even in a condition to remonstrate with dignity?

The just imputations on our own faith, in respect to the same treaty,

ought first to be removed. Are we entitled by nature and compact to a

free participation in the navigation of the Mississippi? Spain excludes

us from it. Is public credit an indispensable resource in time of

public danger? We seem to have abandoned its cause as desperate and

irretrievable. Is commerce of importance to national wealth? Ours is at

the lowest point of declension. Is respectability in the eyes of foreign

powers a safeguard against foreign encroachments? The imbecility of our

government even forbids them to treat with us. Our ambassadors abroad

are the mere pageants of mimic sovereignty. Is a violent and unnatural

decrease in the value of land a symptom of national distress? The price

of improved land in most parts of the country is much lower than can be

accounted for by the quantity of waste land at market, and can only be

fully explained by that want of private and public confidence, which

are so alarmingly prevalent among all ranks, and which have a direct

tendency to depreciate property of every kind. Is private credit the

friend and patron of industry? That most useful kind which relates to

borrowing and lending is reduced within the narrowest limits, and this

still more from an opinion of insecurity than from the scarcity of

money. To shorten an enumeration of particulars which can afford neither

pleasure nor instruction, it may in general be demanded, what indication

is there of national disorder, poverty, and insignificance that could

befall a community so peculiarly blessed with natural advantages as

we are, which does not form a part of the dark catalogue of our public

misfortunes?

This is the melancholy situation to which we have been brought by those

very maxims and councils which would now deter us from adopting the

proposed Constitution; and which, not content with having conducted us

to the brink of a precipice, seem resolved to plunge us into the abyss

that awaits us below. Here, my countrymen, impelled by every motive that

ought to influence an enlightened people, let us make a firm stand for

our safety, our tranquillity, our dignity, our reputation. Let us at

last break the fatal charm which has too long seduced us from the paths

of felicity and prosperity.

It is true, as has been before observed that facts, too stubborn to

be resisted, have produced a species of general assent to the abstract

proposition that there exist material defects in our national system;

but the usefulness of the concession, on the part of the old adversaries

of federal measures, is destroyed by a strenuous opposition to a remedy,

upon the only principles that can give it a chance of success. While

they admit that the government of the United States is destitute of

energy, they contend against conferring upon it those powers which

are requisite to supply that energy. They seem still to aim at things

repugnant and irreconcilable; at an augmentation of federal authority,

without a diminution of State authority; at sovereignty in the Union,

and complete independence in the members. They still, in fine, seem

to cherish with blind devotion the political monster of an imperium in

imperio. This renders a full display of the principal defects of the

Confederation necessary, in order to show that the evils we experience

do not proceed from minute or partial imperfections, but from

fundamental errors in the structure of the building, which cannot be

amended otherwise than by an alteration in the first principles and main

pillars of the fabric.

The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing

Confederation is in the principle of LEGISLATION for STATES or

GOVERNMENTS, in their CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES, and as

contradistinguished from the INDIVIDUALS of which they consist. Though

this principle does not run through all the powers delegated to the

Union, yet it pervades and governs those on which the efficacy of the

rest depends. Except as to the rule of appointment, the United States

has an indefinite discretion to make requisitions for men and money; but

they have no authority to raise either, by regulations extending to the

individual citizens of America. The consequence of this is, that

though in theory their resolutions concerning those objects are laws,

constitutionally binding on the members of the Union, yet in practice

they are mere recommendations which the States observe or disregard at

their option.

It is a singular instance of the capriciousness of the human mind, that

after all the admonitions we have had from experience on this head,

there should still be found men who object to the new Constitution, for

deviating from a principle which has been found the bane of the old, and

which is in itself evidently incompatible with the idea of GOVERNMENT;

a principle, in short, which, if it is to be executed at all, must

substitute the violent and sanguinary agency of the sword to the mild

influence of the magistracy.

There is nothing absurd or impracticable in the idea of a league or

alliance between independent nations for certain defined purposes

precisely stated in a treaty regulating all the details of time, place,

circumstance, and quantity; leaving nothing to future discretion; and

depending for its execution on the good faith of the parties. Compacts

of this kind exist among all civilized nations, subject to the usual

vicissitudes of peace and war, of observance and non-observance, as the

interests or passions of the contracting powers dictate. In the early

part of the present century there was an epidemical rage in Europe for

this species of compacts, from which the politicians of the times

fondly hoped for benefits which were never realized. With a view to

establishing the equilibrium of power and the peace of that part of the

world, all the resources of negotiation were exhausted, and triple and

quadruple alliances were formed; but they were scarcely formed before

they were broken, giving an instructive but afflicting lesson to

mankind, how little dependence is to be placed on treaties which have

no other sanction than the obligations of good faith, and which oppose

general considerations of peace and justice to the impulse of any

immediate interest or passion.

If the particular States in this country are disposed to stand in a

similar relation to each other, and to drop the project of a general

DISCRETIONARY SUPERINTENDENCE, the scheme would indeed be pernicious,

and would entail upon us all the mischiefs which have been enumerated

under the first head; but it would have the merit of being, at least,

consistent and practicable Abandoning all views towards a confederate

government, this would bring us to a simple alliance offensive and

defensive; and would place us in a situation to be alternate friends

and enemies of each other, as our mutual jealousies and rivalships,

nourished by the intrigues of foreign nations, should prescribe to us.

But if we are unwilling to be placed in this perilous situation; if we

still will adhere to the design of a national government, or, which

is the same thing, of a superintending power, under the direction of

a common council, we must resolve to incorporate into our plan those

ingredients which may be considered as forming the characteristic

difference between a league and a government; we must extend the

authority of the Union to the persons of the citizens,--the only proper

objects of government.

Government implies the power of making laws. It is essential to the idea

of a law, that it be attended with a sanction; or, in other words, a

penalty or punishment for disobedience. If there be no penalty annexed

to disobedience, the resolutions or commands which pretend to be laws

will, in fact, amount to nothing more than advice or recommendation.

This penalty, whatever it may be, can only be inflicted in two ways: by

the agency of the courts and ministers of justice, or by military force;

by the COERCION of the magistracy, or by the COERCION of arms. The first

kind can evidently apply only to men; the last kind must of necessity,

be employed against bodies politic, or communities, or States. It is

evident that there is no process of a court by which the observance

of the laws can, in the last resort, be enforced. Sentences may be

denounced against them for violations of their duty; but these sentences

can only be carried into execution by the sword. In an association

where the general authority is confined to the collective bodies of the

communities, that compose it, every breach of the laws must involve a

state of war; and military execution must become the only instrument of

civil obedience. Such a state of things can certainly not deserve the

name of government, nor would any prudent man choose to commit his

happiness to it.

There was a time when we were told that breaches, by the States, of the

regulations of the federal authority were not to be expected; that

a sense of common interest would preside over the conduct of the

respective members, and would beget a full compliance with all the

constitutional requisitions of the Union. This language, at the present

day, would appear as wild as a great part of what we now hear from

the same quarter will be thought, when we shall have received further

lessons from that best oracle of wisdom, experience. It at all times

betrayed an ignorance of the true springs by which human conduct is

actuated, and belied the original inducements to the establishment of

civil power. Why has government been instituted at all? Because the

passions of men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice,

without constraint. Has it been found that bodies of men act with more

rectitude or greater disinterestedness than individuals? The contrary

of this has been inferred by all accurate observers of the conduct of

mankind; and the inference is founded upon obvious reasons. Regard to

reputation has a less active influence, when the infamy of a bad action

is to be divided among a number than when it is to fall singly upon

one. A spirit of faction, which is apt to mingle its poison in the

deliberations of all bodies of men, will often hurry the persons of whom

they are composed into improprieties and excesses, for which they would

blush in a private capacity.

In addition to all this, there is, in the nature of sovereign power,

an impatience of control, that disposes those who are invested with the

exercise of it, to look with an evil eye upon all external attempts to

restrain or direct its operations. From this spirit it happens, that

in every political association which is formed upon the principle of

uniting in a common interest a number of lesser sovereignties, there

will be found a kind of eccentric tendency in the subordinate or

inferior orbs, by the operation of which there will be a perpetual

effort in each to fly off from the common centre. This tendency is not

difficult to be accounted for. It has its origin in the love of power.

Power controlled or abridged is almost always the rival and enemy

of that power by which it is controlled or abridged. This simple

proposition will teach us how little reason there is to expect, that

the persons intrusted with the administration of the affairs of the

particular members of a confederacy will at all times be ready, with

perfect good-humor, and an unbiased regard to the public weal, to

execute the resolutions or decrees of the general authority. The reverse

of this results from the constitution of human nature.

If, therefore, the measures of the Confederacy cannot be executed

without the intervention of the particular administrations, there will

be little prospect of their being executed at all. The rulers of the

respective members, whether they have a constitutional right to do it

or not, will undertake to judge of the propriety of the measures

themselves. They will consider the conformity of the thing proposed

or required to their immediate interests or aims; the momentary

conveniences or inconveniences that would attend its adoption. All this

will be done; and in a spirit of interested and suspicious scrutiny,

without that knowledge of national circumstances and reasons of

state, which is essential to a right judgment, and with that strong

predilection in favor of local objects, which can hardly fail to mislead

the decision. The same process must be repeated in every member of which

the body is constituted; and the execution of the plans, framed by the

councils of the whole, will always fluctuate on the discretion of the

ill-informed and prejudiced opinion of every part. Those who have been

conversant in the proceedings of popular assemblies; who have seen

how difficult it often is, where there is no exterior pressure of

circumstances, to bring them to harmonious resolutions on important

points, will readily conceive how impossible it must be to induce a

number of such assemblies, deliberating at a distance from each other,

at different times, and under different impressions, long to co-operate

in the same views and pursuits.

In our case, the concurrence of thirteen distinct sovereign wills is

requisite, under the Confederation, to the complete execution of every

important measure that proceeds from the Union. It has happened as was

to have been foreseen. The measures of the Union have not been executed;

the delinquencies of the States have, step by step, matured themselves

to an extreme, which has, at length, arrested all the wheels of the

national government, and brought them to an awful stand. Congress

at this time scarcely possess the means of keeping up the forms of

administration, till the States can have time to agree upon a more

substantial substitute for the present shadow of a federal government.

Things did not come to this desperate extremity at once. The

causes which have been specified produced at first only unequal and

disproportionate degrees of compliance with the requisitions of the

Union. The greater deficiencies of some States furnished the pretext of

example and the temptation of interest to the complying, or to the least

delinquent States. Why should we do more in proportion than those who

are embarked with us in the same political voyage? Why should we consent

to bear more than our proper share of the common burden? These were

suggestions which human selfishness could not withstand, and which even

speculative men, who looked forward to remote consequences, could not,

without hesitation, combat. Each State, yielding to the persuasive voice

of immediate interest or convenience, has successively withdrawn its

support, till the frail and tottering edifice seems ready to fall upon

our heads, and to crush us beneath its ruins.

PUBLIUS

1. "I mean for the Union."

FEDERALIST No. 16

The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present

Confederation to Preserve the Union)

From the New York Packet. Tuesday, December 4, 1787.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

THE tendency of the principle of legislation for States, or communities,

in their political capacities, as it has been exemplified by the

experiment we have made of it, is equally attested by the events which

have befallen all other governments of the confederate kind, of which

we have any account, in exact proportion to its prevalence in those

systems. The confirmations of this fact will be worthy of a distinct

and particular examination. I shall content myself with barely observing

here, that of all the confederacies of antiquity, which history has

handed down to us, the Lycian and Achaean leagues, as far as there

remain vestiges of them, appear to have been most free from the fetters

of that mistaken principle, and were accordingly those which have best

deserved, and have most liberally received, the applauding suffrages of

political writers.

This exceptionable principle may, as truly as emphatically, be styled

the parent of anarchy: It has been seen that delinquencies in the

members of the Union are its natural and necessary offspring; and that

whenever they happen, the only constitutional remedy is force, and the

immediate effect of the use of it, civil war.

It remains to inquire how far so odious an engine of government, in its

application to us, would even be capable of answering its end. If there

should not be a large army constantly at the disposal of the national

government it would either not be able to employ force at all, or,

when this could be done, it would amount to a war between parts of

the Confederacy concerning the infractions of a league, in which the

strongest combination would be most likely to prevail, whether it

consisted of those who supported or of those who resisted the general

authority. It would rarely happen that the delinquency to be redressed

would be confined to a single member, and if there were more than one

who had neglected their duty, similarity of situation would induce them

to unite for common defense. Independent of this motive of sympathy, if

a large and influential State should happen to be the aggressing member,

it would commonly have weight enough with its neighbors to win over some

of them as associates to its cause. Specious arguments of danger to

the common liberty could easily be contrived; plausible excuses for

the deficiencies of the party could, without difficulty, be invented

to alarm the apprehensions, inflame the passions, and conciliate the

good-will, even of those States which were not chargeable with any

violation or omission of duty. This would be the more likely to take

place, as the delinquencies of the larger members might be expected

sometimes to proceed from an ambitious premeditation in their rulers,

with a view to getting rid of all external control upon their designs

of personal aggrandizement; the better to effect which it is presumable

they would tamper beforehand with leading individuals in the adjacent

States. If associates could not be found at home, recourse would be

had to the aid of foreign powers, who would seldom be disinclined to

encouraging the dissensions of a Confederacy, from the firm union

of which they had so much to fear. When the sword is once drawn, the

passions of men observe no bounds of moderation. The suggestions of

wounded pride, the instigations of irritated resentment, would be apt

to carry the States against which the arms of the Union were exerted, to

any extremes necessary to avenge the affront or to avoid the disgrace

of submission. The first war of this kind would probably terminate in a

dissolution of the Union.

This may be considered as the violent death of the Confederacy. Its more

natural death is what we now seem to be on the point of experiencing, if

the federal system be not speedily renovated in a more substantial form.

It is not probable, considering the genius of this country, that the

complying States would often be inclined to support the authority of the

Union by engaging in a war against the non-complying States. They would

always be more ready to pursue the milder course of putting themselves

upon an equal footing with the delinquent members by an imitation of

their example. And the guilt of all would thus become the security of

all. Our past experience has exhibited the operation of this spirit in

its full light. There would, in fact, be an insuperable difficulty in

ascertaining when force could with propriety be employed. In the article

of pecuniary contribution, which would be the most usual source of

delinquency, it would often be impossible to decide whether it had

proceeded from disinclination or inability. The pretense of the latter

would always be at hand. And the case must be very flagrant in which its

fallacy could be detected with sufficient certainty to justify the harsh

expedient of compulsion. It is easy to see that this problem alone, as

often as it should occur, would open a wide field for the exercise of

factious views, of partiality, and of oppression, in the majority that

happened to prevail in the national council.

It seems to require no pains to prove that the States ought not to

prefer a national Constitution which could only be kept in motion by

the instrumentality of a large army continually on foot to execute the

ordinary requisitions or decrees of the government. And yet this is the

plain alternative involved by those who wish to deny it the power of

extending its operations to individuals. Such a scheme, if practicable

at all, would instantly degenerate into a military despotism; but it

will be found in every light impracticable. The resources of the Union

would not be equal to the maintenance of an army considerable enough to

confine the larger States within the limits of their duty; nor would the

means ever be furnished of forming such an army in the first instance.

Whoever considers the populousness and strength of several of these

States singly at the present juncture, and looks forward to what they

will become, even at the distance of half a century, will at once

dismiss as idle and visionary any scheme which aims at regulating their

movements by laws to operate upon them in their collective capacities,

and to be executed by a coercion applicable to them in the same

capacities. A project of this kind is little less romantic than the

monster-taming spirit which is attributed to the fabulous heroes and

demi-gods of antiquity.

Even in those confederacies which have been composed of members smaller

than many of our counties, the principle of legislation for sovereign

States, supported by military coercion, has never been found effectual.

It has rarely been attempted to be employed, but against the weaker

members; and in most instances attempts to coerce the refractory and

disobedient have been the signals of bloody wars, in which one half of

the confederacy has displayed its banners against the other half.

The result of these observations to an intelligent mind must be

clearly this, that if it be possible at any rate to construct a federal

government capable of regulating the common concerns and preserving the

general tranquillity, it must be founded, as to the objects committed

to its care, upon the reverse of the principle contended for by the

opponents of the proposed Constitution. It must carry its agency to

the persons of the citizens. It must stand in need of no intermediate

legislations; but must itself be empowered to employ the arm of the

ordinary magistrate to execute its own resolutions. The majesty of the

national authority must be manifested through the medium of the courts

of justice. The government of the Union, like that of each State,

must be able to address itself immediately to the hopes and fears of

individuals; and to attract to its support those passions which have the

strongest influence upon the human heart. It must, in short, possess all

the means, and have aright to resort to all the methods, of executing

the powers with which it is intrusted, that are possessed and exercised

by the government of the particular States.

To this reasoning it may perhaps be objected, that if any State should

be disaffected to the authority of the Union, it could at any time

obstruct the execution of its laws, and bring the matter to the same

issue of force, with the necessity of which the opposite scheme is

reproached.

The plausibility of this objection will vanish the moment we advert to

the essential difference between a mere NON-COMPLIANCE and a DIRECT and

ACTIVE RESISTANCE. If the interposition of the State legislatures be

necessary to give effect to a measure of the Union, they have only NOT

TO ACT, or TO ACT EVASIVELY, and the measure is defeated. This neglect

of duty may be disguised under affected but unsubstantial provisions,

so as not to appear, and of course not to excite any alarm in the people

for the safety of the Constitution. The State leaders may even make

a merit of their surreptitious invasions of it on the ground of some

temporary convenience, exemption, or advantage.

But if the execution of the laws of the national government should not

require the intervention of the State legislatures, if they were to pass

into immediate operation upon the citizens themselves, the particular

governments could not interrupt their progress without an open and

violent exertion of an unconstitutional power. No omissions nor evasions

would answer the end. They would be obliged to act, and in such a manner

as would leave no doubt that they had encroached on the national rights.

An experiment of this nature would always be hazardous in the face of a

constitution in any degree competent to its own defense, and of a

people enlightened enough to distinguish between a legal exercise and

an illegal usurpation of authority. The success of it would require not

merely a factious majority in the legislature, but the concurrence of

the courts of justice and of the body of the people. If the judges were

not embarked in a conspiracy with the legislature, they would pronounce

the resolutions of such a majority to be contrary to the supreme law

of the land, unconstitutional, and void. If the people were not tainted

with the spirit of their State representatives, they, as the natural

guardians of the Constitution, would throw their weight into the

national scale and give it a decided preponderancy in the contest.

Attempts of this kind would not often be made with levity or rashness,

because they could seldom be made without danger to the authors, unless

in cases of a tyrannical exercise of the federal authority.

If opposition to the national government should arise from the

disorderly conduct of refractory or seditious individuals, it could be

overcome by the same means which are daily employed against the same

evil under the State governments. The magistracy, being equally the

ministers of the law of the land, from whatever source it might

emanate, would doubtless be as ready to guard the national as the local

regulations from the inroads of private licentiousness. As to those

partial commotions and insurrections, which sometimes disquiet society,

from the intrigues of an inconsiderable faction, or from sudden or

occasional illhumors that do not infect the great body of the community

the general government could command more extensive resources for the

suppression of disturbances of that kind than would be in the power

of any single member. And as to those mortal feuds which, in certain

conjunctures, spread a conflagration through a whole nation, or through

a very large proportion of it, proceeding either from weighty causes of

discontent given by the government or from the contagion of some

violent popular paroxysm, they do not fall within any ordinary rules of

calculation. When they happen, they commonly amount to revolutions and

dismemberments of empire. No form of government can always either avoid

or control them. It is in vain to hope to guard against events too

mighty for human foresight or precaution, and it would be idle to object

to a government because it could not perform impossibilities.

PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 17

The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present

Confederation to Preserve the Union)

For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, December 5, 1787

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

AN OBJECTION, of a nature different from that which has been stated and

answered, in my last address, may perhaps be likewise urged against the

principle of legislation for the individual citizens of America. It may

be said that it would tend to render the government of the Union too

powerful, and to enable it to absorb those residuary authorities, which

it might be judged proper to leave with the States for local purposes.

Allowing the utmost latitude to the love of power which any reasonable

man can require, I confess I am at a loss to discover what temptation

the persons intrusted with the administration of the general government

could ever feel to divest the States of the authorities of that

description. The regulation of the mere domestic police of a State

appears to me to hold out slender allurements to ambition. Commerce,

finance, negotiation, and war seem to comprehend all the objects which

have charms for minds governed by that passion; and all the powers

necessary to those objects ought, in the first instance, to be lodged in

the national depository. The administration of private justice between

the citizens of the same State, the supervision of agriculture and of

other concerns of a similar nature, all those things, in short, which

are proper to be provided for by local legislation, can never be

desirable cares of a general jurisdiction. It is therefore improbable

that there should exist a disposition in the federal councils to

usurp the powers with which they are connected; because the attempt to

exercise those powers would be as troublesome as it would be nugatory;

and the possession of them, for that reason, would contribute nothing

to the dignity, to the importance, or to the splendor of the national

government.

But let it be admitted, for argument's sake, that mere wantonness and

lust of domination would be sufficient to beget that disposition; still

it may be safely affirmed, that the sense of the constituent body of the

national representatives, or, in other words, the people of the several

States, would control the indulgence of so extravagant an appetite. It

will always be far more easy for the State governments to encroach upon

the national authorities than for the national government to encroach

upon the State authorities. The proof of this proposition turns upon

the greater degree of influence which the State governments if they

administer their affairs with uprightness and prudence, will generally

possess over the people; a circumstance which at the same time teaches

us that there is an inherent and intrinsic weakness in all federal

constitutions; and that too much pains cannot be taken in their

organization, to give them all the force which is compatible with the

principles of liberty.

The superiority of influence in favor of the particular governments

would result partly from the diffusive construction of the national

government, but chiefly from the nature of the objects to which the

attention of the State administrations would be directed.

It is a known fact in human nature, that its affections are commonly

weak in proportion to the distance or diffusiveness of the object. Upon

the same principle that a man is more attached to his family than to his

neighborhood, to his neighborhood than to the community at large, the

people of each State would be apt to feel a stronger bias towards their

local governments than towards the government of the Union; unless

the force of that principle should be destroyed by a much better

administration of the latter.

This strong propensity of the human heart would find powerful

auxiliaries in the objects of State regulation.

The variety of more minute interests, which will necessarily fall under

the superintendence of the local administrations, and which will form so

many rivulets of influence, running through every part of the society,

cannot be particularized, without involving a detail too tedious and

uninteresting to compensate for the instruction it might afford.

There is one transcendant advantage belonging to the province of the

State governments, which alone suffices to place the matter in a clear

and satisfactory light,--I mean the ordinary administration of criminal

and civil justice. This, of all others, is the most powerful, most

universal, and most attractive source of popular obedience and

attachment. It is that which, being the immediate and visible guardian

of life and property, having its benefits and its terrors in constant

activity before the public eye, regulating all those personal interests

and familiar concerns to which the sensibility of individuals is more

immediately awake, contributes, more than any other circumstance,

to impressing upon the minds of the people, affection, esteem, and

reverence towards the government. This great cement of society, which

will diffuse itself almost wholly through the channels of the particular

governments, independent of all other causes of influence, would insure

them so decided an empire over their respective citizens as to render

them at all times a complete counterpoise, and, not unfrequently,

dangerous rivals to the power of the Union.

The operations of the national government, on the other hand, falling

less immediately under the observation of the mass of the citizens, the

benefits derived from it will chiefly be perceived and attended to by

speculative men. Relating to more general interests, they will be less

apt to come home to the feelings of the people; and, in proportion,

less likely to inspire an habitual sense of obligation, and an active

sentiment of attachment.

The reasoning on this head has been abundantly exemplified by the

experience of all federal constitutions with which we are acquainted,

and of all others which have borne the least analogy to them.

Though the ancient feudal systems were not, strictly speaking,

confederacies, yet they partook of the nature of that species of

association. There was a common head, chieftain, or sovereign, whose

authority extended over the whole nation; and a number of subordinate

vassals, or feudatories, who had large portions of land allotted to

them, and numerous trains of INFERIOR vassals or retainers, who occupied

and cultivated that land upon the tenure of fealty or obedience, to

the persons of whom they held it. Each principal vassal was a kind of

sovereign, within his particular demesnes. The consequences of this

situation were a continual opposition to authority of the sovereign, and

frequent wars between the great barons or chief feudatories themselves.

The power of the head of the nation was commonly too weak, either

to preserve the public peace, or to protect the people against the

oppressions of their immediate lords. This period of European affairs is

emphatically styled by historians, the times of feudal anarchy.

When the sovereign happened to be a man of vigorous and warlike temper

and of superior abilities, he would acquire a personal weight and

influence, which answered, for the time, the purpose of a more regular

authority. But in general, the power of the barons triumphed over that

of the prince; and in many instances his dominion was entirely thrown

off, and the great fiefs were erected into independent principalities or

States. In those instances in which the monarch finally prevailed over

his vassals, his success was chiefly owing to the tyranny of those

vassals over their dependents. The barons, or nobles, equally the

enemies of the sovereign and the oppressors of the common people, were

dreaded and detested by both; till mutual danger and mutual interest

effected a union between them fatal to the power of the aristocracy. Had

the nobles, by a conduct of clemency and justice, preserved the fidelity

and devotion of their retainers and followers, the contests between them

and the prince must almost always have ended in their favor, and in the

abridgment or subversion of the royal authority.

This is not an assertion founded merely in speculation or conjecture.

Among other illustrations of its truth which might be cited, Scotland

will furnish a cogent example. The spirit of clanship which was, at an

early day, introduced into that kingdom, uniting the nobles and

their dependants by ties equivalent to those of kindred, rendered the

aristocracy a constant overmatch for the power of the monarch, till the

incorporation with England subdued its fierce and ungovernable spirit,

and reduced it within those rules of subordination which a more rational

and more energetic system of civil polity had previously established in

the latter kingdom.

The separate governments in a confederacy may aptly be compared with

the feudal baronies; with this advantage in their favor, that from the

reasons already explained, they will generally possess the confidence

and good-will of the people, and with so important a support, will be

able effectually to oppose all encroachments of the national government.

It will be well if they are not able to counteract its legitimate and

necessary authority. The points of similitude consist in the rivalship

of power, applicable to both, and in the CONCENTRATION of large portions

of the strength of the community into particular DEPOSITORIES, in one

case at the disposal of individuals, in the other case at the disposal

of political bodies.

A concise review of the events that have attended confederate

governments will further illustrate this important doctrine; an

inattention to which has been the great source of our political

mistakes, and has given our jealousy a direction to the wrong side. This

review shall form the subject of some ensuing papers.

PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 18

The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present

Confederation to Preserve the Union) For the New York Packet. Friday,

December 7, 1787

MADISON, with HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

AMONG the confederacies of antiquity, the most considerable was that of

the Grecian republics, associated under the Amphictyonic council. From

the best accounts transmitted of this celebrated institution, it bore

a very instructive analogy to the present Confederation of the American

States.

The members retained the character of independent and sovereign states,

and had equal votes in the federal council. This council had a general

authority to propose and resolve whatever it judged necessary for the

common welfare of Greece; to declare and carry on war; to decide, in

the last resort, all controversies between the members; to fine the

aggressing party; to employ the whole force of the confederacy against

the disobedient; to admit new members. The Amphictyons were the

guardians of religion, and of the immense riches belonging to the temple

of Delphos, where they had the right of jurisdiction in controversies

between the inhabitants and those who came to consult the oracle. As a

further provision for the efficacy of the federal powers, they took an

oath mutually to defend and protect the united cities, to punish

the violators of this oath, and to inflict vengeance on sacrilegious

despoilers of the temple.

In theory, and upon paper, this apparatus of powers seems amply

sufficient for all general purposes. In several material instances,

they exceed the powers enumerated in the articles of confederation. The

Amphictyons had in their hands the superstition of the times, one of the

principal engines by which government was then maintained; they had a

declared authority to use coercion against refractory cities, and were

bound by oath to exert this authority on the necessary occasions.

Very different, nevertheless, was the experiment from the theory.

The powers, like those of the present Congress, were administered by

deputies appointed wholly by the cities in their political capacities;

and exercised over them in the same capacities. Hence the weakness,

the disorders, and finally the destruction of the confederacy. The

more powerful members, instead of being kept in awe and subordination,

tyrannized successively over all the rest. Athens, as we learn from

Demosthenes, was the arbiter of Greece seventy-three years. The

Lacedaemonians next governed it twenty-nine years; at a subsequent

period, after the battle of Leuctra, the Thebans had their turn of

domination.

It happened but too often, according to Plutarch, that the deputies of

the strongest cities awed and corrupted those of the weaker; and that

judgment went in favor of the most powerful party.

Even in the midst of defensive and dangerous wars with Persia and

Macedon, the members never acted in concert, and were, more or fewer

of them, eternally the dupes or the hirelings of the common enemy.

The intervals of foreign war were filled up by domestic vicissitudes

convulsions, and carnage.

After the conclusion of the war with Xerxes, it appears that the

Lacedaemonians required that a number of the cities should be turned

out of the confederacy for the unfaithful part they had acted. The

Athenians, finding that the Lacedaemonians would lose fewer partisans by

such a measure than themselves, and would become masters of the public

deliberations, vigorously opposed and defeated the attempt. This piece

of history proves at once the inefficiency of the union, the ambition

and jealousy of its most powerful members, and the dependent and

degraded condition of the rest. The smaller members, though entitled by

the theory of their system to revolve in equal pride and majesty around

the common center, had become, in fact, satellites of the orbs of

primary magnitude.

Had the Greeks, says the Abbe Milot, been as wise as they were

courageous, they would have been admonished by experience of the

necessity of a closer union, and would have availed themselves of

the peace which followed their success against the Persian arms, to

establish such a reformation. Instead of this obvious policy, Athens

and Sparta, inflated with the victories and the glory they had acquired,

became first rivals and then enemies; and did each other infinitely more

mischief than they had suffered from Xerxes. Their mutual jealousies,

fears, hatreds, and injuries ended in the celebrated Peloponnesian war;

which itself ended in the ruin and slavery of the Athenians who had

begun it.

As a weak government, when not at war, is ever agitated by internal

dissentions, so these never fail to bring on fresh calamities from

abroad. The Phocians having ploughed up some consecrated ground

belonging to the temple of Apollo, the Amphictyonic council, according

to the superstition of the age, imposed a fine on the sacrilegious

offenders. The Phocians, being abetted by Athens and Sparta, refused to

submit to the decree. The Thebans, with others of the cities, undertook

to maintain the authority of the Amphictyons, and to avenge the violated

god. The latter, being the weaker party, invited the assistance of

Philip of Macedon, who had secretly fostered the contest. Philip gladly

seized the opportunity of executing the designs he had long planned

against the liberties of Greece. By his intrigues and bribes he won

over to his interests the popular leaders of several cities; by their

influence and votes, gained admission into the Amphictyonic council; and

by his arts and his arms, made himself master of the confederacy.

Such were the consequences of the fallacious principle on which this

interesting establishment was founded. Had Greece, says a judicious

observer on her fate, been united by a stricter confederation, and

persevered in her union, she would never have worn the chains of

Macedon; and might have proved a barrier to the vast projects of Rome.

The Achaean league, as it is called, was another society of Grecian

republics, which supplies us with valuable instruction.

The Union here was far more intimate, and its organization much wiser,

than in the preceding instance. It will accordingly appear, that though

not exempt from a similar catastrophe, it by no means equally deserved

it.

The cities composing this league retained their municipal jurisdiction,

appointed their own officers, and enjoyed a perfect equality. The

senate, in which they were represented, had the sole and exclusive right

of peace and war; of sending and receiving ambassadors; of entering into

treaties and alliances; of appointing a chief magistrate or praetor, as

he was called, who commanded their armies, and who, with the advice and

consent of ten of the senators, not only administered the government in

the recess of the senate, but had a great share in its deliberations,

when assembled. According to the primitive constitution, there were two

praetors associated in the administration; but on trial a single one was

preferred.

It appears that the cities had all the same laws and customs, the

same weights and measures, and the same money. But how far this

effect proceeded from the authority of the federal council is left in

uncertainty. It is said only that the cities were in a manner compelled

to receive the same laws and usages. When Lacedaemon was brought into

the league by Philopoemen, it was attended with an abolition of the

institutions and laws of Lycurgus, and an adoption of those of the

Achaeans. The Amphictyonic confederacy, of which she had been a member,

left her in the full exercise of her government and her legislation.

This circumstance alone proves a very material difference in the genius

of the two systems.

It is much to be regretted that such imperfect monuments remain of

this curious political fabric. Could its interior structure and regular

operation be ascertained, it is probable that more light would be thrown

by it on the science of federal government, than by any of the like

experiments with which we are acquainted.

One important fact seems to be witnessed by all the historians who take

notice of Achaean affairs. It is, that as well after the renovation of

the league by Aratus, as before its dissolution by the arts of

Macedon, there was infinitely more of moderation and justice in the

administration of its government, and less of violence and sedition in

the people, than were to be found in any of the cities exercising SINGLY

all the prerogatives of sovereignty. The Abbe Mably, in his observations

on Greece, says that the popular government, which was so tempestuous

elsewhere, caused no disorders in the members of the Achaean republic,

BECAUSE IT WAS THERE TEMPERED BY THE GENERAL AUTHORITY AND LAWS OF THE

CONFEDERACY.

We are not to conclude too hastily, however, that faction did not, in

a certain degree, agitate the particular cities; much less that a due

subordination and harmony reigned in the general system. The contrary is

sufficiently displayed in the vicissitudes and fate of the republic.

Whilst the Amphictyonic confederacy remained, that of the Achaeans,

which comprehended the less important cities only, made little figure on

the theatre of Greece. When the former became a victim to Macedon,

the latter was spared by the policy of Philip and Alexander. Under the

successors of these princes, however, a different policy prevailed.

The arts of division were practiced among the Achaeans. Each city was

seduced into a separate interest; the union was dissolved. Some of the

cities fell under the tyranny of Macedonian garrisons; others under that

of usurpers springing out of their own confusions. Shame and oppression

erelong awaken their love of liberty. A few cities reunited. Their

example was followed by others, as opportunities were found of

cutting off their tyrants. The league soon embraced almost the whole

Peloponnesus. Macedon saw its progress; but was hindered by internal

dissensions from stopping it. All Greece caught the enthusiasm and

seemed ready to unite in one confederacy, when the jealousy and envy in

Sparta and Athens, of the rising glory of the Achaeans, threw a fatal

damp on the enterprise. The dread of the Macedonian power induced the

league to court the alliance of the Kings of Egypt and Syria, who, as

successors of Alexander, were rivals of the king of Macedon. This policy

was defeated by Cleomenes, king of Sparta, who was led by his ambition

to make an unprovoked attack on his neighbors, the Achaeans, and who,

as an enemy to Macedon, had interest enough with the Egyptian and Syrian

princes to effect a breach of their engagements with the league.

The Achaeans were now reduced to the dilemma of submitting to Cleomenes,

or of supplicating the aid of Macedon, its former oppressor. The latter

expedient was adopted. The contests of the Greeks always afforded a

pleasing opportunity to that powerful neighbor of intermeddling in their

affairs. A Macedonian army quickly appeared. Cleomenes was vanquished.

The Achaeans soon experienced, as often happens, that a victorious and

powerful ally is but another name for a master. All that their most

abject compliances could obtain from him was a toleration of the

exercise of their laws. Philip, who was now on the throne of Macedon,

soon provoked by his tyrannies, fresh combinations among the Greeks. The

Achaeans, though weakened by internal dissensions and by the revolt

of Messene, one of its members, being joined by the AEtolians and

Athenians, erected the standard of opposition. Finding themselves,

though thus supported, unequal to the undertaking, they once more had

recourse to the dangerous expedient of introducing the succor of foreign

arms. The Romans, to whom the invitation was made, eagerly embraced

it. Philip was conquered; Macedon subdued. A new crisis ensued to

the league. Dissensions broke out among it members. These the Romans

fostered. Callicrates and other popular leaders became mercenary

instruments for inveigling their countrymen. The more effectually to

nourish discord and disorder the Romans had, to the astonishment of

those who confided in their sincerity, already proclaimed universal

liberty(1) throughout Greece. With the same insidious views, they now

seduced the members from the league, by representing to their pride the

violation it committed on their sovereignty. By these arts this union,

the last hope of Greece, the last hope of ancient liberty, was torn into

pieces; and such imbecility and distraction introduced, that the arms of

Rome found little difficulty in completing the ruin which their arts

had commenced. The Achaeans were cut to pieces, and Achaia loaded with

chains, under which it is groaning at this hour.

I have thought it not superfluous to give the outlines of this important

portion of history; both because it teaches more than one lesson, and

because, as a supplement to the outlines of the Achaean constitution,

it emphatically illustrates the tendency of federal bodies rather to

anarchy among the members, than to tyranny in the head.

PUBLIUS

1. This was but another name more specious for the independence of the

members on the federal head.

FEDERALIST No. 19

The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present

Confederation to Preserve the Union)

For the Independent Journal. Saturday, December 8, 1787

MADISON, with HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

THE examples of ancient confederacies, cited in my last paper, have not

exhausted the source of experimental instruction on this subject. There

are existing institutions, founded on a similar principle, which

merit particular consideration. The first which presents itself is the

Germanic body.

In the early ages of Christianity, Germany was occupied by seven

distinct nations, who had no common chief. The Franks, one of the

number, having conquered the Gauls, established the kingdom which has

taken its name from them. In the ninth century Charlemagne, its warlike

monarch, carried his victorious arms in every direction; and Germany

became a part of his vast dominions. On the dismemberment, which

took place under his sons, this part was erected into a separate and

independent empire. Charlemagne and his immediate descendants possessed

the reality, as well as the ensigns and dignity of imperial power.

But the principal vassals, whose fiefs had become hereditary, and

who composed the national diets which Charlemagne had not abolished,

gradually threw off the yoke and advanced to sovereign jurisdiction

and independence. The force of imperial sovereignty was insufficient

to restrain such powerful dependants; or to preserve the unity and

tranquillity of the empire. The most furious private wars, accompanied

with every species of calamity, were carried on between the different

princes and states. The imperial authority, unable to maintain the

public order, declined by degrees till it was almost extinct in the

anarchy, which agitated the long interval between the death of the last

emperor of the Suabian, and the accession of the first emperor of

the Austrian lines. In the eleventh century the emperors enjoyed full

sovereignty: In the fifteenth they had little more than the symbols and

decorations of power.

Out of this feudal system, which has itself many of the important

features of a confederacy, has grown the federal system which

constitutes the Germanic empire. Its powers are vested in a diet

representing the component members of the confederacy; in the emperor,

who is the executive magistrate, with a negative on the decrees of the

diet; and in the imperial chamber and the aulic council, two judiciary

tribunals having supreme jurisdiction in controversies which concern the

empire, or which happen among its members.

The diet possesses the general power of legislating for the empire; of

making war and peace; contracting alliances; assessing quotas of troops

and money; constructing fortresses; regulating coin; admitting new

members; and subjecting disobedient members to the ban of the empire,

by which the party is degraded from his sovereign rights and his

possessions forfeited. The members of the confederacy are expressly

restricted from entering into compacts prejudicial to the empire; from

imposing tolls and duties on their mutual intercourse, without the

consent of the emperor and diet; from altering the value of money; from

doing injustice to one another; or from affording assistance or retreat

to disturbers of the public peace. And the ban is denounced against such

as shall violate any of these restrictions. The members of the diet, as

such, are subject in all cases to be judged by the emperor and diet, and

in their private capacities by the aulic council and imperial chamber.

The prerogatives of the emperor are numerous. The most important of them

are: his exclusive right to make propositions to the diet; to negative

its resolutions; to name ambassadors; to confer dignities and titles; to

fill vacant electorates; to found universities; to grant privileges not

injurious to the states of the empire; to receive and apply the public

revenues; and generally to watch over the public safety. In certain

cases, the electors form a council to him. In quality of emperor, he

possesses no territory within the empire, nor receives any revenue

for his support. But his revenue and dominions, in other qualities,

constitute him one of the most powerful princes in Europe.

From such a parade of constitutional powers, in the representatives and

head of this confederacy, the natural supposition would be, that it must

form an exception to the general character which belongs to its kindred

systems. Nothing would be further from the reality. The fundamental

principle on which it rests, that the empire is a community of

sovereigns, that the diet is a representation of sovereigns and that the

laws are addressed to sovereigns, renders the empire a nerveless body,

incapable of regulating its own members, insecure against external

dangers, and agitated with unceasing fermentations in its own bowels.

The history of Germany is a history of wars between the emperor and the

princes and states; of wars among the princes and states themselves;

of the licentiousness of the strong, and the oppression of the weak; of

foreign intrusions, and foreign intrigues; of requisitions of men and

money disregarded, or partially complied with; of attempts to enforce

them, altogether abortive, or attended with slaughter and desolation,

involving the innocent with the guilty; of general imbecility,

confusion, and misery.

In the sixteenth century, the emperor, with one part of the empire on

his side, was seen engaged against the other princes and states. In one

of the conflicts, the emperor himself was put to flight, and very near

being made prisoner by the elector of Saxony. The late king of Prussia

was more than once pitted against his imperial sovereign; and commonly

proved an overmatch for him. Controversies and wars among the members

themselves have been so common, that the German annals are crowded

with the bloody pages which describe them. Previous to the peace of

Westphalia, Germany was desolated by a war of thirty years, in which the

emperor, with one half of the empire, was on one side, and Sweden, with

the other half, on the opposite side. Peace was at length negotiated,

and dictated by foreign powers; and the articles of it, to which

foreign powers are parties, made a fundamental part of the Germanic

constitution.

If the nation happens, on any emergency, to be more united by the

necessity of self-defense, its situation is still deplorable. Military

preparations must be preceded by so many tedious discussions, arising

from the jealousies, pride, separate views, and clashing pretensions of

sovereign bodies, that before the diet can settle the arrangements, the

enemy are in the field; and before the federal troops are ready to take

it, are retiring into winter quarters.

The small body of national troops, which has been judged necessary in

time of peace, is defectively kept up, badly paid, infected with

local prejudices, and supported by irregular and disproportionate

contributions to the treasury.

The impossibility of maintaining order and dispensing justice among

these sovereign subjects, produced the experiment of dividing the

empire into nine or ten circles or districts; of giving them an interior

organization, and of charging them with the military execution of the

laws against delinquent and contumacious members. This experiment

has only served to demonstrate more fully the radical vice of the

constitution. Each circle is the miniature picture of the deformities of

this political monster. They either fail to execute their commissions,

or they do it with all the devastation and carnage of civil war.

Sometimes whole circles are defaulters; and then they increase the

mischief which they were instituted to remedy.

We may form some judgment of this scheme of military coercion from a

sample given by Thuanus. In Donawerth, a free and imperial city of the

circle of Suabia, the Abbe de St. Croix enjoyed certain immunities

which had been reserved to him. In the exercise of these, on some public

occasions, outrages were committed on him by the people of the city. The

consequence was that the city was put under the ban of the empire, and

the Duke of Bavaria, though director of another circle, obtained an

appointment to enforce it. He soon appeared before the city with a

corps of ten thousand troops, and finding it a fit occasion, as he had

secretly intended from the beginning, to revive an antiquated claim, on

the pretext that his ancestors had suffered the place to be dismembered

from his territory,(1) he took possession of it in his own name,

disarmed, and punished the inhabitants, and reannexed the city to his

domains.

It may be asked, perhaps, what has so long kept this disjointed machine

from falling entirely to pieces? The answer is obvious: The weakness of

most of the members, who are unwilling to expose themselves to the

mercy of foreign powers; the weakness of most of the principal members,

compared with the formidable powers all around them; the vast weight

and influence which the emperor derives from his separate and hereditary

dominions; and the interest he feels in preserving a system with which

his family pride is connected, and which constitutes him the first

prince in Europe;--these causes support a feeble and precarious Union;

whilst the repellant quality, incident to the nature of sovereignty,

and which time continually strengthens, prevents any reform whatever,

founded on a proper consolidation. Nor is it to be imagined, if this

obstacle could be surmounted, that the neighboring powers would suffer

a revolution to take place which would give to the empire the force

and preeminence to which it is entitled. Foreign nations have long

considered themselves as interested in the changes made by events in

this constitution; and have, on various occasions, betrayed their policy

of perpetuating its anarchy and weakness.

If more direct examples were wanting, Poland, as a government over local

sovereigns, might not improperly be taken notice of. Nor could any proof

more striking be given of the calamities flowing from such institutions.

Equally unfit for self-government and self-defense, it has long been at

the mercy of its powerful neighbors; who have lately had the mercy to

disburden it of one third of its people and territories.

The connection among the Swiss cantons scarcely amounts to a

confederacy; though it is sometimes cited as an instance of the

stability of such institutions.

They have no common treasury; no common troops even in war; no common

coin; no common judicatory; nor any other common mark of sovereignty.

They are kept together by the peculiarity of their topographical

position; by their individual weakness and insignificancy; by the fear

of powerful neighbors, to one of which they were formerly subject;

by the few sources of contention among a people of such simple and

homogeneous manners; by their joint interest in their dependent

possessions; by the mutual aid they stand in need of, for suppressing

insurrections and rebellions, an aid expressly stipulated and often

required and afforded; and by the necessity of some regular and

permanent provision for accommodating disputes among the cantons. The

provision is, that the parties at variance shall each choose four judges

out of the neutral cantons, who, in case of disagreement, choose

an umpire. This tribunal, under an oath of impartiality, pronounces

definitive sentence, which all the cantons are bound to enforce. The

competency of this regulation may be estimated by a clause in their

treaty of 1683, with Victor Amadeus of Savoy; in which he obliges

himself to interpose as mediator in disputes between the cantons, and to

employ force, if necessary, against the contumacious party.

So far as the peculiarity of their case will admit of comparison with

that of the United States, it serves to confirm the principle intended

to be established. Whatever efficacy the union may have had in ordinary

cases, it appears that the moment a cause of difference sprang up,

capable of trying its strength, it failed. The controversies on the

subject of religion, which in three instances have kindled violent and

bloody contests, may be said, in fact, to have severed the league. The

Protestant and Catholic cantons have since had their separate diets,

where all the most important concerns are adjusted, and which have left

the general diet little other business than to take care of the common

bailages.

That separation had another consequence, which merits attention. It

produced opposite alliances with foreign powers: of Berne, at the

head of the Protestant association, with the United Provinces; and of

Luzerne, at the head of the Catholic association, with France.

PUBLIUS

1. Pfeffel, "Nouvel Abrég. Chronol. de l'Hist., etc., d'Allemagne," says

the pretext was to indemnify himself for the expense of the expedition.

FEDERALIST No. 20

The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present

Confederation to Preserve the Union)

From the New York Packet. Tuesday, December 11, 1787.

MADISON, with HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

THE United Netherlands are a confederacy of republics, or rather of

aristocracies of a very remarkable texture, yet confirming all the

lessons derived from those which we have already reviewed.

The union is composed of seven coequal and sovereign states, and each

state or province is a composition of equal and independent cities.

In all important cases, not only the provinces but the cities must be

unanimous.

The sovereignty of the Union is represented by the States-General,

consisting usually of about fifty deputies appointed by the provinces.

They hold their seats, some for life, some for six, three, and one

years; from two provinces they continue in appointment during pleasure.

The States-General have authority to enter into treaties and alliances;

to make war and peace; to raise armies and equip fleets; to ascertain

quotas and demand contributions. In all these cases, however, unanimity

and the sanction of their constituents are requisite. They have

authority to appoint and receive ambassadors; to execute treaties and

alliances already formed; to provide for the collection of duties

on imports and exports; to regulate the mint, with a saving to the

provincial rights; to govern as sovereigns the dependent territories.

The provinces are restrained, unless with the general consent, from

entering into foreign treaties; from establishing imposts injurious to

others, or charging their neighbors with higher duties than their own

subjects. A council of state, a chamber of accounts, with five colleges

of admiralty, aid and fortify the federal administration.

The executive magistrate of the union is the stadtholder, who is now an

hereditary prince. His principal weight and influence in the republic

are derived from this independent title; from his great patrimonial

estates; from his family connections with some of the chief potentates

of Europe; and, more than all, perhaps, from his being stadtholder in

the several provinces, as well as for the union; in which provincial

quality he has the appointment of town magistrates under certain

regulations, executes provincial decrees, presides when he pleases in

the provincial tribunals, and has throughout the power of pardon.

As stadtholder of the union, he has, however, considerable prerogatives.

In his political capacity he has authority to settle disputes between

the provinces, when other methods fail; to assist at the deliberations

of the States-General, and at their particular conferences; to give

audiences to foreign ambassadors, and to keep agents for his particular

affairs at foreign courts.

In his military capacity he commands the federal troops, provides for

garrisons, and in general regulates military affairs; disposes of all

appointments, from colonels to ensigns, and of the governments and posts

of fortified towns.

In his marine capacity he is admiral-general, and superintends and

directs every thing relative to naval forces and other naval

affairs; presides in the admiralties in person or by proxy; appoints

lieutenant-admirals and other officers; and establishes councils of war,

whose sentences are not executed till he approves them.

His revenue, exclusive of his private income, amounts to three hundred

thousand florins. The standing army which he commands consists of about

forty thousand men.

Such is the nature of the celebrated Belgic confederacy, as delineated

on parchment. What are the characters which practice has stamped upon

it? Imbecility in the government; discord among the provinces; foreign

influence and indignities; a precarious existence in peace, and peculiar

calamities from war.

It was long ago remarked by Grotius, that nothing but the hatred of his

countrymen to the house of Austria kept them from being ruined by the

vices of their constitution.

The union of Utrecht, says another respectable writer, reposes an

authority in the States-General, seemingly sufficient to secure harmony,

but the jealousy in each province renders the practice very different

from the theory.

The same instrument, says another, obliges each province to levy certain

contributions; but this article never could, and probably never will, be

executed; because the inland provinces, who have little commerce, cannot

pay an equal quota.

In matters of contribution, it is the practice to waive the articles of

the constitution. The danger of delay obliges the consenting provinces

to furnish their quotas, without waiting for the others; and then

to obtain reimbursement from the others, by deputations, which are

frequent, or otherwise, as they can. The great wealth and influence of

the province of Holland enable her to effect both these purposes.

It has more than once happened, that the deficiencies had to be

ultimately collected at the point of the bayonet; a thing practicable,

though dreadful, in a confederacy where one of the members exceeds in

force all the rest, and where several of them are too small to meditate

resistance; but utterly impracticable in one composed of members,

several of which are equal to each other in strength and resources, and

equal singly to a vigorous and persevering defense.

Foreign ministers, says Sir William Temple, who was himself a foreign

minister, elude matters taken ad referendum, by tampering with the

provinces and cities. In 1726, the treaty of Hanover was delayed by

these means a whole year. Instances of a like nature are numerous and

notorious.

In critical emergencies, the States-General are often compelled to

overleap their constitutional bounds. In 1688, they concluded a treaty

of themselves at the risk of their heads. The treaty of Westphalia, in

1648, by which their independence was formerly and finally recognized,

was concluded without the consent of Zealand. Even as recently as the

last treaty of peace with Great Britain, the constitutional principle

of unanimity was departed from. A weak constitution must necessarily

terminate in dissolution, for want of proper powers, or the usurpation

of powers requisite for the public safety. Whether the usurpation,

when once begun, will stop at the salutary point, or go forward to

the dangerous extreme, must depend on the contingencies of the moment.

Tyranny has perhaps oftener grown out of the assumptions of power,

called for, on pressing exigencies, by a defective constitution, than

out of the full exercise of the largest constitutional authorities.

Notwithstanding the calamities produced by the stadtholdership, it has

been supposed that without his influence in the individual provinces,

the causes of anarchy manifest in the confederacy would long ago have

dissolved it. "Under such a government," says the Abbe Mably, "the Union

could never have subsisted, if the provinces had not a spring within

themselves, capable of quickening their tardiness, and compelling them

to the same way of thinking. This spring is the stadtholder." It is

remarked by Sir William Temple, "that in the intermissions of the

stadtholdership, Holland, by her riches and her authority, which drew

the others into a sort of dependence, supplied the place."

These are not the only circumstances which have controlled the tendency

to anarchy and dissolution. The surrounding powers impose an absolute

necessity of union to a certain degree, at the same time that they

nourish by their intrigues the constitutional vices which keep the

republic in some degree always at their mercy.

The true patriots have long bewailed the fatal tendency of these vices,

and have made no less than four regular experiments by EXTRAORDINARY

ASSEMBLIES, convened for the special purpose, to apply a remedy. As many

times has their laudable zeal found it impossible to UNITE THE PUBLIC

COUNCILS in reforming the known, the acknowledged, the fatal evils of

the existing constitution. Let us pause, my fellow-citizens, for one

moment, over this melancholy and monitory lesson of history; and with

the tear that drops for the calamities brought on mankind by their

adverse opinions and selfish passions, let our gratitude mingle

an ejaculation to Heaven, for the propitious concord which has

distinguished the consultations for our political happiness.

A design was also conceived of establishing a general tax to be

administered by the federal authority. This also had its adversaries and

failed.

This unhappy people seem to be now suffering from popular convulsions,

from dissensions among the states, and from the actual invasion of

foreign arms, the crisis of their destiny. All nations have their eyes

fixed on the awful spectacle. The first wish prompted by humanity

is, that this severe trial may issue in such a revolution of their

government as will establish their union, and render it the parent of

tranquillity, freedom and happiness: The next, that the asylum under

which, we trust, the enjoyment of these blessings will speedily

be secured in this country, may receive and console them for the

catastrophe of their own.

I make no apology for having dwelt so long on the contemplation of these

federal precedents. Experience is the oracle of truth; and where its

responses are unequivocal, they ought to be conclusive and sacred. The

important truth, which it unequivocally pronounces in the present case,

is that a sovereignty over sovereigns, a government over governments, a

legislation for communities, as contradistinguished from individuals, as

it is a solecism in theory, so in practice it is subversive of the order

and ends of civil polity, by substituting VIOLENCE in place of LAW, or

the destructive COERCION of the SWORD in place of the mild and salutary

COERCION of the MAGISTRACY.

PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 21

Other Defects of the Present Confederation

For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, December 12, 1787

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

HAVING in the three last numbers taken a summary review of the principal

circumstances and events which have depicted the genius and fate of

other confederate governments, I shall now proceed in the enumeration of

the most important of those defects which have hitherto disappointed our

hopes from the system established among ourselves. To form a safe and

satisfactory judgment of the proper remedy, it is absolutely necessary

that we should be well acquainted with the extent and malignity of the

disease.

The next most palpable defect of the subsisting Confederation, is

the total want of a SANCTION to its laws. The United States, as now

composed, have no powers to exact obedience, or punish disobedience

to their resolutions, either by pecuniary mulcts, by a suspension or

divestiture of privileges, or by any other constitutional mode. There

is no express delegation of authority to them to use force against

delinquent members; and if such a right should be ascribed to the

federal head, as resulting from the nature of the social compact between

the States, it must be by inference and construction, in the face of

that part of the second article, by which it is declared, "that each

State shall retain every power, jurisdiction, and right, not EXPRESSLY

delegated to the United States in Congress assembled." There is,

doubtless, a striking absurdity in supposing that a right of this kind

does not exist, but we are reduced to the dilemma either of embracing

that supposition, preposterous as it may seem, or of contravening or

explaining away a provision, which has been of late a repeated theme of

the eulogies of those who oppose the new Constitution; and the want

of which, in that plan, has been the subject of much plausible

animadversion, and severe criticism. If we are unwilling to impair the

force of this applauded provision, we shall be obliged to conclude, that

the United States afford the extraordinary spectacle of a government

destitute even of the shadow of constitutional power to enforce the

execution of its own laws. It will appear, from the specimens which have

been cited, that the American Confederacy, in this particular, stands

discriminated from every other institution of a similar kind, and

exhibits a new and unexampled phenomenon in the political world.

The want of a mutual guaranty of the State governments is another

capital imperfection in the federal plan. There is nothing of this kind

declared in the articles that compose it; and to imply a tacit guaranty

from considerations of utility, would be a still more flagrant departure

from the clause which has been mentioned, than to imply a tacit power of

coercion from the like considerations. The want of a guaranty, though

it might in its consequences endanger the Union, does not so immediately

attack its existence as the want of a constitutional sanction to its

laws.

Without a guaranty the assistance to be derived from the Union in

repelling those domestic dangers which may sometimes threaten the

existence of the State constitutions, must be renounced. Usurpation

may rear its crest in each State, and trample upon the liberties of the

people, while the national government could legally do nothing more

than behold its encroachments with indignation and regret. A successful

faction may erect a tyranny on the ruins of order and law, while no

succor could constitutionally be afforded by the Union to the friends

and supporters of the government. The tempestuous situation from which

Massachusetts has scarcely emerged, evinces that dangers of this kind

are not merely speculative. Who can determine what might have been the

issue of her late convulsions, if the malcontents had been headed by

a Caesar or by a Cromwell? Who can predict what effect a despotism,

established in Massachusetts, would have upon the liberties of New

Hampshire or Rhode Island, of Connecticut or New York?

The inordinate pride of State importance has suggested to some minds an

objection to the principle of a guaranty in the federal government,

as involving an officious interference in the domestic concerns of the

members. A scruple of this kind would deprive us of one of the

principal advantages to be expected from union, and can only flow from

a misapprehension of the nature of the provision itself. It could be

no impediment to reforms of the State constitution by a majority of

the people in a legal and peaceable mode. This right would remain

undiminished. The guaranty could only operate against changes to be

effected by violence. Towards the preventions of calamities of this

kind, too many checks cannot be provided. The peace of society and

the stability of government depend absolutely on the efficacy of

the precautions adopted on this head. Where the whole power of the

government is in the hands of the people, there is the less pretense for

the use of violent remedies in partial or occasional distempers of

the State. The natural cure for an ill-administration, in a popular

or representative constitution, is a change of men. A guaranty by the

national authority would be as much levelled against the usurpations of

rulers as against the ferments and outrages of faction and sedition in

the community.

The principle of regulating the contributions of the States to

the common treasury by QUOTAS is another fundamental error in the

Confederation. Its repugnancy to an adequate supply of the national

exigencies has been already pointed out, and has sufficiently appeared

from the trial which has been made of it. I speak of it now solely with

a view to equality among the States. Those who have been accustomed

to contemplate the circumstances which produce and constitute national

wealth, must be satisfied that there is no common standard or barometer

by which the degrees of it can be ascertained. Neither the value of

lands, nor the numbers of the people, which have been successively

proposed as the rule of State contributions, has any pretension to

being a just representative. If we compare the wealth of the United

Netherlands with that of Russia or Germany, or even of France, and if we

at the same time compare the total value of the lands and the aggregate

population of that contracted district with the total value of the lands

and the aggregate population of the immense regions of either of the

three last-mentioned countries, we shall at once discover that there is

no comparison between the proportion of either of these two objects and

that of the relative wealth of those nations. If the like parallel were

to be run between several of the American States, it would furnish

a like result. Let Virginia be contrasted with North Carolina,

Pennsylvania with Connecticut, or Maryland with New Jersey, and we shall

be convinced that the respective abilities of those States, in relation

to revenue, bear little or no analogy to their comparative stock in

lands or to their comparative population. The position may be equally

illustrated by a similar process between the counties of the same State.

No man who is acquainted with the State of New York will doubt that the

active wealth of King's County bears a much greater proportion to that

of Montgomery than it would appear to be if we should take either

the total value of the lands or the total number of the people as a

criterion!

The wealth of nations depends upon an infinite variety of causes.

Situation, soil, climate, the nature of the productions, the nature of

the government, the genius of the citizens, the degree of information

they possess, the state of commerce, of arts, of industry, these

circumstances and many more, too complex, minute, or adventitious

to admit of a particular specification, occasion differences hardly

conceivable in the relative opulence and riches of different countries.

The consequence clearly is that there can be no common measure of

national wealth, and, of course, no general or stationary rule by which

the ability of a state to pay taxes can be determined. The attempt,

therefore, to regulate the contributions of the members of a confederacy

by any such rule, cannot fail to be productive of glaring inequality and

extreme oppression.

This inequality would of itself be sufficient in America to work the

eventual destruction of the Union, if any mode of enforcing a compliance

with its requisitions could be devised. The suffering States would not

long consent to remain associated upon a principle which distributes

the public burdens with so unequal a hand, and which was calculated

to impoverish and oppress the citizens of some States, while those of

others would scarcely be conscious of the small proportion of the weight

they were required to sustain. This, however, is an evil inseparable

from the principle of quotas and requisitions.

There is no method of steering clear of this inconvenience, but by

authorizing the national government to raise its own revenues in its

own way. Imposts, excises, and, in general, all duties upon articles of

consumption, may be compared to a fluid, which will, in time, find its

level with the means of paying them. The amount to be contributed by

each citizen will in a degree be at his own option, and can be regulated

by an attention to his resources. The rich may be extravagant, the

poor can be frugal; and private oppression may always be avoided by

a judicious selection of objects proper for such impositions. If

inequalities should arise in some States from duties on particular

objects, these will, in all probability, be counterbalanced by

proportional inequalities in other States, from the duties on other

objects. In the course of time and things, an equilibrium, as far as

it is attainable in so complicated a subject, will be established

everywhere. Or, if inequalities should still exist, they would neither

be so great in their degree, so uniform in their operation, nor so

odious in their appearance, as those which would necessarily spring from

quotas, upon any scale that can possibly be devised.

It is a signal advantage of taxes on articles of consumption, that they

contain in their own nature a security against excess. They prescribe

their own limit; which cannot be exceeded without defeating the end

proposed, that is, an extension of the revenue. When applied to this

object, the saying is as just as it is witty, that, "in political

arithmetic, two and two do not always make four." If duties are too

high, they lessen the consumption; the collection is eluded; and the

product to the treasury is not so great as when they are confined within

proper and moderate bounds. This forms a complete barrier against any

material oppression of the citizens by taxes of this class, and is

itself a natural limitation of the power of imposing them.

Impositions of this kind usually fall under the denomination of indirect

taxes, and must for a long time constitute the chief part of the revenue

raised in this country. Those of the direct kind, which principally

relate to land and buildings, may admit of a rule of apportionment.

Either the value of land, or the number of the people, may serve as a

standard. The state of agriculture and the populousness of a country

have been considered as nearly connected with each other. And, as a

rule, for the purpose intended, numbers, in the view of simplicity

and certainty, are entitled to a preference. In every country it is

a herculean task to obtain a valuation of the land; in a country

imperfectly settled and progressive in improvement, the difficulties

are increased almost to impracticability. The expense of an accurate

valuation is, in all situations, a formidable objection. In a branch of

taxation where no limits to the discretion of the government are to be

found in the nature of things, the establishment of a fixed rule, not

incompatible with the end, may be attended with fewer inconveniences

than to leave that discretion altogether at large.

PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 22

The Same Subject Continued (Other Defects of the Present Confederation)

From the New York Packet. Friday, December 14, 1787.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

IN ADDITION to the defects already enumerated in the existing federal

system, there are others of not less importance, which concur in

rendering it altogether unfit for the administration of the affairs of

the Union.

The want of a power to regulate commerce is by all parties allowed to

be of the number. The utility of such a power has been anticipated under

the first head of our inquiries; and for this reason, as well as from

the universal conviction entertained upon the subject, little need be

added in this place. It is indeed evident, on the most superficial view,

that there is no object, either as it respects the interests of trade or

finance, that more strongly demands a federal superintendence. The

want of it has already operated as a bar to the formation of beneficial

treaties with foreign powers, and has given occasions of dissatisfaction

between the States. No nation acquainted with the nature of our

political association would be unwise enough to enter into stipulations

with the United States, by which they conceded privileges of any

importance to them, while they were apprised that the engagements on the

part of the Union might at any moment be violated by its members, and

while they found from experience that they might enjoy every advantage

they desired in our markets, without granting us any return but such as

their momentary convenience might suggest. It is not, therefore, to be

wondered at that Mr. Jenkinson, in ushering into the House of Commons a

bill for regulating the temporary intercourse between the two countries,

should preface its introduction by a declaration that similar provisions

in former bills had been found to answer every purpose to the commerce

of Great Britain, and that it would be prudent to persist in the plan

until it should appear whether the American government was likely or not

to acquire greater consistency.(1)

Several States have endeavored, by separate prohibitions, restrictions,

and exclusions, to influence the conduct of that kingdom in this

particular, but the want of concert, arising from the want of a general

authority and from clashing and dissimilar views in the State, has

hitherto frustrated every experiment of the kind, and will continue to

do so as long as the same obstacles to a uniformity of measures continue

to exist.

The interfering and unneighborly regulations of some States, contrary to

the true spirit of the Union, have, in different instances, given just

cause of umbrage and complaint to others, and it is to be feared that

examples of this nature, if not restrained by a national control, would

be multiplied and extended till they became not less serious sources

of animosity and discord than injurious impediments to the intercourse

between the different parts of the Confederacy. "The commerce of the

German empire(2) is in continual trammels from the multiplicity of the

duties which the several princes and states exact upon the merchandises

passing through their territories, by means of which the fine streams

and navigable rivers with which Germany is so happily watered are

rendered almost useless." Though the genius of the people of this

country might never permit this description to be strictly applicable

to us, yet we may reasonably expect, from the gradual conflicts of

State regulations, that the citizens of each would at length come to

be considered and treated by the others in no better light than that of

foreigners and aliens.

The power of raising armies, by the most obvious construction of the

articles of the Confederation, is merely a power of making requisitions

upon the States for quotas of men. This practice in the course of the

late war, was found replete with obstructions to a vigorous and to an

economical system of defense. It gave birth to a competition between the

States which created a kind of auction for men. In order to furnish the

quotas required of them, they outbid each other till bounties grew to

an enormous and insupportable size. The hope of a still further

increase afforded an inducement to those who were disposed to serve to

procrastinate their enlistment, and disinclined them from engaging for

any considerable periods. Hence, slow and scanty levies of men, in

the most critical emergencies of our affairs; short enlistments at an

unparalleled expense; continual fluctuations in the troops, ruinous

to their discipline and subjecting the public safety frequently to

the perilous crisis of a disbanded army. Hence, also, those oppressive

expedients for raising men which were upon several occasions practiced,

and which nothing but the enthusiasm of liberty would have induced the

people to endure.

This method of raising troops is not more unfriendly to economy and

vigor than it is to an equal distribution of the burden. The States

near the seat of war, influenced by motives of self-preservation, made

efforts to furnish their quotas, which even exceeded their abilities;

while those at a distance from danger were, for the most part, as remiss

as the others were diligent, in their exertions. The immediate pressure

of this inequality was not in this case, as in that of the contributions

of money, alleviated by the hope of a final liquidation. The States

which did not pay their proportions of money might at least be

charged with their deficiencies; but no account could be formed of the

deficiencies in the supplies of men. We shall not, however, see much

reason to regret the want of this hope, when we consider how little

prospect there is, that the most delinquent States will ever be able to

make compensation for their pecuniary failures. The system of quotas and

requisitions, whether it be applied to men or money, is, in every view,

a system of imbecility in the Union, and of inequality and injustice

among the members.

The right of equal suffrage among the States is another exceptionable

part of the Confederation. Every idea of proportion and every rule of

fair representation conspire to condemn a principle, which gives to

Rhode Island an equal weight in the scale of power with Massachusetts,

or Connecticut, or New York; and to Delaware an equal voice in the

national deliberations with Pennsylvania, or Virginia, or North

Carolina. Its operation contradicts the fundamental maxim of republican

government, which requires that the sense of the majority should

prevail. Sophistry may reply, that sovereigns are equal, and that a

majority of the votes of the States will be a majority of confederated

America. But this kind of logical legerdemain will never counteract the

plain suggestions of justice and common-sense. It may happen that this

majority of States is a small minority of the people of America;(3) and

two thirds of the people of America could not long be persuaded, upon

the credit of artificial distinctions and syllogistic subtleties, to

submit their interests to the management and disposal of one third. The

larger States would after a while revolt from the idea of receiving

the law from the smaller. To acquiesce in such a privation of their due

importance in the political scale, would be not merely to be insensible

to the love of power, but even to sacrifice the desire of equality. It

is neither rational to expect the first, nor just to require the last.

The smaller States, considering how peculiarly their safety and welfare

depend on union, ought readily to renounce a pretension which, if not

relinquished, would prove fatal to its duration.

It may be objected to this, that not seven but nine States, or

two thirds of the whole number, must consent to the most important

resolutions; and it may be thence inferred that nine States would

always comprehend a majority of the Union. But this does not obviate

the impropriety of an equal vote between States of the most unequal

dimensions and populousness; nor is the inference accurate in point

of fact; for we can enumerate nine States which contain less than a

majority of the people;(4) and it is constitutionally possible that

these nine may give the vote. Besides, there are matters of considerable

moment determinable by a bare majority; and there are others, concerning

which doubts have been entertained, which, if interpreted in favor of

the sufficiency of a vote of seven States, would extend its operation

to interests of the first magnitude. In addition to this, it is to be

observed that there is a probability of an increase in the number of

States, and no provision for a proportional augmentation of the ratio of

votes.

But this is not all: what at first sight may seem a remedy, is, in

reality, a poison. To give a minority a negative upon the majority

(which is always the case where more than a majority is requisite to

a decision), is, in its tendency, to subject the sense of the greater

number to that of the lesser. Congress, from the nonattendance of a few

States, have been frequently in the situation of a Polish diet, where a

single VOTE has been sufficient to put a stop to all their movements.

A sixtieth part of the Union, which is about the proportion of Delaware

and Rhode Island, has several times been able to oppose an entire bar to

its operations. This is one of those refinements which, in practice,

has an effect the reverse of what is expected from it in theory. The

necessity of unanimity in public bodies, or of something approaching

towards it, has been founded upon a supposition that it would contribute

to security. But its real operation is to embarrass the administration,

to destroy the energy of the government, and to substitute the pleasure,

caprice, or artifices of an insignificant, turbulent, or corrupt junto,

to the regular deliberations and decisions of a respectable majority.

In those emergencies of a nation, in which the goodness or badness, the

weakness or strength of its government, is of the greatest importance,

there is commonly a necessity for action. The public business must, in

some way or other, go forward. If a pertinacious minority can control

the opinion of a majority, respecting the best mode of conducting it,

the majority, in order that something may be done, must conform to the

views of the minority; and thus the sense of the smaller number

will overrule that of the greater, and give a tone to the national

proceedings. Hence, tedious delays; continual negotiation and intrigue;

contemptible compromises of the public good. And yet, in such a system,

it is even happy when such compromises can take place: for upon some

occasions things will not admit of accommodation; and then the measures

of government must be injuriously suspended, or fatally defeated. It

is often, by the impracticability of obtaining the concurrence of the

necessary number of votes, kept in a state of inaction. Its situation

must always savor of weakness, sometimes border upon anarchy.

It is not difficult to discover, that a principle of this kind gives

greater scope to foreign corruption, as well as to domestic faction,

than that which permits the sense of the majority to decide; though the

contrary of this has been presumed. The mistake has proceeded from

not attending with due care to the mischiefs that may be occasioned by

obstructing the progress of government at certain critical seasons. When

the concurrence of a large number is required by the Constitution to

the doing of any national act, we are apt to rest satisfied that all is

safe, because nothing improper will be likely TO BE DONE, but we forget

how much good may be prevented, and how much ill may be produced, by

the power of hindering the doing what may be necessary, and of keeping

affairs in the same unfavorable posture in which they may happen to

stand at particular periods.

Suppose, for instance, we were engaged in a war, in conjunction with one

foreign nation, against another. Suppose the necessity of our situation

demanded peace, and the interest or ambition of our ally led him to seek

the prosecution of the war, with views that might justify us in making

separate terms. In such a state of things, this ally of ours would

evidently find it much easier, by his bribes and intrigues, to tie up

the hands of government from making peace, where two thirds of all the

votes were requisite to that object, than where a simple majority would

suffice. In the first case, he would have to corrupt a smaller number;

in the last, a greater number. Upon the same principle, it would be

much easier for a foreign power with which we were at war to perplex our

councils and embarrass our exertions. And, in a commercial view, we may

be subjected to similar inconveniences. A nation, with which we might

have a treaty of commerce, could with much greater facility prevent

our forming a connection with her competitor in trade, though such a

connection should be ever so beneficial to ourselves.

Evils of this description ought not to be regarded as imaginary. One of

the weak sides of republics, among their numerous advantages, is that

they afford too easy an inlet to foreign corruption. An hereditary

monarch, though often disposed to sacrifice his subjects to his

ambition, has so great a personal interest in the government and in the

external glory of the nation, that it is not easy for a foreign power to

give him an equivalent for what he would sacrifice by treachery to the

state. The world has accordingly been witness to few examples of this

species of royal prostitution, though there have been abundant specimens

of every other kind.

In republics, persons elevated from the mass of the community, by the

suffrages of their fellow-citizens, to stations of great pre-eminence

and power, may find compensations for betraying their trust, which,

to any but minds animated and guided by superior virtue, may appear to

exceed the proportion of interest they have in the common stock, and to

overbalance the obligations of duty. Hence it is that history furnishes

us with so many mortifying examples of the prevalency of foreign

corruption in republican governments. How much this contributed to the

ruin of the ancient commonwealths has been already delineated. It is

well known that the deputies of the United Provinces have, in various

instances, been purchased by the emissaries of the neighboring kingdoms.

The Earl of Chesterfield (if my memory serves me right), in a letter to

his court, intimates that his success in an important negotiation must

depend on his obtaining a major's commission for one of those deputies.

And in Sweden the parties were alternately bought by France and England

in so barefaced and notorious a manner that it excited universal disgust

in the nation, and was a principal cause that the most limited monarch

in Europe, in a single day, without tumult, violence, or opposition,

became one of the most absolute and uncontrolled.

A circumstance which crowns the defects of the Confederation remains yet

to be mentioned, the want of a judiciary power. Laws are a dead letter

without courts to expound and define their true meaning and operation.

The treaties of the United States, to have any force at all, must be

considered as part of the law of the land. Their true import, as far

as respects individuals, must, like all other laws, be ascertained by

judicial determinations. To produce uniformity in these determinations,

they ought to be submitted, in the last resort, to one SUPREME TRIBUNAL.

And this tribunal ought to be instituted under the same authority which

forms the treaties themselves. These ingredients are both indispensable.

If there is in each State a court of final jurisdiction, there may be

as many different final determinations on the same point as there are

courts. There are endless diversities in the opinions of men. We often

see not only different courts but the judges of the came court differing

from each other. To avoid the confusion which would unavoidably

result from the contradictory decisions of a number of independent

judicatories, all nations have found it necessary to establish one

court paramount to the rest, possessing a general superintendence, and

authorized to settle and declare in the last resort a uniform rule of

civil justice.

This is the more necessary where the frame of the government is so

compounded that the laws of the whole are in danger of being contravened

by the laws of the parts. In this case, if the particular tribunals

are invested with a right of ultimate jurisdiction, besides the

contradictions to be expected from difference of opinion, there will be

much to fear from the bias of local views and prejudices, and from the

interference of local regulations. As often as such an interference was

to happen, there would be reason to apprehend that the provisions of

the particular laws might be preferred to those of the general laws;

for nothing is more natural to men in office than to look with peculiar

deference towards that authority to which they owe their official

existence.

The treaties of the United States, under the present Constitution, are

liable to the infractions of thirteen different legislatures, and as

many different courts of final jurisdiction, acting under the authority

of those legislatures. The faith, the reputation, the peace of the

whole Union, are thus continually at the mercy of the prejudices, the

passions, and the interests of every member of which it is composed. Is

it possible that foreign nations can either respect or confide in such

a government? Is it possible that the people of America will longer

consent to trust their honor, their happiness, their safety, on so

precarious a foundation?

In this review of the Confederation, I have confined myself to

the exhibition of its most material defects; passing over those

imperfections in its details by which even a great part of the power

intended to be conferred upon it has been in a great measure rendered

abortive. It must be by this time evident to all men of reflection, who

can divest themselves of the prepossessions of preconceived opinions,

that it is a system so radically vicious and unsound, as to admit not

of amendment but by an entire change in its leading features and

characters.

The organization of Congress is itself utterly improper for the exercise

of those powers which are necessary to be deposited in the Union. A

single assembly may be a proper receptacle of those slender, or rather

fettered, authorities, which have been heretofore delegated to the

federal head; but it would be inconsistent with all the principles of

good government, to intrust it with those additional powers which, even

the moderate and more rational adversaries of the proposed Constitution

admit, ought to reside in the United States. If that plan should not be

adopted, and if the necessity of the Union should be able to withstand

the ambitious aims of those men who may indulge magnificent schemes of

personal aggrandizement from its dissolution, the probability would be,

that we should run into the project of conferring supplementary powers

upon Congress, as they are now constituted; and either the machine, from

the intrinsic feebleness of its structure, will moulder into pieces,

in spite of our ill-judged efforts to prop it; or, by successive

augmentations of its force an energy, as necessity might prompt, we

shall finally accumulate, in a single body, all the most important

prerogatives of sovereignty, and thus entail upon our posterity one

of the most execrable forms of government that human infatuation ever

contrived. Thus, we should create in reality that very tyranny which

the adversaries of the new Constitution either are, or affect to be,

solicitous to avert.

It has not a little contributed to the infirmities of the existing

federal system, that it never had a ratification by the PEOPLE. Resting

on no better foundation than the consent of the several legislatures,

it has been exposed to frequent and intricate questions concerning the

validity of its powers, and has, in some instances, given birth to

the enormous doctrine of a right of legislative repeal. Owing its

ratification to the law of a State, it has been contended that the same

authority might repeal the law by which it was ratified. However gross

a heresy it may be to maintain that a PARTY to a COMPACT has a right to

revoke that COMPACT, the doctrine itself has had respectable advocates.

The possibility of a question of this nature proves the necessity of

laying the foundations of our national government deeper than in the

mere sanction of delegated authority. The fabric of American empire

ought to rest on the solid basis of THE CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE. The

streams of national power ought to flow immediately from that pure,

original fountain of all legitimate authority.

PUBLIUS

1. This, as nearly as I can recollect, was the sense of his speech on

introducing the last bill.

2. Encyclopedia, article "Empire."

3. New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Delaware, Georgia, South

Carolina, and Maryland are a majority of the whole number of the States,

but they do not contain one third of the people.

4. Add New York and Connecticut to the foregoing seven, and they will be

less than a majority.

FEDERALIST No. 23

The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the

Preservation of the Union

From the New York Packet. Tuesday, December 18, 1787.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

THE necessity of a Constitution, at least equally energetic with the

one proposed, to the preservation of the Union, is the point at the

examination of which we are now arrived.

This inquiry will naturally divide itself into three branches--the

objects to be provided for by the federal government, the quantity of

power necessary to the accomplishment of those objects, the persons upon

whom that power ought to operate. Its distribution and organization will

more properly claim our attention under the succeeding head.

The principal purposes to be answered by union are these--the common

defense of the members; the preservation of the public peace as well

against internal convulsions as external attacks; the regulation of

commerce with other nations and between the States; the superintendence

of our intercourse, political and commercial, with foreign countries.

The authorities essential to the common defense are these: to raise

armies; to build and equip fleets; to prescribe rules for the government

of both; to direct their operations; to provide for their support. These

powers ought to exist without limitation, BECAUSE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO

FORESEE OR DEFINE THE EXTENT AND VARIETY OF NATIONAL EXIGENCIES, OR THE

CORRESPONDENT EXTENT AND VARIETY OF THE MEANS WHICH MAY BE NECESSARY TO

SATISFY THEM. The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are

infinite, and for this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be

imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed. This power

ought to be coextensive with all the possible combinations of such

circumstances; and ought to be under the direction of the same councils

which are appointed to preside over the common defense.

This is one of those truths which, to a correct and unprejudiced mind,

carries its own evidence along with it; and may be obscured, but cannot

be made plainer by argument or reasoning. It rests upon axioms as simple

as they are universal; the MEANS ought to be proportioned to the END;

the persons, from whose agency the attainment of any END is expected,

ought to possess the MEANS by which it is to be attained.

Whether there ought to be a federal government intrusted with the care

of the common defense, is a question in the first instance, open for

discussion; but the moment it is decided in the affirmative, it will

follow, that that government ought to be clothed with all the powers

requisite to complete execution of its trust. And unless it can be shown

that the circumstances which may affect the public safety are reducible

within certain determinate limits; unless the contrary of this position

can be fairly and rationally disputed, it must be admitted, as a

necessary consequence, that there can be no limitation of that authority

which is to provide for the defense and protection of the community, in

any matter essential to its efficacy that is, in any matter essential to

the FORMATION, DIRECTION, or SUPPORT of the NATIONAL FORCES.

Defective as the present Confederation has been proved to be, this

principle appears to have been fully recognized by the framers of it;

though they have not made proper or adequate provision for its exercise.

Congress have an unlimited discretion to make requisitions of men and

money; to govern the army and navy; to direct their operations. As their

requisitions are made constitutionally binding upon the States, who

are in fact under the most solemn obligations to furnish the supplies

required of them, the intention evidently was that the United States

should command whatever resources were by them judged requisite to the

"common defense and general welfare." It was presumed that a sense of

their true interests, and a regard to the dictates of good faith, would

be found sufficient pledges for the punctual performance of the duty of

the members to the federal head.

The experiment has, however, demonstrated that this expectation was

ill-founded and illusory; and the observations, made under the last

head, will, I imagine, have sufficed to convince the impartial and

discerning, that there is an absolute necessity for an entire change

in the first principles of the system; that if we are in earnest about

giving the Union energy and duration, we must abandon the vain project

of legislating upon the States in their collective capacities; we must

extend the laws of the federal government to the individual citizens

of America; we must discard the fallacious scheme of quotas and

requisitions, as equally impracticable and unjust. The result from all

this is that the Union ought to be invested with full power to levy

troops; to build and equip fleets; and to raise the revenues which will

be required for the formation and support of an army and navy, in the

customary and ordinary modes practiced in other governments.

If the circumstances of our country are such as to demand a compound

instead of a simple, a confederate instead of a sole, government, the

essential point which will remain to be adjusted will be to discriminate

the OBJECTS, as far as it can be done, which shall appertain to the

different provinces or departments of power; allowing to each the most

ample authority for fulfilling the objects committed to its charge.

Shall the Union be constituted the guardian of the common safety? Are

fleets and armies and revenues necessary to this purpose? The government

of the Union must be empowered to pass all laws, and to make all

regulations which have relation to them. The same must be the case in

respect to commerce, and to every other matter to which its jurisdiction

is permitted to extend. Is the administration of justice between

the citizens of the same State the proper department of the local

governments? These must possess all the authorities which are connected

with this object, and with every other that may be allotted to their

particular cognizance and direction. Not to confer in each case a degree

of power commensurate to the end, would be to violate the most obvious

rules of prudence and propriety, and improvidently to trust the great

interests of the nation to hands which are disabled from managing them

with vigor and success.

Who is likely to make suitable provisions for the public defense, as

that body to which the guardianship of the public safety is confided;

which, as the centre of information, will best understand the extent

and urgency of the dangers that threaten; as the representative of the

WHOLE, will feel itself most deeply interested in the preservation of

every part; which, from the responsibility implied in the duty assigned

to it, will be most sensibly impressed with the necessity of proper

exertions; and which, by the extension of its authority throughout the

States, can alone establish uniformity and concert in the plans and

measures by which the common safety is to be secured? Is there not a

manifest inconsistency in devolving upon the federal government the

care of the general defense, and leaving in the State governments the

EFFECTIVE powers by which it is to be provided for? Is not a want of

co-operation the infallible consequence of such a system? And will not

weakness, disorder, an undue distribution of the burdens and calamities

of war, an unnecessary and intolerable increase of expense, be its

natural and inevitable concomitants? Have we not had unequivocal

experience of its effects in the course of the revolution which we have

just accomplished?

Every view we may take of the subject, as candid inquirers after truth,

will serve to convince us, that it is both unwise and dangerous to deny

the federal government an unconfined authority, as to all those objects

which are intrusted to its management. It will indeed deserve the most

vigilant and careful attention of the people, to see that it be modeled

in such a manner as to admit of its being safely vested with the

requisite powers. If any plan which has been, or may be, offered to our

consideration, should not, upon a dispassionate inspection, be found

to answer this description, it ought to be rejected. A government, the

constitution of which renders it unfit to be trusted with all the powers

which a free people ought to delegate to any government, would be an

unsafe and improper depositary of the NATIONAL INTERESTS. Wherever

THESE can with propriety be confided, the coincident powers may safely

accompany them. This is the true result of all just reasoning upon the

subject. And the adversaries of the plan promulgated by the convention

ought to have confined themselves to showing, that the internal

structure of the proposed government was such as to render it unworthy

of the confidence of the people. They ought not to have wandered into

inflammatory declamations and unmeaning cavils about the extent of the

powers. The POWERS are not too extensive for the OBJECTS of federal

administration, or, in other words, for the management of our NATIONAL

INTERESTS; nor can any satisfactory argument be framed to show that

they are chargeable with such an excess. If it be true, as has been

insinuated by some of the writers on the other side, that the difficulty

arises from the nature of the thing, and that the extent of the country

will not permit us to form a government in which such ample powers can

safely be reposed, it would prove that we ought to contract our views,

and resort to the expedient of separate confederacies, which will move

within more practicable spheres. For the absurdity must continually

stare us in the face of confiding to a government the direction of the

most essential national interests, without daring to trust it to the

authorities which are indispensable to their proper and efficient

management. Let us not attempt to reconcile contradictions, but firmly

embrace a rational alternative.

I trust, however, that the impracticability of one general system cannot

be shown. I am greatly mistaken, if any thing of weight has yet been

advanced of this tendency; and I flatter myself, that the observations

which have been made in the course of these papers have served to place

the reverse of that position in as clear a light as any matter still

in the womb of time and experience can be susceptible of. This, at all

events, must be evident, that the very difficulty itself, drawn from

the extent of the country, is the strongest argument in favor of an

energetic government; for any other can certainly never preserve the

Union of so large an empire. If we embrace the tenets of those who

oppose the adoption of the proposed Constitution, as the standard of

our political creed, we cannot fail to verify the gloomy doctrines

which predict the impracticability of a national system pervading entire

limits of the present Confederacy.

PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 24

The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered

For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, December 19, 1787

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

TO THE powers proposed to be conferred upon the federal government, in

respect to the creation and direction of the national forces, I have

met with but one specific objection, which, if I understand it right, is

this, that proper provision has not been made against the existence

of standing armies in time of peace; an objection which, I shall now

endeavor to show, rests on weak and unsubstantial foundations.

It has indeed been brought forward in the most vague and general form,

supported only by bold assertions, without the appearance of argument;

without even the sanction of theoretical opinions; in contradiction to

the practice of other free nations, and to the general sense of America,

as expressed in most of the existing constitutions. The proprietary of

this remark will appear, the moment it is recollected that the objection

under consideration turns upon a supposed necessity of restraining

the LEGISLATIVE authority of the nation, in the article of military

establishments; a principle unheard of, except in one or two of our

State constitutions, and rejected in all the rest.

A stranger to our politics, who was to read our newspapers at the

present juncture, without having previously inspected the plan reported

by the convention, would be naturally led to one of two conclusions:

either that it contained a positive injunction, that standing armies

should be kept up in time of peace; or that it vested in the EXECUTIVE

the whole power of levying troops, without subjecting his discretion, in

any shape, to the control of the legislature.

If he came afterwards to peruse the plan itself, he would be surprised

to discover, that neither the one nor the other was the case; that the

whole power of raising armies was lodged in the LEGISLATURE, not in the

EXECUTIVE; that this legislature was to be a popular body, consisting of

the representatives of the people periodically elected; and that instead

of the provision he had supposed in favor of standing armies, there was

to be found, in respect to this object, an important qualification

even of the legislative discretion, in that clause which forbids the

appropriation of money for the support of an army for any longer period

than two years a precaution which, upon a nearer view of it, will appear

to be a great and real security against the keeping up of troops without

evident necessity.

Disappointed in his first surmise, the person I have supposed would be

apt to pursue his conjectures a little further. He would naturally

say to himself, it is impossible that all this vehement and pathetic

declamation can be without some colorable pretext. It must needs be that

this people, so jealous of their liberties, have, in all the preceding

models of the constitutions which they have established, inserted the

most precise and rigid precautions on this point, the omission of which,

in the new plan, has given birth to all this apprehension and clamor.

If, under this impression, he proceeded to pass in review the several

State constitutions, how great would be his disappointment to find that

TWO ONLY of them(1) contained an interdiction of standing armies in time

of peace; that the other eleven had either observed a profound silence

on the subject, or had in express terms admitted the right of the

Legislature to authorize their existence.

Still, however he would be persuaded that there must be some plausible

foundation for the cry raised on this head. He would never be able to

imagine, while any source of information remained unexplored, that it

was nothing more than an experiment upon the public credulity, dictated

either by a deliberate intention to deceive, or by the overflowings of

a zeal too intemperate to be ingenuous. It would probably occur to him,

that he would be likely to find the precautions he was in search of

in the primitive compact between the States. Here, at length, he would

expect to meet with a solution of the enigma. No doubt, he would observe

to himself, the existing Confederation must contain the most explicit

provisions against military establishments in time of peace; and a

departure from this model, in a favorite point, has occasioned the

discontent which appears to influence these political champions.

If he should now apply himself to a careful and critical survey of the

articles of Confederation, his astonishment would not only be increased,

but would acquire a mixture of indignation, at the unexpected discovery,

that these articles, instead of containing the prohibition he looked

for, and though they had, with jealous circumspection, restricted the

authority of the State legislatures in this particular, had not imposed

a single restraint on that of the United States. If he happened to be

a man of quick sensibility, or ardent temper, he could now no longer

refrain from regarding these clamors as the dishonest artifices of a

sinister and unprincipled opposition to a plan which ought at least to

receive a fair and candid examination from all sincere lovers of their

country! How else, he would say, could the authors of them have been

tempted to vent such loud censures upon that plan, about a point in

which it seems to have conformed itself to the general sense of America

as declared in its different forms of government, and in which it has

even superadded a new and powerful guard unknown to any of them? If,

on the contrary, he happened to be a man of calm and dispassionate

feelings, he would indulge a sigh for the frailty of human nature,

and would lament, that in a matter so interesting to the happiness

of millions, the true merits of the question should be perplexed

and entangled by expedients so unfriendly to an impartial and right

determination. Even such a man could hardly forbear remarking, that

a conduct of this kind has too much the appearance of an intention to

mislead the people by alarming their passions, rather than to convince

them by arguments addressed to their understandings.

But however little this objection may be countenanced, even by

precedents among ourselves, it may be satisfactory to take a nearer view

of its intrinsic merits. From a close examination it will appear that

restraints upon the discretion of the legislature in respect to military

establishments in time of peace, would be improper to be imposed, and

if imposed, from the necessities of society, would be unlikely to be

observed.

Though a wide ocean separates the United States from Europe, yet there

are various considerations that warn us against an excess of confidence

or security. On one side of us, and stretching far into our rear, are

growing settlements subject to the dominion of Britain. On the other

side, and extending to meet the British settlements, are colonies and

establishments subject to the dominion of Spain. This situation and the

vicinity of the West India Islands, belonging to these two powers create

between them, in respect to their American possessions and in relation

to us, a common interest. The savage tribes on our Western frontier

ought to be regarded as our natural enemies, their natural allies,

because they have most to fear from us, and most to hope from them.

The improvements in the art of navigation have, as to the facility of

communication, rendered distant nations, in a great measure, neighbors.

Britain and Spain are among the principal maritime powers of Europe. A

future concert of views between these nations ought not to be regarded

as improbable. The increasing remoteness of consanguinity is every day

diminishing the force of the family compact between France and Spain.

And politicians have ever with great reason considered the ties of

blood as feeble and precarious links of political connection.

These circumstances combined, admonish us not to be too sanguine in

considering ourselves as entirely out of the reach of danger.

Previous to the Revolution, and ever since the peace, there has been a

constant necessity for keeping small garrisons on our Western frontier.

No person can doubt that these will continue to be indispensable, if

it should only be against the ravages and depredations of the Indians.

These garrisons must either be furnished by occasional detachments from

the militia, or by permanent corps in the pay of the government. The

first is impracticable; and if practicable, would be pernicious. The

militia would not long, if at all, submit to be dragged from their

occupations and families to perform that most disagreeable duty in times

of profound peace. And if they could be prevailed upon or compelled to

do it, the increased expense of a frequent rotation of service, and

the loss of labor and disconcertion of the industrious pursuits of

individuals, would form conclusive objections to the scheme. It would

be as burdensome and injurious to the public as ruinous to private

citizens. The latter resource of permanent corps in the pay of the

government amounts to a standing army in time of peace; a small one,

indeed, but not the less real for being small. Here is a simple view of

the subject, that shows us at once the impropriety of a constitutional

interdiction of such establishments, and the necessity of leaving the

matter to the discretion and prudence of the legislature.

In proportion to our increase in strength, it is probable, nay, it may

be said certain, that Britain and Spain would augment their military

establishments in our neighborhood. If we should not be willing to be

exposed, in a naked and defenseless condition, to their insults and

encroachments, we should find it expedient to increase our frontier

garrisons in some ratio to the force by which our Western settlements

might be annoyed. There are, and will be, particular posts, the

possession of which will include the command of large districts of

territory, and facilitate future invasions of the remainder. It may be

added that some of those posts will be keys to the trade with the Indian

nations. Can any man think it would be wise to leave such posts in

a situation to be at any instant seized by one or the other of two

neighboring and formidable powers? To act this part would be to desert

all the usual maxims of prudence and policy.

If we mean to be a commercial people, or even to be secure on our

Atlantic side, we must endeavor, as soon as possible, to have a navy. To

this purpose there must be dock-yards and arsenals; and for the defense

of these, fortifications, and probably garrisons. When a nation has

become so powerful by sea that it can protect its dock-yards by its

fleets, this supersedes the necessity of garrisons for that purpose;

but where naval establishments are in their infancy, moderate garrisons

will, in all likelihood, be found an indispensable security against

descents for the destruction of the arsenals and dock-yards, and

sometimes of the fleet itself.

PUBLIUS

1 This statement of the matter is taken from the printed collection of

State constitutions. Pennsylvania and North Carolina are the two which

contain the interdiction in these words: "As standing armies in time of

peace are dangerous to liberty, THEY OUGHT NOT to be kept up." This

is, in truth, rather a CAUTION than a PROHIBITION. New Hampshire,

Massachusetts, Delaware, and Maryland have, in each of their bills of

rights, a clause to this effect: "Standing armies are dangerous to

liberty, and ought not to be raised or kept up WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF

THE LEGISLATURE"; which is a formal admission of the authority of the

Legislature. New York has no bills of rights, and her constitution says

not a word about the matter. No bills of rights appear annexed to the

constitutions of the other States, except the foregoing, and their

constitutions are equally silent. I am told, however that one or two

States have bills of rights which do not appear in this collection; but

that those also recognize the right of the legislative authority in this

respect.

FEDERALIST No. 25

The Same Subject Continued (The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense

Further Considered)

From the New York Packet. Friday, December 21, 1787.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

IT MAY perhaps be urged that the objects enumerated in the preceding

number ought to be provided for by the State governments, under the

direction of the Union. But this would be, in reality, an inversion

of the primary principle of our political association, as it would in

practice transfer the care of the common defense from the federal

head to the individual members: a project oppressive to some States,

dangerous to all, and baneful to the Confederacy.

The territories of Britain, Spain, and of the Indian nations in our

neighborhood do not border on particular States, but encircle the Union

from Maine to Georgia. The danger, though in different degrees, is

therefore common. And the means of guarding against it ought, in like

manner, to be the objects of common councils and of a common treasury.

It happens that some States, from local situation, are more directly

exposed. New York is of this class. Upon the plan of separate

provisions, New York would have to sustain the whole weight of the

establishments requisite to her immediate safety, and to the mediate or

ultimate protection of her neighbors. This would neither be equitable as

it respected New York nor safe as it respected the other States. Various

inconveniences would attend such a system. The States, to whose lot it

might fall to support the necessary establishments, would be as little

able as willing, for a considerable time to come, to bear the burden of

competent provisions. The security of all would thus be subjected to

the parsimony, improvidence, or inability of a part. If the resources of

such part becoming more abundant and extensive, its provisions should be

proportionally enlarged, the other States would quickly take the alarm

at seeing the whole military force of the Union in the hands of two or

three of its members, and those probably amongst the most powerful. They

would each choose to have some counterpoise, and pretenses could easily

be contrived. In this situation, military establishments, nourished by

mutual jealousy, would be apt to swell beyond their natural or proper

size; and being at the separate disposal of the members, they would be

engines for the abridgment or demolition of the national authority.

Reasons have been already given to induce a supposition that the State

governments will too naturally be prone to a rivalship with that of the

Union, the foundation of which will be the love of power; and that in

any contest between the federal head and one of its members the people

will be most apt to unite with their local government. If, in addition

to this immense advantage, the ambition of the members should be

stimulated by the separate and independent possession of military

forces, it would afford too strong a temptation and too great a

facility to them to make enterprises upon, and finally to subvert, the

constitutional authority of the Union. On the other hand, the liberty of

the people would be less safe in this state of things than in that which

left the national forces in the hands of the national government. As

far as an army may be considered as a dangerous weapon of power, it

had better be in those hands of which the people are most likely to be

jealous than in those of which they are least likely to be jealous.

For it is a truth, which the experience of ages has attested, that the

people are always most in danger when the means of injuring their

rights are in the possession of those of whom they entertain the least

suspicion.

The framers of the existing Confederation, fully aware of the danger to

the Union from the separate possession of military forces by the States,

have, in express terms, prohibited them from having either ships or

troops, unless with the consent of Congress. The truth is, that the

existence of a federal government and military establishments under

State authority are not less at variance with each other than a

due supply of the federal treasury and the system of quotas and

requisitions.

There are other lights besides those already taken notice of, in

which the impropriety of restraints on the discretion of the national

legislature will be equally manifest. The design of the objection, which

has been mentioned, is to preclude standing armies in time of

peace, though we have never been informed how far it is designed the

prohibition should extend; whether to raising armies as well as to

KEEPING THEM UP in a season of tranquillity or not. If it be confined

to the latter it will have no precise signification, and it will be

ineffectual for the purpose intended. When armies are once raised what

shall be denominated "keeping them up," contrary to the sense of the

Constitution? What time shall be requisite to ascertain the violation?

Shall it be a week, a month, a year? Or shall we say they may be

continued as long as the danger which occasioned their being raised

continues? This would be to admit that they might be kept up IN TIME OF

PEACE, against threatening or impending danger, which would be at once

to deviate from the literal meaning of the prohibition, and to

introduce an extensive latitude of construction. Who shall judge of the

continuance of the danger? This must undoubtedly be submitted to the

national government, and the matter would then be brought to this issue,

that the national government, to provide against apprehended danger,

might in the first instance raise troops, and might afterwards keep them

on foot as long as they supposed the peace or safety of the community

was in any degree of jeopardy. It is easy to perceive that a discretion

so latitudinary as this would afford ample room for eluding the force of

the provision.

The supposed utility of a provision of this kind can only be founded

on the supposed probability, or at least possibility, of a combination

between the executive and the legislative, in some scheme of usurpation.

Should this at any time happen, how easy would it be to fabricate

pretenses of approaching danger! Indian hostilities, instigated by Spain

or Britain, would always be at hand. Provocations to produce the desired

appearances might even be given to some foreign power, and appeased

again by timely concessions. If we can reasonably presume such a

combination to have been formed, and that the enterprise is warranted

by a sufficient prospect of success, the army, when once raised, from

whatever cause, or on whatever pretext, may be applied to the execution

of the project.

If, to obviate this consequence, it should be resolved to extend the

prohibition to the RAISING of armies in time of peace, the United States

would then exhibit the most extraordinary spectacle which the world has

yet seen, that of a nation incapacitated by its Constitution to prepare

for defense, before it was actually invaded. As the ceremony of a formal

denunciation of war has of late fallen into disuse, the presence of an

enemy within our territories must be waited for, as the legal warrant

to the government to begin its levies of men for the protection of the

State. We must receive the blow, before we could even prepare to return

it. All that kind of policy by which nations anticipate distant danger,

and meet the gathering storm, must be abstained from, as contrary to

the genuine maxims of a free government. We must expose our property

and liberty to the mercy of foreign invaders, and invite them by our

weakness to seize the naked and defenseless prey, because we are

afraid that rulers, created by our choice, dependent on our will,

might endanger that liberty, by an abuse of the means necessary to its

preservation.

Here I expect we shall be told that the militia of the country is

its natural bulwark, and would be at all times equal to the national

defense. This doctrine, in substance, had like to have lost us our

independence. It cost millions to the United States that might have been

saved. The facts which, from our own experience, forbid a reliance

of this kind, are too recent to permit us to be the dupes of such

a suggestion. The steady operations of war against a regular and

disciplined army can only be successfully conducted by a force of the

same kind. Considerations of economy, not less than of stability and

vigor, confirm this position. The American militia, in the course of the

late war, have, by their valor on numerous occasions, erected eternal

monuments to their fame; but the bravest of them feel and know that

the liberty of their country could not have been established by their

efforts alone, however great and valuable they were. War, like most

other things, is a science to be acquired and perfected by diligence, by

perseverance, by time, and by practice.

All violent policy, as it is contrary to the natural and experienced

course of human affairs, defeats itself. Pennsylvania, at this instant,

affords an example of the truth of this remark. The Bill of Rights of

that State declares that standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and

ought not to be kept up in time of peace. Pennsylvania, nevertheless, in

a time of profound peace, from the existence of partial disorders in one

or two of her counties, has resolved to raise a body of troops; and in

all probability will keep them up as long as there is any appearance

of danger to the public peace. The conduct of Massachusetts affords

a lesson on the same subject, though on different ground. That State

(without waiting for the sanction of Congress, as the articles of the

Confederation require) was compelled to raise troops to quell a domestic

insurrection, and still keeps a corps in pay to prevent a revival of the

spirit of revolt. The particular constitution of Massachusetts opposed

no obstacle to the measure; but the instance is still of use to instruct

us that cases are likely to occur under our government, as well as under

those of other nations, which will sometimes render a military force in

time of peace essential to the security of the society, and that it

is therefore improper in this respect to control the legislative

discretion. It also teaches us, in its application to the United States,

how little the rights of a feeble government are likely to be respected,

even by its own constituents. And it teaches us, in addition to the

rest, how unequal parchment provisions are to a struggle with public

necessity.

It was a fundamental maxim of the Lacedaemonian commonwealth, that the

post of admiral should not be conferred twice on the same person. The

Peloponnesian confederates, having suffered a severe defeat at sea from

the Athenians, demanded Lysander, who had before served with success in

that capacity, to command the combined fleets. The Lacedaemonians, to

gratify their allies, and yet preserve the semblance of an adherence

to their ancient institutions, had recourse to the flimsy subterfuge

of investing Lysander with the real power of admiral, under the nominal

title of vice-admiral. This instance is selected from among a

multitude that might be cited to confirm the truth already advanced

and illustrated by domestic examples; which is, that nations pay little

regard to rules and maxims calculated in their very nature to run

counter to the necessities of society. Wise politicians will be

cautious about fettering the government with restrictions that cannot be

observed, because they know that every breach of the fundamental laws,

though dictated by necessity, impairs that sacred reverence which ought

to be maintained in the breast of rulers towards the constitution of a

country, and forms a precedent for other breaches where the same plea of

necessity does not exist at all, or is less urgent and palpable.

PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 26

The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the

Common Defense Considered.

For the Independent Journal. Saturday, December 22, 1788

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

IT WAS a thing hardly to be expected that in a popular revolution the

minds of men should stop at that happy mean which marks the salutary

boundary between POWER and PRIVILEGE, and combines the energy of

government with the security of private rights. A failure in this

delicate and important point is the great source of the inconveniences

we experience, and if we are not cautious to avoid a repetition of the

error, in our future attempts to rectify and ameliorate our system, we

may travel from one chimerical project to another; we may try change

after change; but we shall never be likely to make any material change

for the better.

The idea of restraining the legislative authority, in the means of

providing for the national defense, is one of those refinements which

owe their origin to a zeal for liberty more ardent than enlightened.

We have seen, however, that it has not had thus far an extensive

prevalency; that even in this country, where it made its first

appearance, Pennsylvania and North Carolina are the only two States by

which it has been in any degree patronized; and that all the others have

refused to give it the least countenance; wisely judging that confidence

must be placed somewhere; that the necessity of doing it, is implied in

the very act of delegating power; and that it is better to hazard the

abuse of that confidence than to embarrass the government and endanger

the public safety by impolitic restrictions on the legislative

authority. The opponents of the proposed Constitution combat, in this

respect, the general decision of America; and instead of being taught

by experience the propriety of correcting any extremes into which we

may have heretofore run, they appear disposed to conduct us into others

still more dangerous, and more extravagant. As if the tone of government

had been found too high, or too rigid, the doctrines they teach are

calculated to induce us to depress or to relax it, by expedients

which, upon other occasions, have been condemned or forborne. It may

be affirmed without the imputation of invective, that if the principles

they inculcate, on various points, could so far obtain as to become the

popular creed, they would utterly unfit the people of this country for

any species of government whatever. But a danger of this kind is not to

be apprehended. The citizens of America have too much discernment to

be argued into anarchy. And I am much mistaken, if experience has not

wrought a deep and solemn conviction in the public mind, that greater

energy of government is essential to the welfare and prosperity of the

community.

It may not be amiss in this place concisely to remark the origin

and progress of the idea, which aims at the exclusion of military

establishments in time of peace. Though in speculative minds it

may arise from a contemplation of the nature and tendency of such

institutions, fortified by the events that have happened in other ages

and countries, yet as a national sentiment, it must be traced to

those habits of thinking which we derive from the nation from whom the

inhabitants of these States have in general sprung.

In England, for a long time after the Norman Conquest, the authority of

the monarch was almost unlimited. Inroads were gradually made upon the

prerogative, in favor of liberty, first by the barons, and afterwards

by the people, till the greatest part of its most formidable pretensions

became extinct. But it was not till the revolution in 1688, which

elevated the Prince of Orange to the throne of Great Britain, that

English liberty was completely triumphant. As incident to the undefined

power of making war, an acknowledged prerogative of the crown, Charles

II. had, by his own authority, kept on foot in time of peace a body of

5,000 regular troops. And this number James II. increased to 30,000;

who were paid out of his civil list. At the revolution, to abolish the

exercise of so dangerous an authority, it became an article of the Bill

of Rights then framed, that "the raising or keeping a standing army

within the kingdom in time of peace, UNLESS WITH THE CONSENT OF

PARLIAMENT, was against law."

In that kingdom, when the pulse of liberty was at its highest pitch, no

security against the danger of standing armies was thought requisite,

beyond a prohibition of their being raised or kept up by the mere

authority of the executive magistrate. The patriots, who effected that

memorable revolution, were too temperate, too wellinformed, to think

of any restraint on the legislative discretion. They were aware that a

certain number of troops for guards and garrisons were indispensable;

that no precise bounds could be set to the national exigencies; that a

power equal to every possible contingency must exist somewhere in the

government: and that when they referred the exercise of that power to

the judgment of the legislature, they had arrived at the ultimate point

of precaution which was reconcilable with the safety of the community.

From the same source, the people of America may be said to have derived

an hereditary impression of danger to liberty, from standing armies in

time of peace. The circumstances of a revolution quickened the public

sensibility on every point connected with the security of popular

rights, and in some instances raise the warmth of our zeal beyond the

degree which consisted with the due temperature of the body politic.

The attempts of two of the States to restrict the authority of the

legislature in the article of military establishments, are of the number

of these instances. The principles which had taught us to be jealous

of the power of an hereditary monarch were by an injudicious excess

extended to the representatives of the people in their popular

assemblies. Even in some of the States, where this error was not

adopted, we find unnecessary declarations that standing armies ought not

to be kept up, in time of peace, WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE LEGISLATURE.

I call them unnecessary, because the reason which had introduced a

similar provision into the English Bill of Rights is not applicable

to any of the State constitutions. The power of raising armies at all,

under those constitutions, can by no construction be deemed to

reside anywhere else, than in the legislatures themselves; and it was

superfluous, if not absurd, to declare that a matter should not be done

without the consent of a body, which alone had the power of doing it.

Accordingly, in some of these constitutions, and among others, in that

of this State of New York, which has been justly celebrated, both

in Europe and America, as one of the best of the forms of government

established in this country, there is a total silence upon the subject.

It is remarkable, that even in the two States which seem to have

meditated an interdiction of military establishments in time of

peace, the mode of expression made use of is rather cautionary than

prohibitory. It is not said, that standing armies SHALL NOT BE kept up,

but that they OUGHT NOT to be kept up, in time of peace. This ambiguity

of terms appears to have been the result of a conflict between jealousy

and conviction; between the desire of excluding such establishments

at all events, and the persuasion that an absolute exclusion would be

unwise and unsafe.

Can it be doubted that such a provision, whenever the situation of

public affairs was understood to require a departure from it, would be

interpreted by the legislature into a mere admonition, and would be made

to yield to the necessities or supposed necessities of the State? Let

the fact already mentioned, with respect to Pennsylvania, decide. What

then (it may be asked) is the use of such a provision, if it cease to

operate the moment there is an inclination to disregard it?

Let us examine whether there be any comparison, in point of efficacy,

between the provision alluded to and that which is contained in the new

Constitution, for restraining the appropriations of money for military

purposes to the period of two years. The former, by aiming at too much,

is calculated to effect nothing; the latter, by steering clear of an

imprudent extreme, and by being perfectly compatible with a proper

provision for the exigencies of the nation, will have a salutary and

powerful operation.

The legislature of the United States will be OBLIGED, by this provision,

once at least in every two years, to deliberate upon the propriety of

keeping a military force on foot; to come to a new resolution on the

point; and to declare their sense of the matter, by a formal vote in

the face of their constituents. They are not AT LIBERTY to vest in the

executive department permanent funds for the support of an army, if they

were even incautious enough to be willing to repose in it so improper

a confidence. As the spirit of party, in different degrees, must be

expected to infect all political bodies, there will be, no doubt,

persons in the national legislature willing enough to arraign the

measures and criminate the views of the majority. The provision for

the support of a military force will always be a favorable topic

for declamation. As often as the question comes forward, the public

attention will be roused and attracted to the subject, by the party in

opposition; and if the majority should be really disposed to exceed the

proper limits, the community will be warned of the danger, and will have

an opportunity of taking measures to guard against it. Independent of

parties in the national legislature itself, as often as the period of

discussion arrived, the State legislatures, who will always be not

only vigilant but suspicious and jealous guardians of the rights of

the citizens against encroachments from the federal government, will

constantly have their attention awake to the conduct of the national

rulers, and will be ready enough, if any thing improper appears, to

sound the alarm to the people, and not only to be the VOICE, but, if

necessary, the ARM of their discontent.

Schemes to subvert the liberties of a great community REQUIRE TIME to

mature them for execution. An army, so large as seriously to menace

those liberties, could only be formed by progressive augmentations;

which would suppose, not merely a temporary combination between the

legislature and executive, but a continued conspiracy for a series of

time. Is it probable that such a combination would exist at all? Is it

probable that it would be persevered in, and transmitted along through

all the successive variations in a representative body, which biennial

elections would naturally produce in both houses? Is it presumable, that

every man, the instant he took his seat in the national Senate or House

of Representatives, would commence a traitor to his constituents and to

his country? Can it be supposed that there would not be found one man,

discerning enough to detect so atrocious a conspiracy, or bold or honest

enough to apprise his constituents of their danger? If such presumptions

can fairly be made, there ought at once to be an end of all delegated

authority. The people should resolve to recall all the powers they have

heretofore parted with out of their own hands, and to divide themselves

into as many States as there are counties, in order that they may be

able to manage their own concerns in person.

If such suppositions could even be reasonably made, still the

concealment of the design, for any duration, would be impracticable. It

would be announced, by the very circumstance of augmenting the army

to so great an extent in time of profound peace. What colorable reason

could be assigned, in a country so situated, for such vast augmentations

of the military force? It is impossible that the people could be long

deceived; and the destruction of the project, and of the projectors,

would quickly follow the discovery.

It has been said that the provision which limits the appropriation of

money for the support of an army to the period of two years would be

unavailing, because the Executive, when once possessed of a force large

enough to awe the people into submission, would find resources in that

very force sufficient to enable him to dispense with supplies from

the acts of the legislature. But the question again recurs, upon what

pretense could he be put in possession of a force of that magnitude in

time of peace? If we suppose it to have been created in consequence of

some domestic insurrection or foreign war, then it becomes a case not

within the principles of the objection; for this is levelled against

the power of keeping up troops in time of peace. Few persons will be so

visionary as seriously to contend that military forces ought not to be

raised to quell a rebellion or resist an invasion; and if the defense of

the community under such circumstances should make it necessary to

have an army so numerous as to hazard its liberty, this is one of those

calamities for which there is neither preventative nor cure. It cannot

be provided against by any possible form of government; it might even

result from a simple league offensive and defensive, if it should ever

be necessary for the confederates or allies to form an army for common

defense.

But it is an evil infinitely less likely to attend us in a united than

in a disunited state; nay, it may be safely asserted that it is an evil

altogether unlikely to attend us in the latter situation. It is not

easy to conceive a possibility that dangers so formidable can assail

the whole Union, as to demand a force considerable enough to place our

liberties in the least jeopardy, especially if we take into our view

the aid to be derived from the militia, which ought always to be counted

upon as a valuable and powerful auxiliary. But in a state of disunion

(as has been fully shown in another place), the contrary of this

supposition would become not only probable, but almost unavoidable.

PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 27

The Same Subject Continued (The Idea of Restraining the Legislative

Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered)

From the New York Packet. Tuesday, December 25, 1787.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

IT HAS been urged, in different shapes, that a Constitution of the kind

proposed by the convention cannot operate without the aid of a military

force to execute its laws. This, however, like most other things

that have been alleged on that side, rests on mere general assertion,

unsupported by any precise or intelligible designation of the reasons

upon which it is founded. As far as I have been able to divine

the latent meaning of the objectors, it seems to originate in a

presupposition that the people will be disinclined to the exercise

of federal authority in any matter of an internal nature. Waiving any

exception that might be taken to the inaccuracy or inexplicitness of the

distinction between internal and external, let us inquire what ground

there is to presuppose that disinclination in the people. Unless we

presume at the same time that the powers of the general government will

be worse administered than those of the State government, there seems to

be no room for the presumption of ill-will, disaffection, or opposition

in the people. I believe it may be laid down as a general rule that

their confidence in and obedience to a government will commonly be

proportioned to the goodness or badness of its administration. It must

be admitted that there are exceptions to this rule; but these exceptions

depend so entirely on accidental causes, that they cannot be considered

as having any relation to the intrinsic merits or demerits of a

constitution. These can only be judged of by general principles and

maxims.

Various reasons have been suggested, in the course of these papers,

to induce a probability that the general government will be better

administered than the particular governments; the principal of which

reasons are that the extension of the spheres of election will present

a greater option, or latitude of choice, to the people; that through

the medium of the State legislatures which are select bodies of men, and

which are to appoint the members of the national Senate there is reason

to expect that this branch will generally be composed with peculiar care

and judgment; that these circumstances promise greater knowledge and

more extensive information in the national councils, and that they will

be less apt to be tainted by the spirit of faction, and more out of

the reach of those occasional ill-humors, or temporary prejudices and

propensities, which, in smaller societies, frequently contaminate

the public councils, beget injustice and oppression of a part of the

community, and engender schemes which, though they gratify a momentary

inclination or desire, terminate in general distress, dissatisfaction,

and disgust. Several additional reasons of considerable force, to

fortify that probability, will occur when we come to survey, with a more

critical eye, the interior structure of the edifice which we are invited

to erect. It will be sufficient here to remark, that until satisfactory

reasons can be assigned to justify an opinion, that the federal

government is likely to be administered in such a manner as to render

it odious or contemptible to the people, there can be no reasonable

foundation for the supposition that the laws of the Union will meet with

any greater obstruction from them, or will stand in need of any other

methods to enforce their execution, than the laws of the particular

members.

The hope of impunity is a strong incitement to sedition; the dread of

punishment, a proportionably strong discouragement to it. Will not the

government of the Union, which, if possessed of a due degree of power,

can call to its aid the collective resources of the whole Confederacy,

be more likely to repress the FORMER sentiment and to inspire the

LATTER, than that of a single State, which can only command the

resources within itself? A turbulent faction in a State may easily

suppose itself able to contend with the friends to the government in

that State; but it can hardly be so infatuated as to imagine itself a

match for the combined efforts of the Union. If this reflection be

just, there is less danger of resistance from irregular combinations of

individuals to the authority of the Confederacy than to that of a single

member.

I will, in this place, hazard an observation, which will not be the

less just because to some it may appear new; which is, that the more the

operations of the national authority are intermingled in the ordinary

exercise of government, the more the citizens are accustomed to meet

with it in the common occurrences of their political life, the more it

is familiarized to their sight and to their feelings, the further it

enters into those objects which touch the most sensible chords and put

in motion the most active springs of the human heart, the greater will

be the probability that it will conciliate the respect and attachment of

the community. Man is very much a creature of habit. A thing that rarely

strikes his senses will generally have but little influence upon his

mind. A government continually at a distance and out of sight can hardly

be expected to interest the sensations of the people. The inference

is, that the authority of the Union, and the affections of the citizens

towards it, will be strengthened, rather than weakened, by its extension

to what are called matters of internal concern; and will have less

occasion to recur to force, in proportion to the familiarity and

comprehensiveness of its agency. The more it circulates through those

channels and currents in which the passions of mankind naturally flow,

the less will it require the aid of the violent and perilous expedients

of compulsion.

One thing, at all events, must be evident, that a government like the

one proposed would bid much fairer to avoid the necessity of using

force, than that species of league contend for by most of its opponents;

the authority of which should only operate upon the States in their

political or collective capacities. It has been shown that in such

a Confederacy there can be no sanction for the laws but force; that

frequent delinquencies in the members are the natural offspring of the

very frame of the government; and that as often as these happen, they

can only be redressed, if at all, by war and violence.

The plan reported by the convention, by extending the authority of the

federal head to the individual citizens of the several States, will

enable the government to employ the ordinary magistracy of each, in the

execution of its laws. It is easy to perceive that this will tend to

destroy, in the common apprehension, all distinction between the sources

from which they might proceed; and will give the federal government the

same advantage for securing a due obedience to its authority which is

enjoyed by the government of each State, in addition to the influence on

public opinion which will result from the important consideration of its

having power to call to its assistance and support the resources of the

whole Union. It merits particular attention in this place, that the laws

of the Confederacy, as to the ENUMERATED and LEGITIMATE objects of its

jurisdiction, will become the SUPREME LAW of the land; to the observance

of which all officers, legislative, executive, and judicial, in each

State, will be bound by the sanctity of an oath. Thus the legislatures,

courts, and magistrates, of the respective members, will be incorporated

into the operations of the national government AS FAR AS ITS JUST AND

CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY EXTENDS; and will be rendered auxiliary to

the enforcement of its laws.(1) Any man who will pursue, by his own

reflections, the consequences of this situation, will perceive that

there is good ground to calculate upon a regular and peaceable execution

of the laws of the Union, if its powers are administered with a common

share of prudence. If we will arbitrarily suppose the contrary, we

may deduce any inferences we please from the supposition; for it is

certainly possible, by an injudicious exercise of the authorities of the

best government that ever was, or ever can be instituted, to provoke

and precipitate the people into the wildest excesses. But though

the adversaries of the proposed Constitution should presume that the

national rulers would be insensible to the motives of public good, or

to the obligations of duty, I would still ask them how the interests

of ambition, or the views of encroachment, can be promoted by such a

conduct?

PUBLIUS

1. The sophistry which has been employed to show that this will tend

to the destruction of the State governments, will, in its will, in its

proper place, be fully detected.

FEDERALIST No. 28

The Same Subject Continued (The Idea of Restraining the Legislative

Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered)

For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, December 26, 1787

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

THAT there may happen cases in which the national government may be

necessitated to resort to force, cannot be denied. Our own experience

has corroborated the lessons taught by the examples of other nations;

that emergencies of this sort will sometimes arise in all societies,

however constituted; that seditions and insurrections are, unhappily,

maladies as inseparable from the body politic as tumors and eruptions

from the natural body; that the idea of governing at all times by the

simple force of law (which we have been told is the only admissible

principle of republican government), has no place but in the reveries

of those political doctors whose sagacity disdains the admonitions of

experimental instruction.

Should such emergencies at any time happen under the national

government, there could be no remedy but force. The means to be employed

must be proportioned to the extent of the mischief. If it should be a

slight commotion in a small part of a State, the militia of the residue

would be adequate to its suppression; and the national presumption is

that they would be ready to do their duty. An insurrection, whatever may

be its immediate cause, eventually endangers all government. Regard to

the public peace, if not to the rights of the Union, would engage the

citizens to whom the contagion had not communicated itself to oppose the

insurgents; and if the general government should be found in practice

conducive to the prosperity and felicity of the people, it were

irrational to believe that they would be disinclined to its support.

If, on the contrary, the insurrection should pervade a whole State, or a

principal part of it, the employment of a different kind of force might

become unavoidable. It appears that Massachusetts found it necessary

to raise troops for repressing the disorders within that State; that

Pennsylvania, from the mere apprehension of commotions among a part of

her citizens, has thought proper to have recourse to the same measure.

Suppose the State of New York had been inclined to re-establish her lost

jurisdiction over the inhabitants of Vermont, could she have hoped for

success in such an enterprise from the efforts of the militia alone?

Would she not have been compelled to raise and to maintain a more

regular force for the execution of her design? If it must then be

admitted that the necessity of recurring to a force different from the

militia, in cases of this extraordinary nature, is applicable to the

State governments themselves, why should the possibility, that the

national government might be under a like necessity, in similar

extremities, be made an objection to its existence? Is it not surprising

that men who declare an attachment to the Union in the abstract, should

urge as an objection to the proposed Constitution what applies with

tenfold weight to the plan for which they contend; and what, as far as

it has any foundation in truth, is an inevitable consequence of civil

society upon an enlarged scale? Who would not prefer that possibility

to the unceasing agitations and frequent revolutions which are the

continual scourges of petty republics?

Let us pursue this examination in another light. Suppose, in lieu of

one general system, two, or three, or even four Confederacies were to be

formed, would not the same difficulty oppose itself to the operations of

either of these Confederacies? Would not each of them be exposed to the

same casualties; and when these happened, be obliged to have recourse to

the same expedients for upholding its authority which are objected to in

a government for all the States? Would the militia, in this supposition,

be more ready or more able to support the federal authority than in the

case of a general union? All candid and intelligent men must, upon

due consideration, acknowledge that the principle of the objection is

equally applicable to either of the two cases; and that whether we

have one government for all the States, or different governments

for different parcels of them, or even if there should be an entire

separation of the States, there might sometimes be a necessity to make

use of a force constituted differently from the militia, to preserve the

peace of the community and to maintain the just authority of the laws

against those violent invasions of them which amount to insurrections

and rebellions.

Independent of all other reasonings upon the subject, it is a full

answer to those who require a more peremptory provision against military

establishments in time of peace, to say that the whole power of the

proposed government is to be in the hands of the representatives of the

people. This is the essential, and, after all, only efficacious security

for the rights and privileges of the people, which is attainable in

civil society.(1)

If the representatives of the people betray their constituents, there

is then no resource left but in the exertion of that original right of

self-defense which is paramount to all positive forms of government,

and which against the usurpations of the national rulers, may be exerted

with infinitely better prospect of success than against those of

the rulers of an individual state. In a single state, if the persons

intrusted with supreme power become usurpers, the different parcels,

subdivisions, or districts of which it consists, having no distinct

government in each, can take no regular measures for defense. The

citizens must rush tumultuously to arms, without concert, without

system, without resource; except in their courage and despair. The

usurpers, clothed with the forms of legal authority, can too often crush

the opposition in embryo. The smaller the extent of the territory, the

more difficult will it be for the people to form a regular or systematic

plan of opposition, and the more easy will it be to defeat their

early efforts. Intelligence can be more speedily obtained of their

preparations and movements, and the military force in the possession

of the usurpers can be more rapidly directed against the part where

the opposition has begun. In this situation there must be a peculiar

coincidence of circumstances to insure success to the popular

resistance.

The obstacles to usurpation and the facilities of resistance increase

with the increased extent of the state, provided the citizens understand

their rights and are disposed to defend them. The natural strength

of the people in a large community, in proportion to the artificial

strength of the government, is greater than in a small, and of course

more competent to a struggle with the attempts of the government

to establish a tyranny. But in a confederacy the people, without

exaggeration, may be said to be entirely the masters of their own fate.

Power being almost always the rival of power, the general government

will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state

governments, and these will have the same disposition towards the

general government. The people, by throwing themselves into either

scale, will infallibly make it preponderate. If their rights are invaded

by either, they can make use of the other as the instrument of redress.

How wise will it be in them by cherishing the union to preserve to

themselves an advantage which can never be too highly prized!

It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system, that the

State governments will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete

security against invasions of the public liberty by the national

authority. Projects of usurpation cannot be masked under pretenses so

likely to escape the penetration of select bodies of men, as of the

people at large. The legislatures will have better means of information.

They can discover the danger at a distance; and possessing all the

organs of civil power, and the confidence of the people, they can at

once adopt a regular plan of opposition, in which they can combine all

the resources of the community. They can readily communicate with each

other in the different States, and unite their common forces for the

protection of their common liberty.

The great extent of the country is a further security. We have already

experienced its utility against the attacks of a foreign power. And

it would have precisely the same effect against the enterprises of

ambitious rulers in the national councils. If the federal army should be

able to quell the resistance of one State, the distant States would

have it in their power to make head with fresh forces. The advantages

obtained in one place must be abandoned to subdue the opposition in

others; and the moment the part which had been reduced to submission was

left to itself, its efforts would be renewed, and its resistance revive.

We should recollect that the extent of the military force must, at all

events, be regulated by the resources of the country. For a long time to

come, it will not be possible to maintain a large army; and as the

means of doing this increase, the population and natural strength of the

community will proportionably increase. When will the time arrive

that the federal government can raise and maintain an army capable of

erecting a despotism over the great body of the people of an immense

empire, who are in a situation, through the medium of their State

governments, to take measures for their own defense, with all

the celerity, regularity, and system of independent nations? The

apprehension may be considered as a disease, for which there can be

found no cure in the resources of argument and reasoning.

PUBLIUS

1. Its full efficacy will be examined hereafter.

FEDERALIST No. 29

Concerning the Militia

From the New York Packet. Wednesday, January 9, 1788

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

THE power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its services in

times of insurrection and invasion are natural incidents to the duties

of superintending the common defense, and of watching over the internal

peace of the Confederacy.

It requires no skill in the science of war to discern that uniformity

in the organization and discipline of the militia would be attended with

the most beneficial effects, whenever they were called into service for

the public defense. It would enable them to discharge the duties of the

camp and of the field with mutual intelligence and concert an advantage

of peculiar moment in the operations of an army; and it would fit them

much sooner to acquire the degree of proficiency in military functions

which would be essential to their usefulness. This desirable uniformity

can only be accomplished by confiding the regulation of the militia to

the direction of the national authority. It is, therefore, with the most

evident propriety, that the plan of the convention proposes to empower

the Union "to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the

militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the

service of the United States, RESERVING TO THE STATES RESPECTIVELY THE

APPOINTMENT OF THE OFFICERS, AND THE AUTHORITY OF TRAINING THE MILITIA

ACCORDING TO THE DISCIPLINE PRESCRIBED BY CONGRESS."

Of the different grounds which have been taken in opposition to the

plan of the convention, there is none that was so little to have been

expected, or is so untenable in itself, as the one from which this

particular provision has been attacked. If a well-regulated militia be

the most natural defense of a free country, it ought certainly to

be under the regulation and at the disposal of that body which is

constituted the guardian of the national security. If standing armies

are dangerous to liberty, an efficacious power over the militia, in the

body to whose care the protection of the State is committed, ought, as

far as possible, to take away the inducement and the pretext to such

unfriendly institutions. If the federal government can command the aid

of the militia in those emergencies which call for the military arm in

support of the civil magistrate, it can the better dispense with the

employment of a different kind of force. If it cannot avail itself of

the former, it will be obliged to recur to the latter. To render an army

unnecessary, will be a more certain method of preventing its existence

than a thousand prohibitions upon paper.

In order to cast an odium upon the power of calling forth the militia

to execute the laws of the Union, it has been remarked that there is

nowhere any provision in the proposed Constitution for calling out the

POSSE COMITATUS, to assist the magistrate in the execution of his duty,

whence it has been inferred, that military force was intended to be his

only auxiliary. There is a striking incoherence in the objections

which have appeared, and sometimes even from the same quarter, not much

calculated to inspire a very favorable opinion of the sincerity or fair

dealing of their authors. The same persons who tell us in one breath,

that the powers of the federal government will be despotic and

unlimited, inform us in the next, that it has not authority sufficient

even to call out the POSSE COMITATUS. The latter, fortunately, is as

much short of the truth as the former exceeds it. It would be as absurd

to doubt, that a right to pass all laws NECESSARY AND PROPER to execute

its declared powers, would include that of requiring the assistance of

the citizens to the officers who may be intrusted with the execution

of those laws, as it would be to believe, that a right to enact laws

necessary and proper for the imposition and collection of taxes would

involve that of varying the rules of descent and of the alienation of

landed property, or of abolishing the trial by jury in cases relating to

it. It being therefore evident that the supposition of a want of power

to require the aid of the POSSE COMITATUS is entirely destitute of

color, it will follow, that the conclusion which has been drawn from it,

in its application to the authority of the federal government over the

militia, is as uncandid as it is illogical. What reason could there

be to infer, that force was intended to be the sole instrument of

authority, merely because there is a power to make use of it when

necessary? What shall we think of the motives which could induce men of

sense to reason in this manner? How shall we prevent a conflict between

charity and conviction?

By a curious refinement upon the spirit of republican jealousy, we are

even taught to apprehend danger from the militia itself, in the hands of

the federal government. It is observed that select corps may be formed,

composed of the young and ardent, who may be rendered subservient to the

views of arbitrary power. What plan for the regulation of the militia

may be pursued by the national government, is impossible to be foreseen.

But so far from viewing the matter in the same light with those who

object to select corps as dangerous, were the Constitution ratified, and

were I to deliver my sentiments to a member of the federal legislature

from this State on the subject of a militia establishment, I should hold

to him, in substance, the following discourse:

"The project of disciplining all the militia of the United States is

as futile as it would be injurious, if it were capable of being carried

into execution. A tolerable expertness in military movements is a

business that requires time and practice. It is not a day, or even a

week, that will suffice for the attainment of it. To oblige the great

body of the yeomanry, and of the other classes of the citizens, to

be under arms for the purpose of going through military exercises and

evolutions, as often as might be necessary to acquire the degree of

perfection which would entitle them to the character of a well-regulated

militia, would be a real grievance to the people, and a serious public

inconvenience and loss. It would form an annual deduction from the

productive labor of the country, to an amount which, calculating upon

the present numbers of the people, would not fall far short of the whole

expense of the civil establishments of all the States. To attempt

a thing which would abridge the mass of labor and industry to so

considerable an extent, would be unwise: and the experiment, if made,

could not succeed, because it would not long be endured. Little more

can reasonably be aimed at, with respect to the people at large, than to

have them properly armed and equipped; and in order to see that this be

not neglected, it will be necessary to assemble them once or twice in

the course of a year.

"But though the scheme of disciplining the whole nation must be

abandoned as mischievous or impracticable; yet it is a matter of the

utmost importance that a well-digested plan should, as soon as possible,

be adopted for the proper establishment of the militia. The attention of

the government ought particularly to be directed to the formation of a

select corps of moderate extent, upon such principles as will really fit

them for service in case of need. By thus circumscribing the plan, it

will be possible to have an excellent body of well-trained militia,

ready to take the field whenever the defense of the State shall require

it. This will not only lessen the call for military establishments, but

if circumstances should at any time oblige the government to form an

army of any magnitude that army can never be formidable to the liberties

of the people while there is a large body of citizens, little, if at

all, inferior to them in discipline and the use of arms, who stand ready

to defend their own rights and those of their fellow-citizens. This

appears to me the only substitute that can be devised for a standing

army, and the best possible security against it, if it should exist."

Thus differently from the adversaries of the proposed Constitution

should I reason on the same subject, deducing arguments of safety

from the very sources which they represent as fraught with danger and

perdition. But how the national legislature may reason on the point, is

a thing which neither they nor I can foresee.

There is something so far-fetched and so extravagant in the idea of

danger to liberty from the militia, that one is at a loss whether to

treat it with gravity or with raillery; whether to consider it as a mere

trial of skill, like the paradoxes of rhetoricians; as a disingenuous

artifice to instil prejudices at any price; or as the serious offspring

of political fanaticism. Where in the name of common-sense, are our

fears to end if we may not trust our sons, our brothers, our neighbors,

our fellow-citizens? What shadow of danger can there be from men who

are daily mingling with the rest of their countrymen and who participate

with them in the same feelings, sentiments, habits and interests? What

reasonable cause of apprehension can be inferred from a power in the

Union to prescribe regulations for the militia, and to command its

services when necessary, while the particular States are to have the

SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE APPOINTMENT OF THE OFFICERS? If it were possible

seriously to indulge a jealousy of the militia upon any conceivable

establishment under the federal government, the circumstance of the

officers being in the appointment of the States ought at once to

extinguish it. There can be no doubt that this circumstance will always

secure to them a preponderating influence over the militia.

In reading many of the publications against the Constitution, a man is

apt to imagine that he is perusing some ill-written tale or romance,

which instead of natural and agreeable images, exhibits to the mind

nothing but frightful and distorted shapes--

"Gorgons, hydras, and chimeras dire";

discoloring and disfiguring whatever it represents, and transforming

everything it touches into a monster.

A sample of this is to be observed in the exaggerated and improbable

suggestions which have taken place respecting the power of calling for

the services of the militia. That of New Hampshire is to be marched to

Georgia, of Georgia to New Hampshire, of New York to Kentucky, and of

Kentucky to Lake Champlain. Nay, the debts due to the French and Dutch

are to be paid in militiamen instead of louis d'ors and ducats. At one

moment there is to be a large army to lay prostrate the liberties of the

people; at another moment the militia of Virginia are to be dragged from

their homes five or six hundred miles, to tame the republican contumacy

of Massachusetts; and that of Massachusetts is to be transported an

equal distance to subdue the refractory haughtiness of the aristocratic

Virginians. Do the persons who rave at this rate imagine that their

art or their eloquence can impose any conceits or absurdities upon the

people of America for infallible truths?

If there should be an army to be made use of as the engine of despotism,

what need of the militia? If there should be no army, whither would

the militia, irritated by being called upon to undertake a distant and

hopeless expedition, for the purpose of riveting the chains of slavery

upon a part of their countrymen, direct their course, but to the seat

of the tyrants, who had meditated so foolish as well as so wicked a

project, to crush them in their imagined intrenchments of power, and

to make them an example of the just vengeance of an abused and incensed

people? Is this the way in which usurpers stride to dominion over

a numerous and enlightened nation? Do they begin by exciting the

detestation of the very instruments of their intended usurpations? Do

they usually commence their career by wanton and disgustful acts

of power, calculated to answer no end, but to draw upon themselves

universal hatred and execration? Are suppositions of this sort the sober

admonitions of discerning patriots to a discerning people? Or are they

the inflammatory ravings of incendiaries or distempered enthusiasts?

If we were even to suppose the national rulers actuated by the most

ungovernable ambition, it is impossible to believe that they would

employ such preposterous means to accomplish their designs.

In times of insurrection, or invasion, it would be natural and proper

that the militia of a neighboring State should be marched into another,

to resist a common enemy, or to guard the republic against the violence

of faction or sedition. This was frequently the case, in respect to the

first object, in the course of the late war; and this mutual succor is,

indeed, a principal end of our political association. If the power of

affording it be placed under the direction of the Union, there will

be no danger of a supine and listless inattention to the dangers of

a neighbor, till its near approach had superadded the incitements of

self-preservation to the too feeble impulses of duty and sympathy.

PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 30

Concerning the General Power of Taxation

From the New York Packet. Friday, December 28, 1787.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

IT HAS been already observed that the federal government ought to

possess the power of providing for the support of the national forces;

in which proposition was intended to be included the expense of raising

troops, of building and equipping fleets, and all other expenses in any

wise connected with military arrangements and operations. But these are

not the only objects to which the jurisdiction of the Union, in respect

to revenue, must necessarily be empowered to extend. It must embrace a

provision for the support of the national civil list; for the payment

of the national debts contracted, or that may be contracted; and, in

general, for all those matters which will call for disbursements out of

the national treasury. The conclusion is, that there must be interwoven,

in the frame of the government, a general power of taxation, in one

shape or another.

Money is, with propriety, considered as the vital principle of the body

politic; as that which sustains its life and motion, and enables it to

perform its most essential functions. A complete power, therefore, to

procure a regular and adequate supply of it, as far as the resources

of the community will permit, may be regarded as an indispensable

ingredient in every constitution. From a deficiency in this particular,

one of two evils must ensue; either the people must be subjected to

continual plunder, as a substitute for a more eligible mode of supplying

the public wants, or the government must sink into a fatal atrophy, and,

in a short course of time, perish.

In the Ottoman or Turkish empire, the sovereign, though in other

respects absolute master of the lives and fortunes of his subjects, has

no right to impose a new tax. The consequence is that he permits the

bashaws or governors of provinces to pillage the people without mercy;

and, in turn, squeezes out of them the sums of which he stands in need,

to satisfy his own exigencies and those of the state. In America, from

a like cause, the government of the Union has gradually dwindled into a

state of decay, approaching nearly to annihilation. Who can doubt,

that the happiness of the people in both countries would be promoted by

competent authorities in the proper hands, to provide the revenues which

the necessities of the public might require?

The present Confederation, feeble as it is intended to repose in the

United States, an unlimited power of providing for the pecuniary wants

of the Union. But proceeding upon an erroneous principle, it has been

done in such a manner as entirely to have frustrated the intention.

Congress, by the articles which compose that compact (as has already

been stated), are authorized to ascertain and call for any sums of money

necessary, in their judgment, to the service of the United States; and

their requisitions, if conformable to the rule of apportionment, are

in every constitutional sense obligatory upon the States. These have no

right to question the propriety of the demand; no discretion beyond

that of devising the ways and means of furnishing the sums demanded.

But though this be strictly and truly the case; though the assumption of

such a right would be an infringement of the articles of Union; though

it may seldom or never have been avowedly claimed, yet in practice it

has been constantly exercised, and would continue to be so, as long

as the revenues of the Confederacy should remain dependent on the

intermediate agency of its members. What the consequences of this system

have been, is within the knowledge of every man the least conversant in

our public affairs, and has been amply unfolded in different parts of

these inquiries. It is this which has chiefly contributed to reduce

us to a situation, which affords ample cause both of mortification to

ourselves, and of triumph to our enemies.

What remedy can there be for this situation, but in a change of the

system which has produced it in a change of the fallacious and delusive

system of quotas and requisitions? What substitute can there be imagined

for this ignis fatuus in finance, but that of permitting the national

government to raise its own revenues by the ordinary methods of taxation

authorized in every well-ordered constitution of civil government?

Ingenious men may declaim with plausibility on any subject; but no

human ingenuity can point out any other expedient to rescue us from the

inconveniences and embarrassments naturally resulting from defective

supplies of the public treasury.

The more intelligent adversaries of the new Constitution admit the force

of this reasoning; but they qualify their admission by a distinction

between what they call INTERNAL and EXTERNAL taxation. The former they

would reserve to the State governments; the latter, which they explain

into commercial imposts, or rather duties on imported articles,

they declare themselves willing to concede to the federal head. This

distinction, however, would violate the maxim of good sense and sound

policy, which dictates that every POWER ought to be in proportion to

its OBJECT; and would still leave the general government in a kind of

tutelage to the State governments, inconsistent with every idea of vigor

or efficiency. Who can pretend that commercial imposts are, or would be,

alone equal to the present and future exigencies of the Union? Taking

into the account the existing debt, foreign and domestic, upon any plan

of extinguishment which a man moderately impressed with the importance

of public justice and public credit could approve, in addition to the

establishments which all parties will acknowledge to be necessary, we

could not reasonably flatter ourselves, that this resource alone, upon

the most improved scale, would even suffice for its present necessities.

Its future necessities admit not of calculation or limitation; and upon

the principle, more than once adverted to, the power of making provision

for them as they arise ought to be equally unconfined. I believe it may

be regarded as a position warranted by the history of mankind, that,

IN THE USUAL PROGRESS OF THINGS, THE NECESSITIES OF A NATION, IN EVERY

STAGE OF ITS EXISTENCE, WILL BE FOUND AT LEAST EQUAL TO ITS RESOURCES.

To say that deficiencies may be provided for by requisitions upon the

States, is on the one hand to acknowledge that this system cannot be

depended upon, and on the other hand to depend upon it for every thing

beyond a certain limit. Those who have carefully attended to its vices

and deformities as they have been exhibited by experience or delineated

in the course of these papers, must feel invincible repugnancy to

trusting the national interests in any degree to its operation. Its

inevitable tendency, whenever it is brought into activity, must be to

enfeeble the Union, and sow the seeds of discord and contention between

the federal head and its members, and between the members themselves.

Can it be expected that the deficiencies would be better supplied

in this mode than the total wants of the Union have heretofore been

supplied in the same mode? It ought to be recollected that if less will

be required from the States, they will have proportionably less means

to answer the demand. If the opinions of those who contend for the

distinction which has been mentioned were to be received as evidence of

truth, one would be led to conclude that there was some known point in

the economy of national affairs at which it would be safe to stop and to

say: Thus far the ends of public happiness will be promoted by supplying

the wants of government, and all beyond this is unworthy of our care or

anxiety. How is it possible that a government half supplied and always

necessitous, can fulfill the purposes of its institution, can provide

for the security, advance the prosperity, or support the reputation of

the commonwealth? How can it ever possess either energy or stability,

dignity or credit, confidence at home or respectability abroad? How can

its administration be any thing else than a succession of expedients

temporizing, impotent, disgraceful? How will it be able to avoid a

frequent sacrifice of its engagements to immediate necessity? How can it

undertake or execute any liberal or enlarged plans of public good?

Let us attend to what would be the effects of this situation in the very

first war in which we should happen to be engaged. We will presume, for

argument's sake, that the revenue arising from the impost duties

answers the purposes of a provision for the public debt and of a peace

establishment for the Union. Thus circumstanced, a war breaks out. What

would be the probable conduct of the government in such an emergency?

Taught by experience that proper dependence could not be placed on the

success of requisitions, unable by its own authority to lay hold of

fresh resources, and urged by considerations of national danger,

would it not be driven to the expedient of diverting the funds already

appropriated from their proper objects to the defense of the State? It

is not easy to see how a step of this kind could be avoided; and if it

should be taken, it is evident that it would prove the destruction of

public credit at the very moment that it was becoming essential to

the public safety. To imagine that at such a crisis credit might be

dispensed with, would be the extreme of infatuation. In the modern

system of war, nations the most wealthy are obliged to have recourse

to large loans. A country so little opulent as ours must feel this

necessity in a much stronger degree. But who would lend to a government

that prefaced its overtures for borrowing by an act which demonstrated

that no reliance could be placed on the steadiness of its measures for

paying? The loans it might be able to procure would be as limited in

their extent as burdensome in their conditions. They would be made

upon the same principles that usurers commonly lend to bankrupt and

fraudulent debtors, with a sparing hand and at enormous premiums.

It may perhaps be imagined that, from the scantiness of the resources

of the country, the necessity of diverting the established funds in the

case supposed would exist, though the national government should possess

an unrestrained power of taxation. But two considerations will serve

to quiet all apprehension on this head: one is, that we are sure the

resources of the community, in their full extent, will be brought into

activity for the benefit of the Union; the other is, that whatever

deficiences there may be, can without difficulty be supplied by loans.

The power of creating new funds upon new objects of taxation, by its own

authority, would enable the national government to borrow as far as

its necessities might require. Foreigners, as well as the citizens of

America, could then reasonably repose confidence in its engagements; but

to depend upon a government that must itself depend upon thirteen other

governments for the means of fulfilling its contracts, when once its

situation is clearly understood, would require a degree of credulity

not often to be met with in the pecuniary transactions of mankind, and

little reconcilable with the usual sharp-sightedness of avarice.

Reflections of this kind may have trifling weight with men who hope to

see realized in America the halcyon scenes of the poetic or fabulous

age; but to those who believe we are likely to experience a common

portion of the vicissitudes and calamities which have fallen to the lot

of other nations, they must appear entitled to serious attention. Such

men must behold the actual situation of their country with painful

solicitude, and deprecate the evils which ambition or revenge might,

with too much facility, inflict upon it.

PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 31

The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)

From the New York Packet. Tuesday, January 1, 1788.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

IN DISQUISITIONS of every kind, there are certain primary truths, or

first principles, upon which all subsequent reasonings must depend.

These contain an internal evidence which, antecedent to all reflection

or combination, commands the assent of the mind. Where it produces not

this effect, it must proceed either from some defect or disorder in the

organs of perception, or from the influence of some strong interest, or

passion, or prejudice. Of this nature are the maxims in geometry, that

"the whole is greater than its part; things equal to the same are equal

to one another; two straight lines cannot enclose a space; and all right

angles are equal to each other." Of the same nature are these other

maxims in ethics and politics, that there cannot be an effect without

a cause; that the means ought to be proportioned to the end; that every

power ought to be commensurate with its object; that there ought to be

no limitation of a power destined to effect a purpose which is itself

incapable of limitation. And there are other truths in the two latter

sciences which, if they cannot pretend to rank in the class of axioms,

are yet such direct inferences from them, and so obvious in themselves,

and so agreeable to the natural and unsophisticated dictates of

common-sense, that they challenge the assent of a sound and unbiased

mind, with a degree of force and conviction almost equally irresistible.

The objects of geometrical inquiry are so entirely abstracted from those

pursuits which stir up and put in motion the unruly passions of the

human heart, that mankind, without difficulty, adopt not only the more

simple theorems of the science, but even those abstruse paradoxes which,

however they may appear susceptible of demonstration, are at variance

with the natural conceptions which the mind, without the aid of

philosophy, would be led to entertain upon the subject. The INFINITE

DIVISIBILITY of matter, or, in other words, the INFINITE divisibility of

a FINITE thing, extending even to the minutest atom, is a point agreed

among geometricians, though not less incomprehensible to common-sense

than any of those mysteries in religion, against which the batteries of

infidelity have been so industriously leveled.

But in the sciences of morals and politics, men are found far less

tractable. To a certain degree, it is right and useful that this should

be the case. Caution and investigation are a necessary armor against

error and imposition. But this untractableness may be carried too far,

and may degenerate into obstinacy, perverseness, or disingenuity.

Though it cannot be pretended that the principles of moral and political

knowledge have, in general, the same degree of certainty with those of

the mathematics, yet they have much better claims in this respect than,

to judge from the conduct of men in particular situations, we should be

disposed to allow them. The obscurity is much oftener in the passions

and prejudices of the reasoner than in the subject. Men, upon too many

occasions, do not give their own understandings fair play; but, yielding

to some untoward bias, they entangle themselves in words and confound

themselves in subtleties.

How else could it happen (if we admit the objectors to be sincere in

their opposition), that positions so clear as those which manifest the

necessity of a general power of taxation in the government of the Union,

should have to encounter any adversaries among men of discernment?

Though these positions have been elsewhere fully stated, they will

perhaps not be improperly recapitulated in this place, as introductory

to an examination of what may have been offered by way of objection to

them. They are in substance as follows:

A government ought to contain in itself every power requisite to the

full accomplishment of the objects committed to its care, and to the

complete execution of the trusts for which it is responsible, free from

every other control but a regard to the public good and to the sense of

the people.

As the duties of superintending the national defense and of securing the

public peace against foreign or domestic violence involve a provision

for casualties and dangers to which no possible limits can be assigned,

the power of making that provision ought to know no other bounds than

the exigencies of the nation and the resources of the community.

As revenue is the essential engine by which the means of answering

the national exigencies must be procured, the power of procuring that

article in its full extent must necessarily be comprehended in that of

providing for those exigencies.

As theory and practice conspire to prove that the power of procuring

revenue is unavailing when exercised over the States in their collective

capacities, the federal government must of necessity be invested with an

unqualified power of taxation in the ordinary modes.

Did not experience evince the contrary, it would be natural to conclude

that the propriety of a general power of taxation in the national

government might safely be permitted to rest on the evidence of these

propositions, unassisted by any additional arguments or illustrations.

But we find, in fact, that the antagonists of the proposed Constitution,

so far from acquiescing in their justness or truth, seem to make their

principal and most zealous effort against this part of the plan. It

may therefore be satisfactory to analyze the arguments with which they

combat it.

Those of them which have been most labored with that view, seem in

substance to amount to this: "It is not true, because the exigencies of

the Union may not be susceptible of limitation, that its power of laying

taxes ought to be unconfined. Revenue is as requisite to the purposes of

the local administrations as to those of the Union; and the former are

at least of equal importance with the latter to the happiness of the

people. It is, therefore, as necessary that the State governments should

be able to command the means of supplying their wants, as that the

national government should possess the like faculty in respect to the

wants of the Union. But an indefinite power of taxation in the LATTER

might, and probably would in time, deprive the FORMER of the means of

providing for their own necessities; and would subject them entirely to

the mercy of the national legislature. As the laws of the Union are to

become the supreme law of the land, as it is to have power to pass all

laws that may be NECESSARY for carrying into execution the authorities

with which it is proposed to vest it, the national government might at

any time abolish the taxes imposed for State objects upon the pretense

of an interference with its own. It might allege a necessity of doing

this in order to give efficacy to the national revenues. And thus

all the resources of taxation might by degrees become the subjects of

federal monopoly, to the entire exclusion and destruction of the State

governments."

This mode of reasoning appears sometimes to turn upon the supposition

of usurpation in the national government; at other times it seems to be

designed only as a deduction from the constitutional operation of its

intended powers. It is only in the latter light that it can be

admitted to have any pretensions to fairness. The moment we launch into

conjectures about the usurpations of the federal government, we get into

an unfathomable abyss, and fairly put ourselves out of the reach of all

reasoning. Imagination may range at pleasure till it gets bewildered

amidst the labyrinths of an enchanted castle, and knows not on which

side to turn to extricate itself from the perplexities into which it has

so rashly adventured. Whatever may be the limits or modifications of the

powers of the Union, it is easy to imagine an endless train of possible

dangers; and by indulging an excess of jealousy and timidity, we may

bring ourselves to a state of absolute scepticism and irresolution. I

repeat here what I have observed in substance in another place, that all

observations founded upon the danger of usurpation ought to be referred

to the composition and structure of the government, not to the nature

or extent of its powers. The State governments, by their original

constitutions, are invested with complete sovereignty. In what does our

security consist against usurpation from that quarter? Doubtless in the

manner of their formation, and in a due dependence of those who are to

administer them upon the people. If the proposed construction of the

federal government be found, upon an impartial examination of it, to be

such as to afford, to a proper extent, the same species of security, all

apprehensions on the score of usurpation ought to be discarded.

It should not be forgotten that a disposition in the State governments

to encroach upon the rights of the Union is quite as probable as a

disposition in the Union to encroach upon the rights of the State

governments. What side would be likely to prevail in such a conflict,

must depend on the means which the contending parties could employ

toward insuring success. As in republics strength is always on the side

of the people, and as there are weighty reasons to induce a belief that

the State governments will commonly possess most influence over them,

the natural conclusion is that such contests will be most apt to end to

the disadvantage of the Union; and that there is greater probability of

encroachments by the members upon the federal head, than by the federal

head upon the members. But it is evident that all conjectures of this

kind must be extremely vague and fallible: and that it is by far the

safest course to lay them altogether aside, and to confine our attention

wholly to the nature and extent of the powers as they are delineated in

the Constitution. Every thing beyond this must be left to the prudence

and firmness of the people; who, as they will hold the scales in their

own hands, it is to be hoped, will always take care to preserve

the constitutional equilibrium between the general and the State

governments. Upon this ground, which is evidently the true one, it will

not be difficult to obviate the objections which have been made to an

indefinite power of taxation in the United States.

PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 32

The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)

From The Independent Journal. Wednesday, January 2, 1788.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

ALTHOUGH I am of opinion that there would be no real danger of the

consequences which seem to be apprehended to the State governments from

a power in the Union to control them in the levies of money, because

I am persuaded that the sense of the people, the extreme hazard of

provoking the resentments of the State governments, and a conviction of

the utility and necessity of local administrations for local purposes,

would be a complete barrier against the oppressive use of such a power;

yet I am willing here to allow, in its full extent, the justness of the

reasoning which requires that the individual States should possess an

independent and uncontrollable authority to raise their own revenues for

the supply of their own wants. And making this concession, I affirm that

(with the sole exception of duties on imports and exports) they would,

under the plan of the convention, retain that authority in the most

absolute and unqualified sense; and that an attempt on the part of the

national government to abridge them in the exercise of it, would be a

violent assumption of power, unwarranted by any article or clause of its

Constitution.

An entire consolidation of the States into one complete national

sovereignty would imply an entire subordination of the parts; and

whatever powers might remain in them, would be altogether dependent

on the general will. But as the plan of the convention aims only at

a partial union or consolidation, the State governments would clearly

retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before had, and which

were not, by that act, EXCLUSIVELY delegated to the United States. This

exclusive delegation, or rather this alienation, of State sovereignty,

would only exist in three cases: where the Constitution in express terms

granted an exclusive authority to the Union; where it granted in one

instance an authority to the Union, and in another prohibited the States

from exercising the like authority; and where it granted an authority

to the Union, to which a similar authority in the States would be

absolutely and totally CONTRADICTORY and REPUGNANT. I use these terms to

distinguish this last case from another which might appear to resemble

it, but which would, in fact, be essentially different; I mean where the

exercise of a concurrent jurisdiction might be productive of occasional

interferences in the POLICY of any branch of administration, but

would not imply any direct contradiction or repugnancy in point of

constitutional authority. These three cases of exclusive jurisdiction

in the federal government may be exemplified by the following instances:

The last clause but one in the eighth section of the first article

provides expressly that Congress shall exercise "EXCLUSIVE LEGISLATION"

over the district to be appropriated as the seat of government. This

answers to the first case. The first clause of the same section empowers

Congress "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises"; and

the second clause of the tenth section of the same article declares

that, "NO STATE SHALL, without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts

or duties on imports or exports, except for the purpose of executing its

inspection laws." Hence would result an exclusive power in the Union

to lay duties on imports and exports, with the particular exception

mentioned; but this power is abridged by another clause, which declares

that no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State;

in consequence of which qualification, it now only extends to the DUTIES

ON IMPORTS. This answers to the second case. The third will be found in

that clause which declares that Congress shall have power "to establish

an UNIFORM RULE of naturalization throughout the United States." This

must necessarily be exclusive; because if each State had power to

prescribe a DISTINCT RULE, there could not be a UNIFORM RULE.

A case which may perhaps be thought to resemble the latter, but which

is in fact widely different, affects the question immediately under

consideration. I mean the power of imposing taxes on all articles other

than exports and imports. This, I contend, is manifestly a concurrent

and coequal authority in the United States and in the individual States.

There is plainly no expression in the granting clause which makes that

power EXCLUSIVE in the Union. There is no independent clause or sentence

which prohibits the States from exercising it. So far is this from being

the case, that a plain and conclusive argument to the contrary is to be

deduced from the restraint laid upon the States in relation to duties on

imports and exports. This restriction implies an admission that, if it

were not inserted, the States would possess the power it excludes;

and it implies a further admission, that as to all other taxes, the

authority of the States remains undiminished. In any other view it would

be both unnecessary and dangerous; it would be unnecessary, because if

the grant to the Union of the power of laying such duties implied the

exclusion of the States, or even their subordination in this particular,

there could be no need of such a restriction; it would be dangerous,

because the introduction of it leads directly to the conclusion which

has been mentioned, and which, if the reasoning of the objectors be

just, could not have been intended; I mean that the States, in all cases

to which the restriction did not apply, would have a concurrent power

of taxation with the Union. The restriction in question amounts to what

lawyers call a NEGATIVE PREGNANT that is, a NEGATION of one thing, and

an AFFIRMANCE of another; a negation of the authority of the States

to impose taxes on imports and exports, and an affirmance of their

authority to impose them on all other articles. It would be mere

sophistry to argue that it was meant to exclude them ABSOLUTELY from the

imposition of taxes of the former kind, and to leave them at liberty

to lay others SUBJECT TO THE CONTROL of the national legislature.

The restraining or prohibitory clause only says, that they shall not,

WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF CONGRESS, lay such duties; and if we are to

understand this in the sense last mentioned, the Constitution would then

be made to introduce a formal provision for the sake of a very absurd

conclusion; which is, that the States, WITH THE CONSENT of the national

legislature, might tax imports and exports; and that they might tax

every other article, UNLESS CONTROLLED by the same body. If this was the

intention, why not leave it, in the first instance, to what is alleged

to be the natural operation of the original clause, conferring a general

power of taxation upon the Union? It is evident that this could not

have been the intention, and that it will not bear a construction of the

kind.

As to a supposition of repugnancy between the power of taxation in the

States and in the Union, it cannot be supported in that sense which

would be requisite to work an exclusion of the States. It is, indeed,

possible that a tax might be laid on a particular article by a State

which might render it INEXPEDIENT that thus a further tax should be

laid on the same article by the Union; but it would not imply a

constitutional inability to impose a further tax. The quantity of the

imposition, the expediency or inexpediency of an increase on either

side, would be mutually questions of prudence; but there would be

involved no direct contradiction of power. The particular policy of

the national and of the State systems of finance might now and then not

exactly coincide, and might require reciprocal forbearances. It is not,

however a mere possibility of inconvenience in the exercise of powers,

but an immediate constitutional repugnancy that can by implication

alienate and extinguish a pre-existing right of sovereignty.

The necessity of a concurrent jurisdiction in certain cases results from

the division of the sovereign power; and the rule that all authorities,

of which the States are not explicitly divested in favor of the Union,

remain with them in full vigor, is not a theoretical consequence of that

division, but is clearly admitted by the whole tenor of the instrument

which contains the articles of the proposed Constitution. We there find

that, notwithstanding the affirmative grants of general authorities,

there has been the most pointed care in those cases where it was deemed

improper that the like authorities should reside in the States, to

insert negative clauses prohibiting the exercise of them by the States.

The tenth section of the first article consists altogether of such

provisions. This circumstance is a clear indication of the sense of the

convention, and furnishes a rule of interpretation out of the body of

the act, which justifies the position I have advanced and refutes every

hypothesis to the contrary.

PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 33

The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)

From The Independent Journal. Wednesday, January 2, 1788.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

THE residue of the argument against the provisions of the Constitution

in respect to taxation is ingrafted upon the following clause. The last

clause of the eighth section of the first article of the plan under

consideration authorizes the national legislature "to make all laws

which shall be NECESSARY and PROPER for carrying into execution THE

POWERS by that Constitution vested in the government of the United

States, or in any department or officer thereof"; and the second clause

of the sixth article declares, "that the Constitution and the laws of

the United States made IN PURSUANCE THEREOF, and the treaties made by

their authority shall be the SUPREME LAW of the land, any thing in the

constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."

These two clauses have been the source of much virulent invective and

petulant declamation against the proposed Constitution. They have been

held up to the people in all the exaggerated colors of misrepresentation

as the pernicious engines by which their local governments were to be

destroyed and their liberties exterminated; as the hideous monster whose

devouring jaws would spare neither sex nor age, nor high nor low, nor

sacred nor profane; and yet, strange as it may appear, after all this

clamor, to those who may not have happened to contemplate them in

the same light, it may be affirmed with perfect confidence that the

constitutional operation of the intended government would be precisely

the same, if these clauses were entirely obliterated, as if they were

repeated in every article. They are only declaratory of a truth which

would have resulted by necessary and unavoidable implication from the

very act of constituting a federal government, and vesting it with

certain specified powers. This is so clear a proposition, that

moderation itself can scarcely listen to the railings which have been

so copiously vented against this part of the plan, without emotions that

disturb its equanimity.

What is a power, but the ability or faculty of doing a thing? What

is the ability to do a thing, but the power of employing the MEANS

necessary to its execution? What is a LEGISLATIVE power, but a power of

making LAWS? What are the MEANS to execute a LEGISLATIVE power but LAWS?

What is the power of laying and collecting taxes, but a LEGISLATIVE

POWER, or a power of MAKING LAWS, to lay and collect taxes? What are the

proper means of executing such a power, but NECESSARY and PROPER laws?

This simple train of inquiry furnishes us at once with a test by which

to judge of the true nature of the clause complained of. It conducts us

to this palpable truth, that a power to lay and collect taxes must be

a power to pass all laws NECESSARY and PROPER for the execution of

that power; and what does the unfortunate and calumniated provision in

question do more than declare the same truth, to wit, that the national

legislature, to whom the power of laying and collecting taxes had been

previously given, might, in the execution of that power, pass all laws

NECESSARY and PROPER to carry it into effect? I have applied these

observations thus particularly to the power of taxation, because it is

the immediate subject under consideration, and because it is the most

important of the authorities proposed to be conferred upon the Union.

But the same process will lead to the same result, in relation to

all other powers declared in the Constitution. And it is EXPRESSLY to

execute these powers that the sweeping clause, as it has been affectedly

called, authorizes the national legislature to pass all NECESSARY and

PROPER laws. If there is any thing exceptionable, it must be sought

for in the specific powers upon which this general declaration is

predicated. The declaration itself, though it may be chargeable with

tautology or redundancy, is at least perfectly harmless.

But SUSPICION may ask, Why then was it introduced? The answer is, that

it could only have been done for greater caution, and to guard

against all cavilling refinements in those who might hereafter feel

a disposition to curtail and evade the legitimate authorities of the

Union. The Convention probably foresaw, what it has been a principal aim

of these papers to inculcate, that the danger which most threatens our

political welfare is that the State governments will finally sap the

foundations of the Union; and might therefore think it necessary, in so

cardinal a point, to leave nothing to construction. Whatever may have

been the inducement to it, the wisdom of the precaution is evident from

the cry which has been raised against it; as that very cry betrays

a disposition to question the great and essential truth which it is

manifestly the object of that provision to declare.

But it may be again asked, Who is to judge of the NECESSITY and

PROPRIETY of the laws to be passed for executing the powers of the

Union? I answer, first, that this question arises as well and as fully

upon the simple grant of those powers as upon the declaratory clause;

and I answer, in the second place, that the national government, like

every other, must judge, in the first instance, of the proper exercise

of its powers, and its constituents in the last. If the federal

government should overpass the just bounds of its authority and make

a tyrannical use of its powers, the people, whose creature it is, must

appeal to the standard they have formed, and take such measures to

redress the injury done to the Constitution as the exigency may suggest

and prudence justify. The propriety of a law, in a constitutional light,

must always be determined by the nature of the powers upon which it is

founded. Suppose, by some forced constructions of its authority (which,

indeed, cannot easily be imagined), the Federal legislature should

attempt to vary the law of descent in any State, would it not be evident

that, in making such an attempt, it had exceeded its jurisdiction, and

infringed upon that of the State? Suppose, again, that upon the pretense

of an interference with its revenues, it should undertake to abrogate

a landtax imposed by the authority of a State; would it not be equally

evident that this was an invasion of that concurrent jurisdiction in

respect to this species of tax, which its Constitution plainly supposes

to exist in the State governments? If there ever should be a doubt on

this head, the credit of it will be entirely due to those reasoners who,

in the imprudent zeal of their animosity to the plan of the convention,

have labored to envelop it in a cloud calculated to obscure the plainest

and simplest truths.

But it is said that the laws of the Union are to be the SUPREME LAW of

the land. But what inference can be drawn from this, or what would they

amount to, if they were not to be supreme? It is evident they would

amount to nothing. A LAW, by the very meaning of the term, includes

supremacy. It is a rule which those to whom it is prescribed are

bound to observe. This results from every political association. If

individuals enter into a state of society, the laws of that society

must be the supreme regulator of their conduct. If a number of political

societies enter into a larger political society, the laws which

the latter may enact, pursuant to the powers intrusted to it by its

constitution, must necessarily be supreme over those societies, and

the individuals of whom they are composed. It would otherwise be a mere

treaty, dependent on the good faith of the parties, and not a government,

which is only another word for POLITICAL POWER AND SUPREMACY. But it

will not follow from this doctrine that acts of the large society which

are NOT PURSUANT to its constitutional powers, but which are invasions

of the residuary authorities of the smaller societies, will become the

supreme law of the land. These will be merely acts of usurpation, and

will deserve to be treated as such. Hence we perceive that the clause

which declares the supremacy of the laws of the Union, like the one

we have just before considered, only declares a truth, which flows

immediately and necessarily from the institution of a federal

government. It will not, I presume, have escaped observation, that

it EXPRESSLY confines this supremacy to laws made PURSUANT TO THE

CONSTITUTION; which I mention merely as an instance of caution in the

convention; since that limitation would have been to be understood,

though it had not been expressed.

Though a law, therefore, laying a tax for the use of the United States

would be supreme in its nature, and could not legally be opposed or

controlled, yet a law for abrogating or preventing the collection of

a tax laid by the authority of the State, (unless upon imports and

exports), would not be the supreme law of the land, but a usurpation

of power not granted by the Constitution. As far as an improper

accumulation of taxes on the same object might tend to render

the collection difficult or precarious, this would be a mutual

inconvenience, not arising from a superiority or defect of power on

either side, but from an injudicious exercise of power by one or the

other, in a manner equally disadvantageous to both. It is to be hoped

and presumed, however, that mutual interest would dictate a concert in

this respect which would avoid any material inconvenience. The inference

from the whole is, that the individual States would, under the proposed

Constitution, retain an independent and uncontrollable authority to

raise revenue to any extent of which they may stand in need, by every

kind of taxation, except duties on imports and exports. It will be shown

in the next paper that this CONCURRENT JURISDICTION in the article of

taxation was the only admissible substitute for an entire subordination,

in respect to this branch of power, of the State authority to that of

the Union.

PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 34

The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)

From The Independent Journal. Saturday, January 5, 1788.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

I FLATTER myself it has been clearly shown in my last number that the

particular States, under the proposed Constitution, would have COEQUAL

authority with the Union in the article of revenue, except as to duties

on imports. As this leaves open to the States far the greatest part of

the resources of the community, there can be no color for the assertion

that they would not possess means as abundant as could be desired for

the supply of their own wants, independent of all external control. That

the field is sufficiently wide will more fully appear when we come to

advert to the inconsiderable share of the public expenses for which it

will fall to the lot of the State governments to provide.

To argue upon abstract principles that this co-ordinate authority cannot

exist, is to set up supposition and theory against fact and reality.

However proper such reasonings might be to show that a thing OUGHT NOT

TO EXIST, they are wholly to be rejected when they are made use of

to prove that it does not exist contrary to the evidence of the fact

itself. It is well known that in the Roman republic the legislative

authority, in the last resort, resided for ages in two different

political bodies not as branches of the same legislature, but as

distinct and independent legislatures, in each of which an opposite

interest prevailed: in one the patrician; in the other, the plebian.

Many arguments might have been adduced to prove the unfitness of two

such seemingly contradictory authorities, each having power to ANNUL

or REPEAL the acts of the other. But a man would have been regarded as

frantic who should have attempted at Rome to disprove their existence.

It will be readily understood that I allude to the COMITIA CENTURIATA

and the COMITIA TRIBUTA. The former, in which the people voted by

centuries, was so arranged as to give a superiority to the patrician

interest; in the latter, in which numbers prevailed, the plebian

interest had an entire predominancy. And yet these two legislatures

coexisted for ages, and the Roman republic attained to the utmost height

of human greatness.

In the case particularly under consideration, there is no such

contradiction as appears in the example cited; there is no power on

either side to annul the acts of the other. And in practice there is

little reason to apprehend any inconvenience; because, in a short course

of time, the wants of the States will naturally reduce themselves within

A VERY NARROW COMPASS; and in the interim, the United States will, in

all probability, find it convenient to abstain wholly from those objects

to which the particular States would be inclined to resort.

To form a more precise judgment of the true merits of this question, it

will be well to advert to the proportion between the objects that will

require a federal provision in respect to revenue, and those which

will require a State provision. We shall discover that the former are

altogether unlimited, and that the latter are circumscribed within very

moderate bounds. In pursuing this inquiry, we must bear in mind that we

are not to confine our view to the present period, but to look forward

to remote futurity. Constitutions of civil government are not to be

framed upon a calculation of existing exigencies, but upon a combination

of these with the probable exigencies of ages, according to the natural

and tried course of human affairs. Nothing, therefore, can be more

fallacious than to infer the extent of any power, proper to be lodged in

the national government, from an estimate of its immediate necessities.

There ought to be a CAPACITY to provide for future contingencies as

they may happen; and as these are illimitable in their nature, it is

impossible safely to limit that capacity. It is true, perhaps, that a

computation might be made with sufficient accuracy to answer the

purpose of the quantity of revenue requisite to discharge the subsisting

engagements of the Union, and to maintain those establishments which,

for some time to come, would suffice in time of peace. But would it be

wise, or would it not rather be the extreme of folly, to stop at this

point, and to leave the government intrusted with the care of the

national defense in a state of absolute incapacity to provide for the

protection of the community against future invasions of the public

peace, by foreign war or domestic convulsions? If, on the contrary, we

ought to exceed this point, where can we stop, short of an indefinite

power of providing for emergencies as they may arise? Though it is

easy to assert, in general terms, the possibility of forming a rational

judgment of a due provision against probable dangers, yet we may safely

challenge those who make the assertion to bring forward their data, and

may affirm that they would be found as vague and uncertain as any that

could be produced to establish the probable duration of the world.

Observations confined to the mere prospects of internal attacks can

deserve no weight; though even these will admit of no satisfactory

calculation: but if we mean to be a commercial people, it must form

a part of our policy to be able one day to defend that commerce. The

support of a navy and of naval wars would involve contingencies that

must baffle all the efforts of political arithmetic.

Admitting that we ought to try the novel and absurd experiment in

politics of tying up the hands of government from offensive war founded

upon reasons of state, yet certainly we ought not to disable it from

guarding the community against the ambition or enmity of other nations.

A cloud has been for some time hanging over the European world. If it

should break forth into a storm, who can insure us that in its progress

a part of its fury would not be spent upon us? No reasonable man would

hastily pronounce that we are entirely out of its reach. Or if

the combustible materials that now seem to be collecting should be

dissipated without coming to maturity, or if a flame should be kindled

without extending to us, what security can we have that our tranquillity

will long remain undisturbed from some other cause or from some other

quarter? Let us recollect that peace or war will not always be left to

our option; that however moderate or unambitious we may be, we cannot

count upon the moderation, or hope to extinguish the ambition of others.

Who could have imagined at the conclusion of the last war that France

and Britain, wearied and exhausted as they both were, would so soon

have looked with so hostile an aspect upon each other? To judge from the

history of mankind, we shall be compelled to conclude that the fiery

and destructive passions of war reign in the human breast with much more

powerful sway than the mild and beneficent sentiments of peace; and

that to model our political systems upon speculations of lasting

tranquillity, is to calculate on the weaker springs of the human

character.

What are the chief sources of expense in every government? What has

occasioned that enormous accumulation of debts with which several of

the European nations are oppressed? The answers plainly is, wars and

rebellions; the support of those institutions which are necessary

to guard the body politic against these two most mortal diseases of

society. The expenses arising from those institutions which are

relative to the mere domestic police of a state, to the support of its

legislative, executive, and judicial departments, with their different

appendages, and to the encouragement of agriculture and manufactures

(which will comprehend almost all the objects of state expenditure),

are insignificant in comparison with those which relate to the national

defense.

In the kingdom of Great Britain, where all the ostentatious apparatus of

monarchy is to be provided for, not above a fifteenth part of the annual

income of the nation is appropriated to the class of expenses last

mentioned; the other fourteen fifteenths are absorbed in the payment of

the interest of debts contracted for carrying on the wars in which that

country has been engaged, and in the maintenance of fleets and armies.

If, on the one hand, it should be observed that the expenses incurred in

the prosecution of the ambitious enterprises and vainglorious pursuits

of a monarchy are not a proper standard by which to judge of those which

might be necessary in a republic, it ought, on the other hand, to be

remarked that there should be as great a disproportion between the

profusion and extravagance of a wealthy kingdom in its domestic

administration, and the frugality and economy which in that particular

become the modest simplicity of republican government. If we balance a

proper deduction from one side against that which it is supposed ought

to be made from the other, the proportion may still be considered as

holding good.

But let us advert to the large debt which we have ourselves contracted

in a single war, and let us only calculate on a common share of the

events which disturb the peace of nations, and we shall instantly

perceive, without the aid of any elaborate illustration, that there must

always be an immense disproportion between the objects of federal and

state expenditures. It is true that several of the States, separately,

are encumbered with considerable debts, which are an excrescence of

the late war. But this cannot happen again, if the proposed system be

adopted; and when these debts are discharged, the only call for revenue

of any consequence, which the State governments will continue to

experience, will be for the mere support of their respective civil list;

to which, if we add all contingencies, the total amount in every State

ought to fall considerably short of two hundred thousand pounds.

In framing a government for posterity as well as ourselves, we ought, in

those provisions which are designed to be permanent, to calculate, not

on temporary, but on permanent causes of expense. If this principle be a

just one our attention would be directed to a provision in favor of

the State governments for an annual sum of about two hundred thousand

pounds; while the exigencies of the Union could be susceptible of no

limits, even in imagination. In this view of the subject, by what logic

can it be maintained that the local governments ought to command, in

perpetuity, an EXCLUSIVE source of revenue for any sum beyond the

extent of two hundred thousand pounds? To extend its power further, in

EXCLUSION of the authority of the Union, would be to take the resources

of the community out of those hands which stood in need of them for the

public welfare, in order to put them into other hands which could have

no just or proper occasion for them.

Suppose, then, the convention had been inclined to proceed upon the

principle of a repartition of the objects of revenue, between the Union

and its members, in PROPORTION to their comparative necessities; what

particular fund could have been selected for the use of the States, that

would not either have been too much or too little too little for their

present, too much for their future wants? As to the line of separation

between external and internal taxes, this would leave to the States, at

a rough computation, the command of two thirds of the resources of the

community to defray from a tenth to a twentieth part of its expenses;

and to the Union, one third of the resources of the community, to defray

from nine tenths to nineteen twentieths of its expenses. If we desert

this boundary and content ourselves with leaving to the States an

exclusive power of taxing houses and lands, there would still be a great

disproportion between the MEANS and the END; the possession of one third

of the resources of the community to supply, at most, one tenth of its

wants. If any fund could have been selected and appropriated, equal to

and not greater than the object, it would have been inadequate to the

discharge of the existing debts of the particular States, and would have

left them dependent on the Union for a provision for this purpose.

The preceding train of observation will justify the position which has

been elsewhere laid down, that "A CONCURRENT JURISDICTION in the

article of taxation was the only admissible substitute for an entire

subordination, in respect to this branch of power, of State authority to

that of the Union." Any separation of the objects of revenue that could

have been fallen upon, would have amounted to a sacrifice of the great

INTERESTS of the Union to the POWER of the individual States. The

convention thought the concurrent jurisdiction preferable to that

subordination; and it is evident that it has at least the merit of

reconciling an indefinite constitutional power of taxation in the

Federal government with an adequate and independent power in the States

to provide for their own necessities. There remain a few other lights,

in which this important subject of taxation will claim a further

consideration.

PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 35

The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)

For the Independent Journal. Saturday, January 5, 1788

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

BEFORE we proceed to examine any other objections to an indefinite power

of taxation in the Union, I shall make one general remark; which is,

that if the jurisdiction of the national government, in the article of

revenue, should be restricted to particular objects, it would naturally

occasion an undue proportion of the public burdens to fall upon those

objects. Two evils would spring from this source: the oppression of

particular branches of industry; and an unequal distribution of the

taxes, as well among the several States as among the citizens of the

same State.

Suppose, as has been contended for, the federal power of taxation were

to be confined to duties on imports, it is evident that the government,

for want of being able to command other resources, would frequently be

tempted to extend these duties to an injurious excess. There are persons

who imagine that they can never be carried to too great a length; since

the higher they are, the more it is alleged they will tend to discourage

an extravagant consumption, to produce a favorable balance of trade,

and to promote domestic manufactures. But all extremes are pernicious

in various ways. Exorbitant duties on imported articles would beget a

general spirit of smuggling; which is always prejudicial to the fair

trader, and eventually to the revenue itself: they tend to render

other classes of the community tributary, in an improper degree, to the

manufacturing classes, to whom they give a premature monopoly of the

markets; they sometimes force industry out of its more natural channels

into others in which it flows with less advantage; and in the last

place, they oppress the merchant, who is often obliged to pay them

himself without any retribution from the consumer. When the demand is

equal to the quantity of goods at market, the consumer generally

pays the duty; but when the markets happen to be overstocked, a great

proportion falls upon the merchant, and sometimes not only exhausts

his profits, but breaks in upon his capital. I am apt to think that

a division of the duty, between the seller and the buyer, more often

happens than is commonly imagined. It is not always possible to raise

the price of a commodity in exact proportion to every additional

imposition laid upon it. The merchant, especially in a country of small

commercial capital, is often under a necessity of keeping prices down in

order to a more expeditious sale.

The maxim that the consumer is the payer, is so much oftener true than

the reverse of the proposition, that it is far more equitable that the

duties on imports should go into a common stock, than that they should

redound to the exclusive benefit of the importing States. But it is not

so generally true as to render it equitable, that those duties should

form the only national fund. When they are paid by the merchant they

operate as an additional tax upon the importing State, whose citizens

pay their proportion of them in the character of consumers. In this view

they are productive of inequality among the States; which inequality

would be increased with the increased extent of the duties. The

confinement of the national revenues to this species of imposts would

be attended with inequality, from a different cause, between the

manufacturing and the non-manufacturing States. The States which can

go farthest towards the supply of their own wants, by their own

manufactures, will not, according to their numbers or wealth, consume so

great a proportion of imported articles as those States which are not

in the same favorable situation. They would not, therefore, in this mode

alone contribute to the public treasury in a ratio to their abilities.

To make them do this it is necessary that recourse be had to excises,

the proper objects of which are particular kinds of manufactures. New

York is more deeply interested in these considerations than such of

her citizens as contend for limiting the power of the Union to external

taxation may be aware of. New York is an importing State, and is not

likely speedily to be, to any great extent, a manufacturing State.

She would, of course, suffer in a double light from restraining the

jurisdiction of the Union to commercial imposts.

So far as these observations tend to inculcate a danger of the import

duties being extended to an injurious extreme it may be observed,

conformably to a remark made in another part of these papers, that the

interest of the revenue itself would be a sufficient guard against such

an extreme. I readily admit that this would be the case, as long as

other resources were open; but if the avenues to them were closed, HOPE,

stimulated by necessity, would beget experiments, fortified by rigorous

precautions and additional penalties, which, for a time, would have the

intended effect, till there had been leisure to contrive expedients to

elude these new precautions. The first success would be apt to inspire

false opinions, which it might require a long course of subsequent

experience to correct. Necessity, especially in politics, often

occasions false hopes, false reasonings, and a system of measures

correspondingly erroneous. But even if this supposed excess should not

be a consequence of the limitation of the federal power of taxation, the

inequalities spoken of would still ensue, though not in the same degree,

from the other causes that have been noticed. Let us now return to the

examination of objections.

One which, if we may judge from the frequency of its repetition, seems

most to be relied on, is, that the House of Representatives is not

sufficiently numerous for the reception of all the different classes of

citizens, in order to combine the interests and feelings of every

part of the community, and to produce a due sympathy between the

representative body and its constituents. This argument presents itself

under a very specious and seducing form; and is well calculated to lay

hold of the prejudices of those to whom it is addressed. But when we

come to dissect it with attention, it will appear to be made up of

nothing but fair-sounding words. The object it seems to aim at is,

in the first place, impracticable, and in the sense in which it

is contended for, is unnecessary. I reserve for another place the

discussion of the question which relates to the sufficiency of the

representative body in respect to numbers, and shall content myself

with examining here the particular use which has been made of a contrary

supposition, in reference to the immediate subject of our inquiries.

The idea of an actual representation of all classes of the people, by

persons of each class, is altogether visionary. Unless it were expressly

provided in the Constitution, that each different occupation should

send one or more members, the thing would never take place in

practice. Mechanics and manufacturers will always be inclined, with few

exceptions, to give their votes to merchants, in preference to persons

of their own professions or trades. Those discerning citizens are well

aware that the mechanic and manufacturing arts furnish the materials

of mercantile enterprise and industry. Many of them, indeed, are

immediately connected with the operations of commerce. They know that

the merchant is their natural patron and friend; and they are aware,

that however great the confidence they may justly feel in their own good

sense, their interests can be more effectually promoted by the merchant

than by themselves. They are sensible that their habits in life have not

been such as to give them those acquired endowments, without which, in

a deliberative assembly, the greatest natural abilities are for the

most part useless; and that the influence and weight, and superior

acquirements of the merchants render them more equal to a contest with

any spirit which might happen to infuse itself into the public

councils, unfriendly to the manufacturing and trading interests. These

considerations, and many others that might be mentioned prove, and

experience confirms it, that artisans and manufacturers will commonly

be disposed to bestow their votes upon merchants and those whom

they recommend. We must therefore consider merchants as the natural

representatives of all these classes of the community.

With regard to the learned professions, little need be observed; they

truly form no distinct interest in society, and according to their

situation and talents, will be indiscriminately the objects of

the confidence and choice of each other, and of other parts of the

community.

Nothing remains but the landed interest; and this, in a political view,

and particularly in relation to taxes, I take to be perfectly united,

from the wealthiest landlord down to the poorest tenant. No tax can be

laid on land which will not affect the proprietor of millions of acres

as well as the proprietor of a single acre. Every landholder will

therefore have a common interest to keep the taxes on land as low as

possible; and common interest may always be reckoned upon as the surest

bond of sympathy. But if we even could suppose a distinction of interest

between the opulent landholder and the middling farmer, what reason is

there to conclude, that the first would stand a better chance of being

deputed to the national legislature than the last? If we take fact as

our guide, and look into our own senate and assembly, we shall find that

moderate proprietors of land prevail in both; nor is this less the case

in the senate, which consists of a smaller number, than in the assembly,

which is composed of a greater number. Where the qualifications of the

electors are the same, whether they have to choose a small or a

large number, their votes will fall upon those in whom they have most

confidence; whether these happen to be men of large fortunes, or of

moderate property, or of no property at all.

It is said to be necessary, that all classes of citizens should have

some of their own number in the representative body, in order that their

feelings and interests may be the better understood and attended to.

But we have seen that this will never happen under any arrangement

that leaves the votes of the people free. Where this is the case, the

representative body, with too few exceptions to have any influence

on the spirit of the government, will be composed of landholders,

merchants, and men of the learned professions. But where is the danger

that the interests and feelings of the different classes of citizens

will not be understood or attended to by these three descriptions of

men? Will not the landholder know and feel whatever will promote or

insure the interest of landed property? And will he not, from his own

interest in that species of property, be sufficiently prone to resist

every attempt to prejudice or encumber it? Will not the merchant

understand and be disposed to cultivate, as far as may be proper, the

interests of the mechanic and manufacturing arts, to which his commerce

is so nearly allied? Will not the man of the learned profession, who

will feel a neutrality to the rivalships between the different branches

of industry, be likely to prove an impartial arbiter between them, ready

to promote either, so far as it shall appear to him conducive to the

general interests of the society?

If we take into the account the momentary humors or dispositions which

may happen to prevail in particular parts of the society, and to which

a wise administration will never be inattentive, is the man whose

situation leads to extensive inquiry and information less likely to be

a competent judge of their nature, extent, and foundation than one

whose observation does not travel beyond the circle of his neighbors and

acquaintances? Is it not natural that a man who is a candidate for

the favor of the people, and who is dependent on the suffrages of his

fellow-citizens for the continuance of his public honors, should take

care to inform himself of their dispositions and inclinations, and

should be willing to allow them their proper degree of influence upon

his conduct? This dependence, and the necessity of being bound himself,

and his posterity, by the laws to which he gives his assent, are

the true, and they are the strong chords of sympathy between the

representative and the constituent.

There is no part of the administration of government that requires

extensive information and a thorough knowledge of the principles of

political economy, so much as the business of taxation. The man who

understands those principles best will be least likely to resort to

oppressive expedients, or sacrifice any particular class of citizens

to the procurement of revenue. It might be demonstrated that the most

productive system of finance will always be the least burdensome. There

can be no doubt that in order to a judicious exercise of the power of

taxation, it is necessary that the person in whose hands it should be

acquainted with the general genius, habits, and modes of thinking of the

people at large, and with the resources of the country. And this is

all that can be reasonably meant by a knowledge of the interests and

feelings of the people. In any other sense the proposition has either

no meaning, or an absurd one. And in that sense let every considerate

citizen judge for himself where the requisite qualification is most

likely to be found.

PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 36

The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)

From the New York Packet. Tuesday, January 8, 1788.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

WE HAVE seen that the result of the observations, to which the foregoing

number has been principally devoted, is, that from the natural operation

of the different interests and views of the various classes of the

community, whether the representation of the people be more or less

numerous, it will consist almost entirely of proprietors of land, of

merchants, and of members of the learned professions, who will truly

represent all those different interests and views. If it should be

objected that we have seen other descriptions of men in the local

legislatures, I answer that it is admitted there are exceptions to the

rule, but not in sufficient number to influence the general complexion

or character of the government. There are strong minds in every walk of

life that will rise superior to the disadvantages of situation, and will

command the tribute due to their merit, not only from the classes to

which they particularly belong, but from the society in general. The

door ought to be equally open to all; and I trust, for the credit

of human nature, that we shall see examples of such vigorous plants

flourishing in the soil of federal as well as of State legislation; but

occasional instances of this sort will not render the reasoning founded

upon the general course of things, less conclusive.

The subject might be placed in several other lights that would all lead

to the same result; and in particular it might be asked, What greater

affinity or relation of interest can be conceived between the carpenter

and blacksmith, and the linen manufacturer or stocking weaver, than

between the merchant and either of them? It is notorious that there are

often as great rivalships between different branches of the mechanic or

manufacturing arts as there are between any of the departments of labor

and industry; so that, unless the representative body were to be far

more numerous than would be consistent with any idea of regularity or

wisdom in its deliberations, it is impossible that what seems to be the

spirit of the objection we have been considering should ever be realized

in practice. But I forbear to dwell any longer on a matter which has

hitherto worn too loose a garb to admit even of an accurate inspection

of its real shape or tendency.

There is another objection of a somewhat more precise nature that claims

our attention. It has been asserted that a power of internal taxation

in the national legislature could never be exercised with advantage, as

well from the want of a sufficient knowledge of local circumstances, as

from an interference between the revenue laws of the Union and of the

particular States. The supposition of a want of proper knowledge seems

to be entirely destitute of foundation. If any question is depending

in a State legislature respecting one of the counties, which demands

a knowledge of local details, how is it acquired? No doubt from the

information of the members of the county. Cannot the like knowledge be

obtained in the national legislature from the representatives of each

State? And is it not to be presumed that the men who will generally be

sent there will be possessed of the necessary degree of intelligence

to be able to communicate that information? Is the knowledge of

local circumstances, as applied to taxation, a minute topographical

acquaintance with all the mountains, rivers, streams, highways,

and bypaths in each State; or is it a general acquaintance with its

situation and resources, with the state of its agriculture, commerce,

manufactures, with the nature of its products and consumptions, with the

different degrees and kinds of its wealth, property, and industry?

Nations in general, even under governments of the more popular kind,

usually commit the administration of their finances to single men or

to boards composed of a few individuals, who digest and prepare, in the

first instance, the plans of taxation, which are afterwards passed into

laws by the authority of the sovereign or legislature.

Inquisitive and enlightened statesmen are deemed everywhere best

qualified to make a judicious selection of the objects proper for

revenue; which is a clear indication, as far as the sense of mankind

can have weight in the question, of the species of knowledge of local

circumstances requisite to the purposes of taxation.

The taxes intended to be comprised under the general denomination of

internal taxes may be subdivided into those of the DIRECT and those

of the INDIRECT kind. Though the objection be made to both, yet the

reasoning upon it seems to be confined to the former branch. And indeed,

as to the latter, by which must be understood duties and excises on

articles of consumption, one is at a loss to conceive what can be the

nature of the difficulties apprehended. The knowledge relating to them

must evidently be of a kind that will either be suggested by the nature

of the article itself, or can easily be procured from any well-informed

man, especially of the mercantile class. The circumstances that may

distinguish its situation in one State from its situation in another

must be few, simple, and easy to be comprehended. The principal thing

to be attended to, would be to avoid those articles which had been

previously appropriated to the use of a particular State; and there

could be no difficulty in ascertaining the revenue system of each. This

could always be known from the respective codes of laws, as well as from

the information of the members from the several States.

The objection, when applied to real property or to houses and lands,

appears to have, at first sight, more foundation, but even in this view

it will not bear a close examination. Land taxes are commonly laid in

one of two modes, either by ACTUAL valuations, permanent or periodical,

or by OCCASIONAL assessments, at the discretion, or according to the

best judgment, of certain officers whose duty it is to make them. In

either case, the EXECUTION of the business, which alone requires the

knowledge of local details, must be devolved upon discreet persons in

the character of commissioners or assessors, elected by the people or

appointed by the government for the purpose. All that the law can do

must be to name the persons or to prescribe the manner of their election

or appointment, to fix their numbers and qualifications and to draw the

general outlines of their powers and duties. And what is there in all

this that cannot as well be performed by the national legislature as by

a State legislature? The attention of either can only reach to general

principles; local details, as already observed, must be referred to

those who are to execute the plan.

But there is a simple point of view in which this matter may be placed

that must be altogether satisfactory. The national legislature can make

use of the SYSTEM OF EACH STATE WITHIN THAT STATE. The method of laying

and collecting this species of taxes in each State can, in all its

parts, be adopted and employed by the federal government.

Let it be recollected that the proportion of these taxes is not to

be left to the discretion of the national legislature, but is to be

determined by the numbers of each State, as described in the second

section of the first article. An actual census or enumeration of the

people must furnish the rule, a circumstance which effectually shuts the

door to partiality or oppression. The abuse of this power of taxation

seems to have been provided against with guarded circumspection. In

addition to the precaution just mentioned, there is a provision that

"all duties, imposts, and excises shall be UNIFORM throughout the United

States."

It has been very properly observed by different speakers and writers

on the side of the Constitution, that if the exercise of the power of

internal taxation by the Union should be discovered on experiment to be

really inconvenient, the federal government may then forbear the use of

it, and have recourse to requisitions in its stead. By way of answer to

this, it has been triumphantly asked, Why not in the first instance

omit that ambiguous power, and rely upon the latter resource? Two solid

answers may be given. The first is, that the exercise of that power, if

convenient, will be preferable, because it will be more effectual;

and it is impossible to prove in theory, or otherwise than by the

experiment, that it cannot be advantageously exercised. The contrary,

indeed, appears most probable. The second answer is, that the existence

of such a power in the Constitution will have a strong influence in

giving efficacy to requisitions. When the States know that the Union

can apply itself without their agency, it will be a powerful motive for

exertion on their part.

As to the interference of the revenue laws of the Union, and of

its members, we have already seen that there can be no clashing or

repugnancy of authority. The laws cannot, therefore, in a legal sense,

interfere with each other; and it is far from impossible to avoid an

interference even in the policy of their different systems. An effectual

expedient for this purpose will be, mutually, to abstain from those

objects which either side may have first had recourse to. As neither can

CONTROL the other, each will have an obvious and sensible interest in

this reciprocal forbearance. And where there is an IMMEDIATE common

interest, we may safely count upon its operation. When the particular

debts of the States are done away, and their expenses come to be limited

within their natural compass, the possibility almost of interference

will vanish. A small land tax will answer the purpose of the States, and

will be their most simple and most fit resource.

Many spectres have been raised out of this power of internal taxation,

to excite the apprehensions of the people: double sets of revenue

officers, a duplication of their burdens by double taxations, and the

frightful forms of odious and oppressive poll-taxes, have been played

off with all the ingenious dexterity of political legerdemain.

As to the first point, there are two cases in which there can be no room

for double sets of officers: one, where the right of imposing the tax is

exclusively vested in the Union, which applies to the duties on imports;

the other, where the object has not fallen under any State regulation

or provision, which may be applicable to a variety of objects. In other

cases, the probability is that the United States will either wholly

abstain from the objects preoccupied for local purposes, or will make

use of the State officers and State regulations for collecting the

additional imposition. This will best answer the views of revenue,

because it will save expense in the collection, and will best avoid any

occasion of disgust to the State governments and to the people. At

all events, here is a practicable expedient for avoiding such an

inconvenience; and nothing more can be required than to show that evils

predicted to not necessarily result from the plan.

As to any argument derived from a supposed system of influence, it is

a sufficient answer to say that it ought not to be presumed; but the

supposition is susceptible of a more precise answer. If such a spirit

should infest the councils of the Union, the most certain road to the

accomplishment of its aim would be to employ the State officers as much

as possible, and to attach them to the Union by an accumulation of their

emoluments. This would serve to turn the tide of State influence into

the channels of the national government, instead of making federal

influence flow in an opposite and adverse current. But all suppositions

of this kind are invidious, and ought to be banished from the

consideration of the great question before the people. They can answer

no other end than to cast a mist over the truth.

As to the suggestion of double taxation, the answer is plain. The wants

of the Union are to be supplied in one way or another; if to be done by

the authority of the federal government, it will not be to be done by

that of the State government. The quantity of taxes to be paid by the

community must be the same in either case; with this advantage, if

the provision is to be made by the Union that the capital resource of

commercial imposts, which is the most convenient branch of revenue, can

be prudently improved to a much greater extent under federal than under

State regulation, and of course will render it less necessary to recur

to more inconvenient methods; and with this further advantage, that as

far as there may be any real difficulty in the exercise of the power of

internal taxation, it will impose a disposition to greater care in the

choice and arrangement of the means; and must naturally tend to make it

a fixed point of policy in the national administration to go as far as

may be practicable in making the luxury of the rich tributary to the

public treasury, in order to diminish the necessity of those impositions

which might create dissatisfaction in the poorer and most numerous

classes of the society. Happy it is when the interest which the

government has in the preservation of its own power, coincides with a

proper distribution of the public burdens, and tends to guard the least

wealthy part of the community from oppression!

As to poll taxes, I, without scruple, confess my disapprobation of them;

and though they have prevailed from an early period in those States(1)

which have uniformly been the most tenacious of their rights, I

should lament to see them introduced into practice under the national

government. But does it follow because there is a power to lay them that

they will actually be laid? Every State in the Union has power to impose

taxes of this kind; and yet in several of them they are unknown in

practice. Are the State governments to be stigmatized as tyrannies,

because they possess this power? If they are not, with what propriety

can the like power justify such a charge against the national

government, or even be urged as an obstacle to its adoption? As little

friendly as I am to the species of imposition, I still feel a thorough

conviction that the power of having recourse to it ought to exist in the

federal government. There are certain emergencies of nations, in which

expedients, that in the ordinary state of things ought to be forborne,

become essential to the public weal. And the government, from the

possibility of such emergencies, ought ever to have the option of making

use of them. The real scarcity of objects in this country, which may

be considered as productive sources of revenue, is a reason peculiar

to itself, for not abridging the discretion of the national councils

in this respect. There may exist certain critical and tempestuous

conjunctures of the State, in which a poll tax may become an inestimable

resource. And as I know nothing to exempt this portion of the globe

from the common calamities that have befallen other parts of it, I

acknowledge my aversion to every project that is calculated to disarm

the government of a single weapon, which in any possible contingency

might be usefully employed for the general defense and security.

(I have now gone through the examination of such of the powers proposed

to be vested in the United States, which may be considered as having an

immediate relation to the energy of the government; and have endeavored

to answer the principal objections which have been made to them. I have

passed over in silence those minor authorities, which are either too

inconsiderable to have been thought worthy of the hostilities of the

opponents of the Constitution, or of too manifest propriety to admit of

controversy. The mass of judiciary power, however, might have claimed

an investigation under this head, had it not been for the consideration

that its organization and its extent may be more advantageously

considered in connection. This has determined me to refer it to the

branch of our inquiries upon which we shall next enter.)(E1)

(I have now gone through the examination of those powers proposed to be

conferred upon the federal government which relate more peculiarly to

its energy, and to its efficiency for answering the great and primary

objects of union. There are others which, though omitted here, will, in

order to render the view of the subject more complete, be taken notice

of under the next head of our inquiries. I flatter myself the progress

already made will have sufficed to satisfy the candid and judicious

part of the community that some of the objections which have been

most strenuously urged against the Constitution, and which were

most formidable in their first appearance, are not only destitute of

substance, but if they had operated in the formation of the plan, would

have rendered it incompetent to the great ends of public happiness and

national prosperity. I equally flatter myself that a further and more

critical investigation of the system will serve to recommend it still

more to every sincere and disinterested advocate for good government

and will leave no doubt with men of this character of the propriety

and expediency of adopting it. Happy will it be for ourselves, and more

honorable for human nature, if we have wisdom and virtue enough to set

so glorious an example to mankind!)(E1)

PUBLIUS

1. The New England States.

E1. Two versions of this paragraph appear in different editions.

FEDERALIST No. 37

Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form

of Government.

From the Daily Advertiser. Friday, January 11, 1788.

MADISON

To the People of the State of New York:

IN REVIEWING the defects of the existing Confederation, and showing that

they cannot be supplied by a government of less energy than that before

the public, several of the most important principles of the latter

fell of course under consideration. But as the ultimate object of

these papers is to determine clearly and fully the merits of this

Constitution, and the expediency of adopting it, our plan cannot be

complete without taking a more critical and thorough survey of the work

of the convention, without examining it on all its sides, comparing

it in all its parts, and calculating its probable effects. That this

remaining task may be executed under impressions conducive to a just

and fair result, some reflections must in this place be indulged, which

candor previously suggests.

It is a misfortune, inseparable from human affairs, that public

measures are rarely investigated with that spirit of moderation which

is essential to a just estimate of their real tendency to advance

or obstruct the public good; and that this spirit is more apt to be

diminished than promoted, by those occasions which require an unusual

exercise of it. To those who have been led by experience to attend to

this consideration, it could not appear surprising, that the act of the

convention, which recommends so many important changes and innovations,

which may be viewed in so many lights and relations, and which touches

the springs of so many passions and interests, should find or excite

dispositions unfriendly, both on one side and on the other, to a fair

discussion and accurate judgment of its merits. In some, it has been too

evident from their own publications, that they have scanned the proposed

Constitution, not only with a predisposition to censure, but with a

predetermination to condemn; as the language held by others betrays an

opposite predetermination or bias, which must render their opinions also

of little moment in the question. In placing, however, these different

characters on a level, with respect to the weight of their opinions, I

wish not to insinuate that there may not be a material difference in

the purity of their intentions. It is but just to remark in favor of the

latter description, that as our situation is universally admitted to be

peculiarly critical, and to require indispensably that something should

be done for our relief, the predetermined patron of what has been

actually done may have taken his bias from the weight of these

considerations, as well as from considerations of a sinister nature. The

predetermined adversary, on the other hand, can have been governed by no

venial motive whatever. The intentions of the first may be upright, as

they may on the contrary be culpable. The views of the last cannot be

upright, and must be culpable. But the truth is, that these papers are

not addressed to persons falling under either of these characters. They

solicit the attention of those only, who add to a sincere zeal for the

happiness of their country, a temper favorable to a just estimate of the

means of promoting it.

Persons of this character will proceed to an examination of the plan

submitted by the convention, not only without a disposition to find

or to magnify faults; but will see the propriety of reflecting, that

a faultless plan was not to be expected. Nor will they barely make

allowances for the errors which may be chargeable on the fallibility to

which the convention, as a body of men, were liable; but will keep in

mind, that they themselves also are but men, and ought not to assume an

infallibility in rejudging the fallible opinions of others.

With equal readiness will it be perceived, that besides these

inducements to candor, many allowances ought to be made for the

difficulties inherent in the very nature of the undertaking referred to

the convention.

The novelty of the undertaking immediately strikes us. It has been

shown in the course of these papers, that the existing Confederation is

founded on principles which are fallacious; that we must consequently

change this first foundation, and with it the superstructure resting

upon it. It has been shown, that the other confederacies which could

be consulted as precedents have been vitiated by the same erroneous

principles, and can therefore furnish no other light than that of

beacons, which give warning of the course to be shunned, without

pointing out that which ought to be pursued. The most that the

convention could do in such a situation, was to avoid the errors

suggested by the past experience of other countries, as well as of our

own; and to provide a convenient mode of rectifying their own errors, as

future experiences may unfold them.

Among the difficulties encountered by the convention, a very important

one must have lain in combining the requisite stability and energy in

government, with the inviolable attention due to liberty and to the

republican form. Without substantially accomplishing this part of their

undertaking, they would have very imperfectly fulfilled the object of

their appointment, or the expectation of the public; yet that it could

not be easily accomplished, will be denied by no one who is unwilling to

betray his ignorance of the subject. Energy in government is essential

to that security against external and internal danger, and to that

prompt and salutary execution of the laws which enter into the very

definition of good government. Stability in government is essential to

national character and to the advantages annexed to it, as well as to

that repose and confidence in the minds of the people, which are

among the chief blessings of civil society. An irregular and mutable

legislation is not more an evil in itself than it is odious to the

people; and it may be pronounced with assurance that the people of

this country, enlightened as they are with regard to the nature, and

interested, as the great body of them are, in the effects of good

government, will never be satisfied till some remedy be applied to

the vicissitudes and uncertainties which characterize the State

administrations. On comparing, however, these valuable ingredients with

the vital principles of liberty, we must perceive at once the difficulty

of mingling them together in their due proportions. The genius of

republican liberty seems to demand on one side, not only that all power

should be derived from the people, but that those intrusted with it

should be kept in independence on the people, by a short duration of

their appointments; and that even during this short period the trust

should be placed not in a few, but a number of hands. Stability, on

the contrary, requires that the hands in which power is lodged should

continue for a length of time the same. A frequent change of men will

result from a frequent return of elections; and a frequent change of

measures from a frequent change of men: whilst energy in government

requires not only a certain duration of power, but the execution of it

by a single hand.

How far the convention may have succeeded in this part of their work,

will better appear on a more accurate view of it. From the cursory view

here taken, it must clearly appear to have been an arduous part.

Not less arduous must have been the task of marking the proper line of

partition between the authority of the general and that of the

State governments. Every man will be sensible of this difficulty, in

proportion as he has been accustomed to contemplate and discriminate

objects extensive and complicated in their nature. The faculties of

the mind itself have never yet been distinguished and defined, with

satisfactory precision, by all the efforts of the most acute and

metaphysical philosophers. Sense, perception, judgment, desire,

volition, memory, imagination, are found to be separated by such

delicate shades and minute gradations that their boundaries have

eluded the most subtle investigations, and remain a pregnant source of

ingenious disquisition and controversy. The boundaries between the great

kingdom of nature, and, still more, between the various provinces,

and lesser portions, into which they are subdivided, afford another

illustration of the same important truth. The most sagacious and

laborious naturalists have never yet succeeded in tracing with certainty

the line which separates the district of vegetable life from the

neighboring region of unorganized matter, or which marks the termination

of the former and the commencement of the animal empire. A still greater

obscurity lies in the distinctive characters by which the objects

in each of these great departments of nature have been arranged and

assorted.

When we pass from the works of nature, in which all the delineations

are perfectly accurate, and appear to be otherwise only from the

imperfection of the eye which surveys them, to the institutions of man,

in which the obscurity arises as well from the object itself as from

the organ by which it is contemplated, we must perceive the necessity of

moderating still further our expectations and hopes from the efforts

of human sagacity. Experience has instructed us that no skill in the

science of government has yet been able to discriminate and define,

with sufficient certainty, its three great provinces the legislative,

executive, and judiciary; or even the privileges and powers of the

different legislative branches. Questions daily occur in the course of

practice, which prove the obscurity which reins in these subjects, and

which puzzle the greatest adepts in political science.

The experience of ages, with the continued and combined labors of the

most enlightened legislatures and jurists, has been equally unsuccessful

in delineating the several objects and limits of different codes of laws

and different tribunals of justice. The precise extent of the common

law, and the statute law, the maritime law, the ecclesiastical law, the

law of corporations, and other local laws and customs, remains still to

be clearly and finally established in Great Britain, where accuracy in

such subjects has been more industriously pursued than in any other part

of the world. The jurisdiction of her several courts, general and local,

of law, of equity, of admiralty, etc., is not less a source of frequent

and intricate discussions, sufficiently denoting the indeterminate

limits by which they are respectively circumscribed. All new laws,

though penned with the greatest technical skill, and passed on the

fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less

obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained

by a series of particular discussions and adjudications. Besides the

obscurity arising from the complexity of objects, and the imperfection

of the human faculties, the medium through which the conceptions of men

are conveyed to each other adds a fresh embarrassment. The use of words

is to express ideas. Perspicuity, therefore, requires not only that the

ideas should be distinctly formed, but that they should be expressed by

words distinctly and exclusively appropriate to them. But no language is

so copious as to supply words and phrases for every complex idea, or

so correct as not to include many equivocally denoting different

ideas. Hence it must happen that however accurately objects may be

discriminated in themselves, and however accurately the discrimination

may be considered, the definition of them may be rendered inaccurate

by the inaccuracy of the terms in which it is delivered. And this

unavoidable inaccuracy must be greater or less, according to the

complexity and novelty of the objects defined. When the Almighty himself

condescends to address mankind in their own language, his meaning,

luminous as it must be, is rendered dim and doubtful by the cloudy

medium through which it is communicated.

Here, then, are three sources of vague and incorrect definitions:

indistinctness of the object, imperfection of the organ of conception,

inadequateness of the vehicle of ideas. Any one of these must produce a

certain degree of obscurity. The convention, in delineating the boundary

between the federal and State jurisdictions, must have experienced the

full effect of them all.

To the difficulties already mentioned may be added the interfering

pretensions of the larger and smaller States. We cannot err in supposing

that the former would contend for a participation in the government,

fully proportioned to their superior wealth and importance; and that the

latter would not be less tenacious of the equality at present enjoyed by

them. We may well suppose that neither side would entirely yield to the

other, and consequently that the struggle could be terminated only by

compromise. It is extremely probable, also, that after the ratio

of representation had been adjusted, this very compromise must have

produced a fresh struggle between the same parties, to give such a turn

to the organization of the government, and to the distribution of its

powers, as would increase the importance of the branches, in forming

which they had respectively obtained the greatest share of influence.

There are features in the Constitution which warrant each of these

suppositions; and as far as either of them is well founded, it shows

that the convention must have been compelled to sacrifice theoretical

propriety to the force of extraneous considerations.

Nor could it have been the large and small States only, which would

marshal themselves in opposition to each other on various points. Other

combinations, resulting from a difference of local position and policy,

must have created additional difficulties. As every State may be divided

into different districts, and its citizens into different classes,

which give birth to contending interests and local jealousies, so the

different parts of the United States are distinguished from each other

by a variety of circumstances, which produce a like effect on a larger

scale. And although this variety of interests, for reasons sufficiently

explained in a former paper, may have a salutary influence on the

administration of the government when formed, yet every one must be

sensible of the contrary influence, which must have been experienced in

the task of forming it.

Would it be wonderful if, under the pressure of all these difficulties,

the convention should have been forced into some deviations from that

artificial structure and regular symmetry which an abstract view of the

subject might lead an ingenious theorist to bestow on a Constitution

planned in his closet or in his imagination? The real wonder is that

so many difficulties should have been surmounted, and surmounted with a

unanimity almost as unprecedented as it must have been unexpected. It is

impossible for any man of candor to reflect on this circumstance without

partaking of the astonishment. It is impossible for the man of pious

reflection not to perceive in it a finger of that Almighty hand which

has been so frequently and signally extended to our relief in the

critical stages of the revolution.

We had occasion, in a former paper, to take notice of the repeated

trials which have been unsuccessfully made in the United Netherlands

for reforming the baneful and notorious vices of their constitution. The

history of almost all the great councils and consultations held among

mankind for reconciling their discordant opinions, assuaging their

mutual jealousies, and adjusting their respective interests, is a

history of factions, contentions, and disappointments, and may be

classed among the most dark and degraded pictures which display the

infirmities and depravities of the human character. If, in a few

scattered instances, a brighter aspect is presented, they serve only as

exceptions to admonish us of the general truth; and by their lustre to

darken the gloom of the adverse prospect to which they are contrasted.

In revolving the causes from which these exceptions result, and applying

them to the particular instances before us, we are necessarily led to

two important conclusions. The first is, that the convention must have

enjoyed, in a very singular degree, an exemption from the pestilential

influence of party animosities the disease most incident to deliberative

bodies, and most apt to contaminate their proceedings. The second

conclusion is that all the deputations composing the convention were

satisfactorily accommodated by the final act, or were induced to accede

to it by a deep conviction of the necessity of sacrificing private

opinions and partial interests to the public good, and by a despair of

seeing this necessity diminished by delays or by new experiments.

FEDERALIST No. 38

The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the

New Plan Exposed.

From The Independent Journal. Saturday, January 12, 1788.

MADISON

To the People of the State of New York:

IT IS not a little remarkable that in every case reported by ancient

history, in which government has been established with deliberation and

consent, the task of framing it has not been committed to an assembly

of men, but has been performed by some individual citizen of preeminent

wisdom and approved integrity.

Minos, we learn, was the primitive founder of the government of Crete,

as Zaleucus was of that of the Locrians. Theseus first, and after him

Draco and Solon, instituted the government of Athens. Lycurgus was the

lawgiver of Sparta. The foundation of the original government of Rome

was laid by Romulus, and the work completed by two of his elective

successors, Numa and Tullius Hostilius. On the abolition of royalty the

consular administration was substituted by Brutus, who stepped forward

with a project for such a reform, which, he alleged, had been prepared

by Tullius Hostilius, and to which his address obtained the assent and

ratification of the senate and people. This remark is applicable to

confederate governments also. Amphictyon, we are told, was the author

of that which bore his name. The Achaean league received its first birth

from Achaeus, and its second from Aratus.

What degree of agency these reputed lawgivers might have in their

respective establishments, or how far they might be clothed with

the legitimate authority of the people, cannot in every instance be

ascertained. In some, however, the proceeding was strictly regular.

Draco appears to have been intrusted by the people of Athens with

indefinite powers to reform its government and laws. And Solon,

according to Plutarch, was in a manner compelled, by the universal

suffrage of his fellow-citizens, to take upon him the sole and absolute

power of new-modeling the constitution. The proceedings under Lycurgus

were less regular; but as far as the advocates for a regular reform

could prevail, they all turned their eyes towards the single efforts of

that celebrated patriot and sage, instead of seeking to bring about a

revolution by the intervention of a deliberative body of citizens.

Whence could it have proceeded, that a people, jealous as the Greeks

were of their liberty, should so far abandon the rules of caution as to

place their destiny in the hands of a single citizen? Whence could it

have proceeded, that the Athenians, a people who would not suffer an

army to be commanded by fewer than ten generals, and who required no

other proof of danger to their liberties than the illustrious merit of

a fellow-citizen, should consider one illustrious citizen as a more

eligible depositary of the fortunes of themselves and their posterity,

than a select body of citizens, from whose common deliberations

more wisdom, as well as more safety, might have been expected? These

questions cannot be fully answered, without supposing that the fears

of discord and disunion among a number of counsellors exceeded the

apprehension of treachery or incapacity in a single individual. History

informs us, likewise, of the difficulties with which these celebrated

reformers had to contend, as well as the expedients which they were

obliged to employ in order to carry their reforms into effect. Solon,

who seems to have indulged a more temporizing policy, confessed that

he had not given to his countrymen the government best suited to their

happiness, but most tolerable to their prejudices. And Lycurgus, more

true to his object, was under the necessity of mixing a portion of

violence with the authority of superstition, and of securing his final

success by a voluntary renunciation, first of his country, and then

of his life. If these lessons teach us, on one hand, to admire the

improvement made by America on the ancient mode of preparing and

establishing regular plans of government, they serve not less, on the

other, to admonish us of the hazards and difficulties incident to such

experiments, and of the great imprudence of unnecessarily multiplying

them.

Is it an unreasonable conjecture, that the errors which may be contained

in the plan of the convention are such as have resulted rather from

the defect of antecedent experience on this complicated and difficult

subject, than from a want of accuracy or care in the investigation of

it; and, consequently such as will not be ascertained until an actual

trial shall have pointed them out? This conjecture is rendered probable,

not only by many considerations of a general nature, but by the

particular case of the Articles of Confederation. It is observable that

among the numerous objections and amendments suggested by the several

States, when these articles were submitted for their ratification,

not one is found which alludes to the great and radical error which on

actual trial has discovered itself. And if we except the observations

which New Jersey was led to make, rather by her local situation, than by

her peculiar foresight, it may be questioned whether a single suggestion

was of sufficient moment to justify a revision of the system. There

is abundant reason, nevertheless, to suppose that immaterial as these

objections were, they would have been adhered to with a very dangerous

inflexibility, in some States, had not a zeal for their opinions and

supposed interests been stifled by the more powerful sentiment of

self-preservation. One State, we may remember, persisted for several

years in refusing her concurrence, although the enemy remained the whole

period at our gates, or rather in the very bowels of our country. Nor

was her pliancy in the end effected by a less motive, than the fear of

being chargeable with protracting the public calamities, and endangering

the event of the contest. Every candid reader will make the proper

reflections on these important facts.

A patient who finds his disorder daily growing worse, and that an

efficacious remedy can no longer be delayed without extreme danger,

after coolly revolving his situation, and the characters of different

physicians, selects and calls in such of them as he judges most capable

of administering relief, and best entitled to his confidence. The

physicians attend; the case of the patient is carefully examined; a

consultation is held; they are unanimously agreed that the symptoms are

critical, but that the case, with proper and timely relief, is so far

from being desperate, that it may be made to issue in an improvement of

his constitution. They are equally unanimous in prescribing the remedy,

by which this happy effect is to be produced. The prescription is no

sooner made known, however, than a number of persons interpose, and,

without denying the reality or danger of the disorder, assure the

patient that the prescription will be poison to his constitution, and

forbid him, under pain of certain death, to make use of it. Might not

the patient reasonably demand, before he ventured to follow this advice,

that the authors of it should at least agree among themselves on some

other remedy to be substituted? And if he found them differing as

much from one another as from his first counsellors, would he not

act prudently in trying the experiment unanimously recommended by the

latter, rather than be hearkening to those who could neither deny the

necessity of a speedy remedy, nor agree in proposing one?

Such a patient and in such a situation is America at this moment.

She has been sensible of her malady. She has obtained a regular and

unanimous advice from men of her own deliberate choice. And she is

warned by others against following this advice under pain of the most

fatal consequences. Do the monitors deny the reality of her danger? No.

Do they deny the necessity of some speedy and powerful remedy? No. Are

they agreed, are any two of them agreed, in their objections to the

remedy proposed, or in the proper one to be substituted? Let them speak

for themselves. This one tells us that the proposed Constitution ought

to be rejected, because it is not a confederation of the States, but

a government over individuals. Another admits that it ought to be a

government over individuals to a certain extent, but by no means to

the extent proposed. A third does not object to the government over

individuals, or to the extent proposed, but to the want of a bill of

rights. A fourth concurs in the absolute necessity of a bill of rights,

but contends that it ought to be declaratory, not of the personal

rights of individuals, but of the rights reserved to the States in their

political capacity. A fifth is of opinion that a bill of rights of any

sort would be superfluous and misplaced, and that the plan would be

unexceptionable but for the fatal power of regulating the times and

places of election. An objector in a large State exclaims loudly against

the unreasonable equality of representation in the Senate. An objector

in a small State is equally loud against the dangerous inequality in

the House of Representatives. From this quarter, we are alarmed with the

amazing expense, from the number of persons who are to administer

the new government. From another quarter, and sometimes from the same

quarter, on another occasion, the cry is that the Congress will be but

a shadow of a representation, and that the government would be far less

objectionable if the number and the expense were doubled. A patriot in

a State that does not import or export, discerns insuperable objections

against the power of direct taxation. The patriotic adversary in a State

of great exports and imports, is not less dissatisfied that the whole

burden of taxes may be thrown on consumption. This politician discovers

in the Constitution a direct and irresistible tendency to monarchy; that

is equally sure it will end in aristocracy. Another is puzzled to say

which of these shapes it will ultimately assume, but sees clearly it

must be one or other of them; whilst a fourth is not wanting, who with

no less confidence affirms that the Constitution is so far from having a

bias towards either of these dangers, that the weight on that side

will not be sufficient to keep it upright and firm against its opposite

propensities. With another class of adversaries to the Constitution the

language is that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments

are intermixed in such a manner as to contradict all the ideas of

regular government and all the requisite precautions in favor of

liberty. Whilst this objection circulates in vague and general

expressions, there are but a few who lend their sanction to it. Let each

one come forward with his particular explanation, and scarce any two are

exactly agreed upon the subject. In the eyes of one the junction of the

Senate with the President in the responsible function of appointing to

offices, instead of vesting this executive power in the Executive alone,

is the vicious part of the organization. To another, the exclusion

of the House of Representatives, whose numbers alone could be a due

security against corruption and partiality in the exercise of such

a power, is equally obnoxious. With another, the admission of the

President into any share of a power which ever must be a dangerous

engine in the hands of the executive magistrate, is an unpardonable

violation of the maxims of republican jealousy. No part of the

arrangement, according to some, is more inadmissible than the trial of

impeachments by the Senate, which is alternately a member both of the

legislative and executive departments, when this power so evidently

belonged to the judiciary department. "We concur fully," reply others,

"in the objection to this part of the plan, but we can never agree

that a reference of impeachments to the judiciary authority would be an

amendment of the error. Our principal dislike to the organization arises

from the extensive powers already lodged in that department." Even

among the zealous patrons of a council of state the most irreconcilable

variance is discovered concerning the mode in which it ought to be

constituted. The demand of one gentleman is, that the council should

consist of a small number to be appointed by the most numerous branch of

the legislature. Another would prefer a larger number, and considers it

as a fundamental condition that the appointment should be made by the

President himself.

As it can give no umbrage to the writers against the plan of the federal

Constitution, let us suppose, that as they are the most zealous, so they

are also the most sagacious, of those who think the late convention