Hellenica

Produced by John Bickers

HELLENICA

By Xenophon

Translation by H. G. Dakyns

Xenophon the Athenian was born 431 B.C. He was a

pupil of Socrates. He marched with the Spartans,

and was exiled from Athens. Sparta gave him land

and property in Scillus, where he lived for many

years before having to move once more, to settle

in Corinth. He died in 354 B.C.

The Hellenica is his chronicle of the history of

the Hellenes from 411 to 359 B.C., starting as a

continuation of Thucydides, and becoming his own

brand of work from Book III onwards.

PREPARER'S NOTE

This was typed from Dakyns' series, "The Works of Xenophon," a

four-volume set. The complete list of Xenophon's works (though there is

doubt about some of these) is:

Work Number of books

The Anabasis 7

The Hellenica 7

The Cyropaedia 8

The Memorabilia 4

The Symposium 1

The Economist 1

On Horsemanship 1

The Sportsman 1

The Cavalry General 1

The Apology 1

On Revenues 1

The Hiero 1

The Agesilaus 1

The Polity of the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians 2

Text in brackets "{}" is my transliteration of Greek text into English

using an Oxford English Dictionary alphabet table. The diacritical marks

have been lost.

HELLENICA

BOOK I

I

B.C. 411. To follow the order of events (1). A few days later

Thymochares arrived from Athens with a few ships, when another sea fight

between the Lacedaemonians and Athenians at once took place, in which

the former, under the command of Agesandridas, gained the victory.

(1) Lit. "after these events"; but is hard to conjecture to what

events the author refers. For the order of events and the

connection between the closing chapter of Thuc. viii. 109, and the

opening words of the "Hellenica," see introductory remarks above.

The scene of this sea-fight is, I think, the Hellespont.

Another short interval brings us to a morning in early winter, when

Dorieus, the son of Diagoras, was entering the Hellespont with fourteen

ships from Rhodes at break of day. The Athenian day-watch descrying him,

signalled to the generals, and they, with twenty sail, put out to sea to

attack him. Dorieus made good his escape, and, as he shook himself free

of the narrows, (2) ran his triremes aground off Rhoeteum. When the

Athenians had come to close quarters, the fighting commenced, and was

sustained at once from ships and shore, until at length the Athenians

retired to their main camp at Madytus, having achieved nothing.

(2) Lit. "as he opened" {os enoige}. This is still a mariner's phrase

in modern Greek, if I am rightly informed.

Meanwhile Mindarus, while sacrificing to Athena at Ilium, had observed

the battle. He at once hastened to the sea, and getting his own triremes

afloat, sailed out to pick up the ships with Dorieus. The Athenians on

their side put out to meet him, and engaged him off Abydos. From early

morning till the afternoon the fight was kept up close to the shore.

(3) Victory and defeat hung still in even balance, when Alcibiades

came sailing up with eighteen ships. Thereupon the Peloponnesians

fled towards Abydos, where, however, Pharnabazus brought them timely

assistance. (4) Mounted on horseback, he pushed forward into the sea as

far as his horse would let him, doing battle himself, and encouraging

his troopers and the infantry alike to play their parts. Then the

Peloponnesians, ranging their ships in close-packed order, and drawing

up their battle line in proximity to the land, kept up the fight. At

length the Athenians, having captured thirty of the enemy's vessels

without their crews, and having recovered those of their own which

they had previously lost, set sail for Sestos. Here the fleet, with the

exception of forty vessels, dispersed in different directions outside

the Hellespont, to collect money; while Thrasylus, one of the generals,

sailed to Athens to report what had happened, and to beg for a

reinforcement of troops and ships. After the above incidents,

Tissaphernes arrived in the Hellespont, and received a visit from

Alcibiades, who presented him with a single ship, bringing with him

tokens of friendship and gifts, whereupon Tissaphernes seized him and

shut him up in Sardis, giving out that the king's orders were to go to

war with the Athenians. Thirty days later Alcibiades, accompanied by

Mantitheus, who had been captured in Caria, managed to procure horses

and escaped by night to Clazomenae.

(3) The original has a somewhat more poetical ring. The author uses

the old Attic or Ionic word {eona}. This is a mark of style, of

which we shall have many instances. One might perhaps produce

something of the effect here by translating: "the battle hugged

the strand."

(4) Or, "came to their aid along the shore."

B.C. 410. And now the Athenians at Sestos, hearing that Mindarus was

meditating an attack upon them with a squadron of sixty sail, gave

him the slip, and under cover of night escaped to Cardia. Hither also

Alcibiades repaired from Clazomenae, having with him five triremes and

a light skiff; but on learning that the Peloponnesian fleet had left

Abydos and was in full sail for Cyzicus, he set off himself by land to

Sestos, giving orders to the fleet to sail round and join him there.

Presently the vessels arrived, and he was on the point of putting out to

sea with everything ready for action, when Theramenes, with a fleet of

twenty ships from Macedonia, entered the port, and at the same instant

Thrasybulus, with a second fleet of twenty sail from Thasos, both

squadrons having been engaged in collecting money. Bidding these

officers also follow him with all speed, as soon as they had taken out

their large sails and cleared for action, Alcibiades set sail himself

for Parium. During the following night the united squadron, consisting

now of eighty-six vessels, stood out to sea from Parium, and reached

Proconnesus next morning, about the hour of breakfast. Here they learnt

that Mindarus was in Cyzicus, and that Pharnabazus, with a body of

infantry, was with him. Accordingly they waited the whole of this day at

Proconnesus. On the following day Alcibiades summoned an assembly,

and addressing the men in terms of encouragement, warned them that a

threefold service was expected of them; that they must be ready for a

sea fight, a land fight, and a wall fight all at once, "for look you,"

said he, "we have no money, but the enemy has unlimited supplies from

the king."

Now, on the previous day, as soon as they were come to moorings, he had

collected all the sea-going craft of the island, big and little alike,

under his own control, that no one might report the number of his

squadron to the enemy, and he had further caused a proclamation to be

made, that any one caught sailing across to the opposite coast would be

punished with death. When the meeting was over, he got his ships ready

for action, and stood out to sea towards Cyzicus in torrents of rain.

Off Cyzicus the sky cleared, and the sun shone out and revealed to him

the spectacle of Mindarus's vessels, sixty in number, exercising at some

distance from the harbour, and, in fact, intercepted by himself. The

Peloponnesians, perceiving at a glance the greatly increased number of

the Athenian galleys, and noting their proximity to the port, made haste

to reach the land, where they brought their vessels to anchor in a

body, and prepared to engage the enemy as he sailed to the attack. But

Alcibiades, sailing round with twenty of his vessels, came to land and

disembarked. Seeing this, Mindarus also landed, and in the engagement

which ensued he fell fighting, whilst those who were with him took to

flight. As for the enemy's ships, the Athenians succeeded in capturing

the whole of them (with the exception of the Syracusan vessels,

which were burnt by their crews), and made off with their prizes to

Proconnesus. From thence on the following day they sailed to attack

Cyzicus. The men of that place, seeing that the Peloponnesians and

Pharnabazus had evacuated the town, admitted the Athenians. Here

Alcibiades remained twenty days, obtaining large sums of money from

the Cyzicenes, but otherwise inflicting no sort of mischief on the

community. He then sailed back to Proconnesus, and from there to

Perinthus and Selybria. The inhabitants of the former place welcomed his

troops into their city, but the Selybrians preferred to give money,

and so escape the admission of the troops. Continuing the voyage the

squadron reached Chrysopolis in Chalcedonia, (5) where they built a

fort, and established a custom-house to collect the tithe dues which

they levied on all merchantmen passing through the Straits from the

Black Sea. Besides this, a detachment of thirty ships was left there

under the two generals, Theramenes and Eubulus, with instructions not

only to keep a look-out on the port itself and on all traders passing

through the channel, but generally to injure the enemy in any way which

might present itself. This done, the rest of the generals hastened back

to the Hellespont.

(5) This is the common spelling, but the coins of Calchedon have the

letters {KALKH}, and so the name is written in the best MSS. of

Herodotus, Xenophon, and other writers, by whom the place is

named. See "Dict. of Greek and Roman Geog." "Chalcedon."

Now a despatch from Hippocrates, Mindarus's vice-admiral, (6) had been

intercepted on its way to Lacedaemon, and taken to Athens. It ran

as follows (in broad Doric): (7) "Ships gone; Mindarus dead; the men

starving; at our wits' end what to do."

(6) "Epistoleus," i.e. secretary or despatch writer, is the Spartan

title of the officer second in command to the admiral.

(7) Reading {'Errei ta kala} (Bergk's conjecture for {kala}) =

"timbers," i.e. "ships" (a Doric word). Cf. Aristoph., "Lys."

1253, {potta kala}. The despatch continues: {Mindaros apessoua}

(al. {apessua}), which is much more racy than the simple word

"dead." "M. is gone off." I cannot find the right English or

"broad Scotch" equivalent. See Thirlwall, "Hist. Gr." IV. xxix. 88

note.

Pharnabazus, however, was ready to meet with encouragement the

despondency which afflicted the whole Peloponnesian army and their

allies. "As long as their own bodies were safe and sound, why need

they take to heart the loss of a few wooden hulls? Was there not timber

enough and to spare in the king's territory?" And so he presented each

man with a cloak and maintenance for a couple of months, after which he

armed the sailors and formed them into a coastguard for the security of

his own seaboard.

He next called a meeting of the generals and trierarchs of the different

States, and instructed them to build just as many new ships in the

dockyards of Antandrus as they had respectively lost. He himself was to

furnish the funds, and he gave them to understand that they might

bring down timber from Mount Ida. While the ships were building, the

Syracusans helped the men of Antandrus to finish a section of their

walls, and were particularly pleasant on garrison duty; and that is why

the Syracusans to this day enjoy the privilege of citizenship, with the

title of "benefactors," at Antandrus. Having so arranged these matters,

Pharnabazus proceeded at once to the rescue of Chalcedon.

It was at this date that the Syracusan generals received news from home

of their banishment by the democratic party. Accordingly they called a

meeting of their separate divisions, and putting forward Hermocrates

(8) as their spokesman, proceeded to deplore their misfortune, insisting

upon the injustice and the illegality of their banishment. "And now let

us admonish you," they added, "to be eager and willing in the future,

even as in the past: whatever the word of command may be, show

yourselves good men and true: let not the memory of those glorious sea

fights fade. Think of those victories you have won, those ships you

have captured by your own unaided efforts; forget not that long list of

achievements shared by yourselves with others, in all which you

proved yourselves invincible under our generalship. It was to a happy

combination of our merit and your enthusiasm, displayed alike on land

and sea, that you owe the strength and perfection of your discipline."

(8) Hermocrates, the son of Hermon. We first hear of him in Thuc. iv.

58 foll. as the chief agent in bringing the Sicilian States

together in conference at Gela B.C. 424, with a view to healing

their differences and combining to frustrate the dangerous designs

of Athens. In 415 B.C., when the attack came, he was again the

master spirit in rendering it abortive (Thuc. vi. 72 foll.) In 412

B.C. it was he who urged the Sicilians to assist in completing the

overthrow of Athens, by sending a squadron to co-operate with the

Peloponnesian navy--for the relief of Miletus, etc. (Thuc. viii.

26, 27 foll.) At a later date, in 411 B.C., when the Peloponnesian

sailors were ready to mutiny, and "laid all their grievances to

the charge of Astyochus (the Spartan admiral), who humoured

Tissaphernes for his own gain" (Thuc. viii. 83), Hermocrates took

the men's part, and so incurred the hatred of Tissaphernes.

With these words they called upon the men to choose other commanders,

who should undertake the duties of their office, until the arrival of

their successors. Thereupon the whole assembly, and more particularly

the captains and masters of vessels and marines, insisted with loud

cries on their continuance in command. The generals replied, "It was

not for them to indulge in faction against the State, but rather it was

their duty, in case any charges were forthcoming against themselves,

at once to render an account." When, however, no one had any kind of

accusation to prefer, they yielded to the general demand, and were

content to await the arrival of their successors. The names of these

were--Demarchus, the son of Epidocus; Myscon, the son of Mencrates; and

Potamis, the son of Gnosis.

The captains, for their part, swore to restore the exiled generals as

soon as they themselves should return to Syracuse. At present with

a general vote of thanks they despatched them to their several

destinations. It particular those who had enjoyed the society of

Hermocrates recalled his virtues with regret, his thoroughness and

enthusiasm, his frankness and affability, the care with which every

morning and evening he was wont to gather in his quarters a group of

naval captains and mariners whose ability he recognised. These were his

confidants, to whom he communicated what he intended to say or do: they

were his pupils, to whom he gave lessons in oratory, now calling upon

them to speak extempore, and now again after deliberation. By these

means Hermocrates had gained a wide reputation at the council board,

where his mastery of language was no less felt than the wisdom of his

advice. Appearing at Lacedaemon as the accuser of Tissaphernes, (9) he

had carried his case, not only by the testimony of Astyochus, but by

the obvious sincerity of his statements, and on the strength of this

reputation he now betook himself to Pharnabazus. The latter did not wait

to be asked, but at once gave him money, which enabled him to collect

friends and triremes, with a view to his ultimate recall to Syracuse.

Meanwhile the successors of the Syracusans had arrived at Miletus, where

they took charge of the ships and the army.

(9) The matter referred to is fully explained Thuc. viii. 85.

It was at this same season that a revolution occurred in Thasos,

involving the expulsion of the philo-Laconian party, with the Laconian

governor Eteonicus. The Laconian Pasippidas was charged with having

brought the business about in conjunction with Tissaphernes, and was

banished from Sparta in consequence. The naval force which he had been

collecting from the allies was handed over to Cratesippidas, who was

sent out to take his place in Chios.

About the same period, while Thrasylus was still in Athens, Agis

(10) made a foraging expedition up to the very walls of the city. But

Thrasylus led out the Athenians with the rest of the inhabitants of the

city, and drew them up by the side of the Lyceum Gymnasium, ready to

engage the enemy if they approached; seeing which, Agis beat a hasty

retreat, not however without the loss of some of his supports, a few of

whom were cut down by the Athenian light troops. This success disposed

the citizens to take a still more favourable view of the objects for

which Thrasylus had come; and they passed a decree empowering him to

call out a thousand hoplites, one hundred cavalry, and fifty triremes.

(10) The reader will recollect that we are giving in "the Deceleian"

period of the war, 413-404 B.C. The Spartan king was in command of

the fortress of Deceleia, only fourteen miles distant from Athens,

and erected on a spot within sight of the city. See Thuc. vii. 19,

27, 28.

Meanwhile Agis, as he looked out from Deceleia, and saw vessel after

vessel laden with corn running down to Piraeus, declared that it was

useless for his troops to go on week after week excluding the Athenians

from their own land, while no one stopped the source of their corn

supply by sea: the best plan would be to send Clearchus, (11) the son

of Rhamphius, who was proxenos (12) of the Byzantines, to Chalcedon and

Byzantium. The suggestion was approved, and with fifteen vessels duly

manned from Megara, or furnished by other allies, Clearchus set out.

These were troop-ships rather than swift-sailing men-of-war. Three of

them, on reaching the Hellespont, were destroyed by the Athenian ships

employed to keep a sharp look-out on all merchant craft in those waters.

The other twelve escaped to Sestos, and thence finally reached Byzantium

in safety.

(11) Of Clearchus we shall hear more in the sequel, and in the

"Anabasis."

(12) The Proxenus answered pretty nearly to our "Consul," "Agent,"

"Resident"; but he differed in this respect, that he was always a

member of the foreign State. An Athenian represented Sparta at

Athens; a Laconian represented Athens at Sparta, and so forth. See

Liddell and Scott.

So closed the year--a year notable also for the expedition against

Sicily of the Carthaginians under Hannibal with one hundred thousand

men, and the capture, within three months, of the two Hellenic cities of

Selinus and Himera.

II

B.C. 409. Next year (1)... the Athenians fortified Thoricus; and

Thrasylus, taking the vessels lately voted him and five thousand of

his seamen armed to serve as peltasts, (2) set sail for Samos at the

beginning of summer. At Samos he stayed three days, and then continued

his voyage to Pygela, where he proceeded to ravage the territory and

attack the fortress. Presently a detachment from Miletus came to the

rescue of the men of Pygela, and attacking the scattered bands of the

Athenian light troops, put them to flight. But to the aid of the light

troops came the naval brigade of peltasts, with two companies of heavy

infantry, and all but annihilated the whole detachment from Miletus.

They captured about two hundred shields, and set up a trophy. Next day

they sailed to Notium, and from Notium, after due preparation, marched

upon Colophon. The Colophonians capitulated without a blow. The

following night they made an incursion into Lydia, where the corn crops

were ripe, and burnt several villages, and captured money, slaves, and

other booty in large quantity. But Stages, the Persian, who was employed

in this neighbourhood, fell in with a reinforcement of cavalry sent to

protect the scattered pillaging parties from the Athenian camp, whilst

occupied with their individual plunder, and took one trooper prisoner,

killing seven others. After this Thrasylus led his troops back to the

sea, intending to sail to Ephesus. Meanwhile Tissaphernes, who had wind

of this intention, began collecting a large army and despatching cavalry

with a summons to the inhabitants one and all to rally to the defence of

the goddess Artemis at Ephesus.

(1) The MSS. here give a suspected passage, which may be rendered

thus: "The first of Olympiad 93, celebrated as the year in which

the newly-added two-horse race was won by Evagorias the Eleian,

and the stadion (200 yards foot-race) by the Cyrenaean Eubotas,

when Evarchippus was ephor at Sparta and Euctemon archon at

Athens." But Ol. 93, to which these officers,and the addition of

the new race at Olympia belong, is the year 408. We must therefore

suppose either that this passage has been accidentally inserted in

the wrong place by some editor or copyist, or that the author was

confused in his dates. The "stadium" is the famous foot-race at

Olympia, 606 3/4 English feet in length, run on a course also

called the "Stadion," which was exactly a stade long.

(2) Peltasts, i.e. light infantry armed with the "pelta" or light

shield, instead of the heavy {aspis} of the hoplite or heavy

infantry soldiers.

On the seventeenth day after the incursion above mentioned Thrasylus

sailed to Ephesus. He disembarked his troops in two divisions, his heavy

infantry in the neighbourhood of Mount Coressus; his cavalry, peltasts,

and marines, with the remainder of his force, near the marsh on the

other side of the city. At daybreak he pushed forward both divisions.

The citizens of Ephesus, on their side, were not slow to protect

themselves. They had to aid them the troops brought up by Tissaphernes,

as well as two detachments of Syracusans, consisting of the crews of

their former twenty vessels and those of five new vessels which had

opportunely arrived quite recently under Eucles, the son of Hippon,

and Heracleides, the son of Aristogenes, together with two Selinuntian

vessels. All these several forces first attacked the heavy infantry

near Coressus; these they routed, killing about one hundred of them, and

driving the remainder down into the sea. They then turned to deal with

the second division on the marsh. Here, too, the Athenians were put to

flight, and as many as three hundred of them perished. On this spot the

Ephesians erected a trophy, and another at Coressus. The valour of the

Syracusans and Selinuntians had been so conspicuous that the citizens

presented many of them, both publicly and privately, with prizes for

distinction in the field, besides offering the right of residence in

their city with certain immunities to all who at any time might wish to

live there. To the Selinuntians, indeed, as their own city had lately

been destroyed, they offered full citizenship.

The Athenians, after picking up their dead under a truce, set sail

for Notium, and having there buried the slain, continued their voyage

towards Lesbos and the Hellespont. Whilst lying at anchor in the harbour

of Methymna, in that island, they caught sight of the Syracusan vessels,

five-and-twenty in number, coasting along from Ephesus. They put out to

sea to attack them, and captured four ships with their crews, and chased

the remainder back to Ephesus. The prisoners were sent by Thrasylus to

Athens, with one exception. This was an Athenian, Alcibiades, who was a

cousin and fellow-exile of Alcibiades. Him Thrasylus released. (3) From

Methymna Thrasylus set sail to Sestos to join the main body of the army,

after which the united forces crossed to Lampsacus. And now winter was

approaching. It was the winter in which the Syracusan prisoners who had

been immured in the stone quarries of Piraeus dug through the rock and

escaped one night, some to Decelia and others to Megara. At Lampsacus

Alcibiades was anxious to marshal the whole military force there

collected in one body, but the old troops refused to be incorporated

with those of Thrasylus. "They, who had never yet been beaten, with

these newcomers who had just suffered a defeat." So they devoted the

winter to fortifying Lampsacus. They also made an expedition against

Abydos, where Pharnabazus, coming to the rescue of the place,

encountered them with numerous cavalry, but was defeated and forced

to flee, Alcibiades pursuing hard with his cavalry and one hundred and

twenty infantry under the command of Menander, till darkness intervened.

After this battle the soldiers came together of their own accord, and

freely fraternised with the troops of Thrasylus. This expedition was

followed by other incursions during the winter into the interior, where

they found plenty to do ravaging the king's territory.

(3) Reading {apelusen}. Wolf's conjecture for the MSS. {katelousen} =

stoned. See Thirlwall, "Hist. Gr." IV. xxix. 93 note.

It was at this period also that the Lacedaemonians allowed their

revolted helots from Malea, who had found an asylum at Coryphasium, to

depart under a flag of truce. It was also about the same period that the

Achaeans betrayed the colonists of Heracleia Trachinia, when they were

all drawn up in battle to meet the hostile Oetaeans, whereby as many

as seven hundred of them were lost, together with the governor (4) from

Lacedaemon, Labotas. Thus the year came to its close--a year marked

further by a revolt of the Medes from Darius, the king of Persia,

followed by renewed submission to his authority.

(4) Technically {armostes} (harmost), i.e. administrator.

III

B.C. 408. The year following is the year in which the temple of Athena,

in Phocaea, was struck by lightning and set on fire. (1) With the

cessation of winter, in early spring, the Athenians set sail with the

whole of their force to Proconnesus, and thence advanced upon Chalcedon

and Byzantium, encamping near the former town. The men of Chalcedon,

aware of their approach, had taken the precaution to deposit all their

pillageable property with their neighbours, the Bithynian Thracians;

whereupon Alcibiades put himself at the head of a small body of heavy

infantry with the cavalry, and giving orders to the fleet to follow

along the coast, marched against the Bithynians and demanded back the

property of the Chalcedonians, threatening them with war in case of

refusal. The Bithynians delivered up the property. Returning to camp,

not only thus enriched, but with the further satisfaction of having

secured pledges of good behaviour from the Bithynians, Alcibiades set to

work with the whole of his troops to draw lines of circumvallation round

Chalcedon from sea to sea, so as to include as much of the river as

possible within his wall, which was made of timber. Thereupon the

Lacedaemonian governor, Hippocrates, let his troops out of the city and

offered battle, and the Athenians, on their side, drew up their forces

opposite to receive him; while Pharnabazus, from without the lines of

circumvallation, was still advancing with his army and large bodies of

horse. Hippocrates and Thrasylus engaged each other with their heavy

infantry for a long while, until Alcibiades, with a detachment of

infantry and the cavalry, intervened. Presently Hippocrates fell,

and the troops under him fled into the city; at the same instant

Pharnabazus, unable to effect a junction with the Lacedaemonian leader,

owing to the circumscribed nature of the ground and the close proximity

of the river to the enemy's lines, retired to the Heracleium, (2)

belonging to the Chalcedonians, where his camp lay. After this success

Alcibiades set off to the Hellespont and the Chersonese to raise money,

and the remaining generals came to terms with Pharnabazus in respect

of Chalcedon; according to these, the Persian satrap agreed to pay the

Athenians twenty talents (3) in behalf of the town, and to grant their

ambassadors a safe conduct up country to the king. It was further

stipulated by mutual consent and under oaths provided, that the

Chalcedonians should continue the payment of their customary tribute

to Athens, being also bound to discharge all outstanding debts. The

Athenians, on their side, were bound to desist from all hostilities

until the return of their ambassadors from the king. These oaths

were not witnessed by Alcibiades, who was now in the neighbourhood of

Selybria. Having taken that place, he presently appeared before the

walls of Byzantium at the head of the men of Chersonese, who came out

with their whole force; he was aided further by troops from Thrace and

more than three hundred horse. Accordingly Pharnabazus, insisting that

he too must take the oath, decided to remain in Chalcedon, and to await

his arrival from Byzantium. Alcibiades came, but was not prepared to

bind himself by any oaths, unless Pharnabazus would, on his side, take

oaths to himself. After this, oaths were exchanged between them by

proxy. Alcibiades took them at Chrysopolis in the presence of two

representatives sent by Pharnabazus--namely, Mitrobates and Arnapes.

Pharnabazus took them at Chalcedon in the presence of Euryptolemus and

Diotimus, who represented Alcibiades. Both parties bound themselves not

only by the general oath, but also interchanged personal pledges of good

faith.

(1) The MSS. here give the words, "in the ephorate of Pantacles and

the archonship of Antigenes, two-and-twenty years from the

beginning of the war," but the twenty-second year of the war =

B.C. 410; Antigenes archon, B.C. 407 = Ol. 93, 2; the passage must

be regarded as a note mis-inserted by some editor or copyist (vide

supra, I. 11.)

(2) I.e. sacred place or temple of Heracles.

(3) Twenty talents = 4800 pounds; or, more exactly, 4875 pounds.

This done, Pharnabazus left Chalcedon at once, with injunctions that

those who were going up to the king as ambassadors should meet him

at Cyzicus. The representatives of Athens were Dorotheus, Philodices,

Theogenes, Euryptolemus, and Mantitheus; with them were two Argives,

Cleostratus and Pyrrholochus. An embassy of the Lacedaemonians was also

about to make the journey. This consisted of Pasippidas and his fellows,

with whom were Hermocrates, now an exile from Syracuse, and his brother

Proxenus. So Pharnabazus put himself at their head. Meanwhile the

Athenians prosecuted the siege of Byzantium; lines of circumvallation

were drawn; and they diversified the blockade by sharpshooting at

long range and occasional assaults upon the walls. Inside the city lay

Clearchus, the Lacedaemonian governor, and a body of Perioci with a

small detachment of Neodamodes. (4) There was also a body of Megarians

under their general Helixus, a Megarian, and another body of Boeotians,

with their general Coeratadas. The Athenians, finding presently that

they could effect nothing by force, worked upon some of the inhabitants

to betray the place. Clearchus, meanwhile, never dreaming that any one

would be capable of such an act, had crossed over to the opposite

coast to visit Pharnabazus; he had left everything in perfect order,

entrusting the government of the city to Coeratadas and Helixus. His

mission was to obtain pay for the soldiers from the Persian satrap,

and to collect vessels from various quarters. Some were already in the

Hellespont, where they had been left as guardships by Pasippidas, or

else at Antandrus. Others formed the fleet which Agesandridas, who had

formerly served as a marine (5) under Mindarus, now commanded on the

Thracian coast. Others Clearchus purposed to have built, and with the

whole united squadron to so injure the allies of the Athenians as to

draw off the besieging army from Byzantium. But no sooner was he fairly

gone than those who were minded to betray the city set to work. Their

names were Cydon, Ariston, Anaxicrates, Lycurgus, and Anaxilaus. The

last-named was afterwards impeached for treachery in Lacedaemon on the

capital charge, and acquitted on the plea that, to begin with, he was

not a Lacedaemonian, but a Byzantine, and, so far from having betrayed

the city, he had saved it, when he saw women and children perishing of

starvation; for Clearchus had given away all the corn in the city to the

Lacedaemonian soldiers. It was for these reasons, as Anaxilaus himself

admitted, he had introduced the enemy, and not for the sake of money,

nor out of hatred to Lacedaemon.

(4) According to the constitution of Lacedaemon the whole government

was in Dorian hands. The subject population was divided into (1)

Helots, who were State serfs. The children of Helots were at times

brought up by Spartans and called "Mothakes"; Helots who had

received their liberty were called "Neodamodes" ({neodamodeis}).

After the conquest of Messenia this class was very numerous. (2)

Perioeci. These were the ancient Achaean inhabitants, living in

towns and villages, and managing their own affairs, paying

tribute, and serving in the army as heavy-armed soldiers. In 458

B.C. they were said to number thirty thousand. The Spartans

themselves were divided, like all Dorians, into three tribes,

Hylleis, Dymanes, and Pamphyli, each of which tribes was divided

into ten "obes," which were again divided into {oikoi} or families

possessed of landed properties. In 458 B.C. there were said to be

nine thousand such families; but in course of time, through

alienation of lands, deaths in war, and other causes, their

numbers were much diminished; and in many cases there was a loss

of status, so that in the time of Agis III., B.C. 244, we hear of

two orders of Spartans, the {omoioi} and the {upomeiones}

(inferiors); seven hundred Spartans (families) proper and one

hundred landed proprietors. See Mullers "Dorians," vol. ii. bk.

iii. ch. x. S. 3 (Eng. trans.); Arist. "Pol." ii. 9, 15; Plut.

("Agis").

(5) The greek word is {epibates}, which some think was the title of an

inferior naval officer in the Spartan service, but there is no

proof of this. Cf. Thuc. viii. 61, and Prof. Jowett's note; also

Grote, "Hist. of Greece," viii. 27 (2d ed.)

As soon as everything was ready, these people opened the gates leading

to the Thracian Square, as it is called, and admitted the Athenian

troops with Alcibiades at their head. Helixus and Coeratadas, in

complete ignorance of the plot, hastened to the Agora with the whole

of the garrison, ready to confront the danger; but finding the enemy in

occupation, they had nothing for it but to give themselves up. They were

sent off as prisoners to Athens, where Coeratadas, in the midst of the

crowd and confusion of debarkation at Piraeus, gave his guards the slip,

and made his way in safety to Decelia.

IV

B.C. 407. Pharnabazus and the ambassadors were passing the winter at

Gordium in Phrygia, when they heard of the occurrences at Byzantium.

Continuing their journey to the king's court in the commencement of

spring, they were met by a former embassy, which was now on its return

journey. These were the Lacedaemonian ambassadors, Boeotius and his

party, with the other envoys; who told them that the Lacedaemonians had

obtained from the king all they wanted. One of the company was Cyrus,

the new governor of all the seaboard districts, who was prepared to

co-operate with the Lacedaemonians in war. He was the bearer, moreover,

of a letter with the royal seal attached. It was addressed to all the

populations of Lower Asia, and contained the following words: "I send

down Cyrus as 'Karanos'" (1)--that is to say, supreme lord--"over all

those who muster at Castolus." The ambassadors of the Athenians, even

while listening to this announcement, and indeed after they had seen

Cyrus, were still desirous, if possible, to continue their journey to

the king, or, failing that, to return home. Cyrus, however, urged upon

Pharnabazus either to deliver them up to himself, or to defer sending

them home at present; his object being to prevent the Athenians learning

what was going on. Pharnabazus, wishing to escape all blame, for the

time being detained them, telling them, at one time, that he would

presently escort them up country to the king, and at another time that

he would send them safe home. But when three years had elapsed, he

prayed Cyrus to let them go, declaring that he had taken an oath to

bring them back to the sea, in default of escorting them up to the king.

Then at last they received safe conduct to Ariobarzanes, with orders for

their further transportation. The latter conducted them a stage further,

to Cius in Mysia; and from Cius they set sail to join their main

armament.

(1) {Karanos.} Is this a Greek word, a Doric form, {karanos}, akin to

{kara} (cf. {karenon}) = chief? or is it not more likely a Persian

or native word, Karanos? and might not the title be akin

conceivably to the word {korano}, which occurs on many Indo-

Bactrian coins (see A. von Sallet, "Die Nachfolger Alexanders des

Grossen," p. 57, etc.)? or is {koiranos} the connecting link? The

words translated "that is to say, supreme lord," {to de karanon

esti kurion}, look very like a commentator's gloss.

Alcibiades, whose chief desire was to return home to Athens with the

troops, immediately set sail for Samos; and from that island, taking

twenty of the ships, he sailed to the Ceramic Gulf of Caria, where he

collected a hundred talents, and so returned to Samos.

Thrasybulus had gone Thrace-wards with thirty ships. In this quarter he

reduced various places which had revolted to Lacedaemon, including

the island of Thasos, which was in a bad plight, the result of wars,

revolutions, and famine.

Thrasylus, with the rest of the army, sailed back straight to Athens.

On his arrival he found that the Athenians had already chosen as their

general Alcibiades, who was still in exile, and Thrasybulus, who was

also absent, and as a third, from among those at home, Conon.

Meanwhile Alcibiades, with the moneys lately collected and his fleet of

twenty ships, left Samos and visited Paros. From Paros he stood out to

sea across to Gytheum, (2) to keep an eye on the thirty ships of war

which, as he was informed, the Lacedaemonians were equipping in that

arsenal. Gytheum would also be a favourable point of observation

from which to gauge the disposition of his fellow-countrymen and the

prospects of his recall. When at length their good disposition seemed

to him established, not only by his election as general, but by the

messages of invitation which he received in private from his friends, he

sailed home, and entered Piraeus on the very day of the festival of the

Plunteria, (3) when the statue of Athena is veiled and screened from

public gaze. This was a coincidence, as some thought, of evil omen,

and unpropitious alike to himself and the State, for no Athenian would

transact serious business on such a day.

(2) Gytheum, the port and arsenal of Sparta, situated near the head of

the Laconian Gulf (now Marathonisi).

(3) {ta Plunteria}, or feast of washings, held on the 25th of the

month Thargelion, when the image of the goddess Athena was

stripped in order that her clothes might be washed by the

Praxiergidae; neither assembly nor court was held on that day, and

the Temple was closed.

As he sailed into the harbour, two great crowds--one from the Piraeus,

the other from the city (4)--flocked to meet the vessels. Wonderment,

mixed with a desire to see Alcibiades, was the prevailing sentiment of

the multitude. Of him they spoke: some asserting that he was the best

of citizens, and that in his sole instance banishment had been

ill-deserved. He had been the victim of plots, hatched in the brains

of people less able than himself, however much they might excel in

pestilent speech; men whose one principle of statecraft was to look to

their private gains; whereas this man's policy had ever been to uphold

the common weal, as much by his private means as by all the power of the

State. His own choice, eight years ago, when the charge of impiety in

the matter of the mysteries was still fresh, would have been to submit

to trial at once. It was his personal foes, who had succeeded in

postponing that undeniably just procedure; who waited till his back was

turned, and then robbed him of his fatherland. Then it was that, being

made the very slave of circumstance, he was driven to court the men he

hated most; and at a time when his own life was in daily peril, he must

see his dearest friends and fellow-citizens, nay, the very State itself,

bent on a suicidal course, and yet, in the exclusion of exile, be unable

to lend a helping hand. "It is not men of this stamp," they averred,

"who desire changes in affairs and revolution: had he not already

guaranteed to him by the Democracy a position higher than that of his

equals in age, and scarcely if at all inferior to his seniors? How

different was the position of his enemies. It had been the fortune of

these, though they were known to be the same men they had always been,

to use their lately acquired power for the destruction in the first

instance of the better classes; and then, being alone left surviving, to

be accepted by their fellow-citizens in the absence of better men."

(4) Or, "collected to meet the vessels from curiosity and a desire to

see Alcibiades."

Others, however, insisted that for all their past miseries and

misfortunes Alcibiades alone was responsible: "If more trials were still

in store for the State, here was the master mischief-maker ready at his

post to precipitate them."

When the vessels came to their moorings, close to the land, Alcibiades,

from fear of his enemies, was unwilling to disembark at once. Mounting

on the quarterdeck, he scanned the multitude, (5) anxious to make

certain of the presence of his friends. Presently his eyes lit upon

Euryptolemus, the son of Peisianax, who was his cousin, and then on the

rest of his relations and other friends. Upon this he landed, and so,

in the midst of an escort ready to put down any attempt upon his person,

made his way to the city.

(5) Or, "he looked to see if his friends were there."

In the Senate and Public Assembly (6) he made speeches, defending

himself against the charge of impiety, and asserting that he had been

the victim of injustice, with other like topics, which in the present

temper of the assembly no one ventured to gainsay.

(6) Technically the "Boule" ({Boule}) or Senate, and "Ecclesia" or

Popular Assembly.

He was then formally declared leader and chief of the State, with

irresponsible powers, as being the sole individual capable of recovering

the ancient power and prestige of Athens. Armed with this authority, his

first act was to institute anew the processional march to Eleusis;

for of late years, owing to the war, the Athenians had been forced to

conduct the mysteries by sea. Now, at the head of the troops, he caused

them to be conducted once again by land. This done, his next step was

to muster an armament of one thousand five hundred heavy infantry, one

hundred and fifty cavalry, and one hundred ships; and lastly, within

three months of his return, he set sail for Andros, which had revolted

from Athens.

The generals chosen to co-operate with him on land were Aristocrates and

Adeimantus, the son of Leucophilides. He disembarked his troops on the

island of Andros at Gaurium, and routed the Andrian citizens who sallied

out from the town to resist the invader; forcing them to return and keep

close within their walls, though the number who fell was not large.

This defeat was shared by some Lacedaemonians who were in the place.

Alcibiades erected a trophy, and after a few days set sail himself for

Samos, which became his base of operations in the future conduct of the

war.

V

At a date not much earlier than that of the incidents just described,

the Lacedaemonians had sent out Lysander as their admiral, in the place

of Cratesippidas, whose period of office had expired. The new admiral

first visited Rhodes, where he got some ships, and sailed to Cos and

Miletus, and from the latter place to Ephesus. At Ephesus he waited with

seventy sail, expecting the advent of Cyrus in Sardis, when he at once

went up to pay the prince a visit with the ambassadors from Lacedaemon.

And now an opportunity was given to denounce the proceedings of

Tissaphernes, and at the same time to beg Cyrus himself to show as much

zeal as possible in the prosecution of the war. Cyrus replied that not

only had he received express injunction from his father to the same

effect, but that his own views coincided with their wishes, which he was

determined to carry out to the letter. He had, he informed them, brought

with him five hundred talents; (1) and if that sum failed, he had still

the private revenue, which his father allowed him, to fall back upon,

and when this resource was in its turn exhausted, he would coin the gold

and silver throne on which he sat, into money for their benefit. (2)

(1) About 120,000 pounds. One Euboic or Attic talent = sixty minae =

six thousand drachmae = 243 pounds 15 shillings of our money.

(2) Cf. the language of Tissaphernes, Thuc. viii. 81.

His audience thanked him for what he said, and further begged him to

fix the rate of payment for the seamen at one Attic drachma per man, (3)

explaining that should this rate of payment be adopted, the sailors of

the Athenians would desert, and in the end there would be a saving

of expenditure. Cyrus complimented them on the soundness of their

arguments, but said that it was not in his power to exceed the

injunctions of the king. The terms of agreement were precise, thirty

minae (4) a month per vessel to be given, whatever number of vessels the

Lacedaemonians might choose to maintain.

(3) About 9 3/4 pence; a drachma (= six obols) would be very high pay

for a sailor--indeed, just double the usual amount. See Thuc. vi.

8 and viii. 29, and Prof. Jowett ad loc. Tissaphernes had, in the

winter of 412 B.C., distributed one month's pay among the

Peloponnesian ships at this high rate of a drachma a day, "as his

envoy had promised at Lacedaemon;" but this he proposed to reduce

to half a drachma, "until he had asked the king's leave, promising

that if he obtained it, he would pay the entire drachma. On the

remonstrance, however, of Hermocrates, the Syracusan general, he

promised to each man a payment of somewhat more than three obols."

(4) Nearly 122 pounds; and thirty minae a month to each ship (the crew

of each ship being taken at two hundred) = three obols a day to

each man. The terms of agreement to which Cyrus refers may have

been specified in the convention mentioned above in chap. iv,

which Boeotius and the rest were so proud to have obtained. But

see Grote, "Hist. of Greece," vol. viii. p. 192 note (2d ed.)

To this rejoinder Lysander at the moment said nothing. But after dinner,

when Cyrus drank to his health, asking him "What he could do to gratify

him most?" Lysander replied, "Add an obol (5) to the sailors' pay."

After this the pay was raised to four instead of three obols, as it

hitherto had been. Nor did the liberality of Cyrus end here; he not only

paid up all arrears, but further gave a month's pay in advance, so that,

if the enthusiasm of the army had been great before, it was greater than

ever now. The Athenians when they heard the news were proportionately

depressed, and by help of Tissaphernes despatched ambassadors to Cyrus.

That prince, however, refused to receive them, nor were the prayers of

Tissaphernes of any avail, however much he insisted that Cyrus should

adopt the policy which he himself, on the advice of Alcibiades, had

persistently acted on. This was simply not to suffer any single Hellenic

state to grow strong at the expense of the rest, but to keep them all

weak alike, distracted by internecine strife.

(5) An obol = one-sixth of a drachma; the Attic obol = rather more

than 1 1/2 pence.

Lysander, now that the organisation of his navy was arranged to his

satisfaction, beached his squadron of ninety vessels at Ephesus, and

sat with hands folded, whilst the vessels dried and underwent repairs.

Alcibiades, being informed that Thrasybulus had come south of the

Hellespont and was fortifying Phocaea, sailed across to join him,

leaving his own pilot Antiochus in command of the fleet, with orders

not to attack Lysander's fleet. Antiochus, however, was tempted to leave

Notium and sail into the harbour of Ephesus with a couple of ships, his

own and another, past the prows of Lysander's squadron. The Spartan at

first contented himself with launching a few of his ships, and started

in pursuit of the intruder; but when the Athenians came out with other

vessels to assist Antiochus, he formed his whole squadron into line of

battle, and bore down upon them, whereupon the Athenians followed suit,

and getting their remaining triremes under weigh at Notium, stood out to

sea as fast as each vessel could clear the point. (6) Thus it befell in

the engagement which ensued, that while the enemy was in due order, the

Athenians came up in scattered detachments and without concert, and in

the end were put to flight with the loss of fifteen ships of war. Of the

crews, indeed, the majority escaped, though a certain number fell into

the hands of the enemy. Then Lysander collected his vessels, and having

erected a trophy on Cape Notium, sailed across to Ephesus, whilst the

Athenians retired to Samos.

(6) {os ekastos enoixen}, for this nautical term see above.

On his return to Samos a little later, Alcibiades put out to sea with

the whole squadron in the direction of the harbour of Ephesus. At the

mouth of the harbour he marshalled his fleet in battle order, and tried

to tempt the enemy to an engagement; but as Lysander, conscious of his

inferiority in numbers, refused to accept the challenge, he sailed

back again to Samos. Shortly after this the Lacedaemonians captured

Delphinium and Eion. (7)

(7) This should probably be Teos, in Ionia, in spite of the MSS.

{'Eiona}. The place referred to cannot at any rate be the well-

known Eion at the mouth of the Strymon in Thrace.

But now the news of the late disaster at Notium had reached the

Athenians at home, and in their indignation they turned upon Alcibiades,

to whose negligence and lack of self-command they attributed

the destruction of the ships. Accordingly they chose ten new

generals--namely Conon, Diomedon, Leon, Pericles, Erasinides,

Aristocrates, Archestratus, Protomachus, Thrasylus, and Aristogenes.

Alcibiades, who was moreover in bad odour in the camp, sailed away with

a single trireme to his private fortress in the Chersonese.

After this Conon, in obedience to a decree of the Athenian people,

set sail from Andros with the twenty vessels under his command in that

island to Samos, and took command of the whole squadron. To fill the

place thus vacated by Conon, Phanosthenes was sent to Andros with four

ships. That captain was fortunate enough to intercept and capture

two Thurian ships of war, crews and all, and these captives were all

imprisoned by the Athenians, with the exception of their leader Dorieus.

He was the Rhodian, who some while back had been banished from Athens

and from his native city by the Athenians, when sentence of death was

passed upon him and his family. This man, who had once enjoyed the

right of citizenship among them, they now took pity on and released him

without ransom.

When Conon had reached Samos he found the armament in a state of great

despondency. Accordingly his first measure was to man seventy ships with

their full complement, instead of the former hundred and odd vessels.

With this squadron he put to sea accompanied by the other generals,

and confined himself to making descents first at one point and then at

another of the enemy's territory, and to collecting plunder.

And so the year drew to its close: a year signalled further by an

invasion of Sicily by the Carthaginians, with one hundred and twenty

ships of war and a land force of one hundred and twenty thousand men,

which resulted in the capture of Agrigentum. The town was finally

reduced to famine after a siege of seven months, the invaders having

previously been worsted in battle and forced to sit down before its

walls for so long a time.

VI

B.C. 406. In the following year--the year of the evening eclipse of the

moon, and the burning of the old temple of Athena (1) at Athens (2)--the

Lacedaemonians sent out Callicratidas to replace Lysander, whose period

of office had now expired. (3) Lysander, when surrendering the squadron

to his successor, spoke of himself as the winner of a sea fight, which

had left him in undisputed mastery of the sea, and with this boast

he handed over the ships to Callicratidas, who retorted, "If you will

convey the fleet from Ephesus, keeping Samos (4) on your right" (that

is, past where the Athenian navy lay), "and hand it over to me at

Miletus, I will admit that you are master of the sea." But Lysander

had no mind to interfere in the province of another officer. Thus

Callicratidas assumed responsibility. He first manned, in addition

to the squadron which he received from Lysander, fifty new vessels

furnished by the allies from Chios and Rhodes and elsewhere. When all

these contingents were assembled, they formed a total of one hundred and

forty sail, and with these he began making preparations for engagement

with the enemy. But it was impossible for him not to note the strong

current of opposition which he encountered from the friends of Lysander.

Not only was there lack of zeal in their service, but they openly

disseminated an opinion in the States, that it was the greatest possible

blunder on the part of the Lacedaemonians so to change their admirals.

Of course, they must from time to time get officers altogether unfit for

the post--men whose nautical knowledge dated from yesterday, and who,

moreover, had no notion of dealing with human beings. It would be very

odd if this practice of sending out people ignorant of the sea and

unknown to the folk of the country did not lead to some catastrophe.

Callicratidas at once summoned the Lacedaemonians there present, and

addressed them in the following terms:--

(1) I.e. as some think, the Erechtheion, which was built partly on the

site of the old temple of Athena Polias, destroyed by the

Persians. According to Dr. Dorpfeld, a quite separate building of

the Doric order, the site of which (S. of the Erechtheion) has

lately been discovered.

(2) The MSS. here add "in the ephorate of Pityas and the archonship of

Callias at Athens;" but though the date is probably correct (cf.

Leake, "Topography of Athens," vol. i. p. 576 foll.), the words

are almost certainly a gloss.

(3) Here the MSS. add "with the twenty-fourth year of the war,"

probably an annotator's gloss; the correct date should be twenty-

fifth. Pel. war 26 = B.C. 406. Pel. war 25 ended B.C. 407.

(4) Lit. on the left (or east) of Samos, looking south from Ephesus.

"For my part," he said, "I am content to stay at home: and if Lysander

or any one else claim greater experience in nautical affairs than I

possess, I have no desire to block his path. Only, being sent out by the

State to take command of this fleet, I do not know what is left to

me, save to carry out my instructions to the best of my ability. For

yourselves, all I beg of you, in reference to my personal ambitions and

the kind of charges brought against our common city, and of which you

are as well aware as I am, is to state what you consider to be the best

course: am I to stay where I am, or shall I sail back home, and explain

the position of affairs out here?"

No one ventured to suggest any other course than that he should obey the

authorities, and do what he was sent to do. Callicratidas then went up

to the court of Cyrus to ask for further pay for the sailors, but

the answer he got from Cyrus was that he should wait for two days.

Callicratidas was annoyed at the rebuff: to dance attendance at the

palace gates was little to his taste. In a fit of anger he cried out

at the sorry condition of the Hellenes, thus forced to flatter the

barbarian for the sake of money. "If ever I get back home," he added,

"I will do what in me lies to reconcile the Athenians and the

Lacedaemonians." And so he turned and sailed back to Miletus. From

Miletus he sent some triremes to Lacedaemon to get money, and convoking

the public assembly of the Milesians, addressed them thus:--

"Men of Miletus, necessity is laid upon me to obey the rulers at home;

but for yourselves, whose neighbourhood to the barbarians has exposed

you to many evils at their hands, I only ask you to let your zeal in the

war bear some proportion to your former sufferings. You should set

an example to the rest of the allies, and show us how to inflict the

sharpest and swiftest injury on our enemy, whilst we await the return

from Lacedaemon of my envoys with the necessary funds. Since one of the

last acts of Lysander, before he left us, was to hand back to Cyrus the

funds already on the spot, as though we could well dispense with them. I

was thus forced to turn to Cyrus, but all I got from him was a series of

rebuffs; he refused me an audience, and, for my part, I could not induce

myself to hang about his gates like a mendicant. But I give you my word,

men of Miletus, that in return for any assistance which you can render

us while waiting for these aids, I will requite you richly. Only by

God's help let us show these barbarians that we do not need to worship

them, in order to punish our foes."

The speech was effective; many members of the assembly arose, and not

the least eagerly those who were accused of opposing him. These, in some

terror, proposed a vote of money, backed by offers of further private

contributions. Furnished with these sums, and having procured from Chios

a further remittance of five drachmas (5) a piece as outfit for each

seaman, he set sail to Methyma in Lesbos, which was in the hands of the

enemy. But as the Methymnaeans were not disposed to come over to him

(since there was an Athenian garrison in the place, and the men at the

head of affairs were partisans of Athens), he assaulted and took the

place by storm. All the property within accordingly became the spoil of

the soldiers. The prisoners were collected for sale by Callicratidas

in the market-place, where, in answer to the demand of the allies, who

called upon him to sell the Methymnaeans also, he made answer, that as

long as he was in command, not a single Hellene should be enslaved if

he could help it. The next day he set at liberty the free-born captives;

the Athenian garrison with the captured slaves he sold. (6) To Conon

he sent word:--He would put a stop to his strumpeting the sea. (7) And

catching sight of him, as he put out to sea, at break of day, he gave

chase, hoping to cut him off from his passage to Samos, and prevent his

taking refuge there.

(5) About 4d.

(6) Grote, "Hist. of Greece," vol. viii. p. 224 (2d ed.), thinks that

Callicratidas did not even sell the Athenian garrison, as if the

sense of the passage were: "The next day he set at liberty the

free-born captives with the Athenian garrison, contenting himself

with selling the captive slaves." But I am afraid that no

ingenuity of stopping will extract that meaning from the Greek

words, which are, {te d' usteraia tous men eleutherous apheke tous

de ton 'Athenaion phrourous kai ta andrapoda ta doula panta

apedoto}. To spare the Athenian garrison would have been too

extraordinary a proceeding even for Callicratidas. The idea

probably never entered his head. It was sufficiently noble for him

to refuse to sell the Methymnaeans. See the remarks of Mr. W. L.

Newman, "The Pol. of Aristotle," vol. i. p. 142.

(7) I.e. the sea was Sparta's bride.

But Conon, aided by the sailing qualities of his fleet, the rowers of

which were the pick of several ships' companies, concentrated in a few

vessels, made good his escape, seeking shelter within the harbour of

Mitylene in Lesbos, and with him two of the ten generals, Leon and

Erasinides. Callicratidas, pursuing him with one hundred and seventy

sail, entered the harbour simultaneously; and Conon thus hindered from

further or final escape by the too rapid movements of the enemy, was

forced to engage inside the harbour, and lost thirty of his ships,

though the crews escaped to land. The remaining, forty in number, he

hauled up under the walls of the town. Callicratidas, on his side, came

to moorings in the harbour; and, having command of the exit, blocked the

Athenian within. His next step was to send for the Methymnaeans in force

by land, and to transport his army across from Chios. Money also came to

him from Cyrus.

Conon, finding himself besieged by land and sea, without means of

providing himself with corn from any quarter, the city crowded with

inhabitants, and aid from Athens, whither no news of the late events

could be conveyed, impossible, launched two of the fastest sailing

vessels of his squadron. These he manned, before daybreak, with the best

rowers whom he could pick out of the fleet, stowing away the marines at

the same time in the hold of the ships and closing the port shutters.

Every day for four days they held out in this fashion, but at evening as

soon as it was dark he disembarked his men, so that the enemy might not

suspect what they were after. On the fifth day, having got in a small

stock of provisions, when it was already mid-day and the blockaders were

paying little or no attention, and some of them even were taking their

siesta, the two ships sailed out of the harbour: the one directing her

course towards the Hellespont, whilst her companion made for the open

sea. Then, on the part of the blockaders, there was a rush to the scene

of action, as fast as the several crews could get clear of land, in

bustle and confusion, cutting away the anchors, and rousing themselves

from sleep, for, as chance would have it, they had been breakfasting on

shore. Once on board, however, they were soon in hot pursuit of the

ship which had started for the open sea, and ere the sun dipped they

overhauled her, and after a successful engagement attached her by cables

and towed her back into harbour, crew and all. Her comrade, making for

the Hellespont, escaped, and eventually reached Athens with news of

the blockade. The first relief was brought to the blockaded fleet by

Diomedon, who anchored with twelve vessels in the Mitylenaean Narrows.

(8) But a sudden attack of Callicratidas, who bore down upon him without

warning, cost him ten of his vessels, Diomedon himself escaping with his

own ship and one other.

(8) Or, "Euripus."

Now that the position of affairs, including the blockade, was fully

known at Athens, a vote was passed to send out a reinforcement of one

hundred and ten ships. Every man of ripe age, (9) whether slave or free,

was impressed for this service, so that within thirty days the whole one

hundred and ten vessels were fully manned and weighed anchor. Amongst

those who served in this fleet were also many of the knights. (10)

The fleet at once stood out across to Samos, and picked up the Samian

vessels in that island. The muster-roll was swelled by the addition of

more than thirty others from the rest of the allies, to whom the same

principle of conscription applied, as also it did to the ships already

engaged on foreign service. The actual total, therefore, when all the

contingents were collected, was over one hundred and fifty vessels.

(9) I.e. from eighteen to sixty years.

(10) See Boeckh. "P. E. A." Bk. II. chap. xxi. p. 263 (Eng. trans.)

Callicratidas, hearing that the relief squadron had already reached

Samos, left fifty ships, under command of Eteonicus, in the harbour of

Mitylene, and setting sail with the other one hundred and twenty, hove

to for the evening meal off Cape Malea in Lesbos, opposite Mitylene. It

so happened that the Athenians on this day were supping on the islands

of Arginusae, which lie opposite Lesbos. In the night the Spartan not

only saw their watch-fires, but received positive information that

"these were the Athenians;" and about midnight he got under weigh,

intending to fall upon them suddenly. But a violent downpour of rain

with thunder and lightning prevented him putting out to sea. By daybreak

it had cleared, and he sailed towards Arginusae. On their side, the

Athenian squadron stood out to meet him, with their left wing

facing towards the open sea, and drawn up in the following

order:--Aristocrates, in command of the left wing, with fifteen ships,

led the van; next came Diomedon with fifteen others, and immediately in

rear of Aristocrates and Diomedon respectively, as their supports, came

Pericles and Erasinides. Parallel with Diomedon were the Samians, with

their ten ships drawn up in single line, under the command of a Samian

officer named Hippeus. Next to these came the ten vessels of the

taxiarchs, also in single line, and supporting them, the three ships of

the navarchs, with any other allied vessels in the squadron. The right

wing was entrusted to Protomachus with fifteen ships, and next to him

(on the extreme right) was Thrasylus with another division of fifteen.

Protomachus was supported by Lysias with an equal number of ships, and

Thrasylus by Aristogenes. The object of this formation was to prevent

the enemy from manouvring so as to break their line by striking them

amidships, (11) since they were inferior in sailing power.

(11) Lit. "by the diekplous." Cf. Thuc. i. 49, and Arnold's note, who

says: "The 'diecplus' was a breaking through the enemy's line in

order by a rapid turning of the vessel to strike the enemy's ship

on the side or stern, where it was most defenceless, and so to

sink it." So, it seems, "the superiority of nautical skill has

passed," as Grote (viii. p. 234) says, "to the Peloponnesians and

their allies." Well may the historian add, "How astonished would

the Athenian Admiral Phormion have been, if he could have

witnessed the fleets and the order of battle at Arginusae!" See

Thuc. iv. 11.

The Lacedaemonians, on the contrary, trusting to their superior

seamanship, were formed opposite with their ships all in single line,

with the special object of manouvring so as either to break the enemy's

line or to wheel round them. Callicratidas commanded the right wing

in person. Before the battle the officer who acted as his pilot, the

Megarian Hermon, suggested that it might be well to withdraw the fleet

as the Athenian ships were far more numerous. But Callicratidas replied

that Sparta would be no worse off even if he personally should perish,

but to flee would be disgraceful. (12) And now the fleets approached,

and for a long space the battle endured. At first the vessels were

engaged in crowded masses, and later on in scattered groups. At length

Callicratidas, as his vessel dashed her beak into her antagonist,

was hurled off into the sea and disappeared. At the same instant

Protomachus, with his division on the right, had defeated the enemy's

left, and then the flight of the Peloponnesians began towards Chios,

though a very considerable body of them made for Phocaea, whilst the

Athenians sailed back again to Arginusae. The losses on the side of the

Athenians were twenty-five ships, crews and all, with the exception of

the few who contrived to reach dry land. On the Peloponnesian side, nine

out of the ten Lacedaemonian ships, and more than sixty belonging to the

rest of the allied squadron, were lost.

(12) For the common reading, {oikeitai}, which is ungrammatical,

various conjectures have been made, e.g.

{oikieitai} = "would be none the worse off for citizens,"

{oikesetai} = "would be just as well administered without him,"

but as the readings and their renderings are alike doubtful, I

have preferred to leave the matter vague. Cf. Cicero, "De Offic."

i. 24; Plutarch, "Lac. Apophth." p. 832.

After consultation the Athenian generals agreed that two captains

of triremes, Theramenes and Thrasybulus, accompanied by some of the

taxiarchs, should take forty-seven ships and sail to the assistance

of the disabled fleet and of the men on board, whilst the rest of the

squadron proceeded to attack the enemy's blockading squadron under

Eteonicus at Mitylene. In spite of their desire to carry out this

resolution, the wind and a violent storm which arose prevented them. So

they set up a trophy, and took up their quarters for the night. As to

Etenoicus, the details of the engagement were faithfully reported to

him by the express despatch-boat in attendance. On receipt of the news,

however, he sent the despatch-boat out again the way she came, with

an injunction to those on board of her to sail off quickly without

exchanging a word with any one. Then on a sudden they were to return

garlanded with wreaths of victory and shouting "Callicratidas has won

a great sea fight, and the whole Athenian squadron is destroyed." This

they did, and Eteonicus, on his side, as soon as the despatch-boat came

sailing in, proceeded to offer sacrifice of thanksgiving in honour of

the good news. Meanwhile he gave orders that the troops were to take

their evening meal, and that the masters of the trading ships were

silently to stow away their goods on board the merchant ships and make

sail as fast as the favourable breeze could speed them to Chios. The

ships of war were to follow suit with what speed they might. This done,

he set fire to his camp, and led off the land forces to Methymna. Conon,

finding the enemy had made off, and the wind had grown comparatively

mild, (13) got his ships afloat, and so fell in with the Athenian

squadron, which had by this time set out from Arginusae. To these he

explained the proceedings of Eteonicus. The squadron put into Mitylene,

and from Mitylene stood across to Chios, and thence, without effecting

anything further, sailed back to Samos.

(13) Or, "had changed to a finer quarter."

VII

All the above-named generals, with the exception of Conon, were

presently deposed by the home authorities. In addition to Conon two new

generals were chosen, Adeimantus and Philocles. Of those concerned in

the late victory two never returned to Athens: these were Protomachus

and Aristogenes. The other six sailed home. Their names were Pericles,

Diomedon, Lysias, Aristocrates, Thrasylus, and Erasinides. On their

arrival Archidemus, the leader of the democracy at that date, who had

charge of the two obol fund, (1) inflicted a fine on Erasinides, and

accused him before the Dicastery (2) of having appropriated money

derived from the Hellespont, which belonged to the people. He brought

a further charge against him of misconduct while acting as general, and

the court sentenced him to imprisonment.

(1) Reading {tes diobelais}, a happy conjecture for the MSS. {tes

diokelias}, which is inexplicable. See Grote, "Hist. of Greece,"

vol. viii. p. 244 note (2d ed.)

(2) I.e. a legal tribunal or court of law. At Athens the free citizens

constitutionally sworn and impannelled sat as "dicasts"

("jurymen," or rather as a bench of judges) to hear cases

({dikai}). Any particular board of dicasts formed a "dicastery."

These proceedings in the law court were followed by the statement of

the generals before the senate (3) touching the late victory and the

magnitude of the storm. Timocrates then proposed that the other

five generals should be put in custody and handed over to the public

assembly. (4) Whereupon the senate committed them all to prison. Then

came the meeting of the public assembly, in which others, and more

particularly Theramenes, formally accused the generals. He insisted

that they ought to show cause why they had not picked up the shipwrecked

crews. To prove that there had been no attempt on their part to attach

blame to others, he might point, as conclusive testimony, to the

despatch sent by the generals themselves to the senate and the people,

in which they attributed the whole disaster to the storm, and nothing

else. After this the generals each in turn made a defence, which was

necessarily limited to a few words, since no right of addressing

the assembly at length was allowed by law. Their explanation of the

occurrences was that, in order to be free to sail against the enemy

themselves, they had devolved the duty of picking up the shipwrecked

crews upon certain competent captains of men-of-war, who had themselves

been generals in their time, to wit Theramenes and Tharysbulus, and

others of like stamp. If blame could attach to any one at all with

regard to the duty in question, those to whom their orders had been

given were the sole persons they could hold responsible. "But," they

went on to say, "we will not, because these very persons have denounced

us, invent a lie, and say that Theramenes and Thrasybulus are to blame,

when the truth of the matter is that the magnitude of the storm alone

prevented the burial of the dead and the rescue of the living." In

proof of their contention, they produced the pilots and numerous other

witnesses from among those present at the engagement. By these arguments

they were in a fair way to persuade the people of their innocence.

Indeed many private citizens rose wishing to become bail for the

accused, but it was resolved to defer decision till another meeting

of the assembly. It was indeed already so late that it would have been

impossible to see to count the show of hands. It was further resolved

that the senate meanwhile should prepare a measure, to be introduced at

the next assembly, as to the mode in which the accused should take their

trial.

(3) This is the Senate or Council of Five Hundred. One of its chief

duties was to prepare measures for discussion in the assembly. It

had also a certain amount of judicial power, hearing complaints

and inflicting fines up to fifty drachmas. It sat daily, a

"prytany" of fifty members of each of the ten tribes in rotation

holding office for a month in turn.

(4) This is the great Public Assembly (the Ecclesia), consisting of

all genuine Athenian citizens of more than twenty years of age.

Then came the festival of the Aparturia, (5) with its family gatherings

of fathers and kinsfolk. Accordingly the party of Theramenes procured

numbers of people clad in black apparel, and close-shaven, (6) who were

to go in and present themselves before the public assembly in the middle

of the festival, as relatives, presumably, of the men who had perished;

and they persuaded Callixenus to accuse the generals in the senate. The

next step was to convoke the assembly, when the senate laid before it

the proposal just passed by their body, at the instance of Callixenus,

which ran as follows: "Seeing that both the parties to this case, to

wit, the prosecutors of the generals on the one hand, and the accused

themselves in their defence on the other, have been heard in the late

meeting of the assembly; we propose that the people of Athens now record

their votes, one and all, by their tribes; that a couple of voting urns

be placed for the convenience of each several tribe; and the public

crier in the hearing of each several tribe proclaim the mode of voting

as follows: 'Let every one who finds the generals guilty of not rescuing

the heroes of the late sea fight deposit his vote in urn No. 1. Let him

who is of the contrary opinion deposit his vote in urn No. 2. Further,

in the event of the aforesaid generals being found guilty, let death be

the penalty. Let the guilty persons be delivered over to the eleven. Let

their property be confiscated to the State, with the exception of one

tithe, which falls to the goddess.'"

(5) An important festival held in October at Athens, and in nearly all

Ionic cities. Its objects were (1) the recognition of a common

descent from Ion, the son of Apollo Patrous; and (2) the

maintenance of the ties of clanship. See Grote, "Hist. of Greece,"

vol. viii. p. 260 foll. (2d ed.); Jebb, "Theophr." xviii. 5.

(6) I.e. in sign of mourning.

Now there came forward in the assembly a man, who said that he had

escaped drowning by clinging to a meal tub. The poor fellows perishing

around him had commissioned him, if he succeeded in saving himself,

to tell the people of Athens how bravely they had fought for their

fatherland, and how the generals had left them there to drown.

Presently Euryptolemus, the son of Peisianax, and others served a

notice of indictment on Callixenus, insisting that his proposal was

unconstitutional, and this view of the case was applauded by some

members of the assembly. But the majority kept crying out that it was

monstrous if the people were to be hindered by any stray individual from

doing what seemed to them right. And when Lysicus, embodying the spirit

of those cries, formally proposed that if these persons would not

abandon their action, they should be tried by the same vote along with

the generals: a proposition to which the mob gave vociferous assent; and

so these were compelled to abandon their summonses. Again, when some of

the Prytanes (7) objected to put a resolution to the vote which was in

itself unconstitutional, Callixenus again got up and accused them in the

same terms, and the shouting began again. "Yes, summons all who refuse,"

until the Prytanes, in alarm, all agreed with one exception to permit

the voting. This obstinate dissentient was Socrates, the son of

Sophroniscus, who insisted that he would do nothing except in accordance

with the law. (8) After this Euryptolemus rose and spoke in behalf of

the generals. He said:--

(7) Prytanes--the technical term for the senators of the presiding

tribe, who acted as presidents of the assembly. Their chairman for

the day was called Epistates.

(8) For the part played by Socrates see further Xenophon's

"Memorabilia," I. i. 18; IV. iv. 2.

"I stand here, men of Athens, partly to accuse Pericles, though he is a

close and intimate connection of my own, and Diomedon, who is my friend,

and partly to urge certain considerations on their behalf, but chiefly

to press upon you what seems to me the best course for the State

collectively. I hold them to blame in that they dissuaded their

colleagues from their intention to send a despatch to the senate and

this assembly, which should have informed you of the orders given to

Theramenes and Thrasybulus to take forty-seven ships of war and pick up

the shipwrecked crews, and of the neglect of the two officers to carry

out those orders. And it follows that though the offence was committed

by one or two, the responsibility must be shared by all; and in return

for kindness in the past, they are in danger at present of sacrificing

their lives to the machinations of these very men, and others whom I

could mention. In danger, do I say, of losing their lives? No, not so,

if you will suffer me to persuade you to do what is just and right; if

you will only adopt such a course as shall enable you best to discover

the truth and shall save you from too late repentance, when you find you

have transgressed irremediably against heaven and your own selves. In

what I urge there is no trap nor plot whereby you can be deceived by me

or any other man; it is a straightforward course which will enable

you to discover and punish the offender by whatever process you like,

collectively or individually. Let them have, if not more, at any rate

one whole day to make what defence they can for themselves; and trust to

your own unbiased judgment to guide you to the right conclusion.

"You know, men of Athens, the exceeding stringency of the decree of

Cannonus, (9) which orders that man, whosoever he be, who is guilty of

treason against the people of Athens, to be put in irons, and so to meet

the charge against him before the people. If he be convicted, he is to

be thrown into the Barathron and perish, and the property of such an one

is to be confiscated, with the exception of the tithe which falls to the

goddess. I call upon you to try these generals in accordance with this

decree. Yes, and so help me God--if it please you, begin with my own

kinsman Pericles for base would it be on my part to make him of more

account than the whole of the State. Or, if you prefer, try them by that

other law, which is directed against robbers of temples and betrayers

of their country, which says: if a man betray his city or rob a sacred

temple of the gods, he shall be tried before a law court, and if he be

convicted, his body shall not be buried in Attica, and his goods shall

be confiscated to the State. Take your choice as between these two laws,

men of Athens, and let the prisoners be tried by one or other. Let three

portions of a day be assigned to each respectively, one portion wherein

they shall listen to their accusation, a second wherein they shall make

their defence, and a third wherein you shall meet and give your votes in

due order on the question of their guilt or innocence. By this procedure

the malefactors will receive the desert of their misdeeds in full, and

those who are innocent will owe you, men of Athens, the recovery of

their liberty, in place of unmerited destruction. (10)

(9) "There was a rule in Attic judicial procedure, called the psephism

of Kannonus (originally adopted, we do not know when, on the

proposition of a citizen of that name, as a psephism or decree for

some particular case, but since generalised into common practice,

and grown into great prescriptive reverence), which peremptorily

forbade any such collective trial or sentence, and directed that a

separate judicial vote should in all cases be taken for or against

each accused party." Grote, "Hist. of Greece," vol. viii. p. 266

(2d ed.)

(10) Reading {adikos apolountai}.

"On your side, in trying the accused by recognised legal procedure, you

will show that you obey the dictates of pious feeling, and can regard

the sanctity of an oath, instead of joining hands with our enemies the

Lacedaemonians and fighting their battles. For is it not to fight their

battles, if you take their conquerors, the men who deprived them of

seventy vessels, and at the moment of victory sent them to perdition

untried and in the teeth of the law? What are you afraid of, that you

press forward with such hot haste? Do you imagine that you may be

robbed of the power of life and death over whom you please, should you

condescend to a legal trial? but that you are safe if you take shelter

behind an illegality, like the illegality of Callixenus, when he worked

upon the senate to propose to this assembly to deal with the accused by

a single vote? But consider, you may actually put to death an innocent

man, and then repentance will one day visit you too late. Bethink you

how painful and unavailing remorse will then be, and more particularly

if your error has cost a fellow-creature his life. What a travesty of

justice it would be if in the case of a man like Aristarchus, (11) who

first tried to destroy the democracy and then betrayed Oenoe to our

enemy the Thebans, you granted him a day for his defence, consulting his

wishes, and conceded to him all the other benefits of the law; whereas

now you are proposing to deprive of these same privileges your own

generals, who in every way conformed to your views and defeated your

enemies. Do not you, of all men, I implore you, men of Athens, act thus.

Why, these laws are your own, to them, beyond all else you owe your

greatness. Guard them jealously; in nothing, I implore you, act without

their sanction.

(11) See below, II. iii; also cf. Thuc. viii. 90, 98.

"But now, turn for a moment and consider with me the actual occurrences

which have created the suspicion of misconduct on the part of our late

generals. The sea-fight had been fought and won, and the ships had

returned to land, when Diomedon urged that the whole squadron should

sail out in line and pick up the wrecks and floating crews. Erasinides

was in favour of all the vessels sailing as fast as possible to deal

with the enemy's forces at Mitylene. And Thrasylus represented that both

objects could be effected, by leaving one division of the fleet there,

and with the rest sailing against the enemy; and if this resolution were

agreed to, he advised that each of the eight generals should leave three

ships of his own division with the ten vessels of the taxiarchs, the

ten Samian vessels, and the three belonging to the navarchs. These added

together make forty-seven, four for each of the lost vessels, twelve

in number. Among the taxiarchs left behind, two were Thrasybulus and

Theramenes, the men who in the late meeting of this assembly undertook

to accuse the generals. With the remainder of the fleet they were to

sail to attack the enemy's fleet. Everything, you must admit, was duly

and admirably planned. It was only common justice, therefore, that those

whose duty it was to attack the enemy should render an account for

all miscarriages of operations against the enemy; while those who were

commissioned to pick up the dead and dying should, if they failed to

carry out the instructions of the generals, be put on trial to explain

the reasons of the failure. This indeed I may say in behalf of both

parites. It was really the storm which, in spite of what the generals

had planned, prevented anything being done. There are witnesses ready to

attest the truth of this: the men who escaped as by a miracle, and among

these one of these very generals, who was on a sinking ship and was

saved. And this man, who needed picking up as much as anybody at that

moment, is, they insist, to be tried by one and the same vote as those

who neglected to perform their orders! Once more, I beg you, men

of Athens, to accept your victory and your good fortune, instead of

behaving like the desperate victims of misfortune and defeat.

Recognise the finger of divine necessity; do not incur the reproach

of stony-heartedness by discovering treason where there was merely

powerlessness, and condemning as guilty those who were prevented by the

storm from carrying out their instructions. Nay! you will better satisfy

the demands of justice by crowning these conquerors with wreaths of

victory than by punishing them with death at the instigation of wicked

men."

At the conclusion of his speech Euryptolemus proposed, as an amendment,

that the prisoners should, in accordance with the decree of Cannonus, be

tried each separately, as against the proposal of the senate to try them

all by a single vote.

At the show of hands the tellers gave the majority in favour of

Euryptolemus's amendment, but upon the application of Menecles, who

took formal exception (12) to this decision, the show of hands was gone

through again, and now the verdict was in favour of the resolution of

the senate. At a later date the balloting was made, and by the votes

recorded the eight generals were condemned, and the six who were in

Athens were put to death.

(12) For this matter cf. Schomann, "De Comitiis Athen." p. 161 foll.;

also Grote, "Hist. of Grece," vol. viii. p. 276 note (2d ed.)

Not long after, repentance seized the Athenians, and they passed a

decree authorising the public prosecution of those who had deceived the

people, and the appointment of proper securities for their persons until

the trial was over. Callixenus was one of those committed for trail.

There were, besides Callixenus, four others against whom true bills were

declared, and they were all five imprisoned by their sureties. But all

subsequently effected their escape before the trial, at the time of the

sedition in which Cleophon (13) was killed. Callixenus eventually came

back when the party in Piraeus returned to the city, at the date of

the amnesty, (14) but only to die of hunger, an object of universal

detestation.

(13) Cleophon, the well-known demagogue. For the occasion of his death

see Grote, "Hist. of Greece," vol. viii. pp. 166, 310 (2d ed.);

Prof. Jebb, "Attic Orators," i. 266, ii. 288. For his character,

as popularly conceived, cf. Aristoph. "Frogs," 677.

(14) B.C. 403.

BOOK II

I

To return to Eteonicus and his troops in Chios. During summer they

were well able to support themselves on the fruits of the season, or

by labouring for hire in different parts of the island, but with the

approach of winter these means of subsistence began to fail. Ill-clad at

the same time, and ill-shod, they fell to caballing and arranging plans

to attack the city of Chios. It was agreed amongst them, that in order

to gauge their numbers, every member of the conspiracy should carry a

reed. Eteonicus got wind of the design, but was at a loss how to deal

with it, considering the number of these reed-bearers. To make an open

attack upon them seemed dangerous. It would probably lead to a rush

to arms, in which the conspirators would seize the city and commence

hostilities, and, in the event of their success, everything hitherto

achieved would be lost. Or again, the destruction on his part of many

fellow-creatures and allies was a terrible alternative, which would

place the Spartans in an unenviable light with regard to the rest of

Hellas, and render the soldiers ill-disposed to the cause in hand.

Accordingly he took with him fifteen men, armed with daggers, and

marched through the city. Falling in with one of the reed-bearers, a man

suffering from ophthalmia, who was returning from the surgeon's house,

he put him to death. This led to some uproar, and people asked why the

man was thus slain. By Eteonicus's orders the answer was set afloat,

"because he carried a reed." As the explanation circulated, one

reed-bearer after another threw away the symbol, each one saying to

himself, as he heard the reason given, "I have better not be seen with

this." After a while Eteonicus called a meeting of the Chians, and

imposed upon them a contribution of money, on the ground that with pay

in their pockets the sailors would have no temptation to revolutionary

projects. The Chians acquiesced. Whereupon Eteonicus promptly ordered

his crews to get on board their vessels. He then rowed alongside

each ship in turn, and addressed the men at some length in terms of

encouragement and cheery admonition, just as though he knew nothing of

what had taken place, and so distributed a month's pay to every man on

board.

After this the Chians and the other allies held a meeting in Ephesus,

and, considering the present posture of affairs, determined to send

ambassadors to Lacedaemon with a statement of the facts, and a request

that Lysander might be sent out to take command of the fleet. Lysander's

high reputation among the allies dated back to his former period of

office, when as admiral he had won the naval victory of Notium. The

ambassadors accordingly were despatched, accompanied by envoys also from

Cyrus, charged with the same message. The Lacedaemonians responded by

sending them Lysander as second in command, (1) with Aracus as admiral,

since it was contrary to their custom that the same man should be

admiral twice. At the same time the fleet was entrusted to Lysander. (2)

(1) Epistoleus. See above.

(2) "At this date the war had lasted five-and-twenty years." So the

MSS. read. The words are probably an interpolation.

It was in this year (3) that Cyrus put Autoboesaces and Mitraeus to

death. These were sons of the sister of Dariaeus (4) (the daughter of

Xerxes, the father of Darius). (5) He put them to death for neglecting,

when they met him, to thrust their hands into the sleeve (or "kore")

which is a tribute of respect paid to the king alone. This "kore" is

longer than the ordinary sleeve, so long in fact that a man with his

hand inside is rendered helpless. In consequence of this act on the part

of Cyrus, Hieramenes (6) and his wife urged upon Dariaeus the danger of

overlooking such excessive insolence on the part of the young prince,

and Dariaeus, on the plea of sickness, sent a special embassy to summon

Cyrus to his bedside.

(3) B.C. 406.

(4) Dariaeus, i.e. Darius, but the spelling of the name is correct,

and occurs in Ctesias, though in the "Anabasis" we have the

spelling Darius.

(5) These words look like the note of a foolish and ignorant scribe.

He ought to have written, "The daughter of Artaxerxes and own

sister of Darius, commonly so called."

(6) For Hieramenes cf. Thuc. viii. 95, and Prof. Jowett ad loc.

B.C. 405. In the following year (7) Lysander arrived at Ephesus, and

sent for Eteonicus with his ships from Chios, and collected all other

vessels elsewhere to be found. His time was now devoted to refitting the

old ships and having new ones built in Antandrus. He also made a journey

to the court of Cyrus with a request for money. All Cyrus could say

was, that not only the money sent by the king was spent, but much more

besides; and he pointed out the various sums which each of the admirals

had received, but at the same time he gave him what he asked for.

Furnished with this money, Lysander appointed captains to the different

men-of-war, and remitted to the sailors their arrears of pay. Meanwhile

the Athenian generals, on their side, were devoting their energies to

the improvements of their navy at Samos.

(7) The MSS. add "during the ephorate of Archytas and the archonship

at Athens of Alexias," which, though correct enough, is probably

an interpolation.

It was now Cyrus's turn to send for Lysander. It was the moment at which

the envoy from his father had arrived with the message: "Your father is

on his sick-bed and desires your presence." The king lay at Thamneria,

in Media, near the territory of the Cadusians, against whom he had

marched to put down a revolt. When Lysander presented himself, Cyrus was

urgent with him not to engage the Athenians at sea unless he had many

more ships than they. "The king," he added, "and I have plenty of

wealth, so that, as far as money goes, you can man plenty of vessels."

He then consigned to him all the tributes from the several cities which

belonged to him personally, and gave him the ready money which he had

as a gift; and finally, reminding him of the sincere friendship he

entertained towards the state of Lacedaemon, as well as to himself

personally, he set out up country to visit his father. Lysander, finding

himself thus left with the complete control of the property of Cyrus

(during the absence of that prince, so summoned to the bedside of his

father), was able to distribute pay to his troops, after which he set

sail for the Ceramic Gulf of Caria. Here he stormed a city in alliance

with the Athenians named Cedreae, and on the following day's assault

took it, and reduced the inhabitants to slavery. These were of a mixed

Hellene and barbaric stock. From Cedreae he continued his voyage

to Rhodes. The Athenians meanwhile, using Samos as their base of

operations, were employed in devastating the king's territory, or in

swooping down upon Chios and Ephesus, and in general were preparing for

a naval battle, having but lately chosen three new generals in addition

to those already in office, whose names were Menander, Tydeus, and

Cephisodotus. Now Lysander, leaving Rhodes, and coasting along Ionia,

made his way to the Hellespont, having an eye to the passage of vessels

through the Straits, and, in a more hostile sense, on the cities which

had revolted from Sparta. The Athenians also set sail from Chios, but

stood out to open sea, since the seaboard of Asia was hostile to them.

Lysander was again on the move; leaving Abydos, he passed up channel to

Lampsacus, which town was allied with Athens; the men of Abydos and

the rest of the troops advancing by land, under the command of the

Lacedaemonian Thorax. They then attacked and took by storm the town,

which was wealthy, and with its stores of wine and wheat and other

commodities was pillaged by the soldiery. All free-born persons,

however, were without exception released by Lysander. And now the

Athenian fleet, following close on his heels, came to moorings at

Elaeus, in the Chersonesus, one hundred and eighty sail in all. It was

not until they had reached this place, and were getting their early

meal, that the news of what had happened at Lampsacus reached them. Then

they instantly set sail again to Sestos, and, having halted long enough

merely to take in stores, sailed on further to Aegospotami, a point

facing Lampsacus, where the Hellespont is not quite two miles (8) broad.

Here they took their evening meal.

(8) Lit. fifteen stades.

The night following, or rather early next morning, with the first streak

of dawn, Lysander gave the signal for the men to take their breakfasts

and get on board their vessels; and so, having got all ready for a naval

engagement, with his ports closed and movable bulwarks attached, he

issued the order that no one was to stir from his post or put out to

sea. As the sun rose the Athenians drew up their vessels facing the

harbour, in line of battle ready for action; but Lysander declining

to come out to meet them, as the day advanced they retired again to

Aegospotami. Then Lysander ordered the swiftest of his ships to follow

the Athenians, and as soon as the crews had disembarked, to watch what

they did, sail back, and report to him. Until these look-outs returned

he would permit no disembarkation from his ships. This performance he

repeated for four successive days, and each day the Athenians put out to

sea and challenged an engagement.

But now Alcibiades, from one of his fortresses, could espy the position

of his fellow-countrymen, moored on an open beach beyond reach of any

city, and forced to send for supplies to Sestos, which was nearly two

miles distant, while their enemies were safely lodged in a harbour, with

a city adjoining, and everything within reach. The situation did not

please him, and he advised them to shift their anchorage to Sestos,

where they would have the advantage of a harbour and a city. "Once

there," he concluded, "you can engage the enemy whenever it suits you."

But the generals, and more particularly Tydeus and Menander, bade him go

about his business. "We are generals now--not you," they said; and so he

went away. And now for five days in succession the Athenians had sailed

out to offer battle, and for the fifth time retired, followed by the

same swift sailors of the enemy. But this time Lysander's orders to the

vessels so sent in pursuit were, that as soon as they saw the

enemy's crew fairly disembarked and dispersed along the shores of the

Chersonesus (a practice, it should be mentioned, which had grown upon

them from day to day owing to the distance at which eatables had to be

purchased, and out of sheer contempt, no doubt, of Lysander, who refused

to accept battle), they were to begin their return voyage, and when in

mid-channel to hoist a shield. The orders were punctually carried out,

and Lysander at once signalled to his whole squadron to put across with

all speed, while Thorax, with the land forces, was to march parallel

with the fleet along the coast. Aware of the enemy's fleet, which he

could see bearing down upon him, Conon had only time to signal to the

crews to join their ships and rally to the rescue with all their might.

But the men were scattered far and wide, and some of the vessels had

only two out of their three banks of rowers, some only a single one,

while others again were completely empty. Conon's own ship, with seven

others in attendance on him and the "Paralus," (9) put out to sea, a

little cluster of nine vessels, with their full complement of men; but

every one of the remaining one hundred and seventy-one vessels were

captured by Lysander on the beach. As to the men themselves, the

large majority of them were easily made prisoners on shore, a few only

escaping to the small fortresses of the neighbourhood. Meanwhile Conon

and his nine vessels made good their escape. For himself, knowing that

the fortune of Athens was ruined, he put into Abarnis, the promontory of

Lampsacus, and there picked up the great sails of Lysander's ships, and

then with eight ships set sail himself to seek refuge with Evagoras in

Cyprus, while the "Paralus" started for Athens with tidings of what had

taken place.

(9) The "Paralus"--the Athenian sacred vessel; cf. Thuc. iii. 33 et

passim.

Lysander, on his side, conveyed the ships and prisoners and all other

spoil back to Lampsacus, having on board some of the Athenian generals,

notably Philocles and Adeimantus. On the very day of these achievements

he despatched Theopompus, a Milesian privateersman, to Lacedaemon to

report what had taken place. This envoy arrived within three days and

delivered his message. Lysander's next step was to convene the allies

and bid them deliberate as to the treatment of the prisoners. Many were

the accusations here levied against the Athenians. There was talk of

crimes committed against the law of Hellas, and of cruelties sanctioned

by popular decrees; which, had they conquered in the late sea-fight,

would have been carried out; such as the proposal to cut off the right

hand of every prisoner taken alive, and lastly the ill-treatment of two

captured men-of-war, a Corinthian and an Andrian vessel, when every man

on board had been hurled headlong down the cliff. Philocles was the very

general of the Athenians who had so ruthlessly destroyed those men. Many

other tales were told; and at length a resolution was passed to put all

the Athenian prisoners, with the exception of Adeimantus, to death. He

alone, it was pleaded, had taken exception to the proposal to cut off

the prisoners' hands. On the other hand, he was himself accused by some

people of having betrayed the fleet. As to Philocles, Lysander put to

him one question, as the officer who had thrown (10) the Corinthians and

Andrians down the cliff: What fate did the man deserve to suffer who

had embarked on so cruel a course of illegality against Hellenes? and so

delivered him to the executioner.

(10) Reading {os... katekremnise}.

II

When he had set the affairs of Lampsacus in order, Lysander sailed to

Byzantium and Chalcedon, where the inhabitants, having first dismissed

the Athenian garrison under a flag of truce, admitted him within their

walls. Those citizens of Byzantium, who had betrayed Byzantium into

the hands of Alcibiades, fled as exiles into Pontus, but subsequently

betaking themselves to Athens, became Athenian citizens. In dealing with

the Athenian garrisons, and indeed with all Athenians wheresoever found,

Lysander made it a rule to give them safe conduct to Athens, and to

Athens only, in the certainty that the larger the number collected

within the city and Piraeus, the more quickly the want of necessaries of

life would make itself felt. And now, leaving Sthenelaus, a Laconian, as

governor-general of Byzantium and Chalcedon, he sailed back himself to

Lampsacus and devoted himself to refitting his ships.

It was night when the "Paralus" reached Athens with her evil tidings,

on receipt of which a bitter wail of woe broke forth. From Piraeus,

following the line of the long walls up to the heart of the city, it

swept and swelled, as each man to his neighbour passed on the news. On

that night no man slept. There was mourning and sorrow for those that

were lost, but the lamentation for the dead was merged in even deeper

sorrow for themselves, as they pictured the evils they were about to

suffer, the like of which they themselves had inflicted upon the men of

Melos, who were colonists of the Lacedaemonians, when they mastered

them by siege. Or on the men of Histiaea; on Scione and Torone; on the

Aeginetans, and many another Hellene city. (1) On the following day the

public assembly met, and, after debate, it was resolved to block up all

the harbours save one, to put the walls in a state of defence, to post

guards at various points, and to make all other necessary preparations

for a siege. Such were the concerns of the men of Athens.

(1) With regard to these painful recollections, see (1) for the siege

and surrender of Melos (in B.C. 416), Thuc. v. 114, 116; and cf.

Aristoph. "Birds," 186; Plut. ("Lysander," 14); (2) for the

ejection of the Histiaeans, an incident of the recovery of Euboea

in 445 B.C., see Thuc. i. 14; Plut. ("Pericles," 23); (3) for the

matter of Scione, which revolted in 423 B.C., and was for a long

time a source of disagreement between the Athenians and

Lacedaemonians, until finally captured by the former in 421 B.C.,

when the citizens were slain and the city given to the Plataeans,

see Thuc. iv. 120-122, 129-133; v. 18, 32; (4) for Torone see

Thuc. ib., and also v. 3; (5) for the expulsion of the Aeginetans

in 431 B.C. see Thuc. ii. 27.

Lysander presently left the Hellespont with two hundred sail and arrived

at Lesbos, where he established a new order of things in Mitylene and

the other cities of the island. Meanwhile he despatched Eteonicus with

a squadron of ten ships to the northern coasts, (2) where that officer

brought about a revolution of affairs which placed the whole region

in the hands of Lacedaemon. Indeed, in a moment of time, after the

sea-fight, the whole of Hellas had revolted from Athens, with the

solitary exception of the men of Samos. These, having massacred the

notables, (3) held the state under their control. After a while Lysander

sent messages to Agis at Deceleia, and to Lacedaemon, announcing his

approach with a squadron of two hundred sail.

(2) Lit. "the Thraceward districts." See above, p. 16.

(3) Or, "since they had slain their notables, held the state under

popular control." See Grote, "Hist. of Greece," vol. viii. p. 303

note 3 (2d ed.), who thinks that the incident referred to is the

violent democratic revolution in Samos described in Thuc. viii.

21, B.C. 412.

In obedience to a general order of Pausanias, the other king of

Lacedaemon, a levy in force of the Lacedaemonians and all the rest of

Peloponnesus, except the Argives, was set in motion for a campaign. As

soon as the several contingents had arrived, the king put himself at

their head and marched against Athens, encamping in the gymnasium of the

Academy, (4) as it is called. Lysander had now reached Aegina, where,

having got together as many of the former inhabitants as possible, he

formally reinstated them in their city; and what he did in behalf of the

Aeginetans, he did also in behalf of the Melians, and of the rest who

had been deprived of their countries. He then pillaged the island of

Salamis, and finally came to moorings off Piraeus with one hundred and

fifty ships of the line, and established a strict blockade against all

merchant ships entering that harbour.

(4) For this most illustrious of Athenian gymnasia, which still

retains its name, see Leake, "Topography of Athens," i. 195 foll.

The Athenians, finding themselves besieged by land and sea, were in

sore perplexity what to do. Without ships, without allies, without

provisions, the belief gained hold upon them that there was no way of

escape. They must now, in their turn, suffer what they had themselves

inflincted upon others; not in retaliation, indeed, for ills received,

but out of sheer insolence, overriding the citizens of petty states, and

for no better reason than that these were allies of the very men now at

their gates. In this frame of mind they enfranchised those who at any

time had lost their civil rights, and schooled themselves to endurance;

and, albeit many succumbed to starvation, no thought of truce or

reconciliation with their foes was breathed. (5) But when the stock

of corn was absolutely insufficient, they sent an embassage to Agis,

proposing to become allies of the Lacedaemonians on the sole condition

of keeping their fortification walls and Piraeus; and to draw up

articles of treaty on these terms. Agis bade them betake themselves to

Lacedaemon, seeing that he had no authority to act himself. With this

answer the ambassadors returned to Athens, and were forthwith sent on to

Lacedaemon. On reaching Sellasia, (6) a town in (7) Laconian territory,

they waited till they got their answer from the ephors, who, having

learnt their terms (which were identical to those already proposed

to Agis), bade them instantly to be gone, and, if they really desired

peace, to come with other proposals, the fruit of happier reflection.

Thus the ambassadors returned home, and reported the result of their

embassage, whereupon despondency fell upon all. It was a painful

reflection that in the end they would be sold into slavery; and

meanwhile, pending the return of a second embassy, many must needs fall

victims to starvation. The razing of their fortifications was not a

solution which any one cared to recommend. A senator, Archestratus, had

indeed put the question in the senate, whether it were not best to make

peace with the Lacedaemonians on such terms as they were willing to

propose; but he was thrown into prison. The Laconian proposals referred

to involved the destruction of both long walls for a space of more than

a mile. And a decree had been passed, making it illegal to submit any

such proposition about the walls. Things having reached this pass,

Theramenes made a proposal in the public assembly as follows: If they

chose to send him as an ambassador to Lysander, he would go and find out

why the Lacedaemonians were so unyielding about the walls; whether it

was they really intended to enslave the city, or merely that they wanted

a guarantee of good faith. Despatched accordingly, he lingered on with

Lysander for three whole months and more, watching for the time when the

Athenians, at the last pinch of starvation, would be willing to accede

to any terms that might be offered. At last, in the fourth month, he

returned and reported to the public assembly that Lysander had detained

him all this while, and had ended by bidding him betake himself to

Lacedaemon, since he had no authority himself to answer his questions,

which must be addressed directly to the ephors. After this Theramenes

was chosen with nine others to go to Lacedaemon as ambassadors with

full powers. Meanwhile Lysander had sent an Athenian exile, named

Aristoteles, in company of certain Lacedaemonians, to Sparta to report

to the board of ephors how he had answered Theramenes, that they, and

they alone, had supreme authority in matters of peace and war.

(5) Or, "they refused to treat for peace."

(6) Sellasia, the bulwark of Sparta in the valley of the Oenus.

(7) The MSS. have "in the neighbourhood of," which words are

inappropriate at this date, though they may well have been added

by some annotator after the Cleomenic war and the battle of

Sellasia, B.C. 222, when Antigonus of Macedon destroyed the place

in the interests of the Achaean League.

Theramenes and his companions presently reached Sellasia, and being

there questioned as to the reason of their visit, replied that they had

full powers to treat of peace. After which the ephors ordered them to

be summoned to their presence. On their arrival a general assembly was

convened, in which the Corinthians and Thebans more particularly, though

their views were shared by many other Hellenes also, urged the meeting

not to come to terms with the Athenians, but to destroy them. The

Lacedaemonians replied that they would never reduce to slavery a city

which was itself an integral portion of Hellas, and had performed a

great and noble service to Hellas in the most perilous of emergencies.

On the contrary, they were willing to offer peace on the terms now

specified--namely, "That the long walls and the fortifications of

Piraeus should be destroyed; that the Athenian fleet, with the exception

of twelve vessels, should be surrendered; that the exiles should be

restored; and lastly, that the Athenians should acknowledge the headship

of Sparta in peace and war, leaving to her the choice of friends and

foes, and following her lead by land and sea." Such were the terms which

Theramenes and the rest who acted with him were able to report on their

return to Athens. As they entered the city, a vast crowd met them,

trembling lest their mission have proved fruitless. For indeed delay

was no longer possible, so long already was the list of victims daily

perishing from starvation. On the day following, the ambassadors

delivered their report, stating the terms upon which the Lacedaemonians

were willing to make peace. Theramenes acted as spokesman, insisting

that they ought to obey the Lacedaemonians and pull down the walls. A

small minority raised their voice in opposition, but the majority were

strongly in favour of the proposition, and the resolution was passed to

accept the peace. After that, Lysander sailed into the Piraeus, and the

exiles were readmitted. And so they fell to levelling the fortifications

and walls with much enthusiasm, to the accompaniment of female

flute-players, deeming that day the beginning of liberty to Greece.

Thus the year drew to its close (8)--during its middle months took place

the accession of Dionysius, the son of Hermocrates the Syracusan, to

the tyranny of Syracuse; an incident itself preceded by a victory gained

over the Carthaginians by the Syracusans; the reduction of Agrigentum

through famine by the Carthaginians themselves; and the exodus of the

Sicilian Greeks from that city.

(8) For the puzzling chronology of this paragraph see Grote, "Hist. of

Greece," vol. x. p 619 (2d ed.) If genuine, the words may perhaps

have slipt out of their natural place in chapter i. above, in

front of the words "in the following year Lysander arrived," etc.

L. Dindorf brackets them as spurious. Xen., "Hist. Gr." ed.

tertia, Lipsiae, MDCCCLXXII. For the incidents referred to see

above; Grote, "Hist. of Greece," vol. x. pp. 582, 598 (2d ed.)

III

B.C. 404. In the following year (1) the people passed a resolution

to choose thirty men who were to draft a constitution based on the

ancestral laws of the State. The following were chosen to act on this

committee:--Polychares, Critias, Melobius, Hippolochus, Eucleides,

Hiero, Mnesilochus, Chremo, Theramenes, Aresias, Diocles, Phaedrias,

Chaereleos, Anaetius, Piso, Sophocles, Erastosthenes, Charicles,

Onomacles, Theognis, Aeschines, Theogones, Cleomedes, Erasistratus,

Pheido, Dracontides, Eumathes, Aristoteles, Hippomachus, Mnesitheides.

After these transactions, Lysander set sail for Samos; and Agis withdrew

the land force from Deceleia and disbanded the troops, dismissing the

contingents to their several cities.

(1) The MSS. here add "it was that year of the Olympiad cycle in which

Crocinas, a Thessalian, won the Stadium; when Endius was ephor at

Sparta, and Pythodorus archon at Athens, though the Athenians

indeed do not call the year by that archon's name, since he was

elected during the oligarchy, but prefer to speak of the year of

'anarchy'; the aforesaid oligarchy originated thus,"--which,

though correct, probably was not written by Xenophon. The year of

anarchy might perhaps be better rendered "the year without

archons."

In was at this date, about the time of the solar eclipse, (2) that

Lycophron of Pherae, who was ambitious of ruling over the whole of

Thessaly, defeated those sections of the Thessalians who opposed him,

such as the men of Larissa and others, and slew many of them. It

was also about this date that Dionysius, now tyrant of Syracuse, was

defeated by the Carthaginians and lost Gela and Camarina. And again, a

little later, the men of Leontini, who previously had been amalgamated

with the Syracusans, separated themselves from Syracuse and Dionysius,

and asserted their independence, and returned to their native city.

Another incident of this period was the sudden despatch and introduction

of Syracusan horse into Catana by Dionysius.

(2) This took place on 2d September B.C. 404.

Now the Samians, though besieged by Lysander on all sides, were at first

unwilling to come to terms. But at the last moment, when Lysander was on

the point of assaulting the town, they accepted the terms, which allowed

every free man to leave the island, but not to carry away any part of

his property, except the clothes on his back. On these conditions they

marched out. The city and all it contained was then delivered over to

its ancient citizens by Lysander, who finally appointed ten governors

to garrison the island. (3) After which, he disbanded the allied fleet,

dismissing them to their respective cities, while he himself, with the

Lacedaemonian squadron, set sail for Laconia, bringing with him the

prows of the conquered vessels and the whole navy of Piraeus, with

the exception of twelve ships. He also brought the crowns which he had

received from the cities as private gifts, and a sum of four hundred and

seventy talents (4) in silver (the surplus of the tribute money which

Cyrus had assigned to him for the prosecution of the war), besides other

property, the fruit of his military exploits. All these things Lysander

delivered to the Lacedaemonians in the latter end of summer. (5)

(3) A council of ten, or "decarchy." See Grote, "H. G." viii. 323 (1st

ed.)

(4) About 112,800 pounds.

(5) The MSS. add "a summer, the close of which coincided with the

termination of a war which had lasted twenty-eight and a half

years, as the list of annual ephors, appended in order, serves to

show. Aenesias is the first name. The war began during his

ephorate, in the fifteenth year of the thirty years' truce after

the capture of Euboea. His successors were Brasidas, Isanor,

Sostratidas, Exarchus, Agesistratus, Angenidas, Onomacles,

Zeuxippus, Pityas, Pleistolas, Cleinomachus, Harchus, Leon,

Chaerilas, Patesiadas, Cleosthenes, Lycarius, Eperatus,

Onomantius, Alexippidas, Misgolaidas, Isias, Aracus, Euarchippus,

Pantacles, Pityas, Archytas, and lastly, Endius, during whose year

of office Lysander sailed home in triumph, after performing the

exploits above recorded,"--the interpolation, probably, of some

editor or copyist, the words "twenty-eight and a half" being

probably a mistake on his part for "twenty-seven and a half." Cf.

Thuc. v. 26; also Buchsenschutz, Einleitung, p. 8 of his school

edition of the "Hellenica."

The Thirty had been chosen almost immediately after the long walls and

the fortifications round Piraeus had been razed. They were chosen

for the express purpose of compiling a code of laws for the future

constitution of the State. The laws were always on the point of being

published, yet they were never forthcoming; and the thirty compilers

contented themselves meanwhile with appointing a senate and the other

magistracies as suited their fancy best. That done, they turned their

attention, in the first instance, to such persons as were well known to

have made their living as informers (6) under the democracy, and to be

thorns in the side of all respectable people. These they laid hold on

and prosecuted on the capital charge. The new senate gladly recorded its

vote of condemnation against them; and the rest of the world, conscious

of bearing no resemblance to them, seemed scarcely vexed. But the Thirty

did not stop there. Presently they began to deliberate by what means

they could get the city under their absolute control, in order that they

might work their will upon it. Here again they proceeded tentatively;

in the first instance, they sent (two of their number), Aeschines and

Aristoteles, to Lacedaemon, and persuaded Lysander to support them in

getting a Lacedaemonian garrison despatched to Athens. They only

needed it until they had got the "malignants" out of the way, and had

established the constitution; and they would undertake to maintain these

troops at their own cost. Lysander was not deaf to their persuasions,

and by his co-operation their request was granted. A bodyguard, with

Callibius as governor, was sent.

(6) Lit. "by sycophancy," i.e. calumnious accusation--the sycophant's

trade. For a description of this pest of Athenian life cf. "Dem."

in Arist. 1, S. 52; quoted in Jebb, "Attic Orators," chap. xxix.

14; cf. Aristoph. "Ach." 904; Xen. "Mem." II. ix. 1.

And now that they had got the garrison, they fell to flattering

Callibius with all servile flattery, in order that he might give

countenance to their doings. Thus they prevailed on him to allow some of

the guards, whom they selected, to accompany them, while they proceeded

to lay hands on whom they would; no longer confining themselves to base

folk and people of no account, but boldly laying hands on those who they

felt sure would least easily brook being thrust aside, or, if a

spirit of opposition seized them, could command the largest number of

partisans.

These were early days; as yet Critias was of one mind with Theramenes,

and the two were friends. But the time came when, in proportion as

Critias was ready to rush headlong into wholesale carnage, like one

who thirsted for the blood of the democracy, which had banished him,

Theramenes balked and thwarted him. It was barely reasonable, he argued,

to put people to death, who had never done a thing wrong to respectable

people in their lives, simply because they had enjoyed influence and

honour under the democracy. "Why, you and I, Critias," he would add,

"have said and done many things ere now for the sake of popularity."

To which the other (for the terms of friendly intimacy still subsisted)

would retort, "There is no choice left to us, since we intend to take

the lion's share, but to get rid of those who are best able to hinder

us. If you imagine, because we are thirty instead of one, our government

requires one whit the less careful guarding than an actual tyranny, you

must be very innocent."

So things went on. Day after day the list of persons put to death for no

just reason grew longer. Day after day the signs of resentment were more

significant in the groups of citizens banding together and forecasting

the character of this future constitution; till at length Theramenes

spoke again, protesting:--There was no help for it but to associate with

themselves a sufficient number of persons in the conduct of affairs, or

the oligarchy would certainly come to an end. Critias and the rest

of the Thirty, whose fears had already converted Theramenes into a

dangerous popular idol, proceeded at once to draw up a list of three

thousand citizens; fit and proper persons to have a share in the conduct

of affairs. But Theramenes was not wholly satisfied, "indeed he must

say, for himself, he regarded it as ridiculous, that in their effort to

associate the better classes with themselves in power, they should fix

on just that particular number, three thousand, as if that figure had

some necessary connection with the exact number of gentlemen in the

State, making it impossible to discover any respectability outside

or rascality within the magic number. And in the second place," he

continued, "I see we are trying to do two things, diametrically opposed;

we are manufacturing a government, which is based on force, and at the

same time inferior in strength to those whom we propose to govern."

That was what he said, but what his colleagues did, was to institute a

military inspection or review. The Three Thousand were drawn up in the

Agora, and the rest of the citizens, who were not included in the list,

elsewhere in various quarters of the city. The order to take arms was

given; (7) but while the men's backs were turned, at the bidding of the

Thirty, the Laconian guards, with those of the citizens who shared their

views, appeared on the scene and took away the arms of all except the

Three Thousand, carried them up to the Acropolis, and safely deposited

them in the temple.

(7) Or, "a summons to the 'place d'armes' was given; but." Or, "the

order to seize the arms was given, and." It is clear from

Aristoph. "Acharn." 1050, that the citizens kept their weapons at

home. On the other hand, it was a custom not to come to any

meeting in arms. See Thuc. vi. 58. It seems probable that while

the men were being reviewed in the market-place and elsewhere, the

ruling party gave orders to seize their weapons (which they had

left at home), and this was done except in the case of the Three

Thousand. Cf. Arnold, "Thuc." II. 2. 5; and IV. 91.

The ground being thus cleared, as it were, and feeling that they had

it in their power to do what they pleased, they embarked on a course of

wholesale butchery, to which many were sacrificed to the merest hatred,

many to the accident of possessing riches. Presently the question

rose, How they were to get money to pay their guards? and to meet this

difficulty a resolution was passed empowering each of the committee to

seize on one of the resident aliens apiece, to put his victim to death,

and to confiscate his property. Theramenes was invited, or rather told

to seize some one or other. "Choose whom you will, only let it be done."

To which he made answer, it hardly seemed to him a noble or worthy

course on the part of those who claimed to be the elite of society to go

beyond the informers (8) in injustice. "Yesterday they, to-day we; with

this difference, the victim of the informer must live as a source of

income; our innocents must die that we may get their wealth. Surely

their method was innocent in comparison with ours."

(8) See above.

The rest of the Thirty, who had come to regard Theramenes as an obstacle

to any course they might wish to adopt, proceeded to plot against him.

They addressed themselves to the members of the senate in private,

here a man and there a man, and denounced him as the marplot of the

constitution. Then they issued an order to the young men, picking out

the most audacious characters they could find, to be present, each with

a dagger hidden in the hollow of the armpit; and so called a meeting

of the senate. When Theramenes had taken his place, Critias got up and

addressed the meeting:

"If," said he, "any member of this council, here seated, imagines that

an undue amount of blood has been shed, let me remind him that with

changes of constitution such things can not be avoided. It is the rule

everywhere, but more particularly at Athens it was inevitable there

should be found a specially large number of persons sworn foes to any

constitutional change in the direction of oligarchy, and this for two

reasons. First, because the population of this city, compared with other

Hellenic cities, is enormously large; and again, owing to the length of

time during which the people has battened upon liberty. Now, as to two

points we are clear. The first is that democracy is a form of government

detestable to persons like ourselves--to us and to you; the next is that

the people of Athens could never be got to be friendly to our friends

and saviours, the Lacedaemonians. But on the loyalty of the better

classes the Lacedaemonians can count. And that is our reason for

establishing an oligarchical constitution with their concurrence. That

is why we do our best to rid us of every one whom we perceive to be

opposed to the oligarchy; and, in our opinion, if one of ourselves

should elect to undermine this constitution of ours, he would deserve

punishment. Do you not agree? And the case," he continued, "is no

imaginary one. The offender is here present--Theramenes. And what we say

of him is, that he is bent upon destroying yourselves and us by every

means in his power. These are not baseless charges; but if you will

consider it, you will find them amply established in this unmeasured

censure of the present posture of affairs, and his persistent opposition

to us, his colleagues, if ever we seek to get rid of any of these

demagogues. Had this been his guiding principle of action from the

beginning, in spite of hostility, at least he would have escaped all

imputation of villainy. Why, this is the very man who originated our

friendly and confidential relations with Lacedaemon. This is the very

man who authorised the abolition of the democracy, who urged us on to

inflict punishment on the earliest batch of prisoners brought before

us. But to-day all is changed; now you and we are out of odour with

the people, and he accordingly has ceased to be pleased with our

proceedings. The explanation is obvious. In case of a catastrophe, how

much pleasanter for him once again to light upon his legs, and leave us

to render account for our past performances.

"I contend that this man is fairly entitled to render his account also,

not only as an ordinary enemy, but as a traitor to yourselves and us.

And let us add, not only is treason more formidable than open war, in

proportion as it is harder to guard against a hidden assassin than

an open foe, but it bears the impress of a more enduring hostility,

inasmuch as men fight their enemies and come to terms with them again

and are fast friends; but whoever heard of reconciliation with a

traitor? There he stands unmasked; he has forfeited our confidence for

evermore. But to show you that these are no new tactics of his, to prove

to you that he is a traitor in grain, I will recall to your memories

some points in his past history.

"He began by being held in high honour by the democracy; but taking a

leaf out of his father's, Hagnon's, book, he next showed a most headlong

anxiety to transform the democracy into the Four Hundred, and, in fact,

for a time held the first place in that body. But presently, detecting

the formation of rival power to the oligarchs, round he shifted; and we

find him next a ringleader of the popular party in assailing them. It

must be admitted, he has well earned his nickname 'Buskin.' (9) Yes,

Theramenes! clever you may be, but the man who deserves to live should

not show his cleverness in leading on his associates into trouble, and

when some obstacle presents itself, at once veer round; but like a pilot

on shipboard, he ought then to redouble his efforts, until the wind is

fair. Else, how in the name of wonderment are those mariners to reach

the haven where they would be, if at the first contrary wind or

tide they turn about and sail in the opposite direction? Death and

destruction are concomitants of constitutional changes and revolution,

no doubt; but you are such an impersonation of change, that, as you

twist and turn and double, you deal destruction on all sides. At one

swoop you are the ruin of a thousand oligarchs at the hands of the

people, and at another of a thousand democrats at the hands of the

better classes. Why, sirs, this is the man to whom the orders were given

by the generals, in the sea-fight off Lesbos, to pick up the crews of

the disabled vessels; and who, neglecting to obey orders, turned round

and accused the generals; and to save himself murdered them! What, I ask

you, of a man who so openly studied the art of self-seeking, deaf

alike to the pleas of honour and to the claims of friendship? Would not

leniency towards such a creature be misplaced? Can it be our duty at

all to spare him? Ought we not rather, when we know the doublings of his

nature, to guard against them, lest we enable him presently to practise

on ourselves? The case is clear. We therefore hereby cite this man

before you, as a conspirator and traitor against yourselves and us. The

reasonableness of our conduct, one further reflection may make clear.

No one, I take it, will dispute the splendour, the perfection of the

Laconian constitution. Imagine one of the ephors there in Sparta, in

lieu of devoted obedience to the majority, taking on himself to find

fault with the government and to oppose all measures. Do you not think

that the ephors themselves, and the whole commonwealth besides, would

hold this renegade worthy of condign punishment? So, too, by the same

token, if you are wise, do you spare yourselves, not him. For what does

the alternative mean? I will tell you. His preservation will cause

the courage of many who hold opposite views to your own to rise; his

destruction will cut off the last hopes of all your enemies, whether

within or without the city."

(9) An annotator seems to have added here the words, occurring in the

MSS., "the buskin which seems to fit both legs equally, but is

constant to neither," unless, indeed, they are an original

"marginal note" of the author. For the character of Theramenes, as

popularly conceived, cf. Aristoph. "Frogs," 538, 968 foll., and

Thuc. viii. 92; and Prof. Jowett, "Thuc." vol. ii. pp. 523, 524.

With these words he sat down, but Theramenes rose and said: "Sirs, with

your permission I will first touch upon the charge against me which

Critias has mentioned last. The assertion is that as the accuser of the

generals I was their murderer. Now I presume it was not I who began

the attack upon them, but it was they who asserted that in spite of

the orders given me I had neglected to pick up the unfortunates in the

sea-fight off Lesbos. All I did was to defend myself. My defence was

that the storm was too violent to permit any vessel to ride at sea, much

more therefore to pick up the men, and this defence was accepted by my

fellow-citizens as highly reasonable, while the generals seemed to be

condemned out of their own mouths. For while they kept on asserting

that it was possible to save the men, the fact still remained that they

abandoned them to their fate, set sail, and were gone.

"However, I am not surprised, I confess, at this grave misconception

(10) on the part of Critias, for at the date of these occurrences he

was not in Athens. He was away in Thessaly, laying the foundations of

a democracy with Prometheus, and arming the Penestae (11) against their

masters. Heaven forbid that any of his transactions there should be

re-enacted here. However, I must say, I do heartily concur with him on

one point. Whoever desires to exclude you from the government, or to

strength the hands of your secret foes, deserves and ought to meet with

condign punishment; but who is most capable of so doing? That you will

best discover, I think, by looking a little more closely into the past

and the present conduct of each of us. Well, then! up to the moment at

which you were formed into a senatorial body, when the magistracies were

appointed, and certain notorious 'informers' were brought to trial, we

all held the same views. But later on, when our friends yonder began

to hale respectable honest folk to prison and to death, I, on my side,

began to differ from them. From the moment when Leon of Salamis, (12)

a man of high and well-deserved reputation, was put to death, though he

had not committed the shadow of a crime, I knew that all his equals must

tremble for themselves, and, so trembling, be driven into opposition to

the new constitution. In the same way, when Niceratus, (13) the son of

Nicias, was arrested; a wealthy man, who, no more than his father, had

never done anything that could be called popular or democratic in his

life; it did not require much insight to discover that his compeers

would be converted into our foes. But to go a step further: when it

came to Antiphon (14) falling at our hands--Antiphon, who during the war

contributed two fast-sailing men-of-war out of his own resources, it was

then plain to me, that all who had ever been zealous and patriotic

must eye us with suspicion. Once more I could not help speaking out in

opposition to my colleagues when they suggested that each of us ought to

seize some one resident alien. (15) For what could be more certain

than that their death-warrant would turn the whole resident foreign

population into enemies of the constitution. I spoke out again when they

insisted on depriving the populace of their arms; it being no part of my

creed that we ought to take the strength out of the city; nor, indeed,

so far as I could see, had the Lacedaemonians stept between us and

destruction merely that we might become a handful of people, powerless

to aid them in the day of need. Had that been their object, they might

have swept us away to the last man. A few more weeks, or even days,

would have sufficed to extinguish us quietly by famine. Nor, again, can

I say that the importation of mercenary foreign guards was altogether to

my taste, when it would have been so easy for us to add to our own

body a sufficient number of fellow-citizens to ensure our supremacy as

governors over those we essayed to govern. But when I saw what an army

of malcontents this government had raised up within the city walls,

besides another daily increasing host of exiles without, I could not

but regard the banishment of people like Thrasybulus and Anytus and

Alcibiades (16) as impolitic. Had our object been to strengthen the

rival power, we could hardly have set about it better than by providing

the populace with the competent leaders whom they needed, and the

would-be leaders themselves with an army of willing adherents.

(10) Reading with Cobet {paranenomikenai}.

(11) I.e. serfs--Penestae being the local name in Thessaly for the

villein class. Like the {Eilotes} in Laconia, they were originally

a conquered tribe, afterwards increased by prisoners of war, and

formed a link between the freemen and born slaves.

(12) Cf. "Mem." IV. iv. 3; Plat. "Apol." 8. 32.

(13) Cf. Lysias, "Or." 18. 6.

(14) Probably the son of Lysidonides. See Thirlwall, "Hist. of

Greece," vol. iv. p. 179 (ed. 1847); also Lysias, "Or." 12. contra

Eratosth. According to Lysias, Theramenes, when a member of the

first Oligarchy, betrayed his own closest friends, Antiphon and

Archeptolemus. See Prof. Jebb, "Attic Orators," I. x. p. 266.

(15) The resident aliens, or {metoikoi}, "metics," so technically

called.

(16) Isocr. "De Bigis," 355; and Prof. Jebb's "Attic Orators," ii.

230. In the defence of his father's career, which the younger

Alcibiades, the defendant in this case (B.C. 397 probably) has

occasion to make, he reminds the court, that under the Thirty,

others were banished from Athens, but his father was driven out of

the civilised world of Hellas itself, and finally murdered. See

Plutarch, "Alcibiades," ad fin.

"I ask then is the man who tenders such advice in the full light of

day justly to be regarded as a traitor, and not as a benefactor? Surely

Critias, the peacemaker, the man who hinders the creation of many

enemies, whose counsels tend to the acquistion of yet more friends, (17)

cannot be accused of strengthening the hands of the enemy. Much more

truly may the imputation be retorted on those who wrongfully appropriate

their neighbours' goods and put to death those who have done no wrong.

These are they who cause our adversaries to grow and multiply, and

who in very truth are traitors, not to their friends only, but to

themselves, spurred on by sordid love of gain.

(17) Or, "the peacemaker, the healer of differences, the cementer of

new alliances, cannot," etc.

"I might prove the truth of what I say in many ways, but I beg you to

look at the matter thus. With which condition of affairs here in Athens

do you think will Thrasybulus and Anytus and the other exiles be the

better pleased? That which I have pictured as desirable, or that which

my colleagues yonder are producing? For my part I cannot doubt but that,

as things now are, they are saying to themselves, 'Our allies muster

thick and fast.' But were the real strength, the pith and fibre of this

city, kindly disposed to us, they would find it an uphill task even to

get a foothold anywhere in the country.

"Then, with regard to what he said of me and my propensity to be for

ever changing sides, let me draw your attention to the following facts.

Was it not the people itself, the democracy, who voted the constitution

of the Four Hundred? This they did, because they had learned to think

that the Lacedaemonians would trust any other form of government rather

than a democracy. But when the efforts of Lacedaemon were not a whit

relaxed, when Aristoteles, Melanthius, and Aristarchus, (18) and the

rest of them acting as generals, were plainly minded to construct an

intrenched fortress on the mole for the purpose of admitting the

enemy, and so getting the city under the power of themselves and their

associates; (19) because I got wind of these schemes, and nipped them in

the bud, is that to be a traitor to one's friends?

(18) Cf. Thuc. viii. 90-92, for the behaviour of the Lacedaemonian

party at Athens and the fortification of Eetioneia in B.C. 411.

(19) I.e. of the political clubs.

"Then he threw in my teeth the nickname 'Buskin,' as descriptive of

an endeavour on my part to fit both parties. But what of the man

who pleases neither? What in heaven's name are we to call him? Yes!

you--Critias? Under the democracy you were looked upon as the most

arrant hater of the people, and under the aristocracy you have proved

yourself the bitterest foe of everything respectable. Yes! Critias, I

am, and ever have been, a foe of those who think that a democracy cannot

reach perfection until slaves and those who, from poverty, would sell

the city for a drachma, can get their drachma a day. (20) But not less

am I, and ever have been, a pronounced opponent of those who do not

think there can possibly exist a perfect oligarchy until the State is

subjected to the despotism of a few. On the contrary, my own ambition

has been to combine with those who are rich enough to possess a horse

and shield, and to use them for the benefit of the State. (21) That was

my ideal in the old days, and I hold to it without a shadow of turning

still. If you can imagine when and where, in conjunction with despots or

demagogues, I have set to my hand to deprive honest gentlefolk of

their citizenship, pray speak. If you can convict me of such crimes at

present, or can prove my perpetration of them in the past, I admit that

I deserve to die, and by the worst of deaths."

(20) I.e. may enjoy the senatorial stipend of a drachma a day = 9 3/4

pence.

(21) See Thuc. viii. 97, for a momentary realisation of that "duly

attempered compound of Oligarchy and Democracy" which Thucydides

praises, and which Theramenes here refers to. It threw the power

into the hands of the wealthier upper classes to the exclusion of

the {nautikos okhlos}. See Prof. Jowett, vol. ii. note, ad loc.

cit.

With these words he ceased, and the loud murmur of the applause which

followed marked the favourable impression produced upon the senate.

It was plain to Critias, that if he allowed his adversary's fate to be

decided by formal voting, Theramenes would escape, and life to himself

would become intolerable. Accordingly he stepped forward and spoke a

word or two in the ears of the Thirty. This done, he went out and gave

an order to the attendants with the daggers to stand close to the bar

in full view of the senators. Again he entered and addressed the senate

thus: "I hold it to be the duty of a good president, when he sees the

friends about him being made the dupes of some delusion, to intervene.

That at any rate is what I propose to do. Indeed our friends here

standing by the bar say that if we propose to acquit a man so openly

bent upon the ruin of the oligarchy, they do not mean to let us do

so. Now there is a clause in the new code forbidding any of the Three

Thousand to be put to death without your vote; but the Thirty have

power of life and death over all outside that list. Accordingly," he

proceeded, "I herewith strike this man, Theramenes, off the list; and

this with the concurrence of my colleagues. And now," he continued, "we

condemn him to death."

Hearing these words Theramenes sprang upon the altar of Hestia,

exclaiming: "And I, sirs, supplicate you for the barest forms of law and

justice. Let it not be in the power of Critias to strike off either

me, or any one of you whom he will. But in my case, in what may be your

case, if we are tried, let our trial be in accordance with the law they

have made concerning those on the list. I know," he added, "but too

well, that this altar will not protect me; but I will make it plain that

these men are as impious towards the gods as they are nefarious towards

men. Yet I do marvel, good sirs and honest gentlemen, for so you are,

that you will not help yourselves, and that too when you must see that

the name of every one of you is as easily erased as mine."

But when he had got so far, the voice of the herald was heard giving the

order to the Eleven to seize Theramenes. They at that instant entered

with their satellites--at their head Satyrus, the boldest and most

shameless of the body--and Critias exclaimed, addressing the Eleven, "We

deliver over to you Theramenes yonder, who has been condemned according

to the law. Do you take him and lead him away to the proper place, and

do there with him what remains to do." As Critias uttered the words,

Satyrus laid hold upon Theramenes to drag him from the altar, and the

attendants lent their aid. But he, as was natural, called upon gods and

men to witness what was happening. The senators the while kept silence,

seeing the companions of Satyrus at the bar, and the whole front of the

senate house crowded with the foreign guards, nor did they need to be

told that there were daggers in reserve among those present.

And so Theramenes was dragged through the Agora, in vehement and loud

tones proclaiming the wrongs that he was suffering. One word, which is

said to have fallen from his lips, I cite. It is this: Satyrus, bade him

"Be silent, or he would rue the day;" to which he made answer, "And if I

be silent, shall I not rue it?" Also, when they brought him the hemlock,

and the time was come to drink the fatal draught, they tell how he

playfully jerked out the dregs from the bottom of the cup, like one who

plays "Cottabos," (22) with the words, "This to the lovely Critias."

These are but "apophthegms" (23) too trivial, it may be thought, to find

a place in history. Yet I must deem it an admirable trait in this man's

character, if at such a moment, when death confronted him, neither his

wits forsook him, nor could the childlike sportiveness vanish from his

soul.

(22) "A Sicilian game much in vogue at the drinking parties of young

men at Athens. The simplest mode was when each threw the wine left

in his cup so as to strike smartly in a metal basin, at the same

time invoking his mistress's name; if all fell into the basin and

the sound was clear, it was a sign he stood well with her."--

Liddell and Scott, sub. v. For the origin of the game compare

curiously enough the first line of the first Elegy of Critias

himself, who was a poet and political philosopher, as well as a

politician:--

"{Kottabos ek Sikeles esti khthonos, euprepes ergon on skopon es latagon

toxa kathistametha.}" Bergk. "Poetae Lyr. Graec." Pars II. xxx.

(23) Or, "these are sayings too slight, perhaps, to deserve record;

yet," etc. By an "apophthegm" was meant originally a terse

(sententious) remark, but the word has somewhat altered in

meaning.

IV

So Theramenes met his death; and, now that this obstacle was removed,

the Thirty, feeling that they had it in their power to play the tyrant

without fear, issued an order forbidding all, whose names were not

on the list, to set foot within the city. Retirement in the country

districts was no protection, thither the prosecutor followed them, and

thence dragged them, that their farms and properties might fall to the

possession of the Thirty and their friends. Even Piraeus was not safe;

of those who sought refuge there, many were driven forth in similar

fashion, until Megara and Thebes overflowed with the crowd of refugees.

Presently Thrasybulus, with about seventy followers, sallied out from

Thebes, and made himself master of the fortress of Phyle. (1) The

weather was brilliant, and the Thirty marched out of the city to repel

the invader; with them were the Three Thousand and the Knights. When

they reached the place, some of the young men, in the foolhardiness of

youth, made a dash at the fortress, but without effect; all they got was

wounds, and so retired. The intention of the Thirty now was to blockade

the place; by shutting off all the avenues of supplies, they thought to

force the garrison to capitulate. But this project was interrupted by

a steady downfall of snow that night and the following day. Baffled

by this all-pervading enemy they beat a retreat to the city, but not

without the sacrifice of many of their camp-followers, who fell a prey

to the men in Phyle. The next anxiety of the government in Athens was to

secure the farms and country houses against the plunderings and forays

to which they would be exposed, if there were no armed force to

protect them. With this object a protecting force was despatched to

the "boundary estates," (2) about two miles south of Phyle. This corps

consisted of the Lacedaemonian guards, or nearly all of them, and two

divisions of horse. (3) They encamped in a wild and broken district, and

the round of their duties commenced.

(1) "A strong fortress (the remains of which still exist) commanding

the narrow pass across Mount Parnes, through which runs the direct

road from Thebes to Athens, past Acharnae. The precipitous rock on

which it stands can only be approached by a ridge on the eastern

side. The height commands a magnificent view of the whole Athenian

plain, of the city itself, of Mount Hymettus, and the Saronic

Gulf,"--"Dict. of Geog., The demi of the Diacria and Mount

Parnes."

(2) Cf. Boeckh, "P. E. A." p. 63, Eng. ed.

(3) Lit. tribes, each of the ten tribes furnishing about one hundred

horse.

But by this time the small garrison above them had increased tenfold,

until there were now something like seven hundred men collected in

Phyle; and with these Thrasybulus one night descended. When he was not

quite half a mile from the enemy's encampment he grounded arms, and a

deep silence was maintained until it drew towards day. In a little while

the men opposite, one by one, were getting to their legs or leaving the

camp for necessary purposes, while a suppressed din and murmur arose,

caused by the grooms currying and combing their horses. This was the

moment for Thrasybulus and his men to snatch up their arms and make a

dash at the enemy's position. Some they felled on the spot; and routing

the whole body, pursued them six or seven furlongs, killing one

hundred and twenty hoplites and more. Of the cavalry, Nicostratus, "the

beautiful," as men called him, and two others besides were slain; they

were caught while still in their beds. Returning from the pursuit,

the victors set up a trophy, got together all the arms they had taken,

besides baggage, and retired again to Phyle. A reinforcement of horse

sent from the city could not discover the vestige of a foe; but waited

on the scene of battle until the bodies of the slain had been picked up

by their relatives, when they withdrew again to the city.

After this the Thirty, who had begun to realise the insecurity of their

position, were anxious to appropriate Eleusis, so that an asylum might

be ready for them against the day of need. With this view an order was

issued to the Knights; and Critias, with the rest of the Thirty, visited

Eleusis. There they held a review of the Eleusians in the presence of

the Knights; (4) and, on the pretext of wishing to discover how many

they were, and how large a garrison they would further require, they

ordered the townsfolk to enter their names. As each man did so he had to

retire by a postern leading to the sea. But on the sea-beach this

side there were lines of cavalry drawn up in waiting, and as each man

appeared he was handcuffed by the satellites of the Thirty. When all

had so been seized and secured, they gave orders to Lysimachus, the

commander of the cavalry, to take them off to the city and deliver them

over to the Eleven. Next day they summoned the heavy armed who were on

the list, and the rest of the Knights (5) to the Odeum, and Critias rose

and addressed them. He said: "Sirs, the constitution, the lines of which

we are laying down, is a work undertaken in your interests no less than

ours; it is incumbent on you therefore to participate in its dangers,

even as you will partake of its honours. We expect you therefore, in

reference to these Eleusians here, who have been seized and secured, to

vote their condemnation, so that our hopes and fears may be identical."

Then, pointing to a particular spot, he said peremptorily, "You will

please deposit your votes there within sight of all." It must be

understood that the Laconian guards were present at the time, and armed

to the teeth, and filling one-half of the Odeum. As to the proceedings

themselves, they found acceptance with those members of the State,

besides the Thirty, who could be satisfied with a simple policy of

self-aggrandisement.

(4) Or, "in the cavalry quarters," cf. {en tois ikhthusin} = in the

fish market. Or, "at the review of the horse."

(5) For the various Odeums at Athens vide Prof. Jebb, "Theophr."

xviii. 235, 236. The one here named was near the fountain

Callirhoe by the Ilissus.

But now Thrasybulus at the head of his followers, by this time about one

thousand strong, descended from Phyle and reached Piraeus in the night.

The Thirty, on their side, informed of this new move, were not slow to

rally to the rescue, with the Laconian guards, supported by their own

cavalry and hoplites. And so they advanced, marching down along the

broad carriage road which leads into Piraeus. The men from Phyle seemed

at first inclined to dispute their passage, but as the wide circuit

of the walls needed a defence beyond the reach of their still scanty

numbers, they fell back in a compact body upon Munychia. (6) Then the

troops from the city poured into the Agora of Hippodmus. (7) Here they

formed in line, stretching along and filling the street which leads to

the temple of Artemis and the Bendideum. (8) This line must have been

at least fifty shields deep; and in this formation they at once began

to march up. As to the men of Phyle, they too blocked the street at the

opposite end, and facing the foe. They presented only a thin line, not

more than ten deep, though behind these, certainly, were ranged a body

of targeteers and light-armed javelin men, who were again supported by

an artillery of stone-throwers--a tolerably numerous division drawn from

the population of the port and district itself. While his antagonists

were still advancing, Thrasybulus gave the order to ground their heavy

shields, and having done so himself, whilst retaining the rest of

his arms, he stood in the midst, and thus addressed them: "Men and

fellow-citizens, I wish to inform some, and to remind others of you,

that of the men you see advancing beneath us there, the right division

are the very men we routed and pursued only five days ago; while on the

extreme left there you see the Thirty. These are the men who have not

spared to rob us of our city, though we did no wrong; who have hounded

us from our homes; who have set the seal of proscription on our dearest

friends. But to-day the wheel of fortune has revolved; that has come

about which least of all they looked for, which most of all we prayed

for. Here we stand with our good swords in our hands, face to face

with our foes; and the gods themselves are with us, seeing that we were

arrested in the midst of our peaceful pursuits; at any moment, whilst

we supped, or slept, or marketed, sentence of banishment was passed upon

us: we had done no wrong--nay, many of us were not even resident in the

country. To-day, therefore, I repeat, the gods do visibly fight upon our

side; the great gods, who raise a tempest even in the midst of calm for

our benefit, and when we lay to our hand to fight, enable our little

company to set up the trophy of victory over the multitude of our foes.

On this day they have brought us hither to a place where the steep

ascent must needs hinder our foes from reaching with lance or arrow

further than our foremost ranks; but we with our volley of spears and

arrows and stones cannot fail to reach them with terrible effect. Had we

been forced to meet them vanguard to vanguard, on an equal footing, who

could have been surprised? But as it is, all I say to you is, let fly

your missiles with a will in right brave style. No one can miss his mark

when the road is full of them. To avoid our darts they must be for ever

ducking and skulking beneath their shields; but we will rain blows upon

them in their blindness; we will leap upon them and lay them low. But,

O sirs! let me call upon you so to bear yourselves that each shall

be conscious to himself that victory was won by him and him alone.

Victory--which, God willing, shall this day restore to us the land of

our fathers, our homes, our freedom, and the rewards of civic life, our

children, if children we have, our darlings, and our wives! Thrice happy

those among us who as conquerors shall look upon this gladdest of all

days. Nor less fortunate the man who falls to-day. Not all the wealth

in the world shall purchase him a monument so glorious. At the right

instant I will strike the keynote of the paean; then, with an invocation

to the God of battle, (9) and in return for the wanton insults they put

upon us, let us with one accord wreak vengeance on yonder men."

(6) The citadel quarter of Piraeus.

(7) Named after the famous architect Hippodamus, who built the town.

It was situated near where the two long walls joined the wall of

Piraeus; a broad street led from it up to the citadel of Munychia.

(8) I.e. the temple of Bendis (the Thracian Artemis). Cf. Plat. "Rep."

327, 354; and Prof. Jowett, "Plato," vol. iii. pp. 193, 226.

(9) Lit. "Enyalius," in Homer an epithet of Ares; at another date (cf.

Aristoph. "Peace," 456) looked upon as a distinct divinity.

Having so spoken, he turned round, facing the foemen, and kept quiet,

for the order passed by the soothsayer enjoined on them, not to

charge before one of their side was slain or wounded. "As soon as that

happens," said the seer, "we will lead you onwards, and the victory

shall be yours; but for myself, if I err not, death is waiting." And

herein he spoke truly, for they had barely resumed their arms when he

himself as though he were driven by some fatal hand, leapt out in front

of the ranks, and so springing into the midst of the foe, was slain,

and lies now buried at the passage of the Cephisus. But the rest were

victorious, and pursued the routed enemy down to the level ground.

There fell in this engagement, out of the number of the Thirty, Critias

himself and Hippomachus, and with them Charmides, (10) the son of

Glaucon, one of the ten archons in Piraeus, and of the rest about

seventy men. The arms of the slain were taken; but, as fellow-citizens,

the conquerors forebore to despoil them of their coats. This being done,

they proceeded to give back the dead under cover of a truce, when the

men, on either side, in numbers stept forward and conversed with one

another. Then Cleocritus (he was the Herald of the Initiated, (11) a

truly "sweet-voiced herald," if ever there was), caused a deep

silence to reign, and addressed their late combatants as follows:

"Fellow-citizens--Why do you drive us forth? why would you slay us?

what evil have we wrought you at any time? or is it a crime that we

have shared with you in the most solemn rites and sacrifices, and in

festivals of the fairest: we have been companions in the chorus, the

school, the army. We have braved a thousand dangers with you by land and

sea in behalf of our common safety, our common liberty. By the gods

of our fathers, by the gods of our mothers, by the hallowed names of

kinship, intermarriage, comradeship, those three bonds which knit the

hearts of so many of us, bow in reverence before God and man, and

cease to sin against the land of our fathers: cease to obey these most

unhallowed Thirty, who for the sake of private gain have in eight months

slain almost more men than the Peloponnesians together in ten years of

warfare. See, we have it in our power to live as citizens in peace; it

is only these men, who lay upon us this most foul burthen, this hideous

horror of fratricidal war, loathed of God and man. Ah! be well assured,

for these men slain by our hands this day, ye are not the sole mourners.

There are among them some whose deaths have wrung from us also many a

bitter tear."

(10) He was cousin to Critias, and uncle by the mother's side to

Plato, who introduces him in the dialogue, which bears his name

(and treats of Temperance), as a very young man at the beginning

of the Peloponnesian War. We hear more of him also from Xenophon

himself in the "Memorabilia," iii. 6. 7; and as one of the

interlocutors in the "Symposium."

(11) I.e. of the Eleusinian mysteries. He had not only a loud voice,

but a big body. Cf. Aristoph. "Frogs," 1237.

So he spoke, but the officers and leaders of the defeated army who were

left, unwilling that their troops should listen to such topics at that

moment, led them back to the city. But the next day the Thirty, in deep

down-heartedness and desolation, sat in the council chamber. The Three

Thousand, wherever their several divisions were posted, were everywhere

a prey to discord. Those who were implicated in deeds of violence, and

whose fears could not sleep, protested hotly that to yield to the party

in Piraeus were preposterous. Those on the other hand who had faith in

their own innocence, argued in their own minds, and tried to convince

their neighbours that they could well dispense with most of their

present evils. "Why yield obedience to these Thirty?" they asked, "Why

assign to them the privilege of destroying the State?" In the end they

voted a resolution to depose the government, and to elect another. This

was a board of ten, elected one from each tribe.

B.C. 403. As to the Thirty, they retired to Eleusis; but the Ten,

assisted by the cavalry officers, had enough to do to keep watch over

the men in the city, whose anarchy and mutual distrust were rampant. The

Knights did not return to quarters at night, but slept out in the Odeum,

keeping their horses and shields close beside them; indeed the distrust

was so great that from evening onwards they patrolled the walls on foot

with their shields, and at break of day mounted their horses, at every

moment fearing some sudden attack upon them by the men in Piraeus. These

latter were now so numerous, and of so mixed a company, that it was

difficult to find arms for all. Some had to be content with shields of

wood, others of wicker-work, which they spent their time in coating with

whitening. Before ten days had elapsed guarantees were given, securing

full citizenship, with equality of taxation and tribute to all,

even foreigners, who would take part in the fighting. Thus they were

presently able to take the field, with large detachments both of heavy

infantry and light-armed troops, besides a division of cavalry, about

seventy in number. Their system was to push forward foraging parties in

quest of wood and fruits, returning at nightfall to Piraeus. Of the city

party no one ventured to take the field under arms; only, from time to

time, the cavalry would capture stray pillagers from Piraeus or inflict

some damage on the main body of their opponents. Once they fell in with

a party belonging to the deme Aexone, (12) marching to their own farms

in search of provisions. These, in spite of many prayers for mercy

and the strong disapprobation of many of the knights, were ruthlessly

slaughtered by Lysimachus, the general of cavalry. The men of Piraeus

retaliated by putting to death a horseman, named Callistratus, of the

tribe Leontis, whom they captured in the country. Indeed their courage

ran so high at present that they even meditated an assault upon the city

walls. And here perhaps the reader will pardon the record of a somewhat

ingenious device on the part of the city engineer, who, aware of the

enemy's intention to advance his batteries along the racecourse, which

slopes from the Lyceum, had all the carts and waggons which were to be

found laden with blocks of stone, each one a cartload in itself, and

so sent them to deposit their freights "pele-mele" on the course in

question. The annoyance created by these separate blocks of stone

was enormous, and quite out of proportion to the simplicity of the

contrivance.

(12) On the coast south of Phalerum, celebrated for its fisheries. Cf.

"Athen." vii. 325.

But it was to Lacedaemon that men's eyes now turned. The Thirty

despatched one set of ambassadors from Eleusis, while another set

representing the government of the city, that is to say the men on the

list, was despatched to summon the Lacedaemonians to their aid, on the

plea that the people had revolted from Sparta. At Sparta, Lysander,

taking into account the possibility of speedily reducing the party in

Piraeus by blockading them by land and sea, and so cutting them off from

all supplies, supported the application, and negotiated the loan of

one hundred talents (13) to his clients, backed by the appointment of

himself as harmost on land, and of his brother, Libys, as admiral of

the fleet. And so proceeding to the scene of action at Eleusis, he got

together a large body of Peloponnesian hoplites, whilst his brother,

the admiral, kept watch and ward by sea to prevent the importation of

supplies into Piraeus by water. Thus the men in Piraeus were soon again

reduced to their former helplessness, while the ardour of the city folk

rose to a proportionally high pitch under the auspices of Lysander.

(13) 24,375 pounds, reckoning one tal. = 243 pounds 15 shillings.

Things were progressing after this sort when King Pausanias intervened.

Touched by a certain envy of Lysander--(who seemed, by a final stroke of

achievement, about to reach the pinnacle of popularity, with Athens laid

like a pocket dependency at his feet)--the king persuaded three of

the ephors to support him, and forthwith called out the ban. With him

marched contingents of all the allied States, except the Boeotians and

Corinthians. These maintained, that to undertake such an expedition

against the Athenians, in whose conduct they saw nothing contrary to the

treaty, was inconsistent with their oaths. But if that was the language

held by them, the secret of their behaviour lay deeper; they seemed to

be aware of a desire on the part of the Lacedaemonians to annex the

soil of the Athenians and to reduce the state to vassalage. Pausanias

encamped on the Halipedon, (14) as the sandy flat is called, with his

right wing resting on Piraeus, and Lysander and his mercenaries forming

the left. His first act was to send an embassage to the party in

Piraeus, calling upon them to retire peacably to their homes; when they

refused to obey, he made, as far as mere noise went, the semblance of an

attack, with sufficient show of fight to prevent his kindly disposition

being too apparent. But gaining nothing by the feint, he was forced to

retire. Next day he took two Laconian regiments, with three tribes of

Athenian horse, and crossed over to the Mute (15) Harbour, examining the

lie of the ground to discover how and where it would be easiest to draw

lines of circumvallation round Piraeus. As he turned his back to retire,

a party of the enemy sallied out and caused him annoyance. Nettled at

the liberty, he ordered the cavalry to charge at the gallop, supported

by the ten-year-service (16) infantry, whilst he himself, with the rest

of the troops, followed close, holding quietly back in reserve. They cut

down about thirty of the enemy's light troops and pursued the rest hotly

to the theatre in Piraeus. Here, as chance would have it, the whole

light and heavy infantry of the Piraeus men were getting under arms;

and in an instant their light troops rushed out and dashed at the

assailants; thick and fast flew missiles of all sorts--javelins, arrows

and sling stones. The Lacedaemonians finding the number of their wounded

increasing every minute, and sorely called, slowly fell back step by

step, eyeing their opponents. These meanwhile resolutely pressed on.

Here fell Chaeron and Thibrachus, both polemarchs, here also Lacrates,

an Olympic victor, and other Lacedaemonians, all of whom now lie

entombed before the city gates in the Ceramicus. (17)

(14) The Halipedon is the long stretch of flat sandy land between

Piraeus Phalerum and the city.

(15) Perhaps the landlocked creek just round the promontory of

Eetioneia, as Leake conjectures, "Topog. of Athens," p. 389. See

also Prof. Jowett's note, "Thuc." v. 2; vol. ii. p. 286.

(16) I.e. who had already seen ten years of service, i.e. over twenty-

eight, as the Spartan was eligible to serve at eighteen. Cf. Xen.

"Hell." III. iv. 23; VI. iv. 176.

(17) The outer Ceramicus, "the most beautiful spot outside the walls."

Cf. Thuc. ii. 34; through it passes the street of the tombs on the

sacred road; and here was the place of burial for all persons

honoured with a public funeral. Cf. Arist. "Birds," 395.

Watching how matters went, Thrasybulus began his advance with the whole

of his heavy infantry to support his light troops and quickly fell

into line eight deep, acting as a screen to the rest of his troops.

Pausanias, on his side, had retired, sorely pressed, about half a

mile towards a bit of rising ground, where he sent orders to the

Lacedaemonians and the other allied troops to bring up reinforcements.

Here, on this slope, he reformed his troops, giving his phalanx the

full depth, and advanced against the Athenians, who did not hesitate

to receive him at close quarters, but presently had to give way; one

portion being forced into the mud and clay at Halae, (18) while the

others wavered and broke their line; one hundred and fifty of them were

left dead on the field, whereupon Pausanias set up a trophy and retired.

Not even so, were his feelings embittered against his adversary. On the

contrary he sent secretly and instructed the men of Piraeus, what sort

of terms they should propose to himself and the ephors in attendance.

To this advice they listened. He also fostered a division in the party

within the city. A deputation, acting on his orders, sought an audience

of him and the ephors. It had all the appearance of a mass meeting. In

approaching the Spartan authorities, they had no desire or occasion,

they stated, to look upon the men of Piraeus as enemies, they would

prefer a general reconciliation and the friendship of both sides with

Lacedaemon. The propositions were favourably received, and by no less a

person than Nauclidas. He was present as ephor, in accordance with the

custom which obliges two members of that board to serve on all military

expeditions with the king, and with his colleague shared the political

views represented by Pausanias, rather than those of Lysander and his

party. Thus the authorities were quite ready to despatch to Lacedaemon

the representatives of Piraeus, carrying their terms of truce with the

Lacedaemonians, as also two private individuals belonging to the city

party, whose names were Cephisophon and Meletus. This double deputation,

however, had no sooner set out to Lacedaemon than the "de facto"

government of the city followed suit, by sending a third set of

representatives to state on their behalf: that they were prepared to

deliver up themselves and the fortifications in their possession to

the Lacedaemonians, to do with them what they liked. "Are the men of

Piraeus," they asked, "prepared to surrender Piraeus and Munychia in

the same way? If they are sincere in their profession of friendship to

Lacedaemon, they ought to do so." The ephors and the members of assembly

at Sparta (19) gave audience to these several parties, and sent

out fifteen commissioners to Athens empowered, in conjunction with

Pausanias, to discover the best settlement possible. The terms (20)

arrived at were that a general peace between the rival parties should be

established, liberty to return to their own homes being granted to all,

with the exception of the Thirty, the Eleven, and the Ten who had been

governors in Piraeus; but a proviso was added, enabling any of the city

party who feared to remain at Athens to find a home in Eleusis.

(18) Halae, the salt marshy ground immediately behind the great

harbour of Piraeus, but outside the fortification lines.

(19) Cf. "Hell." VI. iii. 3, {oi ekkletoi}.

(20) Cf. Prof. Jebb, "Orators," i. 262, note 2.

And now that everything was happily concluded, Pausanias disbanded his

army, and the men from Piraeus marched up under arms into the acropolis

and offered sacrifice to Athena. When they were come down, the generals

called a meeting of the Ecclesia, (21) and Thrasybulus made a speech in

which, addressing the city party, he said: "Men of the city! I have one

piece of advice I would tender to you; it is that you should learn to

know yourselves, and towards the attainment of that self-knowledge I

would have you make a careful computation of your good qualities and

satisfy yourselves on the strength of which of these it is that you

claim to rule over us. Is it that you are more just than ourselves? Yet

the people, who are poorer--have never wronged you for the purposes of

plunder; but you, whose wealth would outweight the whole of ours, have

wrought many a shameful deed for the sake of gain. If, then, you have

no monopoly of justice, can it be on the score of courage that you are

warranted to hold your heads so high? If so, what fairer test of courage

will you propose than the arbitrament of war--the war just ended? Or do

you claim superiority of intelligence?--you, who with all your wealth of

arms and walls, money and Peloponnesian allies, have been paralysed by

men who had none of these things to aid them! Or is it on these Laconian

friends of yours that you pride yourselves? What! when these same

friends have dealt by you as men deal by vicious dogs. You know how that

is. They put a heavy collar round the neck of the brutes and hand them

over muzzled to their masters. So too have the Lacedaemonians handed you

over to the people, this very people whom you have injured; and now they

have turned their backs and are gone. But" (turning to the mass) "do

not misconceive me. It is not for me, sirs, coldly to beg of you, in no

respect to violate your solemn undertakings. I go further; I beg you,

to crown your list of exploits by one final display of virtue. Show

the world that you can be faithful to your oaths, and flawless in your

conduct." By these and other kindred arguments he impressed upon them

that there was no need for anarchy or disorder, seeing that there were

the ancient laws ready for use. And so he broke up (22) the assembly.

(21) I.e. the Public Assembly, see above; and reading with Sauppe

after Cobet {ekklesian epoiesan}, which words are supposed to have

dropt out of the MSS. Or, keeping to the MSS., translate "When the

generals were come down, Thrasybulus," etc. See next note.

(22) The Greek words are {antestese ten ekklesian} (an odd phrase for

the more technical {eluse} or {dieluse ten ekklesian}). Or,

accepting the MSS. reading above (see last note), translate "he

set up (i.e. restored) the Assembly." So Mr. J. G. Philpotts, Mr.

Herbert Hailstone, and others.

At this auspicious moment, then, they reappointed the several

magistrates; the constitution began to work afresh, and civic life was

recommenced. At a subsequent period, on receiving information that the

party at Eleusis were collecting a body of mercenaries, they marched out

with their whole force against them, and put to death their generals,

who came out to parley. These removed, they introduced to the others

their friends and connections, and so persuaded them to come to terms

and be reconciled. The oath they bound themselves by consisted of a

simple asseveration: "We will remember past offences no more;" and to

this day (23) the two parties live amicably together as good citizens,

and the democracy is steadfast to its oaths.

(23) It would be interesting to know the date at which the author

penned these words. Was this portion of the "Hellenica" written

before the expedition of Cyrus? i.e. in the interval between the

formal restoration of the Democracy, September B.C. 403, and March

B.C. 401. The remaining books of the "Hellenica" were clearly

written after that expedition, since reference is made to it quite

early in Bk. III. i. 2. Practically, then, the first volume of

Xenophon's "History of Hellenic Affairs" ends here. This history

is resumed in Bk. III. i. 3. after the Cyreian expedition (of

which episode we have a detailed account in the "Anabasis" from

March B.C. 401 down to March B.C. 399, when the remnant of the Ten

Thousand was handed over to the Spartan general Thibron in Asia).

Some incidents belonging to B.C. 402 are referred to in the

opening paragraphs of "Hellenica," III. i. 1, 2, but only as an

introduction to the new matter; and with regard to the historian

himself, it is clear that "a change has come o'er the spirit of

his dream." This change of view is marked by a change of style in

writing. I have thought it legitimate, under the circumstances, to

follow the chronological order of events, and instead of

continuing the "Hellenica," at this point to insert the

"Anabasis." My next volume will contain the remaining books of the

"Hellenica" and the rest of Xenophon's "historical" writings.

BOOK III

I

B.C. 403-402. Thus the civil strife at Athens had an end. At a

subsequent date Cyrus sent messengers to Lacedaemon, claiming requital

in kind for the service which he had lately rendered in the war with

Athens. (1) The demand seemed to the ephorate just and reasonable.

Accordingly they ordered Samius, (2) who was admiral at the time, to

put himself at the disposition of Cyrus for any service which he might

require. Samius himself needed no persuasion to carry out the wishes of

Cyrus. With his own fleet, accompanied by that of Cyrus, he sailed round

to Cilicia, and so made it impossible for Syennesis, the ruler of that

province, to oppose Cyrus by land in his advance against the king his

brother.

(1) Lit. "what Cyrus himself had been to the Lacedaemonians let the

Lacedaemonians in their turn be to Cyrus."

(2) Samius (Diod. Sic. xiv. 19). But see "Anab." I. iv. 2, where

Pythagoras is named as admiral. Possibly the one officer succeeded

the other.

B.C. 401. The particulars of the expedition are to be found in the pages

of the Syracusan Themistogenes, (3) who describes the mustering of the

armament, and the advance of Cyrus at the head of his troops; and then

the battle, and death of Cyrus himself, and the consequent retreat of

the Hellenes while effecting their escape to the sea. (4)

(3) Lit. "as to how then Cyrus collected an army and with it went up

against his brother, and how the battle was fought and how he

died, and how in the sequel the Hellenes escaped to the sea (all

this), is written by (or 'for,' or 'in honour of') Themistogenes

the Syracusan." My impression is that Xenophon's "Anabasis," or a

portion of the work so named, was edited originally by

Themistogenes. See "Philol. Museum," vol. i. p. 489; L. Dindorf,

{Xen. Ell.}, Ox. MDCCCLIII., node ad loc. {Themistogenei}. Cf.

Diod. Sic. xiv. 19-31, 37, after Ephorus and Theopompus probably.

(4) At Trapezus, March 10, B.C. 400.

B.C. 400. It was in recognition of the service which he had rendered in

this affair, that Tissaphernes was despatched to Lower Asia by the king

his master. He came as satrap, not only of his own provinces, but of

those which had belonged to Cyrus; and he at once demanded the absolute

submission of the Ionic cities, without exception, to his authority.

These communities, partly from a desire to maintain their freedom, and

partly from fear of Tissaphernes himself, whom they had rejected in

favour of Cyrus during the lifetime of that prince, were loth to admit

the satrap within their gates. They thought it better to send an embassy

to the Lacedaemonians, calling upon them as representatives and leaders

(5) of the Hellenic world to look to the interests of their petitioners,

who were Hellenes also, albeit they lived in Asia, and not to suffer

their country to be ravaged and themselves enslaved.

(5) {Prostatai}, "patrons and protectors."

In answer to this appeal, the Lacedaemonians sent out Thibron (6)

as governor, providing him with a body of troops, consisting of one

thousand neodamodes (7) (i.e. enfranchised helots) and four thousand

Peloponnesians. In addition to these, Thibron himself applied to

the Athenians for a detachment of three hundred horse, for whose

service-money he would hold himself responsible. The Athenians in

answer sent him some of the knights who had served under the Thirty,

(8) thinking that the people of Athens would be well rid of them if they

went abroad and perished there.

(6) "As harmost." See "Anab." ad fin.

(7) See "Hell." I. iii. 15; Thuc. vii. 58.

(8) See "Hell." II. iv. 2.

B.C. 400-399. On their arrival in Asia, Thibron further collected

contingents from the Hellenic cities on the continent; for at this time

the word of a Lacedaemonian was law. He had only to command, and every

city must needs obey. (9) But although he had this armament, Thibron,

when he saw the cavalry, had no mind to descend into the plain. If he

succeeded in protecting from pillage the particular district in which

he chanced to be, he was quite content. It was only when the troops (10)

who had taken part in the expedition of Cyrus had joined him on their

safe return, that he assumed a bolder attitude. He was now ready to

confront Tissaphernes, army against army, on the level ground, and won

over a number of cities. Pergamum came in of her own accord. So did

Teuthrania and Halisarna. These were under the government of Eurysthenes

and Procles, (11) the descendants of Demaratus the Lacedaemonian, who

in days of old had received this territory as a gift from the Persian

monarch in return for his share in the campaign against Hellas. Gorgion

and Gongylus, two brothers, also gave in their adhesion; they were

lords, the one of Gambreum and Palae-Gambreum, the other of Myrina and

Gryneum, four cities which, like those above named, had originally

been gifts from the king to an earlier Gongylus--the sole Eretrian who

"joined the Mede," and in consequence was banished. Other cities which

were too weak to resist, Thibron took by force of arms. In the case of

one he was not so successful. This was the Egyptian (12) Larisa, as it

is called, which refused to capitulate, and was forthwith invested and

subjected to a regular siege. When all other attempts to take it failed,

he set about digging a tank or reservoir, and in connection with the

tank an underground channel, by means of which he proposed to draw off

the water supply of the inhabitants. In this he was baffled by frequent

sallies of the besieged, and a continual discharge of timber and stones

into the cutting. He retaliated by the construction of a wooden tortoise

which he erected over the tank; but once more the tortoise was burnt to

a cinder in a successful night attack on the part of the men of Larisa.

These ineffectual efforts induced the ephors to send a despatch bidding

Thibron give up Larisa and march upon Caria.

(9) See "Anab." VI. vi. 12.

(10) March B.C. 399. See the final sentence of the "Anabasis."

(11) See "Anab." VII. viii. 8-16.

(12) Seventy stades S.E. of Cyme in the Aeolid. See Strabo, xiii. 621.

For the origin of the name cf. "Cyrop." VII. i. 45.

He had already reached Ephesus, and was on the point of marching into

Caria, when Dercylidas arrived to take command of his army. The new

general was a man whose genius for invention had won him the nickname of

Sisyphus. Thus it was that Thibron returned home, where on his arrival

he was fined and banished, the allies accusing him of allowing his

troops to plunder their friends.

Dercylidas was not slow to perceive and turn to account the jealousy

which subsisted between Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus. Coming to

terms with the former, he marched into the territory of the latter,

preferring, as he said, to be at war with one of the pair at a time,

rather than the two together. His hostility, indeed, to Pharnabazus was

an old story, dating back to a period during the naval command (13)

of Lysander, when he was himself governor in Abydos; where, thanks to

Pharnabazus, he had got into trouble with his superior officer, and had

been made to stand "with his shield on his arm"--a stigma on his honour

which no true Lacedaemonian would forgive, since this is the punishment

of insubordination. (14) For this reason, doubtless, Dercylidas had the

greater satisfaction in marching against Pharnabazus. From the moment he

assumed command there was a marked difference for the better between his

methods and those of his predecessor. Thus he contrived to conduct his

troops into that portion of the Aeolid which belonged to Pharnabazus,

through the heart of friendly territory without injury to the allies.

(13) Technically "navarchy," in B.C. 408-407. "Hell." I. v. 1.

(14) See Plut. "Aristid." 23 (Clough, ii. p. 309).

This district of Aeolis belonged to Pharnabazus, (15) but had been held

as a satrapy under him by a Dardanian named Zenis whilst he was alive;

but when Zenis fell sick and died, Pharnabazus made preparation to give

the satrapy to another. Then Mania the wife of Zenis, herself also a

Dardanian, fitted out an expedition, and taking with her gifts wherewith

to make a present to Pharnabazus himself, and to gratify his concubines

and those whose power was greatest with Pharnabazus, set forth on her

journey. When she had obtained audience with him she spoke as follows:

"O Pharnabazus, thou knowest that thy servant my husband was in all

respects friendly to thee; moreover, he paid my lord the tributes which

were thy due, so that thou didst praise and honour him. Now therefore,

if I do thee service as faithfully as my husband, why needest thou to

appoint another satrap?--nay but, if in any matter I please thee not, is

it not in thy power to take from me the government on that day, and to

give it to another?" When he had heard her words, Pharnabazus decided

that the woman ought to be satrap. She, as soon as she was mistress of

the territory, never ceased to render the tribute in due season, even

as her husband before her had done. Moreover, whenever she came to the

court of Pharnabazus she brought him gifts continually, and whenever

Pharnabazus went down to visit her provinces she welcomed him with all

fair and courteous entertainment beyond what his other viceroys were

wont to do. The cities also which had been left to her by her husband,

she guarded safely for him; while of those cities that owed her no

allegiance, she acquired, on the seaboard, Larisa and Hamaxitus and

Colonae--attacking their walls by aid of Hellenic mercenaries, whilst

she herself sat in her carriage and watched the spectacle. Nor was

she sparing of her gifts to those who won her admiration; and thus she

furnished herself with a mercenary force of exceptional splendour. She

also went with Pharnabazus on his campaigns, even when, on pretext of

some injury done to the king's territory, Mysians or Pisidians were the

object of attack. In requital, Pharnabazus paid her magnificent honour,

and at times invited her to assist him with her counsel. (16)

(15) I.e. as suzerain.

(16) Grote, "H. G." ix. 292; cf. Herod. viii. 69.

Now when Mania was more than forty years old, the husband of her own

daughter, Meidias--flustered by the suggestions of certain people who

said that it was monstrous a woman should rule and he remain a private

person (17)--found his way into her presence, as the story goes, and

strangled her. For Mania, albeit she carefully guarded herself against

all ordinary comers, as behoved her in the exercise of her "tyranny,"

trusted in Meidias, and, as a woman might her own son-in-law, was ready

to greet him at all times with open arms. He also murdered her son, a

youth of marvellous beauty, who was about seventeen years of age. He

next seized upon the strong cities of Scepsis and Gergithes, in which

lay for the most part the property and wealth of Mania. As for the

other cities of the satrapy, they would not receive the usurper, their

garrisons keeping them safely for Pharnabazus. Thereupon Meidias sent

gifts to Pharnabazus, and claimed to hold the district even as Mania

had held it; to whom the other answered, "Keep your gifts and guard them

safely until that day when I shall come in person and take both you

and them together"; adding, "What care I to live longer if I avenge not

myself for the murder of Mania!"

(17) Or, "his brains whimsied with insinuations."

Just at the critical moment Dercylidas arrived, and in a single day

received the adhesion of the three seaboard cities Larisa, Hamaxitus,

and Colonae--which threw open their gates to him. Then he sent

messengers to the cities of the Aeolid also, offering them freedom if

they would receive him within their walls and become allies. Accordingly

the men of Neandria and Ilium and Cocylium lent willing ears; for since

the death of Mania their Hellenic garrisons had been treated but ill.

But the commander of the garrison in Cebrene, a place of some strength,

bethinking him that if he should succeed in guarding that city for

Pharnabazus, he would receive honour at his hands, refused to admit

Dercylidas. Whereupon the latter, in a rage, prepared to take the place

by force; but when he came to sacrifice, on the first day the victims

would not yield good omens; on the second, and again upon the third day,

it was the same story. Thus for as many as four days he persevered in

sacrificing, cherishing wrath the while--for he was in haste to become

master of the whole Aeolid before Pharnabazus came to the succour of the

district.

Meanwhile a certain Sicyonian captain, Athenadas by name, said to

himself: "Dercylidas does but trifle to waste his time here, whilst

I with my own hand can draw off their water from the men of Cybrene";

wherewith he ran forward with his division and essayed to choke up the

spring which supplied the city. But the garrison sallied out and covered

the Sicyonian himself with wounds, besides killing two of his men.

Indeed, they plied their swords and missiles with such good effect that

the whole company was forced to beat a retreat. Dercylidas was not a

little annoyed, thinking that now the spirit of the besiegers would

certainly die away; but whilst he was in this mood, behold! there

arrived from the beleaguered fortress emissaries of the Hellenes, who

stated that the action taken by the commandant was not to their taste;

for themselves, they would far rather be joined in bonds of fellowship

with Hellenes than with barbarians. While the matter was still under

discussion there came a messenger also from the commandant, to say that

whatever the former deputation had proposed he, on his side, was ready

to endorse. Accordingly Dercylidas, who, it so happened, had at length

obtained favourable omens on that day, marched his force without more

ado up to the gates of the city, which were flung open by those

within; and so he entered. (18) Here, then, he was content to appoint a

garrison, and without further stay advanced upon Scepsis and Gergithes.

(18) Grote ("H. G." ix. 294) says: "The reader will remark how

Xenophon shapes the narrative in such a manner as to inculcate the

pious duty in a general of obeying the warnings furnished by the

sacrifice--either for action or for inaction.... Such an

inference is never (I believe) to be found suggested in

Thucydides." See Brietenbach, "Xen. Hell." I et II, praef. in

alteram ed. p. xvii.

And now Meidias, partly expecting the hostile advance of Pharnabazus,

and partly mistrusting the citizens--for to such a pass things had

come--sent to Dercylidas, proposing to meet him in conference provided

he might take security of hostages. In answer to this suggestion the

other sent him one man from each of the cities of the allies, and bade

him take his pick of these, whichsoever and how many soever he chose, as

hostages for his own security. Meidias selected ten, and so went out. In

conversation with Dercylidas, he asked him on what terms he would accept

his alliance. The other answered: "The terms are that you grant the

citizens freedom and self-government." The words were scarcely out of

his mouth before he began marching upon Scepsis. Whereupon Meidias,

perceiving it was vain to hinder him in the teeth of the citizens,

suffered him to enter. That done, Dercylidas offered sacrifice to Athena

in the citadel of the Scepsians, turned out the bodyguards of Meidias,

and handed over the city to the citizens. And so, having admonished them

to regulate their civic life as Hellenes and free men ought, he left the

place and continued his advance against Gergithes. On this last march

he was escorted by many of the Scepsians themselves; such was the honour

they paid him and so great their satisfaction at his exploits. Meidias

also followed close at his side, petitioning that he would hand over the

city of Gergithians to himself. To whom Dercylidas only made reply,

that he should not fail to obtain any of his just rights. And whilst the

words were yet upon his lips, he was drawing close to the gates, with

Meidias at his side. Behind him followed the troops, marching two

and two in peaceful fashion. The defenders of Gergithes from their

towers--which were extraordinarily high--espied Meidias in company of

the Spartan, and abstained from shooting. And Dercylidas said: "Bid them

open the gates, Meidias, when you shall lead the way, and I will enter

the temple along with you and do sacrifice to Athena." And Meidias,

though he shrank from opening the gates, yet in terror of finding

himself on a sudden seized, reluctantly gave the order to open the

gates. As soon as he was entered in, the Spartan, still taking Meidias

with him, marched up to the citadel and there ordered the main body of

his soldiers to take up their position round the walls, whilst he with

those about him did sacrifice to Athena. When the sacrifice was ended he

ordered Meidias's bodyguard to pile arms (19) in the van of his troops.

Here for the future they would serve as mercenaries, since Meidias their

former master stood no longer in need of their protection. The latter,

being at his wits' end what to do, exclaimed: "Look you, I will now

leave you; I go to make preparation for my guest." But the other

replied: "Heaven forbid! Ill were it that I who have offered sacrifice

should be treated as a guest by you. I rather should be the entertainer

and you the guest. Pray stay with us, and while the supper is preparing,

you and I can consider our obligations, and perform them."

(19) I.e. take up a position, or "to order arms," whilst he addressed

them; not probably "to ground arms," as if likely to be mutinous.

When they were seated Dercylidas put certain questions: "Tell me,

Meidias, did your father leave you heir to his estates?" "Certainly he

did," answered the other. "And how many dwelling-houses have you? what

landed estates? how much pasturage?" The other began running off

an inventory, whilst some of the Scepsians who were present kept

interposing, "He is lying to you, Dercylidas." "Nay, you take too minute

a view of matters," replied the Spartan. When the inventory of the

paternal property was completed, he proceeded: "Tell me, Meidias, to

whom did Mania belong?" A chorus of voices rejoined, "To Pharnabazus."

"Then must her property have belonged to Pharnabazus too." "Certainly,"

they answered. "Then it must now be ours," he remarked, "by right of

conquest, since Pharnabazus is at war with us. Will some one of you

escort me to the place where the property of Mania and Pharnabazus

lies?" So the rest led the way to the dwelling-place of Mania which

Meidias had taken from her, and Meidias followed too. When he was

entered, Dercylidas summoned the stewards, and bidding his attendants

seize them, gave them to understand that, if detected stealing anything

which belonged to Mania, they would lose their heads on the spot. The

stewards proceeded to point out the treasures, and he, when he had

looked through the whole store, bolted and barred the doors, affixing

his seal, and setting a watch. As he went out he found at the doors

certain of the generals (20) and captains, and said to them: "Here,

sirs, we have pay ready made for the army--a year's pay nearly for eight

thousand men--and if we can win anything besides, there will be so much

the more." This he said, knowing that those who heard it would be all

the more amenable to discipline, and would yield him a more flattering

obedience. Then Meidias asked, "And where am I to live, Dercylidas?"

"Where you have the very best right to live," replied the other, "in

your native town of Scepsis, and in your father's house."

(20) Lit. "of the taxiarchs and lochagoi."

II

Such were the exploits of Dercylidas: nine cities taken in eight days.

Two considerations now began to occupy his mind: how was he to avoid

falling into the fatal error of Thibron and becoming a burthen to his

allies, whilst wintering in a friendly country? how, again, was he to

prevent Pharnabazus from overriding the Hellenic states in pure contempt

with his cavalry? Accordingly he sent to Pharnabazus and put it to him

point-blank: Which will you have, peace or war? Whereupon Pharnabazus,

who could not but perceive that the whole Aeolid had now been converted

practically into a fortified base of operations, which threatened his

own homestead of Phrygia, chose peace.

B.C. 399-398. This being so, Dercylidas advanced into Bithynian Thrace,

and there spent the winter; nor did Pharnabazus exhibit a shadow of

annoyance, since the Bithynians were perpetually at war with himself.

For the most part, Dercylidas continued to harry (1) Bithynia in perfect

security, and found provisions without stint. Presently he was joined

from the other side of the straits by some Odrysian allies sent by

Seuthes; (2) they numbered two hundred horse and three hundred peltasts.

These fellows pitched upon a site a little more than a couple of miles

(3) from the Hellenic force, where they entrenched themselves; then

having got from Dercylidas some heavy infantry soldiers to act as

guards of their encampment, they devoted themselves to plundering,

and succeeded in capturing an ample store of slaves and other wealth.

Presently their camp was full of prisoners, when one morning the

Bithynians, having ascertained the actual numbers of the marauding

parties as well as of the Hellenes left as guards behind, collected in

large masses of light troops and cavalry, and attacked the garrison,

who were not more than two hundred strong. As soon as they came close

enough, they began discharging spears and other missiles on the little

body, who on their side continued to be wounded and shot down, but were

quite unable to retaliate, cooped up as they were within a palisading

barely six feet high, until in desperation they tore down their defences

with their own hands, and dashed at the enemy. These had nothing to do

but to draw back from the point of egress, and being light troops easily

escaped beyond the grasp of heavy-armed men, while ever and again, from

one point of vantage or another, they poured their shower of javelins,

and at every sally laid many a brave man low, till at length, like

sheep penned in a fold, the defenders were shot down almost to a man. A

remnant, it is true, did escape, consisting of some fifteen who, seeing

the turn affairs were taking, had already made off in the middle of the

fighting. Slipping through their assailants' fingers, (4) to the small

concern of the Bithynians, they reached the main Hellenic camp in

safety. The Bithynians, satisfied with their achievement, part of which

consisted in cutting down the tent guards of the Odrysian Thracians and

recovering all their prisoners, made off without delay; so that by the

time the Hellenes got wind of the affair and rallied to the rescue, they

found nothing left in the camp save only the stripped corpses of the

slain. When the Odrysians themselves returned, they fell to burying

their own dead, quaffing copious draughts of wine in their honour and

holding horse-races; but for the future they deemed it advisable to

camp along with the Hellenes. Thus they harried and burned Bithynia the

winter through.

(1) {Pheson kai agon}, i.e. "there was plenty of live stock to lift

and chattels to make away with."

(2) For Seuthes see "Anab." VII. i. 5; and below, IV. viii. 26.

(3) Lit. "twenty stades."

(4) Or, "slipping through the enemy's fingers, who took no heed of

them, they," etc.

B.C. 398. With the commencement of spring Dercylidas turned his back

upon the Bithynians and came to Lampsacus. Whilst at this place envoys

reached him from the home authorities. These were Aracus, Naubates, and

Antisthenes. They were sent to inquire generally into the condition of

affairs in Asia, and to inform Dercylidas of the extension of his office

for another year. They had been further commissioned by the ephors to

summon a meeting of the soldiers and inform them that the ephors

held them to blame for their former doings, though for their present

avoidance of evil conduct they must needs praise them; and for the

future they must understand that while no repetition of misdoing would

be tolerated, all just and upright dealing by the allies would receive

its meed of praise. The soldiers were therefore summoned, and the envoys

delivered their message, to which the leader of the Cyreians answered:

"Nay, men of Lacedaemon, listen; we are the same to-day as we were last

year; only our general of to-day is different from our general in the

past. If to-day we have avoided our offence of yesterday, the cause is

not far to seek; you may discover it for yourselves."

Aracus and the other envoys shared the hospitality of Dercylidas's tent,

and one of the party chanced to mention how they had left an embassy

from the men of Chersonese in Lacedaemon. According to their statement,

he added, it was impossible for them to till their land nowadays, so

perpetually were they robbed and plundered by the Thracians; whereas

the peninsula needed only to be walled across from sea to sea, and there

would be abundance of good land to cultivate--enough for themselves and

as many others from Lacedaemon as cared to come. "So that it would not

surprise us," continued the envoys, "if a Lacedaemonian were actually

sent out from Sparta with a force to carry out the project." Dercylidas

kept his ears open but his counsel close, and so sent forward the

commissioners to Ephesus. (5) It pleased him to picture their progress

through the Hellenic cities, and the spectacle of peace and prosperity

which would everywhere greet their eyes. When he knew that his stay was

to be prolonged, he sent again to Pharnabazus and offered him once more

as an alternative either the prolongation of the winter truce or war.

And once again Pharnabazus chose truce. It was thus that Dercylidas was

able to leave the cities in the neighbourhood of the satrap (6) in peace

and friendship. Crossing the Hellespont himself he brought his army

into Europe, and marching through Thrace, which was also friendly, was

entertained by Seuthes, (7) and so reached the Chersonese.

(5) See Grote, "H. G." ix. 301.

(6) Or, reading after Cobet, {tas peri ekeina poleis}--"the cities of

that neighbourhood."

(7) See "Anab." VII. vii. 51.

This district, he soon discovered, not only contained something like a

dozen cities, (8) but was singularly fertile. The soil was of the best,

but ruined by the ravages of the Thracians, precisely as he had been

told. Accordingly, having measured and found the breadth of the isthmus

barely four miles, (9) he no longer hesitated. Having offered sacrifice,

he commenced his line of wall, distributing the area to the soldiers in

detachments, and promising to award them prizes for their industry--a

first prize for the section first completed, and the rest as each

detachment of workers might deserve. By this means the whole wall begun

in spring was finished before autumn. Within these lines he established

eleven cities, with numerous harbours, abundance of good arable land,

and plenty of land under plantation, besides magnificent grazing grounds

for sheep and cattle of every kind.

(8) Lit. "eleven or twelve cities." For the natural productivity, see

"Anab." V. vi. 25.

(9) Lit. "thirty-seven stades." Mod. Gallipoli. See Herod. vi. 36;

Plut. "Pericl." xix.

Having finished the work, he crossed back again into Asia, and on a

tour of inspection, found the cities for the most part in a thriving

condition; but when he came to Atarneus he discovered that certain

exiles from Chios had got possession of the stronghold, which served

them as a convenient base for pillaging and plundering Ionia; and this,

in fact, was their means of livelihood. Being further informed of the

large supplies of grain which they had inside, he proceeded to draw

entrenchments around the place with a view to a regular investment, and

by this means he reduced it in eight months. Then having appointed Draco

of Pellene (10) commandant, he stocked the fortress with an abundance of

provisions of all sorts, to serve him as a halting-place when he chanced

to pass that way, and so withdrew to Ephesus, which is three days'

journey from Sardis.

(10) Cf. Isocr. "Panegyr." 70; Jebb. "Att. Or." ii. p. 161. Of Pellene

(or Pellana) in Laconia, not Pellene in Achaia? though that is the

opinion of Grote and Thirlwall.

B.C. 397. Up to this date peace had been maintained between Tissaphernes

and Dercylidas, as also between the Hellenes and the barbarians in those

parts. But the time came when an embassy arrived at Lacedaemon from the

Ionic cities, protesting that Tissaphernes might, if he chose, leave the

Hellenic cities independent. "Our idea," they added, "is, that if Caria,

the home of Tissaphernes, felt the pinch of war, the satrap would very

soon agree to grant us independence." The ephors, on hearing this, sent

a despatch to Dercylidas, and bade him cross the frontier with his army

into Caria, whilst Pharax the admiral coasted round with the fleet.

These orders were carried out. Meanwhile a visitor had reached

Tissaphernes. This was not less a person than Pharnabazus. His coming

was partly owing to the fact that Tissaphernes had been appointed

general-in-chief, and party in order to testify his readiness to make

common cause with his brother satrap in fighting and expelling the

Hellenes from the king's territory; for if his heart was stirred by

jealousy on account of the generalship bestowed upon his rival, he

was not the less aggrieved at finding himself robbed of the Aeolid.

Tissaphernes, lending willing ears to the proposal, had answered: "First

cross over with me in Caria, and then we will take counsel on these

matters." But being arrived in Caria, they determined to establish

garrisons of some strength in the various fortresses, and so crossed

back again into Ionia.

Hearing that the satraps had recrossed the Maeander, Dercylidas

grew apprehensive for the district which lay there unprotected. "If

Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus," he said to Pharax, "chose to make a

descent, they could harry the country right and left." In this mind he

followed suit, and recrossed the frontier too. And now as they marched

on, preserving no sort of battle order--on the supposition that the

enemy had got far ahead of them into the district of Ephesus--suddenly

they caught sight of his scouts perched on some monumental structures

facing them. To send up scouts into similar edifices and towers on their

own side was the work of a few moments, and before them lay revealed the

long lines of troops drawn up just where their road lay. These were the

Carians, with their white shields, and the whole Persian troops there

present, with all the Hellenic contingents belonging to either satrap.

Besides these there was a great cloud of cavalry: on the right wing the

squadrons of Tissaphernes, and on the left those of Pharnabazus.

Seeing how matters lay, Dercylidas ordered the generals of brigade and

captains to form into line as quickly as possible, eight deep, placing

the light infantry on the fringe of battle, with the cavalry--such

cavalry, that is, and of such numerical strength, as he chanced to have.

Meanwhile, as general, he sacrificed. (11) During this interval the

troops from Peloponnese kept quiet in preparation as for battle. Not

so the troops from Priene and Achilleum, from the islands and the Ionic

cities, some of whom left their arms in the corn, which stood thick and

deep in the plain of the Maeander, and took to their heels; while those

who remained at their posts gave evident signs that their steadiness

would not last. Pharnabazus, it was reported, had given orders to

engage; but Tissaphernes, who recalled his experience of his own

exploits with the Cyreian army, and assumed that all other Hellenes

were of similar mettle, had no desire to engage, but sent to Dercylidas

saying, he should be glad to meet him in conference. So Dercylidas,

attended by the pick of his troops, horse and foot, in personal

attendance on himself, (12) went forward to meet the envoys. He told

them that for his own part he had made his preparations to engage, as

they themselves might see, but still, if the satraps were minded to meet

in conference, he had nothing to say against it--"Only, in that case,

there must be mutual exchange of hostages and other pledges."

(11) I.e. according to custom on the eve of battle. See "Pol. Lac."

xiii. 8.

(12) Lit. "they were splendid fellows to look at." See "Anab." II.

iii. 3.

When this proposal had been agreed to and carried out, the two armies

retired for the night--the Asiatics to Tralles in Caria, the Hellenes to

Leucophrys, where was a temple (13) of Artemis of great sanctity, and

a sandy-bottomed lake more than a furlong in extent, fed by a spring of

ever-flowing water fit for drinking and warm. For the moment so much was

effected. On the next day they met at the place appointed, and it was

agreed that they should mutually ascertain the terms on which either

party was willing to make peace. On his side, Dercylidas insisted

that the king should grant independence to the Hellenic cities; while

Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus demanded the evacuation of the country by

the Hellenic army, and the withdrawal of the Lacedaemonian governors

from the cities. After this interchange of ideas a truce was entered

into, so as to allow time for the reports of the proceedings to be sent

by Dercylidas to Lacedaemon, and by Tissaphernes to the king.

(13) Lately unearthed. See "Class. Rev." v. 8, p. 391.

B.C. 401 (?). Whilst such was the conduct of affairs in Asia under the

guidance of Dercylidas, the Lacedaemonians at home were at the same

time no less busily employed with other matters. They cherished a

long-standing embitterment against the Eleians, the grounds of which

were that the Eleians had once (14) contracted an alliance with the

Athenians, Argives, and Mantineans; moreover, on pretence of a sentence

registered against the Lacedaemonians, they had excluded them from

the horse-race and gymnastic contests. Nor was that the sum of their

offending. They had taken and scourged Lichas, (15) under the following

circumstances:--Being a Spartan, he had formally consigned his chariot

to the Thebans, and when the Thebans were proclaimed victors he stepped

forward to crown his charioteer; whereupon, in spite of his grey hairs,

the Eleians put those indignities upon him and expelled him from the

festival. Again, at a date subsequent to that occurrence, Agis being

sent to offer sacrifice to Olympian Zeus in accordance with the bidding

of an oracle, the Eleians would not suffer him to offer prayer for

victory in war, asserting that the ancient law and custom (16) forbade

Hellenes to consult the god for war with Hellenes; and Agis was forced

to go away without offering the sacrifice.

(14) In 421 B.C. (see Thuc. v. 31); for the second charge, see Thuc.

v. 49 foll.

(15) See "Mem." I. ii. 61; Thuc. v. 50; and Jowett, note ad loc. vol.

ii. p. 314.

(16) See Grote, "H. G." ix. 311 note.

In consequence of all these annoyances the ephors and the Assembly

determined "to bring the men of Elis to their senses." Thereupon they

sent an embassy to that state, announcing that the authorities of

Lacedaemon deemed it just and right that they should leave the country

(17) townships in the territory of Elis free and independent. This the

Eleians flatly refused to do. The cities in question were theirs by

right of war. Thereupon the ephors called out the ban. The leader of the

expedition was Agis. He invaded Elis through Achaia (18) by the Larisus;

but the army had hardly set foot on the enemy's soil and the work of

devastation begun, when an earthquake took place, and Agis, taking

this as a sign from Heaven, marched back again out of the country and

disbanded his army. Thereat the men of Elis were much more emboldened,

and sent embassies to various cities which they knew to be hostile to

the Lacedaemonians.

(17) Lit. "perioecid."

(18) From the north. The Larisus is the frontier stream between Achaia

and Elis. See Strabo, viii. 387.

The year had not completed its revolution (19) ere the ephors again

called out the ban against Elis, and the invading host of Agis was this

time swelled by the rest of the allies, including the Athenians; the

Boeotians and Corinthians alone excepted. The Spartan king now entered

through Aulon, (20) and the men of Lepreum (21) at once revolted

from the Eleians and gave in their adhesion to the Spartan, and

simultaneously with these the Macistians and their next-door neighbours

the Epitalians. As he crossed the river further adhesions followed, on

the part of the Letrinians, the Amphidolians, and the Marganians.

(19) Al. "on the coming round of the next year." See Jowett (note to

Thuc. i. 31), vol. ii. p. 33.

(20) On the south. For the history, see Busolt, "Die Laked." pp.

146-200. "The river" is the Alpheus.

(21) See below, VI. v. 11; Paus. IV. xv. 8.

B.C. 400 (?). Upon this he pushed on into Olympian territory and did

sacrifice to Olympian Zeus. There was no attempt to stay his proceedings

now. After sacrifice he marched against the capital, (22) devastating

and burning the country as he went. Multitudes of cattle, multitudes

of slaves, were the fruits of conquest yielded, insomuch that the fame

thereof spread, and many more Arcadians and Achaeans flocked to join

the standard of the invader and to share in the plunder. In fact, the

expedition became one enormous foray. Here was the chance to fill all

the granaries of Peloponnese with corn. When he had reached the capital,

the beautiful suburbs and gymnasia became a spoil to the troops; but the

city itself, though it lay open before him a defenceless and unwalled

town, he kept aloof from. He would not, rather than could not, take

it. Such was the explanation given. Thus the country was a prey to

devastation, and the invaders massed round Cyllene.

(22) I.e. Elis, of which Cyllene is the port town. For the wealth of

the district, see Polyb. iv. 73; and below, VII. iv. 33.

Then the friends of a certain Xenias--a man of whom it was said that

he might measure the silver coin, inherited from his father, by the

bushel--wishing to be the leading instrument in bringing over the state

to Lacedaemon, rushed out of the house, sword in hand, and began a

work of butchery. Amongst other victims they killed a man who strongly

resembled the leader of the democratic party, Thrasydaeus. (23) Everyone

believed it was really Thrasydaeus who was slain. The popular party were

panic-stricken, and stirred neither hand nor foot. On their side,

the cut-throats poured their armed bands into the market-place. But

Thrasydaeus was laid asleep the while where the fumes of wine had

overpowered him. When the people came to discover that their hero was

not dead, they crowded round his house this side and that, (24) like a

swarm of bees clinging to their leader; and as soon as Thrasydaeus

had put himself in the van, with the people at his back, a battle was

fought, and the people won. And those who had laid their hands to deeds

of butchery went as exiles to the Lacedaemonians.

(23) See Paus. III. viii. 4. He was a friend of Lysias ("Vit. X. Orat.

835").

(24) The house was filled to overflowing by the clustering close-

packed crowd.

After a while Agis himself retired, recrossing the Alpheus; but he was

careful to leave a garrison in Epitalium near that river, with Lysippus

as governor, and the exiles from Elis along with him. Having done so, he

disbanded his army and returned home himself.

B.C. 400-399 (?). (25) During the rest of the summer and the ensuing

winter the territory of the Eleians was ravaged and ransacked by

Lysippus and his troops, until Thrasydaeus, the following summer, sent

to Lacedaemon and agreed to dismantle the walls of Phea and Cyllene, and

to grant autonomy to the Triphylian townships (26)--together with Phrixa

and Epitalium, the Letrinians, Amphidolians, and Marganians; and besides

these to the Acroreians and to Lasion, a place claimed by the Arcadians.

With regard to Epeium, a town midway between Heraea and Macistus,

the Eleians claimed the right to keep it, on the plea that they had

purchased the whole district from its then owners, for thirty talents,

(27) which sum they had actually paid. But the Lacedaemonians, acting on

the principle "that a purchase which forcibly deprives the weaker party

of his possession is no more justifiable than a seizure by violence,"

compelled them to emancipate Epeium also. From the presidency of the

temple of Olympian Zeus, however, they did not oust them; not that it

belonged to Elis of ancient right, but because the rival claimants,

(28) it was felt, were "villagers," hardly equal to the exercise of

the presidency. After these concessions, peace and alliance between the

Eleians and the Lacedaemonians were established, and the war between

Elis and Sparta ceased.

(25) Grote ("H. G." ix. 316) discusses the date of this war between

Elis and Sparta, which he thinks, reaches over three different

years, 402-400 B.C. But Curtius (vol. iv. Eng. tr. p. 196)

disagrees: "The Eleian war must have occurred in 401-400 B.C., and

Grote rightly conjectures that the Eleians were anxious to bring

it to a close before the celebration of the festival. But he errs

in extending its duration over three years." See Diod. xiv. 17.

24; Paus. III. viii. 2 foll.

(26) Grote remarks: "There is something perplexing in Xenophon's

description of the Triphylian townships which the Eleians

surrendered" ("H. G." ix. 315). I adopt Grote's emend. {kai

Phrixan}. See Busolt, op. cit. p. 176.

(27) = 7,312 pounds: 10 shillings.

(28) I.e. the men of the Pisatid. See below, VII. iv. 28; Busolt, op.

cit. p 156.

III

After this Agis came to Delphi and offered as a sacrifice a tenth of the

spoil. On his return journey he fell ill at Heraea--being by this time

an old man--and was carried back to Lacedaemon. He survived the journey,

but being there arrived, death speedily overtook him. He was buried with

a sepulchre transcending in solemnity the lot of ordinary mortality. (1)

(1) See "Ages." xi. 16; "Pol. Lac." xv. 9.

When the holy days of mourning were accomplished, and it was necessary

to choose another king, there were rival claimants to the throne.

Leotychides claimed it as the son, Agesilaus as the brother, of Agis.

Then Leotychides protested: "Yet consider, Agesilaus, the law bids not

'the king's brother,' but 'the king's son' to be king; only if there

chance to be no son, in that case shall the brother of the king be

king." Agesilaus: "Then must I needs be king." Leotychides: "How so,

seeing that I am not dead?" Agesilaus: "Because he whom you call

your father denied you, saying, 'Leotychides is no son of mine.'"

Leotychides: "Nay, but my mother, who would know far better than

he, said, and still to-day says, I am." Agesilaus: "Nay, but the god

himself, Poteidan, laid his finger on thy falsity when by his earthquake

he drove forth thy father from the bridal chamber into the light of day;

and time, 'that tells no lies,' as the proverb has it, bare witness to

the witness of the god; for just ten months from the moment at which he

fled and was no more seen within that chamber, you were born." (2) So

they reasoned together.

(2) I have followed Sauppe as usual, but see Hartman ("Anal. Xen." p.

327) for a discussion of the whole passage. He thinks Xenophon

wrote {ex ou gar toi ephugen} ({o sos pater}, i.e. adulterer) {ek

to thalamo dekato meni tu ephus}. The Doric {ek to thalamo} was

corrupted into {en to thalamo} and {kai ephane} inserted. This

corrupt reading Plutarch had before him, and hence his distorted

version of the story.

Diopethes, (3) a great authority upon oracles, supported Leotychides.

There was an oracle of Apollo, he urged, which said "Beware of the lame

reign." But Diopethes was met by Lysander, who in behalf of Agesilaus

demurred to this interpretation put upon the language of the god. If

they were to beware of a lame reign, it meant not, beware lest a man

stumble and halt, but rather, beware of him in whose veins flows not the

blood of Heracles; most assuredly the kingdom would halt, and that would

be a lame reign in very deed, whensoever the descendants of Heracles

should cease to lead the state. Such were the arguments on either side,

after hearing which the city chose Agesilaus to be king.

(3) See Plut. "Ages." ii. 4; "Lys." xxii. (Clough, iv. 3; iii. 129);

Paus. III. viii. 5.

Now Agesilaus had not been seated on the throne one year when, as he

sacrificed one of the appointed sacrifices in behalf of the city, (4)

the soothsayer warned him, saying: "The gods reveal a conspiracy of the

most fearful character"; and when the king sacrificed a second time,

he said: "The aspect of the victims is now even yet more terrible"; but

when he had sacrificed for the third time, the soothsayer exclaimed: "O

Agesilaus, the sign is given to me, even as though we were in the very

midst of the enemy." Thereupon they sacrificed to the deities who avert

evil and work salvation, and so barely obtained good omens and ceased

sacrificing. Nor had five days elapsed after the sacrifices were ended,

ere one came bringing information to the ephors of a conspiracy, and

named Cinadon as the ringleader; a young man robust of body as of soul,

but not one of the peers. (5) Accordingly the ephors questioned their

informant: "How say you the occurrence is to take place?" and he who

gave the information answered: "Cinadon took me to the limit of the

market-place, and bade me count how many Spartans there were in

the market-place; and I counted--'king, ephors, and elders, and

others--maybe forty. But tell me, Cinadon,' I said to him, 'why have you

bidden me count them?' and he answered me: 'Those men, I would have

you know, are your sworn foes; and all those others, more than four

thousand, congregated there are your natural allies.' Then he took and

showed me in the streets, here one and there two of 'our enemies,' as we

chanced to come across them, and all the rest 'our natural allies'; and

so again running through the list of Spartans to be found in the country

districts, he still kept harping on that string: 'Look you, on each

estate one foeman--the master--and all the rest allies.'" The ephors

asked: "How many do you reckon are in the secret of this matter?" The

informant answered: "On that point also he gave me to understand that

there were by no means many in their secret who were prime movers of the

affair, but those few to be depended on; 'and to make up,' said he,

'we ourselves are in their secret, all the rest of them--helots,

enfranchised, inferiors, provincials, one and all. (6) Note their

demeanour when Spartans chance to be the topic of their talk. Not one of

them can conceal the delight it would give him if he might eat up every

Spartan raw.'" (7) Then, as the inquiry went on, the question came: "And

where did they propose to find arms?" The answer followed: "He explained

that those of us, of course, who are enrolled in regiments have arms of

our own already, and as for the mass--he led the way to the war

foundry, and showed me scores and scores of knives, of swords, of spits,

hatchets, and axes, and reaping-hooks. 'Anything or everything,' he told

me, 'which men use to delve in earth, cut timber, or quarry stone, would

serve our purpose; nay, the instruments used for other arts would in

nine cases out of ten furnish weapons enough and to spare, especially

when dealing with unarmed antagonists.'" Once more being asked what time

the affair was to come off, he replied his orders were "not to leave the

city."

(4) "Pol. Lac." xv. 2.

(5) For the {omoioi}, see Muller, "Dorians," iii. 5, 7 (vol. ii. p.

84); Grote, "H. G." ix. 345, note 2.

(6) For the neodamodes, hypomeiones, perioeci, see Arnold, "Thuc." v.

34; Muller, "Dorians," ii. 43, 84, 18; Busolt, op. cit. p 16.

(7) See "Anab." IV. viii. 14; and Hom. "Il." iv. 34.

As the result of their inquiry the ephors were persuaded that the man's

statements were based upon things he had really seen, (8) and they were

so alarmed that they did not even venture to summon the Little Assembly,

(9) as it was named; but holding informal meetings among themselves--a

few senators here and a few there--they determined to send Cinadon and

others of the young men to Aulon, with instructions to apprehend certain

of the inhabitants and helots, whose names were written on the scytale

(or scroll). (10) He had further instructions to capture another

resident in Aulon; this was a woman, the fashionable beauty of the

place--supposed to be the arch-corruptress of all Lacedaemonians, young

and old, who visited Aulon. It was not the first mission of the sort

on which Cinadon had been employed by the ephors. It was natural,

therefore, that the ephors should entrust him with the scytale on which

the names of the suspects were inscribed; and in answer to his inquiry

which of the young men he was to take with him, they said: "Go and order

the eldest of the Hippagretae (11) (or commanders of horse) to let you

have six or seven who chance to be there." But they had taken care to

let the commander know whom he was to send, and that those sent should

also know that their business was to capture Cinadon. Further, the

authorities instructed Cinadon that they would send three waggons

to save bringing back his captives on foot--concealing as deeply as

possible the fact that he, and he alone, was the object of the mission.

Their reason for not securing him in the city was that they did not

really know the extent of the mischief; and they wished, in the first

instance, to learn from Cinadon who his accomplices were before these

latter could discover they were informed against and effect their

escape. His captors were to secure him first, and having learnt from

him the names of his confederates, to write them down and send them

as quickly as possible to the ephors. The ephors, indeed, were so much

concerned about the whole occurrence that they further sent a company of

horse to assist their agents at Aulon. (12) As soon as the capture was

effected, and one of the horsemen was back with the list of names taken

down on the information of Cinadon, they lost no time in apprehending

the soothsayer Tisamenus and the rest who were the principals in

the conspiracy. When Cinadon (13) himself was brought back and

cross-examined, and had made a full confession of the whole plot, his

plans, and his accomplices, they put to him one final question: "What

was your object in undertaking this business?" He answered: "I wished to

be inferior to no man in Lacedaemon." Let that be as it might, his fate

was to be taken out forthwith in irons, just as he was, and to be placed

with his two hands and his neck in the collar, and so under scourge and

goad to be driven, himself and his accomplices, round the city. Thus

upon the heads of those was visited the penalty of their offences.

(8) "And pointed to a well-concerted plan."

(9) See Grote, "H. G." ix. 348.

(10) See Thuc. i. 131; Plut. "Lys." 19 (Clough, iii. p. 125).

(11) "The Hippagretes (or commander of the three hundred guards called

horsemen, though they were not really mounted)." Grote, "H. G."

vol. ix. p. 349; see "Pol. Lac." iv. 3.

(12) Or, "to those on the way to Aulon."

(13) See for Cinadon's case, Arist. "Pol." v. 7, 3.

IV

B.C. 397. (1) It was after the incidents just recorded that a Syracusan

named Herodas brought news to Lacedaemon. He had chanced to be in

Phoenicia with a certain shipowner, and was struck by the number of

Phoenician triremes which he observed, some coming into harbour from

other ports, others already there with their ships' companies complete,

while others again were still completing their equipments. Nor was it

only what he saw, but he had heard say further that there were to be

three hundred of these vessels all told; whereupon he had taken passage

on the first sailing ship bound for Hellas. He was in haste to lay this

information before the Lacedaemonians, feeling sure that the king and

Tissaphernes were concerned in these preparations--though where the

fleet was to act, or against whom, he would not venture to predict.

(1) See Grote, "H. G." ix. 353, for chronology, etc.

These reports threw the Lacedaemonians into a flutter of expectation and

anxiety. They summoned a meeting of the allies, and began to deliberate

as to what ought to be done. Lysander, convinced of the enormous

superiority of the Hellenic navy, and with regard to land forces drawing

an obvious inference from the exploits and final deliverance of the

troops with Cyrus, persuaded Agesilaus, to undertake a campaign into

Asia, provided the authorities would furnish him with thirty Spartans,

two thousand of the enfranchised, (2) and contingents of the allies

amounting to six thousand men. Apart from these calculations, Lysander

had a personal object: he wished to accompany the king himself, and by

his aid to re-establish the decarchies originally set up by himself in

the different cities, but at a later date expelled through the action

of the ephors, who had issued a fiat re-establishing the old order of

constitution.

(2) Technically, "neodamodes."

B.C. 396. To this offer on the part of Agesilaus to undertake such an

expedition the Lacedaemonians responded by presenting him with all

he asked for, and six months' provisions besides. When the hour of

departure came he offered all such sacrifices as are necessary, and

lastly those "before crossing the border," (3) and so set out. This

done, he despatched to the several states (4) messengers with directions

as to the numbers to be sent from each, and the points of rendezvous;

but for himself he was minded to go and do sacrifice at Aulis, even as

Agamemnon had offered sacrifice in that place ere he set sail for

Troy. But when he had reached the place and had begun to sacrifice, the

Boeotarchs (5) being apprised of his design, sent a body of cavalry and

bade him desist from further sacrificing; (6) and lighting upon victims

already offered, they hurled them from off the altars, scattering the

fragments. Then Agesilaus, calling the gods to witness, got on board his

trireme in bitter indignation, and sailed away. Arrived at Geraestus, he

there collected as large a portion of his troops as possible, and with

the armada made sail for Ephesus.

(3) "Pol. Lac." xiii. 2 foll.

(4) Or, "To the several cities he had already despatched messengers

with directions," etc.; see Paus. III. ix. 1-3.

(5) See Freeman, "Hist. of Federal Government," ch. iv. "Constitution

of the Boeotian League," pp. 162, 163. The Boeotarchs, as

representatives of the several Boeotian cities, were the supreme

military commanders of the League, and, as it would appear, the

general administrators of Federal affairs. "The Boeotarchs of

course command at Delion, but they also act as administrative

magistrates of the League by hindering Agesilaus from sacrificing

at Aulis."

(6) Plut. "Ages." vi.; "Pelop." xxi. See Breitenb. op. cit. Praef. p.

xvi.; and below, III. v. 5; VI. iv. 23.

When he had reached that city the first move was made by Tissaphernes,

who sent asking, "With what purpose he was come thither?" And the

Spartan king made answer: "With the intention that the cities in Asia

shall be independent even as are the cities in our quarter of Hellas."

In answer to this Tissaphernes said: "If you on your part choose to

make a truce whilst I send ambassadors to the king, I think you may well

arrange the matter, and sail back home again, if so you will." "Willing

enough should I be," replied Agesilaus, "were I not persuaded that you

are cheating me." "Nay, but it is open to you," replied the satrap, "to

exact a surety for the execution of the terms... 'Provided always that

you, Tissaphernes, carry out what you say without deceit, we on our side

will abstain from injuring your dominion in any respect whatever

during the truce.'" (7) Accordingly in the presence of three

commissioners--Herippidas, Dercylidas, and Megillus--Tissaphernes took

an oath in the words prescribed: "Verily and indeed, I will effect peace

honestly and without guile." To which the commissioners, on behalf

of Agesilaus, swore a counter-oath: "Verily and indeed, provided

Tissaphernes so acts, we on our side will observe the truce."

(7) For this corrupt passage, see Hartman, "Anal. Xen." p. 332; also

Otto Keller's critical edition of the "Hellenica" (Lips,

MDCCCLXXX.)

Tissaphernes at once gave the lie to what he had sworn. Instead of

adhering to peace he sent up to demand a large army from the king, in

addition to what he already had. But Agesilaus, though he was fully

alive to these proceedings, adhered as rigidly as ever to the truce.

To keep quiet and enjoy leisure was his duty, in the exercise of which

he wore away the time at Ephesus. But in reference to the organisation

of the several states it was a season of vehement constitutional

disturbance in the several cities; that is to say, there were neither

democracies as in the old days of the Athenians, nor yet were there

decarchies as in the days of Lysander. But here was Lysander back again.

Every one recognised him, and flocked to him with petitions for one

favour or another, which he was to obtain for them from Agesilaus.

A crowd of suitors danced attendance on his heels, and formed so

conspicuous a retinue that Agesilaus, any one would have supposed, was

the private person and Lysander the king. All this was maddening

to Agesilaus, as was presently plain. As to the rest of the Thirty,

jealousy did not suffer them to keep silence, and they put it plainly to

Agesilaus that the super-regal splendour in which Lysander lived was

a violation of the constitution. So when Lysander took upon himself to

introduce some of his petitioners to Agesilaus, the latter turned them

a deaf ear. Their being aided and abetted by Lysander was sufficient; he

sent them away discomfited. At length, as time after time things turned

out contrary to his wishes, Lysander himself perceived the position of

affairs. He now no longer suffered that crowd to follow him, and gave

those who asked him help in anything plainly to understand that they

would gain nothing, but rather be losers, by his intervention. But being

bitterly annoyed at the degradation put upon him, he came to the king

and said to him: "Ah, Agesilaus, how well you know the art of humbling

your friends!" "Ay, indeed," the king replied; "those of them whose one

idea it is to appear greater than myself; if I did not know how also to

requite with honour those who work for my good, I should be ashamed."

And Lysander said: "maybe there is more reason in your doings than ever

guided my conduct;" adding, "Grant me for the rest one favour, so shall

I cease to blush at the loss of my influence with you, and you will

cease to be embarrassed by my presence. Send me off on a mission

somewhere; wherever I am I will strive to be of service to you." Such

was the proposal of Lysander. Agesilaus resolved to act upon it, and

despatched Lysander to the Hellespont. And this is what befell.

(8) Lysander, being made aware of a slight which had been put upon

Spithridates the Persian by Pharnabazus, got into conversation with the

injured man, and so worked upon him that he was persuaded to bring

his children and his personal belongings, and with a couple of hundred

troops to revolt. The next step was to deposit all the goods safely in

Cyzicus, and the last to get on shipboard with Spithridates and his

son, and so to present himself with his Persian friends to Agesilaus.

Agesilaus, on his side, was delighted at the transaction, and set

himself at once to get information about Pharnabazus, his territory and

his government.

(8) See "Ages." iii. 3; "Anab." VI. v. 7.

Meanwhile Tissaphernes had waxed bolder. A large body of troops had been

sent down by the king. On the strength of that he declared war against

Agesilaus, if he did not instantly withdraw his troops from Asia. The

Lacedaemonians there (9) present, no less than the allies, received the

news with profound vexation, persuaded as they were that Agesilaus had

no force capable of competing with the king's grand armament. But a

smile lit up the face of Agesilaus as he bade the ambassadors return to

Tissaphernes and tell him that he was much in his debt for the perjury

by which he had won the enmity of Heaven and made the very gods

themselves allies of Hellas. He at once issued a general order to the

troops to equip themselves for a forward movement. He warned the cities

through which he must pass in an advance upon Caria, to have markets in

readiness, and lastly, he despatched a message to the Ionian, Aeolian,

and Hellespontine communities to send their contingents to join him at

Ephesus.

(9) I.e. at Ephesus.

Tissaphernes, putting together the facts that Agesilaus had no cavalry

and that Caria was a region unadapted to that arm, and persuaded in

his own mind also that the Spartan could not but cherish wrath against

himself personally for his chicanery, felt convinced that he was really

intending to invade Caria, and that the satrap's palace was his final

goal. Accordingly he transferred the whole of his infantry to that

province, and proceeded to lead his cavalry round into the plain of the

Maeander. Here he conceived himself capable of trampling the Hellenes

under foot with his horsemen before they could reach the craggy

districts where no cavalry could operate.

But, instead of marching straight into Caria, Agesilaus turned sharp

off in the opposite direction towards Phrygia. Picking up various

detachments of troops which met him on his march, he steadily advanced,

laying cities prostrate before him, and by the unexpectedness of his

attack reaping a golden harvest of spoil. As a rule the march was

prosecuted safely; but not far from Dascylium his advanced guard of

cavalry were pushing on towards a knoll to take a survey of the state

of things in front, when, as chance would have it, a detachment of

cavalry sent forward by Pharnabazus--the corps, in fact, of Rhathines

and his natural brother Bagaeus--just about equal to the Hellenes in

number, also came galloping up to the very knoll in question. The two

bodies found themselves face to face not one hundred and fifty yards

(10) apart, and for the first moment or two stood stock still. The

Hellenic horse were drawn up like an ordinary phalanx four deep, the

barbarians presenting a narrow front of twelve or thereabouts, and a

very disproportionate depth. There was a moment's pause, and then the

barbarians, taking the initiative, charged. There was a hand-to-hand

tussle, in which any Hellene who succeeded in striking his man shivered

his lance with the blow, while the Persian troopers, armed with

cornel-wood javelins, speedily despatched a dozen men and a couple of

horses. (11) At this point the Hellenic cavalry turned and fled. But as

Agesilaus came up to the rescue with his heavy infantry, the Asiatics

were forced in their turn to withdraw, with the loss of one man slain.

This cavalry engagement gave them pause. Agesilaus on the day following

it offered sacrifice. "Was he to continue his advance?" But the victims

proved hopeless. (12) There was nothing for it after this manifestation

but to turn and march towards the sea. It was clear enough to his mind

that without a proper cavalry force it would be impossible to conduct

a campaign in the flat country. Cavalry, therefore, he must get, or be

driven to mere guerilla warfare. With this view he drew up a list of

all the wealthiest inhabitants belonging to the several cities of

those parts. Their duty would be to support a body of cavalry, with the

proviso, however, that any one contributing a horse, arms, and rider, up

to the standard, would be exempted from personal service. The effect

was instantaneous. The zeal with which the recipients of these orders

responded could hardly have been greater if they had been seeking

substitutes to die for them.

(10) Lit. "four plethra."

(11) See Xenophon's treatise "On Horsemanship," xii. 12.

(12) Lit. "lobeless," i.e. with a lobe of the liver wanting--a bad

sign.

B.C. 395. After this, at the first indication of spring, he collected

the whole of his army at Ephesus. But the army needed training. With

that object he proposed a series of prizes--prizes to the heavy infantry

regiments, to be won by those who presented their men in the best

condition; prizes for the cavalry regiments which could ride best;

prizes for those divisions of peltasts and archers which proved most

efficient in their respective duties. And now the gymnasiums were

a sight to see, thronged as they were, one and all, with warriors

stripping for exercise; or again, the hippodrome crowded with horses and

riders performing their evolutions; or the javelin men and archers

going through their peculiar drill. In fact, the whole city where he

lay presented under his hands a spectacle not to be forgotten. The

market-place literally teemed with horses, arms, and accoutrements of

all sorts for sale. The bronze-worker, the carpenter, the smith, the

leather-cutter, the painter and embosser, were all busily engaged in

fabricating the implements of war; so that the city of Ephesus itself

was fairly converted into a military workshop. (13) It would have done

a man's heart good to see those long lines of soldiers with Agesilaus

at their head, as they stepped gaily be-garlanded from the gymnasiums to

dedicate their wreaths to the goddess Artemis. Nor can I well conceive

of elements more fraught with hope than were here combined. Here were

reverence and piety towards Heaven; here practice in war and military

training; here discipline with habitual obedience to authority. But

contempt for one's enemy will infuse a kind of strength in battle. So

the Spartan leader argued; and with a view to its production he ordered

the quartermasters to put up the prisoners who had been captured by

his foraging bands for auction, stripped naked; so that his Hellenic

soldiery, as they looked at the white skins which had never been bared

to sun and wind, the soft limbs unused to toil through constant riding

in carriages, came to the conclusion that war with such adversaries

would differ little from a fight with women.

(13) See Plut. "Marc." (Clough, ii. 262); Polyb. "Hist." x. 20.

By this date a full year had elapsed since the embarkation of Agesilaus,

and the time had come for the Thirty with Lysander to sail back home,

and for their successors, with Herippidas, to arrive. Among these

Agesilaus appointed Xenocles and another to the command of the cavalry,

Scythes to that of the heavy infantry of the enfranchised, (14)

Herippidas to that of the Cyreians, and Migdon to that of the

contingents from the states. Agesilaus gave them to understand that he

intended to lead them forthwith by the most expeditious route against

the stronghold of the country, (15) so that without further ceremony

they might prepare their minds and bodies for the tug of battle.

Tissaphernes, however, was firmly persuaded that this was only talk

intended to deceive him; Agesilaus would this time certainly invade

Caria. Accordingly he repeated his former tactics, transporting his

infantry bodily into Caria and posting his cavalry in the valley of the

Maeander. But Agesilaus was as good as his word, and at once invaded the

district of Sardis. A three days' march through a region denuded of the

enemy threw large supplies into his hands. On the fourth day the cavalry

of the enemy approached. Their general ordered the officer in charge of

his baggage-train to cross the Pactolus and encamp, while his troopers,

catching sight of stragglers from the Hellenic force scattered in

pursuit of booty, put several of them to the sword. Perceiving which,

Agesilaus ordered his cavalry to the rescue; and the Persians on their

side, seeing their advance, collected together in battle order to

receive them, with dense squadrons of horse, troop upon troop. The

Spartan, reflecting that the enemy had as yet no infantry to support

him, whilst he had all branches of the service to depend upon, concluded

that the critical moment had arrived at which to risk an engagement.

In this mood he sacrificed, and began advancing his main line of battle

against the serried lines of cavalry in front of him, at the same time

ordering the flower of his heavy infantry--the ten-years-service men

(16)--to close with them at a run, and the peltasts to bring up their

supports at the double. The order passed to his cavalry was to charge

in confidence that he and the whole body of his troops were close behind

them. The cavalry charge was received by the Persians without flinching,

but presently finding themselves environed by the full tide of war they

swerved. Some found a speedy grave within the river, but the mass of

them gradually made good their escape. The Hellenes followed close on

the heels of the flying foe and captured his camp. here the peltasts not

unnaturally fell to pillaging; whereupon Agesilaus planted his troops

so as to form a cordon enclosing the property of friends and foes alike.

The spoil taken was considerable; it fetched more than seventy talents,

(17) not to mention the famous camels, subsequently brought over by

Agesilaus into Hellas, which were captured here. At the moment of the

battle Tissaphernes lay in Sardis. Hence the Persians argued that they

had been betrayed by the satrap. And the king of Persia, coming to a

like conclusion himself that Tissaphernes was to blame for the evil turn

of his affairs, sent down Tithraustes and beheaded him. (18)

(14) The neodamodes.

(15) I.e. Lydia. See Plut. "Ages." x. (Clough, iv. 11).

(16) See note to "Hell." II. iv. 32.

(17) = 17,062 pounds: 10 shillings.

(18) See Diod. xiv. 80.

This done, Tithraustes sent an embassy to Agesilaus with a message as

follows: "The author of all our trouble, yours and ours, Agesilaus, has

paid the penalty of his misdoings; the king therefore asks of you first

that you should sail back home in peace; secondly, that the cities in

Asia secured in their autonomy should continue to render him the ancient

tribute." To this proposition Agesilaus made answer that "without the

authorities at home he could do nothing in the matter." "Then do you,

at least," replied Tithraustes, "while awaiting advice from Lacedaemon,

withdraw into the territory of Pharnabazus. Have I not avenged you of

your enemy?" "While, then, I am on my way thither," rejoined Agesilaus,

"will you support my army with provisions?" On this wise Tithraustes

handed him thirty talents, (19) which the other took, and forthwith

began his march into Phrygia (the Phrygia of Pharnabazus). He lay in the

plain district above Cyme, (20) when a message reached him from the home

authorities, giving him absolute disposal of the naval forces, (21)

with the right to appoint the admiral of his choice. This course the

Lacedaemonians were led to adopt by the following considerations: If,

they argued, the same man were in command of both services, the land

force would be greatly strengthened through the concentration of the

double force at any point necessary; and the navy likewise would be far

more useful through the immediate presence and co-operation of the land

force where needed. Apprised of these measures, Agesilaus in the first

instance sent an order to the cities on the islands and the seaboard to

fit out as many ships of war as they severally might deem desirable.

The result was a new navy, consisting of the vessels thus voluntarily

furnished by the states, with others presented by private persons out

of courtesy to their commander, and amounting in all to a fleet of one

hundred and twenty sail. The admiral whom he selected was Peisander, his

wife's brother, a man of genuine ambition and of a vigorous spirit, but

not sufficiently expert in the details of equipment to achieve a great

naval success. Thus while Peisander set off to attend to naval matters,

Agesilaus continued his march whither he was bound to Phrygia.

(19) = 7,312 pounds: 10 shillings.

(20) See "Cyrop." VII. i. 45.

(21) See Grote, "H. G." ix. 327, note 3; Arist. "Pol." ii. 9, 33.

V

But now Tithraustes seemed to have discovered in Agesilaus a disposition

to despise the fortunes of the Persian monarch--he evidently had no

intention to withdraw from Asia; on the contrary, he was cherishing

hopes vast enough to include the capture of the king himself. Being at

his wits' end how to manage matters, he resolved to send Timocrates the

Rhodian to Hellas with a gift of gold worthy fifty silver talents, (1)

and enjoined upon him to endeavour to exchange solemn pledges with

the leading men in the several states, binding them to undertake a

war against Lacedaemon. Timocrates arrived and began to dole out

his presents. In Thebes he gave gifts to Androcleidas, Ismenias, and

Galaxidorus; in Corinth to Timolaus and Polyanthes; in Argos to Cylon

and his party. The Athenians, (2) though they took no share of the gold,

were none the less eager for the war, being of opinion that empire

was theirs by right. (3) The recipients of the moneys forthwith began

covertly to attack the Lacedaemonians in their respective states, and,

when they had brought these to a sufficient pitch of hatred, bound

together the most important of them in a confederacy.

(1) = 12,187 pounds: 10 shillings.

(2) See Paus. III. ix. 8; Plut. "Ages." xv.

(3) Reading {nomizontes auton to arkhein} with Sauppe; or if, as

Breitinbach suggests, {enomizon de oukh outon to arkhesthai},

translate "but thought it was not for them to take the

initiative."

But it was clear to the leaders in Thebes that, unless some one struck

the first blow, the Lacedaemonians would never be brought to break the

truce with their allies. They therefore persuaded the Opuntian Locrians

(4) to levy moneys on a debatable district, (5) jointly claimed by the

Phocians and themselves, when the Phocians would be sure to retaliate

by an attack on Locris. These expectations were fulfilled. The Phocians

immediately invaded Locris and seized moneys on their side with ample

interest. Then Androcleidas and his friends lost no time in persuading

the Thebans to assist the Locrians, on the ground that it was no

debatable district which had been entered by the Phocians, but

the admittedly friendly and allied territory of Locris itself. The

counter-invasion of Phocis and pillage of their country by the Thebans

promptly induced the Phocians to send an embassy to Lacedaemon. In

claiming assistance they explained that the war was not of their own

seeking, but that they had attacked the Locrians in self-defence. On

their side the Lacedaemonians were glad enough to seize a pretext for

marching upon the Thebans, against whom they cherished a long-standing

bitterness. They had not forgotten the claim which the Thebans had

set up to a tithe for Apollo in Deceleia, (6) nor yet their refusal to

support Lacedaemon in the attack on Piraeus; (7) and they accused them

further of having persuaded the Corinthians not to join that expedition.

Nor did they fail to call to mind some later proceedings of the

Thebans--their refusal to allow Agesilaus to sacrifice in Aulis; (8)

their snatching the victims already offered and hurling them from the

altars; their refusal to join the same general in a campaign directed

even against Asia. (9) The Lacedaemonians further reasoned that now,

if ever, was the favourable moment to conduct an expedition against

the Thebans, and once for all to put a stop to their insolent behaviour

towards them. Affairs in Asia were prospering under the strong arm of

Agesilaus, and in Hellas they had no other war on hand to trammel their

movements. Such, therefore, being the general view of the situation

adopted at Lacedaemon, the ephors proceeded to call out the ban.

Meanwhile they despatched Lysander to Phocis with orders to put himself

at the head of the Phocians along with the Oetaeans, Heracleotes,

Melians, and Aenianians, and to march upon Haliartus; before the

walls of which place Pausanias, the destined leader of the expedition,

undertook to present himself at the head of the Lacedaemonians and other

Peloponnesian forces by a specified date. Lysander not only carried

out his instructions to the letter, but going a little beyond them,

succeeded in detaching Orchomenus from Thebes. (10) Pausanias, on

the other hand, after finding the sacrifice for crossing the frontier

favourable, sat down at Tegea and set about despatching to and fro the

commandants of allied troops whilst contentedly awaiting the soldiers

from the provincial (11) districts of Laconia.

(4) For an alliance between Athens and the Locrians, B.C. 395, see

Hicks, 67; and below, IV. ii. 17.

(5) Lit. "the." See Paus. III. ix. 9.

(6) See Grote, "H. G." ix. 309, 403; viii. 355.

(7) "Hell." II. iv. 30, B.C. 403.

(8) See above, III. iv. 3; and below, VII. i. 34.

(9) See Paus. III. ix. 1-3.

(10) See Freeman, op. cit. p. 167, "Ill feeling between Thebes and

other towns."--"Against Thebes, backed by Sparta, resistance was

hopeless. It was not till long after that, at last (in 395 B.C.),

on a favourable opportunity during the Corinthian war, Orchomenos

openly seceded." And for the prior "state of disaffection towards

Thebes on the part of the smaller cities," see "Mem." III. v. 2,

in reference to B.C. 407.

(11) Lit. "perioecid."

And now that it was fully plain to the Thebans that the Lacedaemonians

would invade their territory, they sent ambassadors to Athens, who spoke

as follows:--

"Men of Athens, it is a mistake on your part to blame us for certain

harsh resolutions concerning Athens at the conclusion of the war.

(12) That vote was not authorised by the state of Thebes. It was the

utterance merely of one man, (13) who was at that time seated in

the congress of the allies. A more important fact is that when the

Lacedaemonians summoned us to attack Piraeus (14) the collective state

of Thebes passed a resolution refusing to join in the campaign. As

then you are to a large extent the cause of the resentment which the

Lacedaemonians feel towards us, we consider it only fair that you in

your turn should render us assistance. Still more do we demand of you,

sirs, who were of the city party at that date, to enter heart and soul

into war with the Lacedaemonians. For what were their services to you?

They first deliberately converted you into an oligarchy and placed you

in hostility to the democracy, and then they came with a great force

under guise of being your allies, and delivered you over to the

majority, so that, for any service they rendered you, you were all dead

men; and you owe your lives to our friends here, the people of Athens.

(15)

(12) See "Hell." II. ii. 19; and below, VI. v. 35.

(13) Plut. "Lys." xv. "Erianthus the Theban gave his vote to pull down

the city, and turn the country into sheep-pasture."--Clough, iii.

121.

(14) See "Hell." II. iv. 30.

(15) See "Hell." II. iv. 38, 40, 41.

"But to pass on--we all know, men of Athens, that you would like to

recover the empire which you formerly possessed; and how can you compass

your object better than by coming to the aid yourselves of the victims

of Lacedaemonian injustice? Is it their wide empire of which you are

afraid? Let not that make cowards of you--much rather let it embolden

you as you lay to heart and ponder your own case. When your empire was

widest then the crop of your enemies was thickest. Only so long as they

found no opportunity to revolt did they keep their hatred of you dark;

but no sooner had they found a champion in Lacedaemon than they at once

showed what they really felt towards you. So too to-day. Let us show

plainly that we mean to stand shoulder to shoulder (16) embattled

against the Lacedaemonians; and haters enough of them--whole

armies--never fear, will be forthcoming. To prove the truth of this

assertion you need only to count upon your fingers. How many friends

have they left to them to-day? The Argives have been, are, and ever will

be, hostile to them. Of course. But the Eleians? Why, the Eleians have

quite lately (17) been robbed of so much territory and so many cities

that their friendship is converted into hatred. And what shall we say

of the Corinthians? the Arcadians? the Achaeans? In the war which Sparta

waged against you, there was no toil, no danger, no expense, which those

peoples did not share, in obedience to the dulcet coaxings (18) and

persuasions of that power. The Lacedaemonians gained what they wanted,

and then not one fractional portion of empire, honour, or wealth did

these faithful followers come in for. That is not all. They have no

scruple in appointing their helots (19) as governors, and on the free

necks of their alies, in the day of their good fortune, they have

planted the tyrant's heel.

(16) Lit. "shield to shield."

(17) Lit. "to-day," "nowadays."

(18) {mala liparoumenoi}. See Thuc. i. 66 foll.; vi. 88.

(19) See "Pol. Lac." xiv.

"Then again take the case of those whom they have detached from

yourselves. In the most patent way they have cajoled and cheated them;

in place of freedom they have presented them with a twofold slavery. The

allies are tyrannised over by the governor and tyrannised over by the

ten commissioners set up by Lysander over every city. (20) And to come

lastly to the great king. In spite of all the enormous contributions

with which he aided them to gain a mastery over you, is the lord of Asia

one whit better off to-day than if he had taken exactly the opposite

course and joined you in reducing them?

(20) Grote ("H. G." ix. 323), referring to this passage, and to

"Hell." VI. iii. 8-11, notes the change in Spartan habits between

405 and 394 B.C. (i.e. between the victory of Aegospotami and the

defeat of Cnidos), when Sparta possessed a large public revenue

derived from the tribute of the dependent cities. For her earlier

condition, 432 B.C., cf. Thuc. i. 80. For her subsequent

condition, 334 B.C., cf. Arist. "Pol." ii. 6, 23.

"Is it not clear that you have only to step forward once again as the

champions of this crowd of sufferers from injustice, and you will attain

to a pinnacle of power quite unprecedented? In the days of your old

empire you were leaders of the maritime powers merely--that is clear;

but your new empire to-day will be universal. You will have at

your backs not only your former subjects, but ourselves, and the

Peloponnesians, and the king himself, with all that mighty power

which is his. We do not deny that we were serviceable allies enough to

Lacedaemon, as you will bear us witness; but this we say:--If we helped

the Lacedaemonians vigorously in the past, everything tends to show that

we shall help you still more vigorously to-day; for our swords will be

unsheathed, not in behalf of islanders, or Syracusans, or men of alien

stock, as happened in the late war, but of ourselves, suffering under a

sense of wrong. And there is another important fact which you ought to

realise: this selfish system of organised greed which is Sparta's will

fall more readily to pieces than your own late empire. Yours was the

proud assertion of naval empire over subjects powerless by sea. Theirs

is the selfish sway of a minority asserting dominion over states equally

well armed with themselves, and many times more numerous. Here our

remarks end. Do not forget, however, men of Athens, that as far as we

can understand the matter, the field to which we invite you is destined

to prove far richer in blessings to your own state of Athens than to

ours, Thebes."

With these words the speaker ended. Among the Athenians, speaker after

speaker spoke in favour of the proposition, (21) and finally a unanimous

resolution was passed voting assistance to the Thebans. Thrasybulus, in

an answer communicating the resolution, pointed out with pride that in

spite of the unfortified condition of Piraeus, Athens would not shrink

from repaying her former debt of gratitude to Thebes with interest.

"You," he added, "refused to join in a campaign against us; we are

prepared to fight your battles with you against the enemy, if he attacks

you." Thus the Thebans returned home and made preparations to defend

themselves, whilst the Athenians made ready to assist them.

(21) For the alliance between Boeotia and Athens, B.C. 395, see

Kohler, "C. I. A." ii. 6; Hicks, op. cit. 65; Lys. "pro Man." S.

13; Jebb, "Att. Or." i. p. 247; and the two speeches of the same

orator Lysias against Alcibiades (son of the famous Alcibiades),

on a Charge of Desertion ("Or." xiv.), and on a Charge of Failure

to Serve ("Or." xv.)--Jebb, op. cit. i. p. 256 foll.

And now the Lacedaemonians no longer hesitated. Pausanias the

king advanced into Boeotia with the home army and the whole of the

Peloponnesian contingents, saving only the Corinthians, who declined

to serve. Lysander, at the head of the army supplied by Phocis and

Orchomenus and the other strong places in those parts, had already

reached Haliartus, in front of Pausanias. Being arrived, he refused to

sit down quietly and await the arrival of the army from Lacedaemon, but

at once marched with what troops he had against the walls of Haliartus;

and in the first instance he tried to persuade the citizens to detach

themselves from Thebes and to assume autonomy, but the intention was

cut short by certain Thebans within the fortress. Whereupon Lysander

attacked the place. The Thebans were made aware, (22) and hurried to the

rescue with heavy infantry and cavalry. Then, whether it was that the

army of relief fell upon Lysander unawares, or that with clear knowledge

of his approach he preferred to await the enemy, with intent to crush

him, is uncertain. This only is clear: a battle was fought beside the

walls, and a trophy still exists to mark the victory of the townsfolk

before the gates of Haliartus. Lysander was slain, and the rest fled to

the mountains, the Thebans hotly pursuing. But when the pursuit had led

them to some considerable height, and they were fairly environed and

hemmed in by difficult ground and narrow space, then the heavy infantry

turned to bay, and greeted them with a shower of darts and missiles.

First two or three men dropped who had been foremost of the pursuers,

and then upon the rest they poured volleys of stones down the

precipitous incline, and pressed on their late pursuers with much zeal,

until the Thebans turned tail and quitted the deadly slope, leaving

behind them more than a couple of hundred corpses.

(22) See Plut. "Lys." xxviii. (Clough, iii. 137).

On this day, thereafter, the hearts of the Thebans failed them as they

counted their losses and found them equal to their gains; but the next

day they discovered that during the night the Phocians and the rest of

them had made off to their several homes, whereupon they fell to pluming

themselves highly on their achievement. But presently Pausanias appeared

at the head of the Lacedaemonian army, and once more their dangers

seemed to thicken round them. Deep, we are told, was the silence and

abasement which reigned in their host. It was not until the third day,

when the Athenians arrived (23) and were duely drawn up beside them,

whilst Pausanias neither attacked nor offered battle, that at length the

confidence of the Thebans took a larger range. Pausanias, on his side,

having summoned his generals and commanders of fifties, (24) deliberated

whether to give battle or to content himself with picking up the bodies

of Lysander and those who fell with him, under cover of a truce.

(23) See Dem. "On the Crown," 258.

(24) Lit. "polemarchs and penteconters"--"colonels and lieutenants."

See "Pol. Lac." xi.

The considerations which weighed upon the minds of Pausanias and

the other high officers of the Lacedaemonians seem to have been that

Lysander was dead and his defeated army in retreat; while, as far as

they themselves were concerned, the Corinthian contingent was absolutely

wanting, and the zeal of the troops there present at the lowest ebb.

They further reasoned that the enemy's cavalry was numerous and theirs

the reverse; whilst, weightiest of all, there lay the dead right under

the walls, so that if they had been ever so much stronger it would have

been no easy task to pick up the bodies within range of the towers of

Haliartus. On all these grounds they determined to ask for a flag of

truce, in order to pick up the bodies of the slain. These, however, the

Thebans were not disposed to give back unless they agreed to retire from

their territory. The terms were gladly accepted by the Lacedaemonians,

who at once picked up the corpses of the slain, and prepared to quit the

territory of Boeotia. The preliminaries were transacted, and the retreat

commenced. Despondent indeed was the demeanour of the Lacedaemonians,

in contrast with the insolent bearing of the Thebans, who visited the

slightest attempt to trespass on their private estates with blows and

chased the offenders back on to the high roads unflinchingly. Such was

the conclusion of the campaign of the Lacedaemonians.

As for Pausanias, on his arrival at home he was tried on the capital

charge. The heads of indictment set forth that he had failed to reach

Haliartus as soon as Lysander, in spite of his undertaking to be there

on the same day: that, instead of using any endeavour to pick up the

bodies of the slain by force of arms, he had asked for a flag of truce:

that at an earlier date, when he had got the popular government of

Athens fairly in his grip at Piraeus, he had suffered it to slip through

his fingers and escape. Besides this, (25) he failed to present himself

at the trial, and a sentence of death was passed upon him. He escaped

to Tegea and there died of an illness whilst still in exile. Thus closes

the chapter of events enacted on the soil of Hellas. To return to Asia

and Agesilaus.

(25) Or, add, "as a further gravamen."

BOOK IV

I

B.C. 395. With the fall of the year Agesilaus reached Phrygia--the

Phrygia of Pharnabazus--and proceeded to burn and harry the district.

City after city was taken, some by force and some by voluntary

surrender. To a proposal of Spithridates to lead him into Paphlagonia,

(1) where he would introduce the king of the country to him in

conference and obtain his alliance, he readily acceded. It was a

long-cherished ambition of Agesilaus to alienate some one of the subject

nations from the Persian monarch, and he pushed forward eagerly.

(1) See Hartman ("An. Xen." p. 339), who suggests {Otun auto} for {sun

auto}.

On his arrival in Paphlagonia, King Otys (2) came, and an alliance was

made. (The fact was, he had been summoned by the king to Susa and had

not gone up.) More than that, through the persuasion of Spithridates he

left behind as a parting gift to Agesilaus one thousand cavalry and a

couple of thousand peltasts. Agesilaus was anxious in some way to

show his gratitude to Spithridates for such help, and spoke as

follows:--"Tell me," he said to Spithridates, "would you not like to

give your daughter to King Otys?" "Much more would I like to give her,"

he answered, "than he to take her--I an outcast wanderer, and he lord

of a vast territory and forces." Nothing more was said at the time about

the marriage; but when Otys was on the point of departure and came to

bid farewell, Agesilaus, having taken care that Spithridates should be

out of the way, in the presence of the Thirty broached the subject: (3)

"Can you tell me, Otys, to what sort of family Spithridates belongs?"

"To one of the noblest in Persia," replied the king. Agesilaus: "Have

you observed how beautiful his son is?" Otys: "To be sure; last evening

I was supping with him." Agesilaus: "And they tell me his daughter

is yet more beautiful." Otys: "That may well be; beautiful she is."

Agesilaus: "For my part, as you have proved so good a friend to us, I

should like to advise you to take this girl to wife. Not only is she

very beautiful--and what more should a husband ask for?--but her

father is of noble family, and has a force at his back large enough to

retaliate on Pharnabazus for an injury. He has made the satrap, as you

see, a fugitive and a vagabond in his own vast territory. I need not

tell you," he added, "that a man who can so chastise an enemy is well

able to benefit a friend; and of this be assured: by such an alliance

you will gain not the connection of Spithridates alone, but of myself

and the Lacedaemonians, and, as we are the leaders of Hellas, of

the rest of Hellas also. And what a wedding yours will be! Were ever

nuptials celebrated on so grand a scale before? Was ever bride led home

by such an escort of cavalry and light-armed troops and heavy infantry,

as shall escort your wife home to your palace?" Otys asked: "Is

Spithridates of one mind with you in this proposal?" and Agesilaus

answered: "In good sooth he did not bid me make it for him. And for

my own part in the matter, though it is, I admit, a rare pleasure to

requite an enemy, yet I had far rather at any time discover some good

fortune for my friends." Otys: "Why not ask if your project pleases

Spithridates too?" Then Agesilaus, turning to Herippidas and the rest

of the Thirty, bade them go to Spithridates; "and give him such good

instruction," he added, "that he shall wish what we wish." The Thirty

rose and retired to administer their lesson. But they seemed to tarry

a long time, and Agesilaus asked: "What say you, King Otys--shall we

summon him hither ourselves? You, I feel certain, are better able to

persuade him than the whole Thirty put together." Thereupon Agesilaus

summoned Spithridates and the others. As they came forward, Herippidas

promptly delivered himself thus: "I spare you the details, Agesilaus.

To make a long story short, Spithridates says, 'He will be glad to do

whatever pleases you.'" Then Agesilaus, turning first to one and then

to the other: "What pleases me," said he, "is that you should wed a

daughter--and you a wife--so happily. (4) But," he added, "I do not see

how we can well bring home the bride by land till spring." "No, not by

land," the suitor answered, "but you might, if you chose, conduct her

home at once by sea." Thereupon they exchanged pledges to ratify the

compact; and so sent Otys rejoicing on his way.

(2) See "Ages." iii. 4, where he is called Cotys.

(3) I.e. "Spartan counsellors."

(4) Or, "and may the wedding be blest!"

Agesilaus, who had not failed to note the king's impatience, at once

fitted out a ship of war and gave orders to Callias, a Lacedaemonian,

to escort the maiden to her new home; after which he himself began his

march on Dascylium. Here was the palace of Pharnabazus. It lay in the

midst of abundant supplies. Here, too, were most fair hunting grounds,

offering the hunter choice between enclosed parks (5) and a wide expanse

of field and fell; and all around there flowed a river full of fish

of every sort; and for the sportsman versed in fowling, winged game in

abundance.

(5) Lit. "paradises." See "Anab." I. ii. 7; "Cyrop." I. iv. 11.

In these quarters the Spartan king passed the winter, collecting

supplies for the army either on the spot or by a system of forage. On

one of these occasions the troops, who had grown reckless and scornful

of the enemy through long immunity from attack, whilst engaged

in collecting supplies were scattered over the flat country, when

Pharnabazus fell upon them with two scythe-chariots and about four

hundred horse. Seeing him thus advancing, the Hellenes ran together,

mustering possibly seven hundred men. The Persian did not hesitate, but

placing his chariots in front, supported by himself and the cavalry, he

gave the command to charge. The scythe-chariots charged and scattered

the compact mass, and speedily the cavalry had laid low in the dust

about a hundred men, while the rest retreated hastily, under cover of

Agesilaus and his hoplites, who were fortunately near.

It was the third or fourth day after this that Spithridates made a

discovery: Pharnabazus lay encamped in Caue, a large village not more

than eighteen miles (6) away. This news he lost no time in reporting

to Herippidas. The latter, who was longing for some brilliant exploit,

begged Agesilaus to furnish him with two thousand hoplites, an equal

number of peltasts, and some cavalry--the latter to consist of the

horsemen of Spithridates, the Paphlagonians, and as many Hellene

troopers as he might perchance persuade to follow him. Having got the

promise of them from Agesilaus, he proceeded to take the auspices.

Towards late afternoon he obtained favourable omens and broke off the

sacrifice. Thereupon he ordered the troops to get their evening meal,

after which they were to present themselves in front of the camp. But by

the time darkness had closed in, not one half of them had come out. To

abandon the project was to call down the ridicule of the rest of the

Thirty. So he set out with the force to hand, and about daylight,

falling on the camp of Pharnabazus, put many of his advanced guard

of Mysians to the sword. The men themselves made good their escape in

different directions, but the camp was taken, and with it divers goblets

and other gear such as a man like Pharnabazus would have, not to speak

of much baggage and many baggage animals. It was the dread of being

surrounded and besieged, if he should establish himself for long at any

one spot, which induced Pharnabazus to flee in gipsy fashion from point

to point over the country, carefully obliterating his encampments.

Now as the Paphlagonians and Spithridates brought back the captured

property, they were met by Herippidas with his brigadiers and captains,

who stopped them and (7) relieved them of all they had; the object being

to have as large a list as possible of captures to deliver over to the

officers who superintended the sale of booty. (8) This treatment the

Asiatics found intolerable. They deemed themselves at once injured

and insulted, got their kit together in the night, and made off in the

direction of Sardis to join Ariaeus without mistrust, seeing that he

too had revolted and gone to war with the king. On Agesilaus himself

no heavier blow fell during the whole campaign than the desertion of

Spithridates and Megabates and the Paphlagonians.

(6) Lit. "one hundred and sixty stades."

(7) Or, "captains posted to intercept them, who relieved..." See

"Anab." IV. i. 14.

(8) See "Pol. Lac." xiii. 11, for these officers.

Now there was a certain man of Cyzicus, Apollophanes by name; he was an

old friend of Pharnabazus, and at this time had become a friend also

of Agesilaus. (9) This man informed Agesilaus that he thought he could

bring about a meeting between him and Pharnabazus, which might tend to

friendship; and having so got ear of him, he obtained pledges of good

faith between his two friends, and presented himself with Pharnabazus at

the trysting-place, where Agesilaus with the Thirty around him awaited

their coming, reclined upon a grassy sward. Pharnabazus presently

arrived clad in costliest apparel; but just as his attendants were about

to spread at his feet the carpets on which the Persians delicately seat

themselves, he was touched with a sense of shame at his own luxury

in sight of the simplicity of Agesilaus, and he also without further

ceremony seated himself on the bare ground. And first the two bade one

another hail, and then Pharnabazus stretched out his right hand and

Agesilaus his to meet him, and the conversation began. Pharnabazus, as

the elder of the two, spoke first. "Agesilaus," he said, "and all you

Lacedaemonians here present, while you were at war with the Athenians

I was your friend and ally; it was I who furnished the wealth that made

your navy strong on sea; on land I fought on horseback by your side,

and pursued your enemies into the sea. (10) As to duplicity like that of

Tissaphernes, I challenge you to accuse me of having played you false by

word or deed. Such have I ever been; and in return how am I treated

by yourselves to-day?--in such sort that I cannot even sup in my own

country unless, like the wild animals, I pick up the scraps you chance

to leave. The beautiful palaces which my father left me as an heirloom,

the parks (11) full of trees and beasts of the chase in which my heart

rejoiced, lie before my eyes hacked to pieces, burnt to ashes. Maybe I

do not comprehend the first principles of justice and holiness; do you

then explain to me how all this resembles the conduct of men who know

how to repay a simple debt of gratitude." He ceased, and the Thirty were

ashamed before him and kept silence. (12)

(9) "Ages." v. 4; Plut. "Ages." xi. (Clough, iv. p. 14).

(10) See "Hell." I. i. 6.

(11) Lit. "paradises."

(12) Theopompus of Chios, the historian (b. B.C. 378, fl. B.C. 333),

"in the eleventh book (of his {Suntazis Ellenikon}) borrowed

Xenophon's lively account of the interview between Agesilaus and

Pharnabazus (Apollonius apud Euseb. B, "Praep. Evang." p. 465)."

See "Hist. Lit. of Anc. Gr.," Muller and Donaldson, ii. p. 380.

At length, after some pause, Agesilaus spoke. "I think you are aware,"

he said, "Pharnabazus, that within the states of Hellas the folk of

one community contract relations of friendship and hospitality with one

another; (13) but if these states should go to war, then each man will

side with his fatherland, and friend will find himself pitted against

friend in the field of battle, and, if it so betide, the one may even

deal the other his death-blow. So too we to-day, being at war with your

sovereign lord the king, must needs regard as our enemy all that he

calls his; not but that with yourself personally we should esteem it

our high fortune to be friends. If indeed it were merely an exchange of

service--were you asked to give up your lord the king and to take us as

your masters in his stead, I could not so advise you; but the fact is,

by joining with us it is in your power to-day to bow your head to no

man, to call no man master, to reap the produce of your own domain in

freedom--freedom, which to my mind is more precious than all riches. Not

that we bid you to become a beggar for the sake of freedom, but rather

to use our friendship to increase not the king's authority, but your

own, by subduing those who are your fellow-slaves to-day, and who

to-morrow shall be your willing subjects. Well, then, freedom given and

wealth added--what more would you desire to fill the cup of happiness to

overflowing?" Pharnabazus replied: "Shall I tell you plainly what I will

do?" "That were but kind and courteous on your part," he answered. "Thus

it stands with me, then," said Pharnabazus. "If the king should send

another general, and if he should wish to rank me under this new

man's orders, I, for my part, am willing to accept your friendship and

alliance; but if he offers me the supreme command--why, then, I plainly

tell you, there is a certain something in the very name ambition which

whispers me that I shall war against you to the best of my ability."

(14) When he heard that, Agesilaus seized the satrap's hand, exclaiming:

"Ah, best of mortals, may the day arrive which sends us such a friend!

Of one thing rest assured. This instant I leave your territory with what

haste I may, and for the future--even in case of war--as long as we can

find foes elsewhere our hands shall hold aloof from you and yours."

(13) Or, add, "we call them guest friends."

(14) Or, "so subtle a force, it seems, is the love of honour that."

Grote, "H. G." ix. 386; cf. Herod. iii. 57 for "ambition,"

{philotimia}.

And with these words he broke up the meeting. Pharnabazus mounted his

horse and rode away, but his son by Parapita, who was still in the bloom

of youth, lingered behind; then, running up to Agesilaus, he exclaimed:

"See, I choose you as my friend." "And I accept you," replied the king.

"Remember, then," the lad answered, and with the word presented the

beautiful javelin in his hand to Agesilaus, who received it, and

unclasping a splendid trapping (15) which his secretary, Idaeus, had

round the neck of his charger, he gave it in return to the youth;

whereupon the boy leapt on his horse's back and galloped after his

father. (16) At a later date, during the absence of Pharnabazus abroad,

this same youth, the son of Parapita, was deprived of the government by

his brother and driven into exile. Then Agesilaus took great interest

in him, and as he had a strong attachment to the son of Eualces, an

Athenian, Agesilaus did all he could to have this friend of his, who

was the tallest of the boys, admitted to the two hundred yards race at

Olympia.

(15) {phalara}, bosses of gold, silver, or other metals, cast or

chased, with some appropriate device in relief, which were worn as

an ornamental trapping for horses, affixed to the head-stall or to

a throat-collar, or to a martingale over the chest.--Rich's

"Companion to Lat. Dict. and Greek Lex.," s.v.

(16) See Grote, ix. 387; Plut. "Ages." xiv. (Clough, iv. 15); "Ages."

iii. 5. The incident is idealised in the "Cyrop." I. iv. 26 foll.

See "Lyra Heroica": CXXV. A Ballad of East and West--the incident

of the "turquoise-studded rein."

B.C. 394. But to return to the actual moment. Agesilaus was as good as

his word, and at once marched out of the territory of Pharnabazus. The

season verged on spring. Reaching the plain of Thebe, (17) he encamped

in the neighbourhood of the temple of Artemis of Astyra, (18) and there

employed himself in collecting troops from every side, in addition to

those which he already had, so as to form a complete armament. These

preparations were pressed forward with a view to penetrating as far as

possible into the interior. He was persuaded that every tribe or nation

placed in his rear might be considered as alienated from the king.

(17) "Anab." VII. viii. 7.

(18) Vide Strab. xiii. 606, 613. Seventy stades from Thebe.

II

Such were the concerns and projects of Agesilaus. Meanwhile the

Lacedaemonians at home were quite alive to the fact that moneys had been

sent into Hellas, and that the bigger states were leagued together

to declare war against them. It was hard to avoid the conclusion that

Sparta herself was in actual danger, and that a campaign was inevitable.

While busy, therefore, with preparations themselves, they lost no time

in despatching Epicydidas to fetch Agesilaus. That officer, on his

arrival, explained the position of affairs, and concluded by delivering

a peremptory summons of the state recalling him to the assistance of

the fatherland without delay. The announcement could not but come as a

grievous blow to Agesilaus, as he reflected on the vanished hopes, and

the honours plucked from his grasp. Still, he summoned the allies and

announced to them the contents of the despatch from home. "To aid our

fatherland," he added, "is an imperative duty. If, however, matters turn

out well on the other side, rely upon it, friends and allies, I will

not forget you, but I shall be back anon to carry out your wishes." When

they heard the announcement many wept, and they passed a resolution, one

and all, to assist Agesilaus in assisting Lacedaemon; if matters turned

out well there, they undertook to take him as their leader and come back

again to Asia; and so they fell to making preparations to follow him.

Agesilaus, on his side, determined to leave behind him in Asia Euxenus

as governor, and with him a garrison numbering no less than four

thousand troops, which would enable him to protect the states in Asia.

But for himself, as on the one hand he could see that the majority of

the soldiers would far rather stay behind than undertake service against

fellow-Hellenes, and on the other hand he wished to take as fine and

large an army with him as he could, he offered prizes first to that

state or city which should continue the best corps of troops, and

secondly to that captain of mercenaries who should join the expedition

with the best equipped battalion of heavy infantry, archers, and light

infantry. On the same principle he informed the chief cavalry officers

that the general who succeeded in presenting the best accoutred and best

mounted regiment would receive from himself some victorious distinction.

"The final adjudication," he said, "would not be made until they had

crossed from Asia into Europe and had reached the Chersonese; and this

with a view to impress upon them that the prizes were not for show but

for real campaigners." (1) These consisted for the most part of infantry

or cavalry arms and accoutrements tastefully furnished, besides which

there were chaplets of gold. The whole, useful and ornamental alike,

must have cost nearly a thousand pounds, (2) but as the result of this

outlay, no doubt, arms of great value were procured for the expedition.

(3) When the Hellespont was crossed the judges were appointed. The

Lacedaemonians were represented by Menascus, Herippidas, and

Orsippus, and the allies by one member from each state. As soon as the

adjudication was complete, the army commenced its march with Agesilaus

at its head, following the very route taken by the great king when he

invaded Hellas.

(1) Or, "that the perfection of equipment was regarded as anticipative

of actual service in the field." Cobet suggests for {eukrinein}

{dieukrinein}; cf. "Oecon." viii. 6.

(2) Lit. "at least four talents" = 975 pounds.

(3) Or, "beyond which, the arms and material to equip the expedition

were no doubt highly costly."

Meanwhile the ephors had called out the ban, and as Agesipolis was still

a boy, the state called upon Aristodemus, who was of the royal family

and guardian of the young king, to lead the expedition; and now that

the Lacedaemonians were ready to take the field and the forces of their

opponents were duly mustered, the latter met (4) to consider the most

advantageous method of doing battle.

(4) At Corinth. See above, III. iv. 11; below, V. iv. 61, where the

victory of Nixos is described but not localised.

Timolaus of Corinth spoke: "Soldiers of the allied forces," he said,

"the growth of Lacedaemon seems to me just like that of some mighty

river--at its sources small and easily crossed, but as it farther and

farther advances, other rivers discharge themselves into its channel, and

its stream grows ever more formidable. So is it with the Lacedaemonians.

Take them at the starting-point and they are but a single community, but

as they advance and attach city after city they grow more numerous

and more resistless. I observe that when people wish to take wasps'

nests--if they try to capture the creatures on the wing, they are liable

to be attacked by half the hive; whereas, if they apply fire to them ere

they leave their homes, they will master them without scathe themselves.

On this principle I think it best to bring about the battle within the

hive itself, or, short of that, as close to Lacedaemon as possible." (5)

(5) Or, "if not actually at Lacedaemon, then at least as near as

possible to the hornet's nest."

The arguments of the speaker were deemed sound, and a resolution was

passed in that sense; but before it could be carried out there were

various arrangements to be made. There was the question of headship.

Then, again, what was the proper depth of line to be given to the

different army corps? for if any particular state or states gave too

great a depth to their battle line they would enable the enemy to turn

their flank. Whilst they were debating these points, the Lacedaemonians

had incorporated the men of Tegea and the men of Mantinea, and were

ready to debouch into the bimarine region. (6) And as the two armies

advanced almost at the same time, the Corinthians and the rest reached

the Nemea, (7) and the Lacedaemonians and their allies occupied Sicyon.

The Lacedaemonians entered by Epieiceia, and at first were severely

handled by the light-armed troops of the enemy, who discharged stones

and arrows from the vantage-ground on their right; but as they dropped

down upon the Gulf of Corinth they advanced steadily onwards through the

flat country, felling timber and burning the fair land. Their rivals, on

their side, after a certain forward movement, (8) paused and encamped,

placing the ravine in front of them; but still the Lacedaemonians

advanced, and it was only when they were within ten furlongs (9) of the

hostile position that they followed suit and encamped, and then they

remained quiet.

(6) I.e. "the shores of the Corinthian Gulf." Or, "upon the strand or

coast road or coast land of Achaia" (aliter {ten aigialon}(?) the

Strand of the Corinthian Gulf, the old name of this part of

Achaia).

(7) Or, "the district of Nemea."

(8) {epelthontes}, but see Grote ("H. G." ix. 425 note), who prefers

{apelthontes} = retreated and encamped.

(9) Lit. "ten stades." For the numbers below, see Grote, "H. G." ix.

422, note 1.

And here I may state the numbers on either side. The Lacedaemonian

heavy-armed infantry levies amounted to six thousand men. Of Eleians,

Triphylians, Acroreians, and Lasionians, there must have been nearly

three thousand, with fifteen hundred Sicyonians, while Epidaurus,

Troezen, Hermione, and Halieis (10) contributed at least another three

thousand. To these heavy infantry troops must be added six hundred

Lacedaemonian cavalry, a body of Cretan archers about three hundred

strong, besides another force of slingers, at least four hundred in

all, consisting of Marganians, Letrinians, and Amphidolians. The men

of Phlius were not represented. Their plea was they were keeping "holy

truce." That was the total of the forces on the Lacedaemonian side.

There was collected on the enemy's side six thousand Athenian heavy

infantry, with about, as was stated, seven thousand Argives, and in the

absence of the men of Orchomenus something like five thousand Boeotians.

There were besides three thousand Corinthians, and again from the whole

of Euboea at least three thousand. These formed the heavy infantry.

Of cavalry the Boeotians, again in the absence of the Orchomenians,

furnished eight hundred, the Athenians (11) six hundred, the Chalcidians

of Euboea one hundred, the Opuntian Locrians (12) fifty. Their light

troops, including those of the Corinthians, were more numerous, as the

Ozolian Locrians, the Melians, and Arcarnanians (13) helped to swell

their numbers.

(10) Halieis, a seafaring people (Strabo, viii. 373) and town on the

coast of Hermionis; Herod. vii. 137; Thuc. i. 105, ii. 56, iv. 45;

Diod. xi. 78; "Hell." VI. ii. 3.

(11) For a treaty between Athens and Eretria, B.C. 395, see Hicks, 66;

and below, "Hell." IV. iii. 15; Hicks, 68, 69; Diod. xiv. 82.

(12) See above, "Hell." III. v. 3.

(13) See below, "Hell." IV. vi. 1; ib. vii. 1; VI. v. 23.

Such was the strength of the two armies. The Boeotians, as long as they

occupied the left wing, showed no anxiety to join battle, but after a

rearrangement which gave them the right, placing the Athenians opposite

the Lacedaemonians, and themselves opposite the Achaeans, at once, we

are told, (14) the victims proved favourable, and the order was passed

along the lines to prepare for immediate action. The Boeotians, in the

first place, abandoning the rule of sixteen deep, chose to give their

division the fullest possible depth, and, moreover, kept veering

more and more to their right, with the intention of overlapping their

opponent's flank. The consequence was that the Athenians, to avoid being

absolutely severed, were forced to follow suit, and edged towards the

right, though they recognised the risk they ran of having their flank

turned. For a while the Lacedaemonians had no idea of the advance of the

enemy, owing to the rough nature of the ground, (15) but the notes of

the paean at length announced to them the fact, and without an instant's

delay the answering order "prepare for battle" ran along the different

sections of their army. As soon as their troops were drawn up, according

to the tactical disposition of the various generals of foreign brigades,

the order was passed to "follow the lead," and then the Lacedaemonians

on their side also began edging to their right, and eventually stretched

out their wing so far that only six out of the ten regimental divisions

of the Athenians confronted the Lacedaemonians, the other four finding

themselves face to face with the men of Tegea. And now when they

were less than a furlong (16) apart, the Lacedaemonians sacrificed in

customary fashion a kid to the huntress goddess, (17) and advanced upon

their opponents, wheeling round their overlapping columns to outflank

his left. As the two armies closed, the allies of Lacedaemon were as

a rule fairly borne down by their opponents. The men of Pellene alone,

steadily confronting the Thespiaeans, held their ground, and the dead

of either side strewed the position. (18) As to the Lacedaemonians

themselves: crushing that portion of the Athenian troops which lay

immediately in front of them, and at the same time encircling them

with their overlapping right, they slew man after man of them; and,

absolutely unscathed themselves, their unbroken columns continued their

march, and so passed behind the four remaining divisions (19) of the

Athenians before these latter had returned from their own victorious

pursuit. Whereby the four divisions in question also emerged from battle

intact, except for the casualties inflicted by the Tegeans in the

first clash of the engagement. The troops next encountered by the

Lacedaemonians were the Argives retiring. These they fell foul of, and

the senior polemarch was just on the point of closing with them "breast

to breast" when some one, it is said, shouted, "Let their front ranks

pass." This was done, and as the Argives raced past, their enemies

thrust at their unprotected (20) sides and killed many of them. The

Corinthians were caught in the same way as they retired, and when their

turn had passed, once more the Lacedaemonians lit upon a portion of the

Theban division retiring from the pursuit, and strewed the field with

their dead. The end of it all was that the defeated troops in the first

instance made for safety to the walls of their city, but the Corinthians

within closed the gates, whereupon the troops took up quarters once

again in their old encampment. The Lacedaemonians on their side withdrew

to the point at which they first closed with the enemy, and there set up

a trophy of victory. So the battle ended.

(14) Or, "then they lost no time in discovering that the victims

proved favourable."

(15) See Grote, "H. G." ix. 428; cf. Lys. "pro Mant." 20.

(16) Lit. "a stade."

(17) Lit. "our Lady of the Chase." See "Pol. Lac." xiii. 8.

(18) Lit. "men on either side kept dropping at their post."

(19) Lit. "tribes."

(20) I.e. "right."

III

Meanwhile Agesilaus was rapidly hastening with his reinforcements from

Asia. He had reached Amphipolis when Dercylidas brought the news of this

fresh victory of the Lacedaemonians; their own loss had been eight men,

that of the enemy considerable. It was his business at the same time to

explain that not a few of the allies had fallen also. Agesilaus

asked, "Would it not be opportune, Dercylidas, if the cities that have

furnished us with contingents could hear of this victory as soon as

possible?" And Dercylidas replied: "The news at any rate is likely

to put them in better heart." Then said the king: "As you were an

eye-witness there could hardly be a better bearer of the news than

yourself." To this proposal Dercylidas lent a willing ear--to travel

abroad (1) was his special delight--and he replied, "Yes, under your

orders." "Then you have my orders," the king said. "And you may further

inform the states from myself that we have not forgotten our promise;

if all goes well over here we shall be with them again ere long."

So Dercylidas set off on his travels, in the first instance to the

Hellespont; (2) while Agesilaus crossed Macedonia, and arrived in

Thessaly. And now the men of Larissa, Crannon, Scotussa, and Pharsalus,

who were allies of the Boeotians--and in fact all the Thessalians except

the exiles for the time being--hung on his heels (3) and did him damage.

(1) See "Pol. Lac." xiv. 4.

(2) See below, "Hell." IV. viii. 3.

(3) See "Ages." ii. 2; Grote, "H. G." ix. 420, note 2.

For some while he marched his troops in a hollow square, (4) posting

half his cavalry in front and half on his rear; but finding that the

Thessalians checked his passage by repeated charges from behind, he

strengthened his rearguard by sending round the cavalry from his van,

with the exception of his own personal escort. (5) The two armies stood

confronted in battle order; but the Thessalians, not liking the notion

of a cavalry engagement with heavy infantry, turned, and step by step

retreated, while the others followed them with considerable caution.

Agesilaus, perceiving the error under which both alike laboured, now

sent his own personal guard of stalwart troopers with orders that both

they and the rest of the horsemen should charge at full gallop, (6)

and not give the enemy the chance to recoil. The Thessalians were taken

aback by this unexpected onslaught, and half of them never thought of

wheeling about, whilst those who did essay to do so presented the

flanks of their horses to the charge, (7) and were made prisoners.

Still Polymarchus of Pharsalus, the general in command of their cavalry,

rallied his men for an instant, and fell, sword in hand, with his

immediate followers. This was the signal for a flight so precipitate on

the part of the Thessalians, that their dead and dying lined the road,

and prisoners were taken; nor was any halt made until they reached Mount

Narthacius. Here, then, midway between Pras and Narthacius, Agesilaus

set up a trophy, halting for the moment, in unfeigned satisfaction at

the exploit. It was from antagonists who prided themselves on their

cavalry beyond everything that he had wrested victory, with a body

of cavalry of his own mustering. Next day he crossed the mountains

of Achaea Phthiotis, and for the future continued his march through

friendly territory until he reached the confines of Boeotia.

(4) See Rustow and Kochly, S. 187 foll.

(5) See Thuc. v. 72; Herod. vi. 56, viii. 124.

(6) Lit. "and bids them pass the order to the others and themselves to

charge," etc.

(7) See "Horsemanship," vii. 16; Polyb. iv. 8.

Here, at the entrance of that territory, the sun (in partial eclipse)

(8) seemed to appear in a crescent shape, and the news reached him of

the defeat of the Lacedaemonians in a naval engagement, and the death

of the admiral Peisander. Details of the disaster were not wanting. The

engagement of the hostile fleets took place off Cnidus. Pharnabazus, the

Persian admiral, was present with the Phoenician fleet, and in front

of him were ranged the ships of the Hellenic squadron under Conon.

Peisander had ventured to draw out his squadron to meet the combined

fleets, though the numerical inferiority of his fleet to that of the

Hellenic navy under Conon was conspicuous, and he had the mortification

of seeing the allies who formed his left wing take to flight

immediately. He himself came to close quarters with the enemy, and was

driven on shore, on board his trireme, under pressure of the hostile

rams. The rest, as many as were driven to shore, deserted their ships

and sought safety as best they could in the territory of Cnidus. The

admiral alone stuck to his ship, and fell sword in hand.

(8) B.C. 394, August 14.

It was impossible for Agesilaus not to feel depressed by those tidings

at first; on further reflection, however, it seemed to him that the

moral quality of more than half his troops well entitled them to share

in the sunshine of success, but in the day of trouble, when things

looked black, he was not bound to take them into his confidence.

Accordingly he turned round and gave out that he had received news that

Peisander was dead, but that he had fallen in the arms of victory in

a sea-fight; and suiting his action to the word, he proceeded to offer

sacrifice in return for good tidings, (9) distributing portions of the

victims to a large number of recipients. So it befell that in the first

skirmish with the enemy the troops of Agesilaus gained the upper hand,

in consequence of the report that the Lacedaemonians had won a victory

by sea.

(9) "Splendide mendax." For the ethics of the matter, see "Mem." IV.

ii. 17; "Cyrop." I. vi. 31.

To confront Agesilaus stood an army composed of the Boeotians,

Athenians, Argives, Corinthians, Aenianians, Euboeans, and both

divisions of the Locrians. Agesilaus on his side had with him a division

(10) of Lacedaemonians, which had crossed from Corinth, also half the

division from Orchomenus; besides which there were the neodamodes (11)

from Lacedaemon, on service with him already; and in addition to these

the foreign contingent under Herippidas; (12) and again the quota

furnished by the Hellenic cities in Asia, with others from the cities in

Europe which he had brought over during his progress; and lastly, there

were additional levies from the spot--Orchomenian and Phocian heavy

infantry. In light-armed troops, it must be admitted, the numbers told

heavily in favour of Agesilaus, but the cavalry (13) on both sides were

fairly balanced.

(10) Lit. "a mora"; for the numbers, see "Ages." ii. 6; Plut. "Ages."

17; Grote, "H. G." ix. 433.

(11) I.e. "enfranchised helots."

(12) See "Ages." ii. 10, 11; and above, "Hell." III. iv. 20.

(13) See Hicks, op. cit. 68.

Such were the forces of either party. I will describe the battle itself,

if only on account of certain features which distinguish it from the

battles of our time. The two armies met on the plain of Coronea--the

troops of Agesilaus advancing from the Cephisus, the Thebans and their

allies from the slopes of Helicon. Agesilaus commanded his own right

in person, with the men of Orchomenus on his extreme left. The Thebans

formed their own right, while the Argives held their left. As they drew

together, for a while deep silence reigned on either side; but when they

were not more than a furlong (14) apart, with the loud hurrah (15) the

Thebans, quickening to a run, rushed furiously (16) to close quarters;

and now there was barely a hundred yards (17) breadth between the two

armies, when Herippidas with his foreign brigade, and with them the

Ionians, Aeolians, and Hellespontines, darted out from the Spartans'

battle-lines to greet their onset. One and all of the above played their

part in the first rush forward; in another instant they were (18) within

spear-thrust of the enemy, and had routed the section immediately before

them. As to the Argives, they actually declined to receive the attack

of Agesilaus, and betook themselves in flight to Helicon. At this

moment some of the foreign division were already in the act of crowning

Agesilaus with the wreath of victory, when some one brought him word

that the Thebans had cut through the Orchomenians and were in among the

baggage train. At this the Spartan general immediately turned his army

right about and advanced against them. The Thebans, on their side,

catching sight of their allies withdrawn in flight to the base of the

Helicon, and anxious to get across to their own friends, formed in close

order and tramped forward stoutly.

(14) Lit. "a stade."

(15) Lit. "Alalah."

(16) Like a tornado.

(17) Lit. "about three plethra."

(18) Or, "All these made up the attacking columns... and coming

within... routed..."

At this point no one will dispute the valour of Agesilaus, but he

certainly did not choose the safest course. It was open to him to make

way for the enemy to pass, which done, he might have hung upon his heels

and mastered his rear. This, however, he refused to do, preferring to

crash full front against the Thebans. Thereupon, with close interlock

of shield wedged in with shield, they shoved, they fought, they dealt

death, (19) they breathed out life, till at last a portion of the

Thebans broke their way through towards Helicon, but paid for that

departure by the loss of many lives. And now the victory of Agesilaus

was fairly won, and he himself, wounded, had been carried back to the

main line, when a party of horse came galloping up to tell him that

something like eighty of the enemy, under arms, were sheltering under

the temple, and they asked what they ought to do. Agesilaus, though he

was covered with wounds, did not, for all that, forget his duty to God.

He gave orders to let them retire unscathed, and would not suffer any

injury to be done to them. And now, seeing it was already late, they

took their suppers and retired to rest.

(19) Or, "they slew, they were slain." In illustration of this famous

passage, twice again worked up in "Ages." ii. 12, and "Cyrop."

VII. i. 38, commented on by Longinus, {peri upsous}, 19, and

copied by Dio Cassius, 47, 45, I venture to quote a passage from

Mr. Rudyard Kipling, "With the Main Guard," p. 57, Mulvaney

loquitur: "The Tyrone was pushin' an' pushin' in, an' our men was

sweerin' at thim, an' Crook was workin' away in front av us all,

his sword-arm swingin' like a pump-handle an' his revolver

spittin' like a cat. But the strange thing av ut was the quiet

that lay upon. 'Twas like a fight in a dhrame--excipt for thim

that wus dead."

But with the morning Gylis the polemarch received orders to draw up the

troops in battle order, and to set up a trophy, every man crowned with a

wreath in honour of the god, and all the pipers piping. Thus they busied

themselves in the Spartan camp. On their side the Thebans sent heralds

asking to bury their dead, under a truce; and in this wise a truce was

made. Agesilaus withdrew to Delphi, where on arrival he offered to

the god a tithe of the produce of his spoils--no less than a hundred

talents. (20) Gylis the polemarch meanwhile withdrew into Phocis at the

head of his troops, and from that district made a hostile advance into

Locris. Here nearly a whole day was spent by the men in freely helping

themselves to goods and chattels out of the villages and pillaging the

corn; (21) but as it drew towards evening the troops began to retire,

with the Lacedaemonians in the rear. The Locrians hung upon their heels

with a heavy pelt of stones and javelins. Thereupon the Lacedaemonians

turned short round and gave chase, laying some of their assailants low.

Then the Locrians ceased clinging to their rear, but continued their

volleys from the vantage-ground above. The Lacedaemonians again made

efforts to pursue their persistent foes even up the slope. At last

darkness descended on them, and as they retired man after man dropped,

succumbing to the sheer difficulty of the ground; some in their

inability to see what lay in front, or else shot down by the enemy's

missiles. It was then that Gylis the polemarch met his end, as also

Pelles, who was on his personal staff, and the whole of the Spartans

present without exception--eighteen or thereabouts--perished, either

crushed by stones or succumbing to other wounds. Indeed, except for

timely aid brought from the camp where the men were supping, the chances

are that not a man would have escaped to tell the tale.

(20) = 25,000 pounds nearly.

(21) Or, "not to speak of provisions."

IV

This incident ended the campaign. The army as a whole was disbanded, the

contingents retiring to their several cities, and Agesilaus home across

the Gulf by sea.

B.C. 393. Subsequently (1) the war between the two parties recommenced.

The Athenians, Boeotians, Argives, and the other allies made Corinth

the base of their operations; the Lacedaemonians and their allies held

Sicyon as theirs. As to the Corinthians, they had to face the fact that,

owing to their proximity to the seat of war, it was their territory

which was ravaged and their people who perished, while the rest of

the allies abode in peace and reaped the fruits of their lands in due

season. Hence the majority of them, including the better class, desired

peace, and gathering into knots they indoctrinated one another with

these views.

(1) B.C. 393. See Grote, ix. p. 455, note 2 foll.; "Hell." IV. viii.

7.

B.C. 392. (2) On the other hand, it could hardly escape the notice of

the allied powers, the Argives, Athenians, and Boeotians, as also those

of the Corinthians themselves who had received a share of the king's

moneys, or for whatever reason were most directly interested in the war,

that if they did not promptly put the peace party out of the way, ten

chances to one the old laconising policy would again hold the field. It

seemed there was nothing for it but the remedy of the knife. There was a

refinement of wickedness in the plan adopted. With most people the life

even of a legally condemned criminal is held sacred during a solemn

season, but these men deliberately selected the last day of the Eucleia,

(3) when they might reckon on capturing more victims in the crowded

market-place, for their murderous purposes. Their agents were supplied

with the names of those to be gotten rid of, the signal was given, and

then, drawing their daggers, they fell to work. Here a man was struck

down standing in the centre of a group of talkers, and there another

seated; a third while peacably enjoying himself at the play; a fourth

actually whilst officiating as a judge at some dramatic contest. (4)

When what was taking place became known, there was a general flight on

the part of the better classes. Some fled to the images of the gods

in the market-place, others to the altars; and here these unhallowed

miscreants, ringleaders and followers alike, utterly regardless of

duty and law, fell to butchering their victims even within the sacred

precincts of the gods; so that even some of those against whom no hand

was lifted--honest, law-abiding folk--were filled with sore amazement

at sight of such impiety. In this way many of the elder citizens, as

mustering more thickly in the market-place, were done to death. The

younger men, acting on a suspicion conceived by one of their number,

Pasimelus, as to what was going to take place, kept quiet in the

Kraneion; (5) but hearing screams and shouting and being joined anon by

some who had escaped from the affair, they took the hint, and, running

up along the slope of the Acrocorinthus, succeeded in repelling an

attack of the Argives and the rest. While they were still deliberating

what they ought to do, down fell a capital from its column--without

assignable cause, whether of earthquake or wind. Also, when they

sacrificed, the aspect of the victims was such that the soothsayers said

it was better to descend from that position.

(2) Others assign the incidents of this whole chapter iv. to B.C. 393.

(3) The festival of Artemis Eucleia.

(4) See Diod. xiv. 86.

(5) See Paus. II. ii. 4.

So they retired, in the first instance prepared to go into exile beyond

the territory of Corinth. It was only upon the persuasion of their

friends and the earnest entreaties of their mothers and sisters who

came out to them, supported by the solemn assurance of the men in power

themselves, who swore to guarantee them against evil consequences, that

some of them finally consented to return home. Presented to their eyes

was the spectacle of a tyranny in full exercise, and to their minds the

consciousness of the obliteration of their city, seeing that boundaries

were plucked up and the land of their fathers had come to be re-entitled

by the name of Argos instead of Corinth; and furthermore, compulsion was

put upon them to share in the constitution in vogue at Argos, for which

they had little appetite, while in their own city they wielded less

power than the resident aliens. So that a party sprang up among them

whose creed was, that life was not worth living on such terms: their

endeavour must be to make their fatherland once more the Corinth of old

days--to restore freedom to their city, purified from the murderer and

his pollution and fairly rooted in good order and legality. (6) It was

a design worth the venture: if they succeeded they would become the

saviours of their country; if not--why, in the effort to grasp the

fairest flower of happiness, they would but overreach, and find instead

a glorious termination to existence.

(6) {eunomia}. See "Pol. Ath." i. 8; Arist. "Pol." iv. 8, 6; iii. 9,

8; v. 7, 4.

It was in furtherance of this design that two men--Pasimelus and

Alcimenes--undertook to creep through a watercourse and effect a meeting

with Praxitas the polemarch of the Lacedaemonians, who was on garrison

duty with his own division in Sicyon. They told him they could give

him ingress at a point in the long walls leading to Lechaeum. Praxitas,

knowing from previous experience that the two men might be relied upon,

believed their statement; and having arranged for the further detention

in Sicyon of the division which was on the point of departure, he busied

himself with plans for the enterprise. When the two men, partly by

chance and partly by contrivance, came to be on guard at the gate where

the tophy now stands, without further ado Praxitas presented himself

with his division, taking with him also the men of Sicyon and the whole

of the Corinthian exiles. (7) Having reached the gate, he had a qualm of

misgiving, and hesitated to step inside until he had first sent in a

man on whom he could rely to take a look at things within. The two

Corinthians introduced him, and made so simple and straightforward

a representation (8) that the visitor was convinced, and reported

everything as free of pitfalls as the two had asserted. Then the

polemarch entered, but owing to the wide space between the double

walls, as soon as they came to form in line within, the intruders were

impressed by the paucity of their numbers. They therefore erected a

stockade, and dug as good a trench as they could in front of them,

pending the arrival of reinforcements from the allies. In their rear,

moreover, lay the guard of the Boeotians in the harbour. Thus they

passed the whole day which followed the night of ingress without

striking a blow.

(8) Or, "showed him the place in so straightforward a manner."

On the next day, however, the Argive troops arrived in all haste,

hurrying to the rescue, and found the enemy duly drawn up. The

Lacedaemonians were on their own right, the men of Sicyon next, and

leaning against the eastern wall the Corinthian exiles, one hundred and

fifty strong. (9) Their opponents marshalled their lines face to face in

correspondence: Iphicrates with his mercenaries abutting on the eastern

wall; next to them the Argives, whilst the Corinthians of the city held

their left. In the pride inspired by numbers they began advancing at

once. They overpowered the Sicyonians, and tearing asunder the stockade,

pursued them to the sea and here slew numbers of them. At that instant

Pasimachus, the cavalry general, at the head of a handful of troopers,

seeing the Sicyonians sore presed, made fast the horses of his troops to

the trees, and relieving the Sicyonians of their heavy infantry shields,

advanced with his volunteers against the Argives. The latter, seeing the

Sigmas on the shields and taking them to be "Sicyonians," had not the

slightest fear. Whereupon, as the story goes, Pasimachus, exclaiming

in his broad Doric, "By the twin gods! these Sigmas will cheat you,

you Argives," came to close quarters, and in that battle of a handful

against a host, was slain himself with all his followers. In another

quarter of the field, however, the Corinthian exiles had got the better

of their opponents and worked their way up, so that they were now

touching the city circumvallation walls.

(9) See Grote, ix. p. 333 foll.

The Lacedaemonians, on their side, perceiving the discomfiture of the

Sicyonians, sprang out with timely aid, keeping the palisade-work on

their left. But the Argives, discovering that the Lacedaemonians were

behind them, wheeled round and came racing back, pouring out of the

palisade at full speed. Their extreme right, with unprotected flanks

exposed, fell victims to the Lacedaemonians; the rest, hugging the wall,

made good their retreat in dense masses towards the city. Here they

encountered the Corinthian exiles, and discovering that they had fallen

upon foes, swerved aside in the reverse direction. In this predicament

some mounted by the ladders of the city wall, and, leaping down from

its summit, were destroyed; (10) others yielded up their lives, thrust

through, as they jostled at the foot of the steps; others again were

literally trampled under one another's feet and suffocated.

(10) Or, "plunged from its summit into perdition." See Thuc. ii. 4.

The Lacedaemonians had no difficulty in the choice of victims; for at

that instant a work was assigned to them to do, (11) such as they could

hardly have hoped or prayed for. To find delivered into their hands

a mob of helpless enemies, in an ecstasy of terror, presenting their

unarmed sides in such sort that none turned to defend himself, but

each victim rather seemed to contribute what he could towards his own

destruction--if that was not divine interposition, I know now what to

call it. Miracle or not, in that little space so many fell, and the

corpses lay piled so thick, that eyes familiar with the stacking of corn

or wood or piles of stones were called upon to gaze at layers of human

bodies. Nor did the guard of the Boeotians in the port itself (12)

escape death; some were slain upon the ramparts, others on the roofs of

the dock-houses, which they had scaled for refuge. Nothing remained but

for the Corinthians and Argives to carry away their dead under cover of

a truce; whilst the allies of Lacedaemon poured in their reinforcements.

When these were collected, Praxitas decided in the first place to raze

enough of the walls to allow a free broadway for an army on march. This

done, he put himself at the head of his troops and advanced on the road

to Megara, taking by assault, first Sidus and next Crommyon. Leaving

garrisons in these two fortresses, he retraced his steps, and finally

fortifying Epieiceia as a garrison outpost to protect the territory

of the allies, he at once disbanded his troops and himself withdrew to

Lacedaemon.

(11) Or, "Heaven assigned to them a work..." Lit. "The God..."

(12) I.e. "of Lechaeum."

B.C. 392-391. (13) After this the great armaments of both belligerents

had ceased to exist. The states merely furnished garrisons--the one

set at Corinth, the other set at Sicyon--and were content to guard the

walls. Though even so, a vigorous war was carried on by dint of the

mercenary troops with which both sides were furnished.

(13) So Grote and Curtius; al. B.C. 393.

A signal incident in the period was the invasion of Phlius by

Iphicrates. He laid an ambuscade, and with a small body of troops

adopting a system of guerilla war, took occasion of an unguarded sally

of the citizens of Phlius to inflict such losses on them, that though

they had never previously received the Lacedaemonians within their

walls, they received them now. They had hitherto feared to do so lest

it might lead to the restoration of the banished members of

their community, who gave out that they owed their exile to their

Lacedaemonian sympathies; (14) but they were now in such abject fear

of the Corinthian party that they sent to fetch the Lacedaemonians,

and delivered the city and citadel to their safe keeping. These latter,

however, well disposed to the exiles of Phlius, did not, at the time

they held the city, so much as breathe the thought of bringing back the

exiles; on the contrary, as soon as the city seemed to have recovered

its confidence, they took their departure, leaving city and laws

precisely as they had found them on their entry.

(14) Lit. "laconism."

To return to Iphicrates and his men: they frequently extended their

incursions even into Arcadia in many directions, (15) following their

usual guerilla tactics, but also making assaults on fortified posts. The

heavy infantry of the Arcadians positively refused to face them in the

field, so profound was the terror in which they held these light troops.

In compensation, the light troops themselves entertained a wholesome

dread of the Lacedaemonians, and did not venture to approach even within

javelin-range of their heavy infantry. They had been taught a lesson

when, within that distance, some of the younger hoplites had made a dash

at them, catching and putting some of them to the sword. But however

profound the contempt of the Lacedaemonians for these light troops,

their contempt for their own allies was deeper. (On one occasion (16) a

reinforcement of Mantineans had sallied from the walls between Corinth

and Lechaeum to engage the peltasts, and had no sooner come under attack

than they swerved, losing some of their men as they made good their

retreat. The Lacedaemonians were unkind enough to poke fun at these

unfortunates. "Our allies," they said, "stand in as much awe of these

peltasts as children of the bogies and hobgoblins of their nurses." For

themselves, starting from Lechaeum, they found no difficulty in marching

right round the city of Corinth with a single Lacedaemonian division and

the Corinthian exiles.) (17)

(15) See Thuc. ii. 4.

(16) See Grote, ix. 472 note. Lechaeum was not taken by the

Lacedaemonians until the Corinthian long walls had been rebuilt by

the Athenians. Possibly the incidents in this section (S. 17)

occurred after the capture of Lechaeum. The historian introduces

them parenthetically, as it were, in illustration of his main

topic--the success of the peltasts.

(17) Or, adopting Schneider's conjecture, {estratopedeuonto}, add "and

encamping."

The Athenians, on their side, who felt the power of the Lacedaemonians

to be dangerously close, now that the walls of Corinth had been laid

open, and even apprehended a direct attack upon themselves, determined

to rebuild the portion of the wall severed by Praxitas. Accordingly

they set out with their whole force, including a suite of stonelayers,

masons, and carpenters, and within a few days erected a quite splendid

wall on the side facing Sicyon towards the west, (18) and then proceeded

with more leisure to the completion of the eastern portion.

(18) See Thuc. vi. 98.

To turn once more to the other side: the Lacedaemonians, indignant at

the notion that the Argives should be gathering the produce of their

lands in peace at home, as if war were a pastime, marched against them.

Agesilaus commanded the expedition, and after ravaging their territory

from one end to the other, crossed their frontier at Tenea (19) and

swooped down upon Corinth, taking the walls which had been lately

rebuilt by the Athenians. He was supported on the sea side by his

brother Teleutias (20) with a naval force of about twelve triremes, and

the mother of both was able to congratulate herself on the joint success

of both her sons; one having captured the enemy's walls by land and

the other his ships and naval arsenal by sea, on the same day. These

achievements sufficed Agesilaus for the present; he disbanded the army

of the allies and led the state troops home.

(19) Reading {Tenean}, Koppen's emendation for {tegean}. In the

parallel passage ("Ages." ii. 17) the text has {kata ta stena}.

See Grote, "H. G." ix. 471.

(20) See below, IV. viii. 11.

V

B.C. 390. (1) Subsequently the Lacedaemonians made a second expedition

against Corinth. They heard from the exiles that the citizens contrived

to preserve all their cattle in Peiraeum; indeed, large numbers derived

their subsistence from the place. Agesilaus was again in command of the

expedition. In the first instance he advanced upon the Isthmus. It

was the month of the Isthmian games, (2) and here he found the Argives

engaged in conducting the sacrifice to Poseidon, as if Corinth were

Argos. So when they perceived the approach of Agesilaus, the Argives and

their friends left the offerings as they lay, including the preparations

for the breakfast, and retired with undisguised alarm into the city

by the Cenchrean road. (3) Agesilaus, though he observed the movement,

refrained from giving chase, but taking up his quarters in the temple,

there proceeded to offer victims to the god himself, and waited until

the Corinthian exiles had celebrated the sacrifice to Poseidon, along

with the games. But no sooner had Agesilaus turned his back and retired,

than the Argives returned and celebrated the Isthmian games afresh;

so that in this particular year there were cases in which the same

competitors were twice defeated in this or that contest, or conversely,

the same man was proclaimed victor twice over.

(1) Al. B.C. 392. The historian omits the overtures for peace, B.C.

391 (or 391-390) referred to in Andoc. "De Pace." See Jebb, "Att.

Or." i. 83, 108; Grote, "H. G." ix. 474; Curtius, "H. G." Eng. tr.

iv. 261.

(2) Grote and Curtius believe these to be the Isthmian games of 390

B.C., not of 392 B.C., as Sauppe and others suppose. See Peter,

"Chron. Table," p. 89, note 183; Jowett, "Thuc." ii. 468, note on

VIII. 9, 1.

(3) Lit. "road to Cenchreae."

On the fourth day Agesilaus led his troops against Peiraeum, but finding

it strongly defended, he made a sudden retrograde march after the

morning meal in the direction of the capital, as though he calculated on

the betrayal of the city. The Corinthians, in apprehension of some such

possible catastrophe, sent to summon Iphicrates with the larger

portion of his light infantry. These passed by duly in the night, not

unobserved, however, by Agesilaus, who at once turned round at break of

day and advanced on Piraeum. He himself kept to the low ground by the

hot springs, (4) sending a division to scale the top of the pass. That

night he encamped at the hot springs, while the division bivouacked

in the open, in possession of the pass. Here Agesilaus distinguished

himself by an invention as seasonable as it was simple. Among those

who carried provisions for the division not one had thought of bringing

fire. The altitude was considerable; there had been a fall of rain and

hail towards evening and the temperature was low; besides which, the

scaling party were clad in thin garments suited to the summer season.

There they sat shivering in the dark, with scarcely heart to attack

their suppers, when Agesilaus sent up to them as many as ten porters

carrying fire in earthen pots. One found his way up one way, one

another, and presently there were many bonfires blazing--magnificently

enough, since there was plenty of wood to hand; so that all fell to

oiling themselves and many supped over again. The same night the sky was

lit up by the blaze of the temple of Poseidon--set on fire no one knows

how.

(4) Near mod. Lutraki.

When the men in Piraeum perceived that the pass was occupied, they at

once abandoned all thought of self-defence and fled for refuge to the

Heraion (5)--men and women, slaves and free-born, with the greater part

of their flocks and herds. Agesilaus, with the main body, meanwhile

pursued his march by the sea-shore, and the division, simultaneously

descending from the heights, captured the fortified position of Oenoe,

appropriating its contents. Indeed, all the troops on that day reaped

a rich harvest in the supplies they brought in from various farmsteads.

Presently those who had escaped into the Heraion came out, offering to

leave it to Agesilaus to decide what he would do with them. He decided

to deliver up to the exiles all those concerned with the late butchery,

and that all else should be sold. And so from the Heraion streamed out

a long line of prisoners, whilst from other sides embassies arrived in

numbers; and amongst these a deputation from the Boeotians, anxious to

learn what they should do to obtain peace. These latter Agesilaus,

with a certain loftiness of manner, affected not even to see, although

Pharax, (6) their proxenus, stood by their side to introduce them.

Seated in a circular edifice on the margin of the lake, (7) he surveyed

the host of captives and valuables as they were brought out. Beside the

prisoners, to guard them, stepped the Lacedaemonian warriors from the

camp, carrying their spears--and themselves plucked all gaze their way,

so readily will success and the transient fortune of the moment rivet

attention. But even while Agesilaus was still thus seated, wearing a

look betokening satisfaction at some great achievement, a horseman came

galloping up; the flanks of his charger streamed with sweat. To the many

inquiries what news he brought, the rider responded never a word; but

being now close beside Agesilaus, he leaped from his horse, and running

up to him with lowering visage narrated the disaster of the Spartan

division (8) at Lechaeum. At these tidings the king sprang instantly

from his seat, clutching his spear, and bade his herald summon to a

meeting the generals, captains of fifties, and commanders of foreign

brigades. (9) When these had rapidly assembled he bade them, seeing that

the morning meal had not yet been tasted, to swallow hastily what they

could, and with all possible speed to overtake him. But for himself,

he, with the officers of the royal staff, (10) set off at once without

breakfast. His bodyguard, with their heavy arms, accompanied him with

all speed--himself in advance, the officers following behind. In this

fashion he had already passed beyond the warm springs, and was well

within the plateau of Lechaeum, when three horsemen rode up with further

news: the dead bodies had been picked up. On receipt of these tidings

he commanded the troops to order arms, and having rested them a little

space, led them back again to the Heraion. The next day he spent in

disposing of the captured property. (11)

(5) Or, "Heraeum," i.e. sanctuary of Hera, on a promontory so called.

See Leake, "Morea," iii. 317.

(6) See "Hell." III. ii. 12, if the same.

(7) Or, "on the round pavilion by the lake" (mod. Vuliasmeni).

(8) Technically "mora."

(9) Lit. the polemarchs, penteconters, and xenagoi.

(10) See "Pol. Lac." xiii. 1.

(11) See Grote, "H. G." ix. 480, in reference to "Ages." vii. 6.

The ambassadors of the Boeotians were then summoned, and, being asked to

explain the object of their coming, made no further mention of the

word "peace," but replied that, if there was nothing to hinder it, they

wished to have a pass to their own soldiers within the capital. The king

answered with a smile: "I know your desire is not so much to see your

soldiers as to feast your eyes on the good fortune of your friends, and

to measure its magnitude. Wait then, I will conduct you myself; with

me you will be better able to discover the true value of what has taken

place." And he was as good as his word. Next day he sacrificed, and led

his army up to the gates of Corinth. The trophy he respected, but not

one tree did he leave standing--chopping and burning, as proof positive

that no one dared to face him in the field. And having so done, he

encamped about Lechaeum; and as to the Theban ambassadors, in lieu

of letting them pass into the city, he sent them off by sea across to

Creusis.

But in proportion to the unwontedness of such a calamity befalling

Lacedaemonians, a widespread mourning fell upon the whole Laconian army,

those alone excepted whose sons or fathers or brothers had died at their

post. The bearing of these resembled that of conquerors, (12) as with

bright faces they moved freely to and fro, glorying in their domestic

sorrow. Now the tragic fate which befell the division was on this wise:

It was the unvaried custom of the men of Amyclae to return home at

the Hyacinthia, (13) to join in the sacred paean, a custom not to be

interrupted by active service or absence from home or for any other

reason. So, too, on this occasion, Agesilaus had left behind all the

Amyclaeans serving in any part of his army at Lechaeum. At the right

moment the general in command of the garrison at that place had posted

the garrison troops of the allies to guard the walls during his absence,

and put himself at the head of his division of heavy infantry with that

of the cavalry, (14) and led the Amyclaeans past the walls of Corinth.

Arrived at a point within three miles or so (15) of Sicyon, the

polemarch turned back himself in the direction of Lechaeum with his

heavy infantry regiment, six hundred strong, giving orders to the

cavalry commandant to escort the Amyclaeans with his division as far as

they required, and then to turn and overtake him. It cannot be said that

the Lacedaemonians were ignorant of the large number of light troops and

heavy infantry inside Corinth, but owing to their former successes they

arrogantly presumed that no one would attack them. Within the capital

of the Corinthians, however, their scant numbers--a thin line of heavy

infantry unsupported by light infantry or cavalry--had been noted; and

Callias, the son of Hipponicus, (16) who was in command of the Athenian

hoplites, and Iphicrates at the head of his peltasts, saw no risk in

attacking with the light brigade. Since if the enemy continued his

march by the high road, he would be cut up by showers of javelins on his

exposed right flank; or if he were tempted to take the offensive, they

with their peltasts, the nimblest of all light troops, would easily slip

out of the grasp of his hoplites.

(12) See Grote, "H. G." ix. 488.

(13) Observed on three days of the month Hecatombaeus (= July). See

Muller's "Dorians," ii. 360. For Amyclae, see Leake, "Morea," i.

ch. iv. p. 145 foll.; Baedeker's "Greece," p. 279.

(14) See below, "Hell." VI. iv. 12; and "Pol. Lac." xi. 4, xiii. 4.

(15) Lit. "twenty or thirty stades."

(16) See Cobet, "Prosop. Xen." p. 67 foll.

With this clearly-conceived idea they led out their troops; and while

Callias drew up his heavy infantry in line at no great distance from the

city, Iphicrates and his peltasts made a dash at the returning division.

The Lacedaemonians were presently within range of the javelins. (17)

Here a man was wounded, and there another dropped, not to rise again.

Each time orders were given to the attendant shield-bearers (18) to pick

up the men and bear them into Lechaeum; and these indeed were the

only members of the mora who were, strictly speaking, saved. Then the

polemarch ordered the ten-years-service men (19) to charge and drive off

their assailants. Charge, however, as they might, they took nothing by

their pains--not a man could they come at within javelin range. Being

heavy infantry opposed to light troops, before they could get to close

quarters the enemy's word of command sounded "Retire!" whilst as soon

as their own ranks fell back, scattered as they were in consequence of

a charge where each man's individual speed had told, Iphicrates and his

men turned right about and renewed the javelin attack, while others,

running alongside, harassed their exposed flank. At the very first

charge the assailants had shot down nine or ten, and, encouraged by

this success, pressed on with increasing audacity. These attacks told so

severely that the polemarch a second time gave the order (and this time

for the fifteen-years-service men) to charge. The order was promptly

obeyed, but on retiring they lost more men than on the first occasion,

and it was not until the pick and flower of the division had succumbed

that they were joined by their returning cavalry, in whose company they

once again attempted a charge. The light infantry gave way, but the

attack of the cavalry was feebly enforced. Instead of pressing home the

charge until at least they had sabred some of the enemy, they kept their

horses abreast of their infantry skirmishers, (20) charging and wheeling

side by side.

(17) See Grote, "H. G." ix. 467, note on the improvements of

Iphicrates.

(18) Grote, "H. G." ix. 484; cf. "Hell." IV. viii. 39; "Anab." IV. ii.

20; Herod. ix. 10-29.

(19) Youngest rank and file, between eighteen and twenty-eight years

of age, who formed the first line. The Spartan was liable to

service at the age of eighteen. From twenty-eight to thirty-three

he would belong to the fifteen-years-service division (the second

line); and so on. See below, IV. vi. 10.

(20) See Thuc. iv. 125.

Again and again the monotonous tale of doing and suffering repeated

itself, except that as their own ranks grew thinner and their courage

ebbed, the courage of their assailants grew bolder and their numbers

increased. In desperation they massed compactly upon the narrow slope of

a hillock, distant a couple of furlongs (21) or so from the sea, and a

couple of miles (22) perhaps from Lechaeum. Their friends in Lechaeum,

perceiving them, embarked in boats and sailed round until they were

immediately under the hillock. And now, in the very slough of despair,

being so sorely troubled as man after man dropped dead, and unable

to strike a blow, to crown their distress they saw the enemy's heavy

infantry advancing. Then they took to flight; some of them threw

themselves into the sea; others--a mere handful--escaped with the

cavalry into Lechaeum. The death-roll, including those who fell in the

second fight and the final flight, must have numbered two hundred and

fifty slain, or thereabouts. (23) Such is the tale of the destruction of

the Lacedaemonian mora.

(21) Lit. "two stades."

(22) Lit. "sixteen or seventeen stades."

(23) See Grote, "H. G." ix. 486.

Subsequently, with the mutilated fragment of the division, Agesilaus

turned his back upon Lechaeum, leaving another division behind to

garrison that port. On his passage homewards, as he wound his way

through the various cities, he made a point of arriving at each as late

in the day as possible, renewing his march as early as possible next

morning. Leaving Orchomenus at the first streak of dawn, he passed

Mantinea still under cover of darkness. The spectacle of the Mantineans

rejoicing at their misfortune would have been too severe an ordeal for

his soldiers.

But Iphicrates had not yet reached the summit of his good fortune.

Success followed upon success. Lacedaemonian garrisons had been placed

in Sidus and Crommyon by Praxitas when he took these fortresses, and

again in Oenoe, when Peiraeum was taken quite lately by Agesilaus. One

and all of these now fell into the hands of Iphicrates. Lechaeum still

held out, garrisoned as it was by the Lacedaemonians and their allies;

while the Corinthian exiles, unable since (24) the disaster of the mora

any longer to pass freely by land from Sicyon, had the sea passage still

open to them, and using Lechaeum as their base, (25) kept up a game of

mutual annoyance with the party in the capital.

(24) Lit. "owing to."

(25) The illustrative incidents narrated in chapter iv. 17 may belong

to this period.

VI

B.C. 390-389. (1) At a later date the Achaeans, being in possession of

Calydon, a town from old times belonging to Aetolia, and having further

incorporated the Calydonians as citizens, (2) were under the necessity

of garrisoning their new possession. The reason was, that the

Arcarnanians were threatening the place with an army, and were aided

by contingents from Athens and Boeotia, who were anxious to help their

allies. (3) Under the strain of this combined attack the Achaeans

despatched ambassadors to Lacedaemon, who on arrival complained of the

unfair conduct of Lacedaemon towards themselves. "We, sirs," they said,

"are ever ready to serve in your armies, in obedience to whatever orders

you choose to issue; we follow you whithersoever you think fit to lead;

but when it comes to our being beleaguered by the Acarnanians, with

their allies the Athenians and Boeotians, you show not the slightest

concern. Understand, then, that if things go on thus we cannot hold out;

but either we must give up all part in the war in Peloponnesus and cross

over in full force to engage the Arcarnanians, or we must make peace

with them on whatever terms we can." This language was a tacit threat

that if they failed to obtain the assistance they felt entitled to from

Lacedaemon they would quit the alliance.

(1) According to others (who suppose that the Isthmia and the events

recorded in chapter v. 1-19 above belong to B.C. 392), we have now

reached B.C. 391.

(2) Or, "having conferred a city organisation on the Calydonians."

(3) See Thuc. ii. 68.

The ephors and the assembly concluded that there was no alternative

but to assist the Achaeans in their campaign against the Acarnanians.

Accordingly they sent out Agesilaus with two divisions and the proper

complement of allies. The Achaeans none the less marched out in full

force themselves. No sooner had Agesilaus crossed the gulf than there

was a general flight of the population from the country districts into

the towns, whilst the flocks and herds were driven into remote districts

that they might not be captured by the troops. Being now arrived on

the frontier of the enemy's territory, Agesilaus sent to the general

assembly of the Acarnanians at Stratus, (4) warning them that unless

they chose to give up their alliance with the Boeotians and Athenians,

and to take instead themselves and their allies, he would ravage their

territory through its length and breadth, and not spare a single thing.

When they turned a deaf ear to this summons, the other proceeded to do

what he threatened, systematically laying the district waste, felling

the timber and cutting down the fruit-trees, while slowly moving on at

the rate of ten or twelve furlongs a day. The Acarnanians, owing to the

snail-like progress of the enemy, were lulled into a sense of security.

They even began bringing down their cattle from their alps, and devoted

themselves to the tillage of far the greater portion of their fields.

But Agesilaus only waited till their rash confidence reached its climax;

then on the fifteenth or sixteenth day after he had first entered the

country he sacrificed at early dawn, and before evening had traversed

eighteen miles (5) or so of country to the lake (6) round which were

collected nearly all the flocks and herds of the Acarnanians, and so

captured a vast quantity of cattle, horses, and grazing stock of all

kinds, besides numerous slaves.

(4) "The Akarnanians had, in early times, occupied the hill of Olpai

as a place for judicial proceedings common to the whole nation"

(see Thuc. iii. 105). "But in Thucydides' own time Stratos had

attained its position as the greatest city of Akarnania, and

probably the Federal Assemblies were already held there" (Thuc.

ii. 80). "In the days of Agesilaos we find Stratos still more

distinctly marked as the place of Federal meeting."--Freeman,

"Hist. Fed. Gov." ch. iv. p. 148 foll., "On the constitution of

the League."

(5) Lit. "one hundred and sixty stades."

(6) See Thuc. ii. 80; vi. 106.

Having secured this prize, he stayed on the spot the whole of the

following day, and devoted himself to disposing of the captured property

by public sale. While he was thus engaged, a large body of Arcarnanian

light infantry appeared, and availing themselves of the position in

which Agesilaus was encamped against the mountain side, assailed him

with volleys of sling-stones and rocks from the razor-edge of the

mountain, without suffering any scathe themselves. By this means they

succeeded in dislodging and forcing his troops down into the level

plain, and that too at an hour when the whole camp was engaged in

preparations for the evening meal. As night drew on, the Acarnanians

retired; sentinels were posted, and the troops slept in peace.

Next day Agesilaus led off his army. The exit from the plain and

meadow-land round the lake was a narrow aperture through a close

encircling range of hills. In occupation of this mountain barrier the

Acarnanians, from the vantage-ground above, poured down a continuous

pelt of stones and other missiles, or, creeping down to the fringes,

dogged and annoyed them so much that the army was no longer able to

proceed. If the heavy infantry or cavalry made sallies from the main

line they did no harm to their assailants, for the Acarnanians had only

to retire and they had quickly gained their strongholds. It was too

severe a task, Agesilaus thought, to force his way through the narrow

pass so sorely beset. He made up his mind, therefore, to charge that

portion of the enemy who dogged his left, though these were pretty

numerous. The range of hills on this side was more accessible to heavy

infantry and horse alike. During the interval needed for the inspection

of victims, the Acarnanians kept plying them with javelins and bullets,

and, coming into close proximity, wounded man after man. But presently

came the word of command, "Advance!" and the fifteen-years-service men

of the heavy infantry (7) ran forward, accompanied by the cavalry, at a

round pace, the general himself steadily following with the rest of the

column. Those of the Acarnanians who had crept down the mountain side at

that instant in the midst of their sharpshooting turned and fled, and as

they climbed the steep, man after man was slain. When, however, the top

of the pass was reached, there stood the hoplites of the Acarnanians

drawn up in battle line, and supported by the mass of their light

infantry. There they steadily waited, keeping up a continuous discharge

of missiles the while, or launching their long spears; whereby they

dealt wounds to the cavalry troopers and death in some cases to the

horses. But when they were all but within the clutches of the advancing

heavy infantry (8) of the Lacedaemonians their firmness forsook them;

they swerved and fled, and there died of them on that day about three

hundred. So ended the affair.

(7) I.e. "the first two ranks." See above, IV. v. 14.

(8) See "Ages." ii. 20, for an extraordinary discrepancy.

Agesilaus set up a trophy of victory, and afterwards making a tour of

the country, he visited it with fire and sword. (9) Occasionally, in

obedience to pressure put upon him by the Achaeans, he would assault

some city, but did not capture a single one. And now, as the season of

autumn rapidly approached, he prepared to leave the country; whereupon

the Achaeans, who looked upon his exploits as abortive, seeing that not

a single city, willingly or unwillingly, had as yet been detached from

their opponents, begged him, as the smallest service he could render

them, at any rate to stay long enough in the country to prevent the

Acarnanians from sowing their corn. He answered that the course they

suggested ran counter to expediency. "You forget," he said, "that I mean

to invade your enemies again next summer; and therefore the larger their

sowing now, the stronger will be their appetite for peace hereafter."

With this retort he withdrew overland through Aetolia, and by roads,

moreover, which no army, small or great, could possibly have traversed

without the consent of the inhabitants. The Aetolians, however, were

only too glad to yield the Spartan king a free passage, cherishing hopes

as they did that he would aid them to recover Naupactus. On reaching

Rhium (10) he crossed the gulf at that point and returned homewards,

the more direct passage from Calydon to Peloponnesus being effectually

barred by an Athenian squadron stationed at Oeniadae.

(9) Or lit. "burning and felling."

(10) Or Antirrhium (as more commonly called).

VII

B.C. 389-388. (1) On the expiration of winter, and in fulfilment of his

promise to the Achaeans, Agesilaus called out the ban once more with

early spring to invade the Acarnanians. The latter were apprised of his

intention, and, being persuaded that owing to the midland situation of

their cities they would just as truly be blockaded by an enemy who chose

to destroy their corn as they would be if besieged with entrenchments in

regular form, they sent ambassadors to Lacedaemon, and made peace with

the Achaeans and alliance with the Lacedaemonians. Thus closes this page

of history concerning the affairs of Arcarnania.

(1) According to others, B.C. 390.

To turn to the next. There was a feeling on the part of the

Lacedaemonians (2) that no expedition against Athens or Boeotia would be

safe so long as a state so important and so close to their own frontier

as Argos remained in open hostility behind them. Accordingly they called

out the ban against Argos. Now when Agesipolis learnt that the duty of

leadership devolved on him, and, moreover, that the sacrifices before

crossing the frontier were favourable, he went to Olympia and consulted

the will of the god. "Would it be lawful to him," he inquired, "not to

accept the holy truce, on the ground that the Argives made the season

for it (3) depend not on a fixed date, but on the prospect of a

Lacedaemonian invasion?" The god indicated to the inquirer that he might

lawfully repudiate any holy truce which was fraudulently antedated. (4)

Not content with this, the young king, on leaving Olympia, went at once

to Delphi, and at that shrine put the same question to Apollo: "Were his

views in accordance with his Father's as touching the holy truce?"--to

which the son of Zeus made answer: "Yea, altogether in accordance." (5)

(2) Or, "It was agreed by the Lacedaemonians."

(3) I.e. "the season of the Carneia."

(4) Or, "wrongfully put forward." See below, V. i. 29; iii. 28; Paus.

III. v. 8; Jebb. "Att. Or." i. p. 131; Grote, "H. G." ix. 494

foll.; Jowett, "Thuc." ii. 315; note to Thuc. V. liv. 3.

(5) Grote; cf. Aristot. "Rhet." ii. 33.

Then without further hesitation, picking up his army at Phlius

(where, during his absence to visit the temples, the troops had been

collecting), he advanced by Nemea into the enemy's territory. The

Argives, on their side, perceiving that they would be unable to hinder

his advance, in accordance with their custom sent a couple of heralds,

garlanded, and presented their usual plea of a holy truce. Agesipolis

answered them curtly that the gods were not satisfied with the justice

of their plea, and, refusing to accept the truce, pushed forward,

causing thereby great perplexity and consternation throughout the rural

districts and the capital itself.

But while he was getting his evening meal that first evening in the

Argive territory--just at the moment when the after-dinner libation had

been poured out--the god sent an earthquake; and with one consent the

Lacedaemonians, beginning with the officers of the royal quarters,

sang the sacred hymn of Poseidon. The soldiers, in general, expected to

retreat, arguing that, on the occurrence of an earthquake once before,

Agis had retired from Elis. But Agesipolis held another view: if the god

had sent his earthquake at the moment when he was meditating invasion,

he should have understood that the god forbade his entrance; but now,

when the invasion was a thing effected, he must needs take it as a

signal of his approval. (6) Accordingly next morning he sacrificed to

Poseidon, and advanced a short distance further into the country.

(6) Or, "interpret the signal as a summons to advance."

The late expedition of Agesilaus into Argos (7) was still fresh in men's

minds, and Agesipolis was eager to ascertain from the soldiers how close

his predecessor had advanced to the fortification walls; or again, how

far he had gone in ravaging the open country--not unlike a competitor

in the pentathlon, (8) eager to cap the performance of his rival in each

event. On one occasion it was only the discharge of missiles from the

towers which forced him to recross the trenches round the walls; on

another, profiting by the absence of the majority of the Argives in

Laconian territory, he came so close to the gates that their officers

actually shut out their own Boeotian cavalry on the point of entering,

in terror lest the Lacedaemonians might pour into the town in company,

and these Boeotian troopers were forced to cling, like bats to a wall,

under each coign of vantage beneath the battlements. Had it not been for

the accidental absence of the Cretans, (9) who had gone off on a raid to

Nauplia, without a doubt numbers of men and horses would have been

shot down. At a later date, while encamping in the neighbourhood of the

Enclosures, (10) a thunder-bolt fell into his camp. One or two men were

struck, while others died from the effect of the concussion on their

brains. At a still later period he was anxious to fortify some sort of

garrison outpost in the pass of Celusa, (11) but upon offering sacrifice

the victims proved lobeless, (12) and he was constrained to lead back

and disband his army--not without serious injury inflicted on the

Argives, as the result of an invasion which had taken them wholly by

surprise.

(7) See above, "Hell." IV. iv. 19.

(8) The pentathlon of Olympia and the other great games consisted of

five contests, in the following order--(1) leaping, (2) discus-

throwing, (3) javelin-throwing, (4) running, (5) wrestling. Cf.

Simonides, {alma podokeien diskon akonta palen}, where, "metri

gratia," the order is inverted. The competitors were drawn in

pairs. The odd man who drew a bye in any particular round or heat

was called the "ephedros." The successful athletes of the pairs,

that is, those who had won any three events out of five, would

then again be drawn against each other, and so on until only two

were left, between whom the final heat took place. See, for an

exhaustive discussion of the subject, Prof. Percy Gardner, "The

Pentathlon of the Greeks" ("Journal of Hellenic Studies," vol. i.

9, p. 210 foll. pl. viii.), from whom this note is taken.

(9) See Thuc. vii. 57.

(10) {peri tas eirktas}--what these were no one knows, possibly a

stone quarry used as a prison. Cf. "Cyrop." III. i. 19; "Mem." II.

i. 5; see Grote, "H. G." ix. 497; Paus. III. v.. 8.

(11) Or Celossa. See Strabo, viii. 382.

(12) I.e. "hopeless." See above, III. iv. 15.

VIII

394 B.C. Such were the land operations in the war. Meanwhile another

series of events was being enacted on the sea and within the seaboard

cities; and these I will now narrate in detail. But I shall confine my

pen to the more memorable incidents, and others of less account I shall

pass over.

In the first place, then, Pharnabazus and Conon, after defeating the

Lacedaemonians in the naval engagement of Cnidus, commenced a tour of

inspection round the islands and the maritime states, expelling from

them, as they visited them, one after another the Spartan governors. (1)

Everywhere they gave consolatory assurances to the citizens that they

had no intention of establishing fortress citadels within their walls,

or in any way interfering with their self-government. (2) Such words

fell soothingly upon the ears of those to whom they were addressed;

the proposals were courteously accepted; all were eager to present

Pharnabazus with gifts of friendship and hospitality. The satrap,

indeed, was only applying the instructions of his master Conon on these

matters--who had taught him that if he acted thus all the states would

be friendly to him, whereas, if he showed any intention to enslave them,

the smallest of them would, as Conon insisted, be capable of causing

a world of trouble, and the chances were, if apprehensions were once

excited, he would find himself face to face with a coalition of united

Hellas. To these admonitions Pharnabazus lent a willing ear.

(1) Lit. "the Laconian harmosts."

(2) See Hicks, 70, "Honours to Konon," Inscript. found at Erythrae in

Ionia. Cf. Diod. xiv. 84.

Accordingly, when disembarking at Ephesus, he presented Conon with a

fleet of forty sail, (3) and having further instructed him to meet him

at Sestos, (4) set off himself by land along the coast to visit his own

provinces. For here it should be mentioned that his old enemy Dercylidas

happened to be in Abydos at the time of the sea-fight; (5) nor had he at

a later date suffered eclipse with the other governors, (6) but on

the contrary, had kept tight hold of Abydos and still preserved it in

attachment to Lacedaemon. The course he had adopted was to summon a

meeting of the Abydenians, when he made them a speech as follows: "Sirs,

to-day it is possible for you, who have before been friends to my city,

to appear as benefactors of the Lacedaemonians. For a man to prove

faithful to his friends in the heyday of their good fortune is no great

marvel; but to prove steadfast when his friends are in misfortune--that

is a service monumental for all time. But do not mistake me. It does not

follow that, because we have been defeated in a great sea-fight, we are

therefore annihilated. (7) Certainly not. Even in old days, you will

admit, when Athens was mistress of the sea, our state was not powerless

to benefit friends or chastise enemies. Moreover, in proportion as the

rest of the cities have joined hands with fortune to turn their backs

upon us, so much the more certainly will the grandeur of your fidelity

shine forth. Or, is any one haunted by the fear that we may find

ourselves blockaded by land and sea?--let him consider that at present

there is no Hellenic navy whatever on the seas, and if the barbarian

attempts to clutch the empire of the sea, Hellas will not sit by and

suffer it; so that, if only in self-defence, she must inevitably take

your side."

(3) See Diod. xiv. 83.

(4) See above, "Hell." II. i. 27 foll.

(5) See above, "Hell." IV. iii. 3.

(6) Lit. "harmosts."

(7) Or, "we are beaten, ergo, it is all over with us."

To this the Abydenians lent no deaf ears, but rather responded with

willingness approaching enthusiasm--extending the hand of fellowship

to the ex-governors, some of whom were already flocking to Abydos as a

harbour of refuge, whilst others they sent to summon from a distance.

So when a number of efficient and serviceable men had been collected,

Dercylidas ventured to cross over to Sestos--lying, as it does, not more

than a mile (8) distant, directly facing Abydos. There he not only

set about collecting those who held lands in the Chersonese through

Lacedaemonian influence, but extended his welcome also to the governors

(9) who had been driven out of European states. (10) He insisted

that, if they came to think of it, not even was their case desperate,

reminding them that even in Asia, which originally belonged to the

Persian monarch, places were to be found--such as the little state of

Temnos, or Aegae, and others, capable of administering their affairs,

unsubjected to the king of Persia. "But," he added, "if you want a

strong impregnable position, I cannot conceive what better you can find

than Sestos. Why, it would need a combined naval and military force to

invest that port." By these and such like arguments he rescued them from

the lethargy of despair.

(8) Lit. "eight stades."

(9) Lit. "harmosts."

(10) See Demos. "de Cor." 96.

Now when Pharnabazus found Abydos and Sestos so conditioned, he gave

them to understand that unless they chose to eject the Lacedaemonians,

he would bring war to bear upon them; and when they refused to obey,

having first assigned to Conon as his business to keep the sea closed

against them, he proceeded in person to ravage the territory of the men

of Abydos. Presently, finding himself no nearer the fulfilment of his

object--which was their reduction--he set off home himself and left it

to Conon the while so to conciliate the Hellespontine states that as

large a naval power as possible might be mustered against the coming

spring. In his wrath against the Lacedaemonians, in return for the

treatment he had received from them, his paramount object was to invade

their territory and exact what vengeance he could.

B.C. 393. The winter was thus fully taken up with preparations; but with

the approach of spring, Pharnabazus and Conon, with a large fleet fully

manned, and a foreign mercenary brigade to boot, threaded their way

through the islands to Melos. (11) This island was to serve as a base of

operations against Lacedaemon. And in the first instance he sailed down

to Pherae (12) and ravaged that district, after which he made successive

descents at various other points on the seaboard, and did what injury

he could. But in apprehension of the harbourless character of the coast,

coupled with the enemy's facility of reinforcement and his own scarcity

of supplies, he very soon turned back and sailed away, until finally he

came to moorings in the harbour of Phoenicus in Cythera. The occupants

of the city of the Cytherians, in terror of being taken by storm,

evacuated the walls. To dismiss these under a flag of truce across to

Laconia was his first step; his second was to repair the fortress

in question and to leave a garrison in the island under an Athenian

governor--Nicophemus. After this he set sail to the Isthmus of Corinth,

where he delivered an exhortation to the allies begging them to

prosecute the war vigorously, and to show themselves faithful to the

Great King; and so, having left them all the moneys he had with him, set

off on his voyage home.

(11) See Lys. xix. "de bon. Arist." 19 foll.; and Hicks, 71, "Honours

to Dionysios I. and his court"; Grote, "H. G." ix. 453.

(12) Mod. Kalamata.

But Conon had a proposal to make:--If Pharnabazus would allow him to

keep the fleet, he would undertake, in the first place, to support it

free of expense from the islands; besides which, he would sail to his

own country and help his fellow-citizens the Athenians to rebuild their

long walls and the fortifications round Piraeus. No heavier blow, he

insisted, could well be inflicted on Lacedaemon. "In this way, I can

assure you," he added, "you will win the eternal gratitude of the

Athenians and wreak consummate vengeance on the Lacedaemonians, since

at one stroke you will render null and void that on which they have

bestowed their utmost labour." These arguments so far weighed with

Pharnabazus that he despatched Conon to Athens with alacrity, and

further supplied him with funds for the restoration of the walls. Thus

it was that Conon, on his arrival at Athens, was able to rebuild a large

portion of the walls--partly by lending his own crews, and partly by

giving pay to carpenters and stone-masons, and meeting all the necessary

expenses. There were other portions of the walls which the Athenians and

Boeotians and other states raised as a joint voluntary undertaking.

Nor must it be forgotten that the Corinthians, with the funds left them

by Pharnabazus, manned a fleet--the command of which they entrusted

to their admiral Agathinus--and so were undisputed masters of the sea

within the gulf round Achaia and Lechaeum.

B.C. 393-391. The Lacedaemonians, in opposition, fitted out a fleet

under the command of Podanemus. That officer, in an attack of no great

moment, lost his life, and Pollis, (13) his second in command, was

presently in his turn obliged to retire, being wounded, whereupon

Herippidas took command of the vessels. On the other hand, Proaenus

the Corinthian, who had relieved Agathinus, evacuated Rhium, and the

Lacedaemonians recovered that post. Subsequently Teleutias succeeded to

Herippidas's fleet, and it was then the turn of that admiral to dominate

the gulf. (14)

(13) See "Hell." I. i. 23.

(14) According to Grote ("H. G." ix. 471, note 2), this section

summarises the Lacedaemonian maritime operations in the Corinthian

Gulf from the late autumn of 393 B.C. till the appointment of

Teleutias in the spring or early summer of 391 B.C., the year of

the expedition of Agesilaus recounted above, "Hell." IV. iv. 19.

B.C. 392. The Lacedaemonians were well informed of the proceedings of

Conon. They knew that he was not only restoring the fortifications

of Athens by help of the king's gold, but maintaining a fleet at his

expense besides, and conciliating the islands and seaboard cities

towards Athens. If, therefore, they could indoctrinate Tiribazus--who

was a general of the king--with their sentiments, they believed they

could not fail either to draw him aside to their own interests, or, at

any rate, to put a stop to his feeding Conon's navy. With this intention

they sent Antalcidas to Tiribazus: (15) his orders were to carry out

this policy and, if possible, to arrange a peace between Lacedaemon and

the king. The Athenians, getting wind of this, sent a counter-embassy,

consisting of Hermogenes, Dion, Callisthenes, and Callimedon, with Conon

himself. They at the same time invited the attendance of ambassadors

from the allies, and there were also present representatives of the

Boeotians, of Corinth, and of Argos. When they had arrived at their

destination, Antalcidas explained to Tiribazus the object of his

visit: he wished, if possible, to cement a peace between the state

he represented and the king--a peace, moreover, exactly suited to the

aspirations of the king himself; in other words, the Lacedaemonians gave

up all claim to the Hellenic cities in Asia as against the king, while

for their own part they were content that all the islands and other

cities should be independent. "Such being our unbiased wishes," he

continued, "for what earthly reason should (the Hellenes or) the king

go to war with us? or why should he expend his money? The king is

guaranteed against attack on the part of Hellas, since the Athenians are

powerless apart from our hegemony, and we are powerless so long as the

separate states are independent." The proposals of Antalcidas sounded

very pleasantly in the ears of Tiribazus, but to the opponents of

Sparta they were the merest talk. The Athenians were apprehensive of

an agreement which provided for the independence of the cities in the

islands, whereby they might be deprived of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros.

The Thebans, again, were afraid of being compelled to let the Boeotian

states go free. The Argives did not see how such treaty contracts

and covenants were compatible with the realisation of their own great

object--the absorption of Corinth by Argos. And so it came to pass that

this peace (16) proved abortive, and the representatives departed each

to his own home.

(15) See Plut. "Ages." xxiii. (Clough, iv. p. 27); and for the date

B.C. 392 (al. B.C. 393) see Grote, "H. G." ix. 498.

(16) See Andoc. "de Pace"; Jebb, "Attic Or." i. 83, 128 foll. Prof.

Jebb assigns this speech to B.C. 390 rather than B.C. 391. See

also Grote, "H. G." ix. 499; Diod. xiv. 110.

Tiribazus, on his side, thought it hardly consistent with his own safety

to adopt the cause of the Lacedaemonians without the concurrence of

the king--a scruple which did not prevent him from privately presenting

Antalcidas with a sum of money, in hopes that when the Athenians and

their allies discovered that the Lacedaemonians had the wherewithal to

furnish a fleet, they might perhaps be more disposed to desire peace.

Further, accepting the statements of the Lacedaemonians as true, he

took on himself to secure the person of Conon, as guilty of wrongdoing

towards the king, and shut him up. (17) That done, he set off up

country to the king to recount the proposals of Lacedaemon, with his own

subsequent capture of Conon as a mischievous man, and to ask for further

guidance on all these matters.

(17) See Diod. xiv. 85; and Corn. Nep. 5.

On the arrival of Tiribazus at the palace, the king sent down Struthas

to take charge of the seaboard district. The latter, however, was a

strong partisan of Athens and her allies, since he found it impossible

to forget the long list of evils which the king's country had suffered

at the hands of Agesilaus; so that the Lacedaemonians, contrasting

the hostile disposition of the new satrap towards themselves with his

friendliness to the Athenians, sent Thibron to deal with him by force of

arms.

B.C. 391. (18) That general crossed over and established his base

of operations in Ephesus and the towns in the plain of the

Maeander--Priene, Leucophrys, and Achilleum--and proceeded to harry the

king's territory, sparing neither live nor dead chattels. But as time

went on, Struthas, who could not but note the disorderly, and indeed

recklessly scornful manner in which the Lacedaemonian brought up his

supports on each occasion, despatched a body of cavalry into the plain.

Their orders were to gallop down and scour the plain, making a clean

sweep (19) of all they could lay their hands on. Thibron, as it

befell, had just finished breakfast, and was returning to the mess

with Thersander the flute-player. The latter was not only a good

flute-player, but, as affecting Lacedaemonian manners, laid claim to

personal prowess. Struthas, then, seeing the disorderly advance of the

supports and the paucity of the vanguard, appeared suddenly at the head

of a large body of cavalry, all in orderly array. Thibron and Thersander

were the first to be cut down, and when these had fallen the rest of the

troops were easily turned. A mere chase ensued, in which man after

man was felled to earth, though a remnant contrived to escape into the

friendly cities; still larger numbers owed their safety to their late

discovery of the business on hand. Nor, indeed, was this the first time

the Spartan commander had rushed to the field, without even issuing a

general order. So ends the history of these events.

(18) Al. B.C. 392, al. B.C. 390.

(19) See "Hell." VII. i. 40; "Cyrop." I. iv. 17; III. iii. 23; "Anab."

VI. iii. 3.

B.C. 390. (20) We pass on to the arrival at Lacedaemon of a party of

Rhodian exiles expelled by the popular party. They insisted that it was

not equitable to allow the Athenians to subjugate Rhodes and thus build

up so vast a power. The Lacedaemonians were alive to the fact that the

fate of Rhodes depended on which party in the state prevailed: if the

democracy were to dominate, the whole island must fall into the hands of

Athens; if the wealthier classes, (21) into their own. Accordingly they

fitted out for them a fleet of eight vessels, and put Ecdicus in command

of it as admiral.

(20) Grote, "H. G." ix. 504; al. B.C. 391.

(21) Or, "the Lacedaemonians were not slow to perceive that the whole

island of Rhodes was destined to fall either into the hands of

Athens or of themselves, according as the democracy or the

wealthier classes respectively dominated."

At the same time they despatched another officer on board these vessels

named Diphridas, on a separate mission. His orders were to cross over

into Asia and to secure the states which had received Thibron. He was

also to pick up the survivors of Thibron's army, and with these troops,

aided by a second army which he would collect from any other quarter

open to him, he was to prosecute the war against Struthas. Diphridas

followed out his instructions, and amongst other achievements was

fortunate enough to capture Tigranes, (22) the son-in-law of Struthas,

with his wife, on their road to Sardis. The sum paid for their ransom

was so large that he at once had the wherewithal to pay his mercenaries.

Diphridas was no less attractive than his predecessor Thibron; but

he was of a more orderly temperament, steadier, and incomparably more

enterprising as a general; the secret of this superiority being that

he was a man over whom the pleasures of the body exercised no sway. He

became readily absorbed in the business before him--whatever he had to

do he did it with a will.

(22) See "Anab." VII. viii. 9 for a similar exploit.

Ecdicus having reached Cnidus, there learned that the democracy in

Rhones were entirely masters of the situation. They were dominant by

land and sea; indeed they possessed a fleet twice the size of his

own. He was therefore content to keep quiet in Cnidus until the

Lacedaemonians, perceiving that his force was too small to allow him to

benefit their friends, determined to relieve him. With this view they

ordered Teleutias to take the twelve ships which formed his squadron (at

present in the gulf adjoining Achaia and Lechaeum), (23) and to feel his

way round to Ecdicus: that officer he was to send home. For himself, he

was to undertake personally to protect the interests of all who cared to

be their friends, whilst injuring the enemy by every possible means.

(23) See above, IV. viii. 11.

So then Teleutias, having reached Samos, where he added some vessels to

his fleet, set sail to Cnidus. At this point Ecdicus returned home, and

Teleutias, continuing his voyage, reached Rhodes, at the head now of

seven-and-twenty vessels. It was during this portion of the voyage that

he fell in with Philocrates, the son of Ephialtes, who was sailing from

Athens to Cyprus with ten triremes, in aid of their ally Evagoras. (24)

The whole flotilla fell into the Spartan's hands--a curious instance, it

may be added, of cross purposes on the part of both belligerents. Here

were the Athenians, supposed to be on friendly terms with the king,

engaged in sending an allied force to support Evagoras, who was at open

war with him; and here again was Teleutias, the representative of a

people at war with Persia, engaged in crippling a fleet which had been

despatched on a mission hostile to their adversary. Teleutias put

back into Cnidus to dispose of his captives, and so eventually reached

Rhodes, where his arrival brought timely aid to the party in favour of

Lacedaemon.

(24) See Diod. xiv. 98; Hicks, 72; Kohler, "C. I. A." ii. p. 397;

Isoc. "Evag." 54-57; Paus. I. iii. 1; Lys. "de bon. Ar." 20; Dem.

p. 161.

B.C. 389. (25) And now the Athenians, fully impressed with the belief

that their rivals were laying the basis of a new naval supremacy,

despatched Thrasybulus the Steirian to check them, with a fleet of forty

sail. That officer set sail, but abstained from bringing aid to Rhodes,

and for good reasons. In Rhodes the Lacedaemonian party had hold of

the fortress, and would be out of reach of his attack, especially as

Teleutias was close at hand to aid them with his fleet. On the other

hand, his own friends ran no danger of succumbing to the enemy, as

they held the cities and were numerically much stronger, and they had

established their superiority in the field. Consequently he made for

the Hellespont, where, in the absence of any rival power, he hoped to

achieve some stroke of good fortune for his city. Thus, in the first

place, having detected the rivalries existing between Medocus, (26)

the king of the Odrysians, and Seuthes, (27) the rival ruler of the

seaboard, he reconciled them to each other, and made them friends and

allies of Athens; in the belief that if he secured their friendship the

Hellenic cities on the Thracian coast would show greater proclivity to

Athens. Such being the happy state of affairs not only in Europe but as

regards the states in Asia also, thanks to the friendly attitude of

the king to his fellow-citizens, he sailed into Byzantium and sold the

tithe-duty levied on vessels arriving from the Euxine. By another stroke

he converted the oligarchy of Byzantium into a democracy. The result of

this was that the Byzantine demos (28) were no longer sorry to see as

vast a concourse of Athenians in their city as possible. Having so done,

and having further won the friendship of the men of Calchedon, he set

sail south of the Hellespont. Arrived at Lesbos, he found all the cities

devoted to Lacedaemon with the exception of Mytilene. He was therefore

loth to attack any of the former until he had organised a force within

the latter. This force consisted of four hundred hoplites, furnished

from his own vessels, and a corps of exiles from the different

cities who had sought shelter in Mytilene; to which he added a stout

contingent, the pick of the Mytileneian citizens themselves. He stirred

the ardour of the several contingents by suitable appeals: representing

to the men of Mytilene that by their capture of the cities they would at

once become the chiefs and patrons of Lesbos; to the exiles he made it

appear that if they would but unite to attack each several city in turn,

they might all reckon on their particular restoration; while he needed

only to remind his own warriors that the acquisition of Lesbos meant not

only the attachment of a friendly city, but the discovery of a mine

of wealth. The exhortations ended and the contingents organised, he

advanced against Methymna.

(25) Grote, "H. G." ix. 507.

(26) Al. Amedocus.

(27) For Seuthes, see above, "Hell." III. ii. 2, if the same.

(28) For the varying fortunes of the democrats at Byzantium in 408

B.C. and 405 B.C., see above, ("Hell." I. iii. 18; II. ii. 2); for

the present moment, 390-389 B.C., see Demosth. "c. Lept." 475; for

the admission of Byzantium into the new naval confederacy in 378

B.C., see Hicks, 68; Kohler, "C. I. A." ii. 19; and for B.C. 363,

Isocr. "Phil." 53; Diod. xv. 79; and for its commercial

prosperity, Polyb. iv. 38-47.

Therimachus, who chanced to be the Lacedaemonian governor at the time,

on hearing of the meditated attack of Thrasybulus, had taken a body

of marines from his vessels, and, aided by the citizens of Methymna

themselves, along with all the Mytileneian exiles to be found in that

place, advanced to meet the enemy on their borders. A battle was fought

and Therimachus was slain, a fate shared by several of the exiles of his

party.

As a result (29) of his victory the Athenian general succeeded in

winning the adhesion of some of the states; or, where adhesion

was refused, he could at least raise supplies for his soldiers by

freebooting expeditions, and so hastened to reach his goal, which was

the island of Rhodes. His chief concern was to support as powerful an

army as possible in those parts, and with this object he proceeded

to levy money aids, visiting various cities, until he finally reached

Aspendus, and came to moorings in the river Eurymedon. The money was

safely collected from the Aspendians, and the work completed, when,

taking occasion of some depredations (30) of the soldiers on the

farmsteads, the people of the place in a fit of irritation burst into

the general's quarters at night and butchered him in his tent.

(29) According to some critics, B.C. 389 is only now reached.

(30) See Diod. xiv. 94.

So perished Thrasybulus, (31) a good and great man by all admission. In

room of him the Athenians chose Agyrrhius, (32) who was despatched to

take command of the fleet. And now the Lacedaemonians--alive to the fact

that the sale of the Euxine tithe-dues had been negotiated in Byzantium

by Athens; aware also that as long as the Athenians kept hold on

Calchedon the loyalty of the other Hellespontine cities was secured to

them (at any rate while Pharnabazus remained their friend)--felt that

the state of affairs demanded their serious attention. They attached no

blame indeed to Dercylidas. Anaxibius, however, through the friendship

of the ephors, contrived to get himself appointed as governor, on a

mission to Abydos. With the requisite funds and ships, he promised to

exert such hostile pressure upon Athens that at least her prospects

in the Hellespont would cease to be so sunny. His friends the ephors

granted him in return for these promises three ships of war and funds

to support a thousand mercenaries, and so they despatched him on his

mission. Reaching Abydos, he set about improving his naval and military

position. First he collected a foreign brigade, by help of which he drew

off some of the Aeolid cities from Pharnabazus. Next he set on foot

a series of retaliatory expeditions against the states which attacked

Abydos, marching upon them and ravaging their territories; and lastly,

manning three vessels besides those which he already held in the harbour

of Abydos, he intercepted and brought into port all the merchant ships

of Athens or of her allies which he could lay hands on.

(31) "Thus perished the citizen to whom, more than any one else,

Athens owed not only her renovated democracy, but its wise,

generous, and harmonious working, after renovation."--Grote, "H.

G." ix. 509.

(32) For this statesman, see Demosth. "c. Timocr." 742; Andoc. "de

Myst." 133; Aristot. "Ath. Pol." 41, and Mr. Kenyon's notes ad

loc.; Aristoph. "Eccles." 102, and the Schol. ad loc.; Diod. xiv.

99; Curtius, "H. G." Eng tr. iv. 280.

Getting wind of these proceedings, the Athenians, fearing lest the fair

foundation laid for them by Thrasybulus in the Hellespont should be

ruined, sent out Iphicrates with eight vessels and twelve hundred

peltasts. The majority of them (33) consisted of troops which he had

commanded at Corinth. In explanation it may be stated that the Argives,

when once they had appropriated Corinth and incorporated it with Argos,

gave out they had no further need of Iphicrates and his troops; the real

fact being that he had put to death some of the partisans of Argos. (34)

And so it was he turned his back on Corinth and found himself at home in

Athens at the present crisis.

(33) Or, "The mass of them."

(34) See Grote, "H. G." ix. p. 491 note. The "Argolising" or philo-

Argeian party, as opposed to the philo-Laconian party. See above,

"Hell." IV. iv. 6.

B.C. 389-388. When Iphicrates first reached the Chersonese he and

Anaxibius carried on war against each other by the despatch of guerilla

or piratic bands across the straits. But as time wore on, information

reached him of the departure of Anaxibius to Antandrus, accompanied

by his mercenaries and his own bodyguard of Laconians and two hundred

Abydenian hoplites. Hearing further that Anaxibius had won the friendly

adhesion of Antandrus, Iphicrates conjectured that after establishing a

garrison in that place he would make the best of his way back, if only

to bring the Abydenians home again. He therefore crossed in the night,

selecting a desert point on the Abydene coast, from which he scaled

the hills above the town and planted himself in ambuscade within their

folds. The triremes which brought him across had orders at break of day

to coast up northwards along the Chersonese, which would suggest the

notion that he was only out on one of his customary voyages to collect

money. The sequel more than fulfilled his expectations. Anaxibius began

his return march, and if report speaks truly, he did so notwithstanding

that the victims were against his marching that day; contemptuously

disregarding the warning, and satisfied that his march lay all along

through a friendly country and was directed to a friendly city. Besides

which, those whom he met assured him that Iphicrates was off on a voyage

to Proconnesus: hence the unusual absence of precaution on the march.

On his side Iphicrates saw the chance, but, so long as the troops of

Anaxibius lingered on the level bottoms, refused to spring from his

lair, waiting for the moment when the Abydenian division in the van

was safely landed in the plain of Cremaste, at the point where the

gold mines stand; the main column following on the downward slope, and

Anaxibius with his Laconians just beginning the descent. At that instant

Iphicrates set his ambuscade in motion, and dashed against the Spartan

at full speed. The latter quickly discerned that there was no hope of

escape as he scanned the long straggling line of his attenuated column.

The troops in advance, he was persuaded, would never be able to come

back to his aid up the face of that acclivity; besides which, he

observed the utter bewilderment of the whole body at sight of the

ambuscade. He therefore turned to those next him, and spoke as follows:

"Sirs, it is good for me to die on this spot, where honour bids me; but

for you, sirs, yonder your path lies, haste and save yourselves (35)

before the enemy can close with us." As the words died on his lips he

took from the hands of his attendant shield-bearer his heavy shield, and

there, at his post, unflinchingly fought and fell; not quite alone,

for by his side faithfully lingered a favourite youth, and of the

Lacedaemonian governors who had rallied to Abydos from their several

cities yet other twelve fought and fell beside the pair. The rest fled,

dropping down one by one as the army pursued them to the walls of the

city. The death-roll amounted to something like fifty hoplites of the

Abydenians, and of the rest two hundred. After this exploit Iphicrates

returned to the Chersonese. (36)

(35) Or, "sauve qui peut."

(36) See Hicks, 76; and below, "Hell." V. i. 31.

BOOK V

I

B.C. 388. Such was the state of affairs in the Hellespont, so far at

least as Athens and Sparta are concerned. Eteonicus was once more in

Aegina; and notwithstanding that the Aeginetans and Athenians had up to

this time held commercial intercourse, yet now that the war was plainly

to be fought out on the sea, that officer, with the concurrence of the

ephorate, gave permission to any one who liked to plunder Attica. (1)

The Athenians retaliated by despatching a body of hoplites under their

general Pamphilus, who constructed a fort against the Aeginetans,

(2) and proceeded to blockade them by land and sea with ten warships.

Teleutias, however, while threading his way among the islands in

question of contributions, had chanced to reach a point where he

received information of the turn in affairs with regard to the

construction of the fortress, whereupon he came to the rescue of the

beleaguered Aeginetans, and so far succeeded that he drove off the

enemy's blockading squadron. But Pamphilus kept a firm hold on the

offensive fortress, and was not to be dislodged.

(1) Or, "determined to let slip the hounds of war;" or, more

prosaically, "issued letters of marque." See Grote, "H. G." ix.

517.

(2) I.e. in Aegina as an {epiteikhisma}.

After this the new admiral Hierax arrived from Lacedaemon. The naval

force was transferred into his successor's hands, and under the happiest

auspices Teleutias set sail for home. As he descended to the seashore

to start on his homeward voyage there was not one among his soldiers

who had not a warm shake of the hand for their old admiral. Here one

presented him with a crown, and there another with a victor's wreath;

and those who arrived too late, still, as the ship weighed anchor, threw

garlands into the sea and wafted him many a blessing with prayerful

lips. I am well aware that in the above incident I have no memorable

story of munificence, peril, or invention to narrate, but in all

sincerity I protest that a man may find food for reflection in the

inquiry what Teleutias had done to create such a disposition in his

subordinates. Here we are brought face to face with a true man's work

more worthy of account than multitudes of riches or adventure. (3)

(3) See Grote, "H. G." ix. 518: "The ideal of government as it

presented itself to Xenophon was the paternal despotism or

something like it," {to ethelonton arkhein}. Cf. "Cyrop." passim,

"Heiro," and his various other compositions.

The new admiral Hierax, taking with him the larger portion of the fleet,

set sail once more for Rhodes. He left behind him twelve vessels

in Aegina under his vice-admiral Gorgopas, who was now installed as

governor of that island. In consequence of this chance the Athenian

troops inside the fortres were more blockaded than the Aeginetans

themselves, so much so that a vote was passed by the Athenian assembly,

in obedience to which a large fleet was manned, and the garrison, after

four months' sojourn in Aegina, were brought back. But this was

no sooner done than they began to be harassed by Gorgopas and the

privateers again. To operate against these they fitted out thirteen

vessels, choosing Eunomus as admiral in command. Hierax was still in

Rhodes when the Lacedaemonians sent out a new admiral, Antalcidas; they

believed that they could not find a better mode of gratifying Tiribazus.

Accordingly Antalcidas, after visiting Aegina in order to pick up the

vessels under Gorgopas, set sail for Ephesus. At this point he sent back

Gorgopas with his twelve ships to Aegina, and appointed his vice-admiral

Nicolochus to command the remainder of the fleet.

Nicolochus was to relieve Abydos, and thither set sail; but in the

course of the voyage turned aside to Tenedos, where he ravaged the

territory, and, with the money so secured, sailed on to Abydos. The

Athenian generals (4) on their side, collecting from Samothrace, Thasos,

and the fortresses in that quarter, hastened to the relief of Tenedos;

but, finding that Nicolochus had continued his voyage to Abydos, they

selected the Chersonese as their base, and proceeded to blockade him

and his fleet of five-and-twenty vessels with the two-and-thirty vessels

under their joint command.

(4) And among the rest Iphicrates and Diotimus. See below, S. 25;

above, IV. viii. 39.

Meanwhile Gorgopas, returning from Ephesus, fell in with the Athenian

admiral Eunomus, and, shunning an encounter at the moment, sought

shelter in Aegina, which he reached a little before sunset; and at

once disembarking his men, set them down to their evening meal; whilst

Eunomus on his side, after hanging back for a little while, sailed away.

Night fell, and the Athenian, showing the customary signal light to

prevent his squadron straggling, led the way in the darkness. Gorgopas

instantly got his men on board again, and, taking the lantern for his

guide, followed the Athenians, craftily lagging behind a little space,

so as not to show himself or raise any suspicion of his presence. In

place of the usual cry the boatswains timed the rowers by a clink of

stones, and silently the oars slid, feathering through the waves (5);

and just when the squadron of Eunomus was touching the coast, off Cape

Zoster (6) in Attica, the Spartan sounded the bugle-note for the charge.

Some of Eunomus's vessels were in the act of discharging their crews,

others were still getting to their moorings, whilst others were as yet

only bearing down to land. The engagement was fought by the light of the

moon, and Gorgopas captured four triremes, which he tied astern, and so

set sail with his prizes in tow towards Aegina. The rest of the Athenian

squadron made their escape into the harbour of Piraeus.

(5) Lit. "the boatswains employing a clink of stones and a sliding

motion of the oars."

(6) I.e. "Cape Girdle," mod. Cape Karvura. See Tozer, "Geog. of

Greece," pp. 78, 372.

It was after these events that Chabrias (7) commenced his voyage to

Cyprus, bringing relief to Evagoras. His force consisted at first of

eight hundred light troops and ten triremes, but was further increased

by other vessels from Athens and a body of heavy infantry. Thus

reinforced, the admiral chose a night and landed in Aegina; and secreted

himself in ambuscade with his light troops in hollow ground some way

beyond the temple of Heracles. At break of day, as prearranged, the

Athenian hoplites made their appearance under command of Demaenetus, and

began mounting up between two and three miles (8) beyond the Kerakleion

at Tripurgia, as it is called. The news soon reached Gorgopas, who

sallied out to the rescue with the Aeginetans and the marines of his

vessels, being further accompanied by eight Spartans who happened to be

with him. Not content with these he issued orders inviting any of the

ships' crews, who were free men, to join the relief party. A large

number of these sailors responded. They armed themselves as best they

could, and the advance commenced. When the vanguard were well past the

ambuscade, Chabrias and his men sprang up from their hiding-place,

and poured a volley of javelins and stones upon the enemy. At the same

moment the hoplites, who had disembarked, (9) were advancing, so that

the Spartan vanguard, in the absence of anything like collective

action, were speedily cut down, and among them fell Gorgopas with the

Lacedaemonians. At their fall the rest of course turned and fled. One

hundred and fifty Aeginetans were numbered among the slain, while the

loss incurred by the foreigners, metics, and sailors who had joined the

relief party, reached a total of two hundred. After this the Athenians

sailed the sea as freely as in the times of actual peace. Nor would

anything induce the sailors to row a single stroke for Eteonicus--even

under pressure--since he had no pay to give.

(7) According to Diod. xiv. 92, Chabrias had been for some time in

Corinth. See also above, IV. viii. 24.

(8) Lit. "about sixteen stades."

(9) Or, reading {oi anabebekotes}, "who had scaled the height." See

Hartman, "Anal. Xen." p. 364.

Subsequently the Lacedaemonians despatched Teleutias once again to take

command of the squadron, and when the sailors saw it was he who had

come, they were overjoyed. He summoned a meeting and addressed them

thus: "Soldiers, I am back again, but I bring with me no money. Yet if

God be willing, and your zeal flag not, I will endeavour to supply

you with provisions without stint. Be well assured, as often as I find

myself in command of you, I have but one prayer--that your lives may

be spared no less than mine; and as for the necessaries of existence,

perhaps it would astonish you if I said I would rather you should

have them than I. Yet by the gods I swear I would welcome two days'

starvation in order to spare you one. Was not my door open in old days

to every comer? Open again it shall stand now; and so it shall be; where

your own board overflows, you shall look in and mark the luxury of your

general; but if at other times you see him bearing up against cold and

heat and sleepless nights, you must apply the lesson to yourselves

and study to endure those evils. I do not bid you do aught of this for

self-mortification's sake, but that you may derive some after-blessing

from it. Soldiers, let Lacedaemon, our own mother-city, be to you an

example. Her good fortune is reputed to stand high. That you know; and

you know too, that she purchased her glory and her greatness not by

faint-heartedness, but by choosing to suffer pain and incur dangers in

the day of need. 'Like city,' I say, 'like citizens.' You, too, as I

can bear you witness, have been in times past brave; but to-day must we

strive to be better than ourselves. So shall we share our pains without

repining, and when fortune smiles, mingle our joys; for indeed the

sweetest thing of all surely is to flatter no man, Hellene or Barbarian,

for the sake of hire; we will suffice to ourselves, and from a source

to which honour pre-eminently invites us; since, I need not remind you,

abundance won from the enemy in war furnishes forth not bodily nutrition

only, but a feast of glory the wide world over."

So he spoke, and with one voice they all shouted to him to issue what

orders he thought fit; they would not fail him in willing service. The

general's sacrifice was just concluded, and he answered: "Good, then, my

men; go now, as doubtless you were minded, and take your evening meal,

and next provide yourselves, please, with one day's food. After that

repair to your ships without delay, for we have a voyage on hand,

whither God wills, and must arrive in time." So then, when the men

returned, he embarked them on their ships, and sailed under cover of

night for the great harbour of Piraeus: at one time he gave the rowers

rest, passing the order to take a snatch of sleep; at another he pushed

forward towards his goal with rise and fall of oars. If any one supposes

that there was a touch of madness in such an expedition--with but

twelve triremes to attack an enemy possessed of a large fleet--he should

consider the calculations of Teleutias. He was under the firm persuasion

that the Athenians were more careless than ever about their navy in the

harbour since the death of Gorgopas; and in case of finding warships

riding at anchor--even so, there was less danger, he conjectured, in

attacking twenty ships in the port of Athens than ten elsewhere; for,

whereas, anywhere outside the harbour the sailors would certainly be

quartered on board, at Athens it was easy to divine that the captains

and officers would be sleeping at their homes, and the crews located

here and there in different quarters.

This minded he set sail, and when he was five or six furlongs (10)

distant from the harbour he lay on his oars and rested. But with the

first streak of dawn he led the way, the rest following. The admiral's

orders to the crews were explicit. They were on no account to sink any

merchant vessel; they were equally to avoid damaging (11) their own

vessels, but if at any point they espied a warship at her moorings they

must try and cripple her. The trading vessels, provided they had got

their cargoes on board, they must seize and tow out of the harbour;

those of larger tonnage they were to board wherever they could and

capture the crews. Some of his men actually jumped on to the Deigma

quay, (12) where they seized hold of various traders and pilots and

deposited them bodily on board ship. So the Spartan admiral carried out

his programme.

(10) Lit. "five or six stades."

(11) See Hartman, "Anal. Xen." pp. 365, 366.

(12) See Grote ("H. G." ix. 523): cf. Thuc. ii. 94, the attempt of

Brasidas on the port of Megara. For the wealth of Piraeus, Grote

"H. G." ix. 351. See below, "Pol. Ath." i. 17; "Rev." iii. 13.

As to the Athenians, meanwhile, some of them who got wind of what was

happening rushed from indoors outside to see what the commotion meant,

others from the streets home to get their arms, and others again were

off to the city with the news. The whole of Athens rallied to the rescue

at that instant, heavy infantry and cavalry alike, the apprehension

being that Piraeus was taken. But the Spartan sent off the captured

vessels to Aegina, telling off three or four of his triremes to convoy

them thither; with the rest he followed along the coast of Attica, and

emerging in seemingly innocent fashion from the harbour, captured

a number of fishing smacks, and passage boats laden with passengers

crossing to Piraeus from the islands; and finally, on reaching Sunium

he captured some merchantmen laden with corn or other merchandise. After

these performances he sailed back to Aegina, where he sold his prizes,

and with the proceeds was able to provide his troops with a month's

pay, and for the future was free to cruise about and make what reprisals

chance cast in his way. By such a procedure he was able to support a

full quota of mariners on board his squadron, and procured to himself

the prompt and enthusiastic service of his troops.

B.C. 388-387. Antalcidas had now returned from the Persian court with

Tiribazus. The negotiations had been successful. He had secured the

alliance of the Persian king and his military co-operation in case the

Athenians and their allies refused to abide by the peace which the king

dictated. But learning that his second in command, Nicolochus, was being

blockaded with his fleet by Iphicrates and Diotimus (13) in Abydos, he

set off at once by land for that city. Being come thither he took the

fleet one night and put out to sea, having first spread a story that he

had invitations from a party in Calchedon; but as a matter of fact

he came to anchorage in Percote and there kept quiet. Meanwhile the

Athenian forces under Demaenetus and Dionysius and Leontichus and

Phanias had got wind of his movement, and were in hot pursuit towards

Proconnesus. As soon as they were well past, the Spartan veered round

and returned to Abydos, trusting to information brought him of the

approach of Polyxenus with the Syracusan (14) and Italian squadron of

twenty ships, which he wished to pick up and incorporate with his own.

(13) See above; Lysias, "de bon. Arist." (Jebb, "Att. Or." i. p. 327).

(14) See below, VI. ii. 4 foll; Hicks, 71, 84, 88.

A little later the Athenian Thrasybulus (15) (of Collytus) was making

his way up with eight ships from Thrace, his object being to effect

a junction with the main Athenian squadron. The scouts signalled the

approach of eight triremes, whereupon Antalcidas, embarking his marines

on board twelve of the fastest sailers of his fleet, ordered them to

make up their full complements, where defective, from the remaining

vessels; and so lay to, skulking in his lair with all possible secrecy.

As soon as the enemy's vessels came sailing past he gave chase; and

they catching sight of him took to flight. With his swiftest sailors

he speedily overhauled their laggards, and ordering his vanguard to let

these alone, he followed hard on those ahead. But when the foremost

had fallen into his clutches, the enemy's hinder vessels, seeing their

leaders taken one by one, out of sheer despondency fell an easy prey

to the slower sailers of the foe, so that not one of the eight vessels

escaped.

(15) His name occurs on the famous stele of the new Athenian

confederacy, B.C. 378. See Hicks, 81; Kohler, "C. I. A." ii. 17;

Demos. "de. Cor." p. 301; Arist. "Rhet." ii. 23; Demos. "c.

Timocr." 742.

Presently the Syracusan squadron of twenty vessels joined him, and again

another squadron from Ionia, or rather so much of that district as lay

under the control of Tiribazus. The full quota of the contingent

was further made up from the territory of Ariobarzanes (which whom

Antalcidas kept up a friendship of long standing), in the absence of

Pharnabazus, who by this date had already been summoned up country on

the occasion of his marriage with the king's daughter. With this fleet,

which, from whatever sources derived, amounted to more than eighty sail,

Antalcidas ruled the seas, and was in a position not only to cut off the

passage of vessels bound to Athens from the Euxine, but to convoy them

into the harbours of Sparta's allies.

The Athenians could not but watch with alarm the growth of the enemy's

fleet, and began to fear a repetition of their former discomfiture.

To be trampled under foot by the hostile power seemed indeed no remote

possibility, now that the Lacedaemonians had procured an ally in the

person of the Persian monarch, and they were in little less than a state

of siege themselves, pestered as they were by privateers from Aegina. On

all these grounds the Athenians became passionately desirous of peace.

(16) The Lacedaemonians were equally out of humour with the war for

various reasons--what with their garrison duties, one mora at Lechaeum

and another at Orchomenus, and the necessity of keeping watch and ward

on the states, if loyal not to lose them, if disaffected to prevent

their revolt; not to mention that reciprocity of annoyance (17) of which

Corinth was the centre. So again the Argives had a strong appetite for

peace; they knew that the ban had been called out against them, and,

it was plain, that no fictitious alteration of the calendar would any

longer stand them in good stead. Hence, when Tiribazus issued a summons

calling on all who were willing to listen to the terms of peace sent

down by the king (18) to present themselves, the invitation was promptly

accepted. At the opening of the conclave (19) Tiribazus pointed to

the king's seal attached to the document, and proceeded to read the

contents, which ran as follows:

(16) See, at this point, Grote on the financial condition of Athens

and the "Theorikon," "H. G." ix. 525.

(17) Or, "that give-and-take of hard knocks."

(18) See Hicks, 76.

(19) At Sardis, doubtless.

"The king, Artaxerxes, deems it just that the cities in Asia, with the

islands of Clazomenae and Cyprus, should belong to himself; the rest of

the Hellenic cities he thinks it just to leave independent, both small

and great, with the exception of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, which three

are to belong to Athens as of yore. Should any of the parties concerned

not accept this peace, I, Artaxerxes, will war against him or them with

those who share my views. This will I do by land and by sea, with ships

and with money."

After listening to the above declaration the ambassadors from the

several states proceeded to report the same to their respective

governments. One and all of these took the oaths (20) to ratify and

confirm the terms unreservedly, with the exception of the Thebans,

who claimed to take the oaths in behalf of all Boeotians. This claim

Agesilaus repudiated: unless they chose to take the oaths in precise

conformity with the words of the king's edict, which insisted on "the

future autonomy of each state, small or great," he would not admit them.

To this the Theban ambassadors made no other reply, except that

the instructions they had received were different. "Pray go, then,"

Agesilaus retorted, "and ask the question; and you may inform your

countrymen that if they will not comply, they will be excluded from the

treaty." The Theban ambassadors departed, but Agesilaus, out of hatred

to the Thebans, took active measures at once. Having got the consent of

the ephors he forthwith offered sacrifice. The offerings for crossing

the frontier were propitious, and he pushed on to Tegea. From Tegea he

despatched some of the knights right and left to visit the perioeci

and hasten their mobilisation, and at the same time sent commanders of

foreign brigades to the allied cities on a similar errand. But before

he had started from Tegea the answer from Thebes arrived; the point was

yielded, they would suffer the states to be independent. Under these

circumstances the Lacedaemonians returned home, and the Thebans were

forced to accept the truce unconditionally, and to recognise the

autonomy of the Boeotian cities. (21) But now the Corinthians were by

no means disposed to part with the garrison of the Argives. Accordingly

Agesilaus had a word of warning for both. To the former he said, "if

they did not forthwith dismiss the Argives," and to the latter, "if

they did not instantly quit Corinth," he would march an army into their

territories. The terror of both was so great that the Argives marched

out of Corinth, and Corinth was once again left to herself; (22)

whereupon the "butchers" (23) and their accomplices in the deed of blood

determined to retire from Corinth, and the rest of the citizens welcomed

back their late exiles voluntarily.

(20) At Sparta, doubtless.

(21) See Freeman, op. cit. pp. 168, 169.

(22) See "Ages." ii. 21; Grote, "H. G." ix. 537.

(23) {oi sphageis}, a party catchword (in reference to the incidents

narrated above, "Hell." IV. iv. 2). See below, {ton bareon

demagogon}, "Hell." V. ii. 7; {oi kedomenoi tes Peloponnesou},

"Hell." VII. v. 1; above, {oi sphageis}, "Hell." III. ii. 27, of

the philo-Laconian oligarchs in Elis. See Dem. "c. Lept." 473.

Now that the transactions were complete, and the states were bound by

their oaths to abide by the peace sent down to them by the king, the

immediate result was a general disarmament, military and naval forces

being alike disbanded; and so it was that the Lacedaemonians and

Athenians, with their allies, found themselves in the enjoyment of peace

for the first time since the period of hostilities subsequent to the

demolition of the walls of Athens. From a condition which, during

the war, can only be described as a sort of even balance with their

antagonists, the Lacedaemonians now emerged; and reached a pinnacle

of glory consequent upon the Peace of Antalcidas, (24) so called.

As guarantors of the peace presented by Hellas to the king, and as

administrators personally of the autonomy of the states, they had added

Corinth to their alliance; they had obtained the independence of

the states of Boeotia at the expense of Thebes, (25) which meant the

gratification of an old ambition; and lastly, by calling out the ban in

case the Argives refused to evacuate Corinth, they had put a stop to the

appropriation of that city by the Argives.

(24) Or, more correctly, the peace "under," or "at the date of," {ep

'Antalkidou}. See Grote, "H. G." x. 1, note 1.

(25) Or, "they had made the states of Boeotia independent of Thebes."

See Grote, "H. G." x. 44.

II

B.C. 386. Indeed the late events had so entirely shaped themselves in

conformity with the wishes of the Lacedaemonians, that they determined

to go a step farther and chastise those of their allies who either had

borne hard on them during the war, or otherwise had shown themselves

less favourable to Lacedaemon than to her enemies. (1) Chastisement was

not all; they must lay down such secure foundations for the future as

should render the like disloyalty impossible again. (2) As the first

step towards this policy they sent a dictatorial message to the

Mantinaeans, and bade them raze their fortifications, on the sole ground

that they could not otherwise trust them not to side with their enemies.

Many things in their conduct, they alleged, from time to time, had not

escaped their notice: their frequent despatches of corn to the Argives

while at war with Lacedaemon; at other times their refusal to furnish

contingents during a campaign, on the pretext of some holy truce or

other; (3) or if they did reluctantly take the field--the miserable

inefficiency of their service. "But, more than that," they added, "we

note the jealousy with which you eye any good fortune which may betide

our state; the extravagant pleasure (4) you exhibit at the sudden

descent of some disaster."

(1) See Hartman, "An. Xen." p. 367 foll.; Busolt, "Die Lak." p. 129

foll.

(2) Or, "they determined to chastise... and reduce to such order

that disloyalty should be impossible."

(3) See above, "Hell." IV. ii. 16.

(4) Ib. IV. v. 18.

This very year, moreover, it was commonly said, (5) saw the expiration,

as far as the Mantineans were concerned, of the thirty years' truce,

consequent upon the battle of Mantinea. On their refusal, therefore,

to raze their fortification walls the ban was called out against them.

Agesilaus begged the state to absolve him from the conduct of this war

on the plea that the city of Mantinea had done frequent service to

his father (6) in his Messenian wars. Accordingly Agesipolis led the

expedition--in spite of the cordial relations of his father Pausanias

(7) with the leaders of the popular party in Mantinea.

(5) As to this point, see Curtius, "H. G." V. v. (iv. 305 note, Eng.

trans.) There appears to be some confusion. According to Thuc. v.

81, "When the Argives deserted the alliance (with Mantinea,

Athens, and Elis, making a new treaty of alliance with Lacedaemon

for fifty years) the Mantineans held out for a time, but without

the Argives they were helpless, and so they came to terms with the

Lacedaemonians, and gave up their claims to supremacy over the

cities in Arcadia, which had been subject to them.... These

changes were effected at the close of winter (418 B.C.) towards

the approach of spring (417 B.C.), and so ended the fourteenth

year of the war." Jowett. According to Diod. xv. 5, the

Lacedaemonians attacked Mantinea within two years after the Peace

of Antalcidas, apparently in 386 B.C. According to Thuc. v. 82,

and "C. I. A. 50, in B.C. 417 Argos had reverted to her alliance

with Athens, and an attempt to connect the city with the sea by

long walls was made, certain other states in Peloponnese being

privy to the project" (Thuc. v. 83)--an attempt frustrated by

Lacedaemon early in B.C. 416. Is it possible that a treaty of

alliance between Mantinea and Lacedaemon for thirty years was

formally signed in B.C. 416?

(6) I.e. Archidamus.

(7) See above, "Hell." III. v. 25.

B.C. 385. The first move of the invader was to subject the enemy's

territory to devastation; but failing by such means to induce them to

raze their walls, he proceeded to draw lines of circumvallation round

the city, keeping half his troops under arms to screen the entrenching

parties whilst the other half pushed on the work with the spade. As soon

as the trench was completed, he experienced no further difficulty in

building a wall round the city. Aware, however, of the existence of a

huge supply of corn inside the town, the result of the bountiful harvest

of the preceding year, and averse to the notion of wearing out the city

of Lacedaemon and her allies by tedious campaigning, he hit upon the

expedient of damming up the river which flowed through the town.

It was a stream of no inconsiderable size. (8) By erecting a barrier at

its exit from the town he caused the water to rise above the basements

of the private dwellings and the foundations of the fortification walls.

Then, as the lower layers of bricks became saturated and refused their

support to the rows above, the wall began to crack and soon to totter

to its fall. The citizens for some time tried to prop it with pieces

of timber, and used other devices to avert the imminent ruin of their

tower; but finding themselves overmatched by the water, and in dread

lest the fall at some point or other of the circular wall (9) might

deliver them captive to the spear of the enemy, they signified their

consent to raze their walls. But the Lacedaemonians now steadily refused

any form of truce, except on the further condition that the Mantineans

would suffer themselves to be broken up and distributed into villages.

They, looking the necessity in the face, consented to do even that. The

sympathisers with Argos among them, and the leaders of their democracy,

thought their fate was sealed. Then the father treated with the son,

Pausanias with Agesipolis, on their behalf, and obtained immunity for

them--sixty in number--on condition that they should quit the city. The

Lacedaemonian troops stood lining the road on both sides, beginning

from the gates, and watched the outgoers; and with their spears in

their hands, in spite of bitter hatred, kept aloof from them with less

difficulty than the Mantineans of the better classes themselves--a

weighty testimony to the power of Spartan discipline, be it said. In

conclusion, the wall was razed, and Mantinea split up into four parts,

(10) assuming once again its primitive condition as regards inhabitants.

The first feeling was one of annoyance at the necessity of pulling down

their present houses and erecting others, yet when the owners (11)

found themselves located so much nearer their estates round about the

villages, in the full enjoyment of aristocracy, and rid for ever of

"those troublesome demagogues," they were delighted with the turn which

affairs had taken. It became the custom for Sparta to send them, not one

commander of contingents, (12) but four, one for each village; and the

zeal displayed, now that the quotas for military service were furnished

from the several village centres, was far greater than it had been under

the democratic system. So the transactions in connection with Mantinea

were brought to a conclusion, and thereby one lesson of wisdom was

taught mankind--not to conduct a river through a fortress town.

(8) I.e. the Ophis. See Leake, "Morea," III. xxiv. p. 71; Pausan.

"Arcad." 8; Grote, "H. G." x. 48, note 2.

(9) Or, "in the circuit of the wall."

(10) See Diod. xv. 5; Strab. viii. 337; Ephor. fr. 138, ed. Did.; and

Grote, "H. G." x. 51.

(11) Or, "holders of properties." The historian is referring not to

the population at large, I think, but to the rich landowners, i.e.

the {Beltistoi}, and is not so partial as Grote supposes ("H. G."

x. 51 foll.)

(12) Technically {zenagoi}, Lacedaemonian officers who commanded the

contingents of the several allies. See above, "Hell." III. v. 7;

Thuc. ii. 76; and Arnold's note ad loc.; also C. R. Kennedy, "ap.

Dict. of Greek and Roman Antiquities," s.v.; Muller, "Dorians,"

ii. 250, Eng. tr.; Busolt, "Die Lak." p. 125.

B.C. 384-383. To pass on. The party in exile from Phlius, seeing the

severe scrutiny to which the behaviour of the allies of Lacedaemon

during the late war was being subjected, felt that their opportunity had

come. They repaired to Lacedaemon, and laid great emphasis on the fact

that, so long as they had been in power themselves at home, "their

city used to welcome Lacedaemonians within her walls, and her citizens

flocked to the campaign under their leadership; but no sooner had they

been driven into exile than a change had come. The men of Phlius now

flatly refused to follow Lacedaemon anywhere; the Lacedaemonians, alone

of all men living, must not be admitted within their gates." After

listening to their story, the ephors agreed that the matter demanded

attention. Then they sent to the state of Phlius a message to this

effect; the Phliasian exiles were friends of Lacedaemon; nor did

it appear that they owed their exile to any misdoing. Under the

circumstances, Lacedaemon claimed their recall from banishment, not by

force, but as a concession voluntarily granted. When the matter was thus

stated, the Phliasians were not without alarm that an army might march

upon Phlius, and a party inside the town might admit the enemy within

the walls; for within the walls of Phlius were to be found many who,

either as blood relations or for other reasons, were partisans of the

exiles, and as so often happens, at any rate in the majority of states,

there was a revolutionary party who, in their ardour to reform, would

welcome gladly their restoration. Owing to fears of this character, a

formal decree was passed: to welcome home the exiles, and to restore

to them all undisputed property, the purchasers of the same being

indemnified from the treasury of the state; and in the event of any

ambiguity or question arising between the parties, the same to be

determined before a court of justice. Such was the position of affairs

in connection with the Phliasian exiles at the date in question.

B.C. 383. (13) And now from yet another quarter ambassadors arrived at

Lacedaemon: that is to say, from Acanthus and Apollonia, the two largest

and most important states of the Olynthian confederacy. The ephorate,

after learning from them the object of their visit, presented them to

the assembly and the allies, in presence of whom Cleigenes of Acanthus

made a speech to this effect:

(13) Al. B.C. 382.

"Men of Lacedaemon and of the allied states," he said, "are you aware of

a silent but portentous growth within the bosom of Hellas? (14) Few here

need to be told that for size and importance Olynthus now stands at

the head of the Thracian cities. But are you aware that the citizens of

Olynthus had already brought over several states by the bribe of joint

citizenship and common laws; that they have forcibly annexed some of the

larger states; and that, so encouraged, they have taken in hand

further to free the cities of Macedonia from Amyntas the king of the

Macedonians; that, as soon as their immediate neighbours had shown

compliance, they at once proceeded to attack larger and more distant

communities; so much so, that when we started to come hither, we left

them masters not only of many other places, but of Pella itself, the

capital of Macedonia. Amyntas, (15) we saw plainly, must ere long

withdraw from his cities, and was in fact already all but in name an

outcast from Macedonia.

(14) Or, "are you aware of a new power growing up in Hellas?"

(15) For Amyntas's reign, see Diod. xiv. 89, 92; xv. 19; Isocr.

"Panegyr." 126, "Archid." 46.

"The Olynthians have actually sent to ourselves and to the men of

Apollonia a joint embassy, warning us of their intention to attack us if

we refuse to present ourselves at Olynthus with a military contingent.

Now, for our parts, men of Lacedaemon, we desire nothing better than to

abide by our ancestral laws and institutions, to be free and independent

citizens; but if aid from without is going to fail us, we too must

follow the rest and coalesce with the Olynthians. Why, even now they

muster no less than eight hundred (16) heavy infantry and a considerably

larger body of light infantry, while their cavalry, when we have joined

them, will exceed one thousand men. At the date of our departure we left

embassies from Athens and Boeotia in Olynthus, and we were told that

the Olynthians themselves had passed a formal resolution to return the

compliment. They were to send an embassy on their side to the aforesaid

states to treat of an alliance. And yet, if the power of the Athenians

and the Thebans is to be further increased by such an accession of

strength, look to it," the speaker added, "whether hereafter you will

find things so easy to manage in that quarter.

(16) See Grote, "H. G." x. 72; Thirlwall, "H. G." v. 12 (ch. xxxvii).

"They hold Potidaea, the key to the isthmus of Pallene, and therefore,

you can well believe, they can command the states within that peninsula.

If you want any further proof of the abject terror of those states, you

have it in the fact that notwithstanding the bitter hatred which they

bear to Olynthus, not one of them has dared to send ambassadors along

with us to apprise you of these matters.

"Reflect, how you can reconcile your anxiety to prevent the unification

of Boeotia with your neglect to hinder the solidifying of a far larger

power--a power destined, moreover, to become formidable not on land

only, but by sea? For what is to stop it, when the soil itself supplies

timber for shipbuilding, (17) and there are rich revenues derived

from numerous harbours and commercial centres?--it cannot but be that

abundance of food and abundance of population will go hand in hand. Nor

have we yet reached the limits of Olynthian expansion; there are their

neighbours to be thought of--the kingless or independent Thracians.

These are already to-day the devoted servants of Olynthus, and when it

comes to their being actually under her, that means at once another vast

accession of strength to her. With the Thracians in her train, the gold

mines of Pangaeus would stretch out to her the hand of welcome.

(17) See Hicks, 74, for a treaty between Amyntas and the Chalcidians,

B.C. 390-389: "The article of the treaty between Amyntas III.,

father of Philip, and the Chalcidians, about timber, etc., reminds

us that South Macedonia, the Chalcidic peninsula, and Amphipolis

were the chief sources whence Athens derived timber for her

dockyards." Thuc. iv. 108; Diod. xx. 46; Boeckh, "P. E. A." p.

250; and for a treaty between Athens and Amyntas, B.C. 382, see

Hicks, 77; Kohler, "C. I. A." ii. 397, 423.

"In making these assertions, we are but uttering remarks ten thousand

times repeated in the democracy of Olynthus. And as to their confident

spirit, who shall attempt to describe it? It is God, for aught I know,

who, with the growth of a new capacity, gives increase also to the proud

thoughts and vast designs of humanity. For ourselves, men of Lacedaemon

and of the allied states, our task is completed. We have played our

parts in announcing to you how things stand there. To you it is left to

determine whether what we have described is worthy of your concern. One

only thing further you ought to recognise: the power we have spoken

of as great is not as yet invincible, for those states which are

involuntary participants in the citizenship of Olynthus will, in

prospect of any rival power appearing in the field, speedily fall away.

On the contrary, let them be once closely knit and welded together

by the privileges of intermarriage and reciprocal rights of holding

property in land--which have already become enactments; let them

discover that it is a gain to them to follow in the wake of conquerors

(just as the Arcadians, (18) for instance, find it profitable to march

in your ranks, whereby they save their own property and pillage their

neighbours'); let these things come to pass, and perhaps you may find

the knot no longer so easy to unloose."

(18) For the point of the comparison, see Freeman, "Hist. Fed. Gov."

ch. iv. "Real nature of the Olynthian scheme," pp. 190 foll., and

note 2, p. 197; also Grote, "H. G." x. 67 foll., 278 foll.

At the conclusion of this address, the Lacedaemonians requested the

allies to speak, bidding them give their joint advice as to the best

course to be pursued in the interests of Peloponnese and the allies.

Thereupon many members, and especially those who wished to gratify

the Lacedaemonians, agreed in counselling active measures; and it was

resolved that the states should severally send contingents to form a

total of ten thousand men. Proposals were also made to allow any state,

so wishing, to give money instead of men, at the rate of three Aeginetan

obols (19) a day per man; or where the contingent consisted of cavalry,

the pay given for one horseman was to be the equivalent to that of

four hoplites; while, in the event of any defaulting in service, the

Lacedaemonians should be allowed to mulct the said state of a stater

per man per diem. These resolutions were passed, and the deputies

from Acanthus rose again. They argued that, though excellent, these

resolutions were not of a nature to be rapidly carried into effect.

Would it not be better, they asked, pending the mobilisation of the

troops, to despatch an officer at once in command of a force from

Lacedaemon and the other states, not too large to start immediately. The

effect would be instantaneous, for the states which had not yet given in

their adhesion to Olynthus would be brought to a standstill, and those

already forcibly enrolled would be shaken in their alliance. These

further resolutions being also passed, the Lacedaemonians despatched

Eudamidas, accompanied by a body of neodamodes, with perioeci and

Sciritae, (20) to the number of two thousand odd. Eudamidas lost no time

in setting out, having obtained leave from the ephors for his brother

Phoebidas to follow later with the remainder of the troops assigned

to him. Pushing on himself to the Thracian territory, he set about

despatching garrisons to various cities at their request. He also

secured the voluntary adhesion of Potidaea, although already a member

of the Olynthian alliance; and this town now served as his base of

operations for carrying on war on a scale adapted to his somewhat

limited armament.

(19) I.e. "rather more than sixpence a day for a hoplite, and two

shillings for a horseman." "The Aeginetan stater weighed about 196

grains, rather more than two of our shillings, and was divided

into two drachms of 98 grains, each of which contained six obols

of about 16 grains each." See Percy Gardner, "Types of Greek

Coins," "Hist. Int." p. 8; Jowett, note to Thuc. III. lxx. 4, vol.

i. pp. 201, 202.

(20) Or, "new citizens, provincials, and Sciritae."

Phoebidas, when the remaining portion of his brother's forces was duly

mustered, put himself at their head and commenced his march. On reaching

Thebes the troops encamped outside the city, round the gymnasium.

Faction was rife within the city. The two polemarchs in office, Ismenias

and Leontiades, were diametrically opposed, (21) being the respective

heads of antagonistic political clubs. Hence it was that, while

Ismenias, ever inspired by hatred to the Lacedaemonians, would not come

anywhere near the Spartan general, Leontiades, on the other hand,

was assiduous in courting him; and when a sufficient intimacy was

established between them, he made a proposal as follows: "You have it

in your power," he said, addressing Phoebidas, "this very day to confer

supreme benefit on your country. Follow me with your hoplites, and I

will introduce you into the citadel. That done, you may rest assured

Thebes will be completely under the thumb of Lacedaemon and of us, your

friends. At present, as you see, there is a proclamation forbidding any

Theban to take service with you against Olynthus, but we will change all

that. You have only to act with us as we suggest, and we shall at once

be able to furnish you with large supplies of infantry and cavalry, so

that you will join your brother with a magnificent reinforcement, and

pending his proposed reduction of Olynthus, you will have accomplished

the reduction of a far larger state than that--to wit, this city of

Thebes."

(21) See Grote, "H. G." vol. x. p. 80: "We have little or no

information respecting the government of Thebes," etc. The "locus

classicus" seems to be Plut. "de Genio Socratis." See Freeman, op.

cit. ch. iv. S. 2, "Of the Boeotian League," pp. 154-184; and, in

reference to the seizure of the Kadmeia, p. 170.

The imagination of Phoebidas was kindled as he listened to the tempting

proposal. To do a brilliant deed was far dearer to him than life; (22)

on the other hand, he had no reasoning capacity, and would seem to have

been deficient altogether in sound sense. The consent of the Spartan

secured, Leontiades bade him set his troops in motion, as if everything

were ready for his departure. "And anon, when the hour is come," added

the Theban, "I will be with you, and show you the way myself."

(22) Or, "Renown was his mistress." See Grote, "H. G." x. 84.

The senate was seated in the arcade or stoa in the market-place, since

the Cadmeia was in possession of the women who were celebrating the

Thesmophoria. (23) It was noon of a hot summer's day; scarcely a soul

was stirring in the streets. This was the moment for Leontiades. He

mounted on horseback and galloped off to overtake Phoebidas. He turned

him back, and led him without further delay into the acropolis. Having

posted Phoebidas and his soldiers inside, he handed him the key of the

gates, and warning him not to suffer any one to enter into the citadel

without a pass from himself, he straightway betook himself to

the senate. Arrived there, he delivered himself thus: "Sirs, the

Lacedaemonians are in possession of the citadel; but that is no

cause for despondency, since, as they assure us, they have no hostile

intention, except, indeed, towards any one who has an appetite for

war. For myself, and acting in obedience to the law, which empowers the

polemarch to apprehend all persons suspected of capital crimes, I hereby

seize the person of Ismenias as an arch-fomenter of war. I call upon

you, sirs, who are captains of companies, and you who are ranked with

them, to do your duty. Arise and secure the prisoner, and lead him away

to the place appointed."

(23) An ancient festival held by women in honour of Demeter and

Persephone ({to Thesmophoro}), who gave the first impulse to civil

society, lawful marriage, etc. See Herod. ii. 171; Diod. v. 5.

Those who were privy to the affair, it will be understood, presented

themselves, and the orders were promptly carried out. Of those not in

the secret, but opposed to the party of Leontiades, some sought refuge

at once outside the city in terror for their lives; whilst the rest,

albeit they retired to their houses at first, yet when they found

that Ismenias was imprisoned in the Cadmeia, and further delay seemed

dangerous, retreated to Athens. These were the men who shared the views

of Androcleidas and Ismenias, and they must have numbered about three

hundred.

Now that the transactions were concluded, another polemarch was chosen

in place of Ismenias, and Leontiades at once set out to Lacedaemon.

There he found the ephors and the mass of the community highly incensed

against Phoebidas, "who had failed to execute the orders assigned to

him by the state." Against this general indignation, however, Agesilaus

protested. (24) If mischief had been wrought to Lacedaemon by this deed,

it was just that the doer of it should be punished; but, if good, it was

a time-honoured custom to allow full scope for impromptu acts of this

character. "The sole point you have to look to," he urged, "is whether

what has been done is good or evil." After this, however, Leontiades

presented himself to the assembly (25) and addressed the members as

follows: "Sirs, Lacedaemonians, the hostile attitude of Thebes towards

you, before the occurrence of late events, was a topic constantly on

your lips, since time upon time your eyes were called upon to witness

her friendly bearing to your foes in contrast with her hatred of your

friends. Can it be denied that Thebes refused to take part with you in

the campaign against your direst enemy, the democracy in Piraeus; and

balanced that lukewarmness by on onslaught on the Phocians, whose

sole crime was cordiality to yourselves? (26) Nor is that all. In full

knowledge that you were likely to be engaged in war with Olynthus, she

proceeded at once to make an alliance with that city. So that up to the

last moment you were in constant expectation of hearing that the whole

of Boeotia was laid at the feet of Thebes. With the late incidents all

is changed. You need fear Thebes no longer. One brief despatch (27) in

cipher will suffice to procure a dutiful subservience to your every wish

in that quarter, provided only you will take as kindly an interest in us

as we in you."

(24) See "Ages." vii.

(25) "Select Committee." See "Hell." II. iv. 38; and below, VI. iii.

3.

(26) See above, "Hell." III. v. 4.

(27) Lit. "scytale."

This appeal told upon the meeting, and the Lacedaemonians (28) resolved

formally, now that the citadel had been taken, to keep it, and to put

Ismenias on his trial. In consequence of this resolution a body of

commissioners (29) was despatched, three Lacedaemonians and one for each

of the allied states, great and small alike. The court of inquiry thus

constituted, the sittings commenced, and an indictment was preferred

against Ismenias. He was accused of playing into the hands of the

barbarian; of seeking amity with the Persians to the detriment of

Hellas; of accepting sums of money as bribes from the king; and,

finally, of being, along with Androcleidas, the prime cause of the whole

intestine trouble to which Hellas was a prey. Each of these charges was

met by the defendant, but to no purpose, since he failed to disabuse

the court of their conviction that the grandeur of his designs was only

equalled by their wickedness. (30) The verdict was given against him,

and he was put to death. The party of Leontiades thus possessed

the city; and went beyond the injunctions given them in the eager

performance of their services.

(28) See Grote, "H. G." vol. x. p. 85; Diod. xv. 20; Plut. "Pelop."

vi.; ib. "de Genio Socratis," V. vii. 6 A; Cor. Nep. "Pelop." 1.

(29) Lit. "Dicasts."

(30) Or, "that he was a magnificent malefactor." See Grote, "H. G."

vol. ix. p. 420, "the great wicked man" (Clarendon's epithets for

Cromwell); Plato, "Meno." 90 B; "Republic," 336 A, "a rich and

mighty man." See also Plut. "Ages." xxxii. 2, Agesilaus's

exclamation at sight of Epaminondas, {o tou megalopragmonos

anthropou}.

B.C. 382. As a result of these transactions the Lacedaemonians pressed

on the combined campaign against Olynthus with still greater enthusiasm.

They not only set out Teleutias as governor, but by their united efforts

furnished him with an aggregate army of ten thousand men. (31) They

also sent despatches to the allied states, calling upon them to support

Teleutias in accordance with the resolution of the allies. All the

states were ready to display devotion to Teleutias, and to do him

service, since he was a man who never forgot a service rendered him.

Nor was Thebes an exception; for was not the governor a brother

of Agesilaus? Thebes, therefore, was enthusiastic in sending her

contribution of heavy infantry and cavalry. The Spartan conducted his

march slowly and surely, taking the utmost pains to avoid injuring his

friends, and to collect as large a force as possible. He also sent a

message in advance to Amyntas, begging him, if he were truly desirous of

recovering his empire, to raise a body of mercenaries, and to distribute

sums of money among the neighbouring kings with a view to their

alliance. Nor was that all. He sent also to Derdas, the ruler of Elimia,

pointing out to him that the Olynthians, having laid at their feet the

great power of Macedonia, would certainly not suffer his lesser power

to escape unless they were stayed up by force in arms in their career of

insolence. Proceeding thus, by the time he had reached the territory

of the allied powers he was at the head of a very considerable army. At

Potidaea he halted to make the necessary disposition of his troops, and

thence advanced into the territory of the enemy. As he approached

the hostile city, he abstained from felling and firing alike, being

persuaded that to do so was only to create difficulties in his own

path, whether advancing or retreating; it would be time enough, when he

retired from Olynthus, to fell the trees and lay them as a barrier in

the path of any assailant in the rear.

(31) Lit. "sent out along with him the combined force of ten thousand

men," in ref to S. 20 above.

Being now within a mile or so (32) of the city he came to a halt. The

left division was under his personal command, for it suited him to

advance in a line opposite the gate from which the enemy sallied; the

other division of the allies stretched away to the right. The cavalry

were thus distributed: the Laconians, Thebans, and all the Macedonians

present were posted on the right. With his own division he kept Derdas

and his troopers, four hundred strong. This he did partly out of genuine

admiration for this body of horse, and partly as a mark of courtesy to

Derdas, which should make him not regret his coming.

(32) Lit. "ten stades."

Presently the enemy issued forth and formed in line opposite, under

cover of their walls. Then their cavalry formed in close order and

commenced the attack. Dashing down upon the Laconians and Boeotians they

dismounted Polycharmus, the Lacedaemonian cavalry general, inflicting a

hundred wounds on him as he lay on the ground, and cut down others, and

finally put to flight the cavalry on the right wing. The flight of these

troopers infected the infantry in close proximity to them, who in turn

swerved; and it looked as if the whole army was about to be worsted,

when Derdas at the head of his cavalry dashed straight at the gates of

Olynthus, Teleutias supporting him with the troops of his division.

The Olynthian cavalry, seeing how matters were going, and in dread

of finding the gates closed upon them, wheeled round and retired with

alacrity. Thus it was that Derdas had his chance to cut down man after

man as their cavalry ran the gauntlet past him. In the same way, too,

the infantry of the Olynthians retreated within their city, though,

owing to the closeness of the walls in their case, their loss was

trifling. Teleutias claimed the victory, and a trophy was duly erected,

after which he turned his back on Olynthus and devoted himself to

felling the fruit-trees. This was the campaign of the summer. He

now dismissed both the Macedonians and the cavalry force of Derdas.

Incursions, however, on the part of the Olynthians themselves against

the states allied to Lacedaemon were frequent; lands were pillaged, and

people put to the sword.

III

B.C. 381. With the first symptoms of approaching spring the Olynthian

cavalry, six hundred strong, had swooped into the territory of

Apollonia--about the middle of the day--and dispersing over the

district, were employed in pillaging; but as luck would have it,

Derdas had arrived that day with his troopers, and was breakfasting in

Apollonia. He noted the enemy's incursion, but kept quiet, biding his

time; his horses were ready saddled, and his troopers armed cap-a-pied.

As the Olynthians came galloping up contemptuously, not only into the

suburbs, but to the very gates of the city, he seized his opportunity,

and with his compact and well-ordered squadron dashed out; whereupon the

invaders took to flight. Having once turned them, Derdas gave them no

respite, pursuing and slaughtering them for ten miles or more, (1) until

he had driven them for shelter within the very ramparts of Olynthus.

Report said that Derdas slew something like eighty men in this affair.

After this the Olynthians were more disposed to keep to their walls,

contenting themselves with tilling the merest corner of their territory.

(1) Lit. "ninety stades."

Time advanced, and Teleutias was in conduct of another expedition

against the city of Olynthus. His object was to destroy any timber

(2) still left standing, or fields still cultivated in the hostile

territory. This brought out the Olynthian cavalry, who, stealthily

advancing, crossed the river which washes the walls of the town, and

again continued their silent march right up to the adversary's camp.

At sight of an audacity which nettled him, Teleutias at once ordered

Tlemonidas, the officer commanding his light infantry division, to

charge the assailants at the run. On their side the men of Olynthus,

seeing the rapid approach of the light infantry, wheeled and quietly

retired until they had recrossed the river, drawing the enemy on,

who followed with conspicuous hardihood. Arrogating to themselves the

position of pursuers towards fugitives, they did not hesitate to cross

the river which stood between them and their prey. Then the Olynthian

cavalry, choosing a favourable moment, when those who had crossed seemed

easy to deal with, wheeled and attacked them, putting Tlemonidas himself

to the sword with more than a hundred others of his company. Teleutias,

when he saw what was happening, snatched up his arms in a fit of anger

and began leading his hoplites swiftly forward, ordering at the same

time his peltasts and cavalry to give chase and not to slacken. Their

fate was the fate of many before and since, who, in the ardour of

pursuit, have come too close to the enemy's walls and found it hard to

get back again. Under a hail of missiles from the walls they were forced

to retire in disorder and with the necessity of guarding themselves

against the missiles. At this juncture the Olynthians sent out their

cavalry at full gallop, backed by supports of light infantry; and

finally their heavy infantry reserves poured out and fell upon the

enemy's lines, now in thorough confusion. Here Teleutias fell fighting,

and when that happened, without further pause the troops immediately

about him swerved. Not one soul longer cared to make a stand, but the

flight became general, some fleeing towards Spartolus, others in the

direction of Acanthus, a third set seeking refuge within the walls of

Apollonia, and the majority within those of Potidaea. As the tide of

fugitives broke into several streams, so also the pursuers divided

the work between them; this way and that they poured, dealing death

wholesale. So perished the pith and kernel of the armament.

(2) I.e. fruit-trees.

Such calamities are not indeed without a moral. The lesson they are

meant to teach mankind, I think, is plain. If in a general sense one

ought not to punish any one, even one's own slave, in anger--since

the master in his wrath may easily incur worse evil himself than he

inflicts--so, in the case of antagonists in war, to attack an enemy

under the influence of passion rather than of judgment is an absolute

error. For wrath is but a blind impulse devoid of foresight, whereas to

the penetrating eye of reason a blow parried may be better than a wound

inflicted. (3)

(3) See, for the same sentiment, "Horsemanship," vi. 13. See also

Plut. "Pel." and "Marc." (Clough, ii. p. 278).

When the news of what had happened reached Lacedaemon it was agreed,

after due deliberation, that a force should be sent, and of no trifling

description, if only to quench the victors' pride, and to prevent their

own achievements from becoming null and void. In this determination they

sent out King Agesipolis, as general, attended, like Agesilaus (4) on

his Asiatic campaign, by thirty Spartans. (5) Volunteers flocked to his

standard. They were partly the pick and flower of the provincials, (6)

partly foreigners of the class called Trophimoi, (7) or lastly, bastard

sons of Spartans, comely and beautiful of limb, and well versed in the

lore of Spartan chivalry. The ranks of this invading force were further

swelled by volunteers from the allied states, the Thessalians notably

contributing a corps of cavalry. All were animated by the desire of

becoming known to Agesipolis, so that even Amyntas and Derdas in zeal

of service outdid themselves. With this promise of success Agesipolis

marched forward against Olynthus.

(4) See above, "Hell." III. iv. 2.

(5) Lit. "Spartiates." The new army was sent out B.C. 380, according

to Grote.

(6) Lit. "beautiful and brave of the Perioeci."

(7) Xenophon's own sons educated at Sparta would belong to this class.

See Grote, "H. G." x. 91.

Meanwhile the state of Phlius, complimented by Agesipolis on the amount

of the funds contributed by them to his expedition and the celerity with

which the money had been raised, and in full belief that while one king

was in the field they were secure against the hostile attack of the

other (since it was hardly to be expected that both kings should be

absent from Sparta at one moment), boldly desisted from doing justice

by her lately reinstated citizens. On the one hand, these exiles claimed

that points in dispute should be determined before an impartial court

of justice; the citizens, on the other, insisted on the claimants

submitting the cases for trial in the city itself. And when the latter

demurred to that solution, asking "What sort of trial that would be

where the offenders were also the judges?" they appealed to deaf

ears. Consequently the restored party appealed at Sparta, to prefer a

complaint against their city. They were accompanied by other members of

the community, who stated that many of the Phliasians themselves besides

the appellants recognised the injustice of their treatment. The state of

Phlius was indignant at this manouvre, and retaliated by imposing a fine

on all who had betaken themselves to Lacedaemon without a mandate from

the state. Those who incurred the fine hesitated to return home; they

preferred to stay where they were and enforce their views: "It is quite

plain now who were the perpetrators of all the violence--the very

people who originally drove us into exile, and shut their gates upon

Lacedaemon; the confiscators of our property one day, the ruthless

opponents of its restoration the next. Who else but they have now

brought it about that we should be fined for appearing at Lacedaemon?

and for what purpose but to deter any one else for the future from

venturing to expose the proceedings at Phlius?" Thus far the appellants.

And in good sooth the conduct of the men of Phlius did seem to savour of

insolence; so much so that the ephors called out the ban against them.

B.C. 380. Nor was Agesilaus otherwise than well satisfied with

this decision, not only on the ground of old relations of friendly

hospitality between his father Archidamus and the party of Podanemus,

who were numbered among the restored exiles at this time, but because

personally he was bound by similar ties himself towards the adherents

of Procles, son of Hipponicus. The border sacrifices proving favourable,

the march commenced at once. As he advanced, embassy after embassy met

him, and would fain by presents of money avert invasion. But the king

answered that the purpose of his march was not to commit wrongdoing, but

to protect the victims of injustice. Then the petitioners offered to do

anything, only they begged him to forgo invasion. Again he replied--How

could he trust to their words when they had lied to him already? He

must have the warrant of acts, not promises. And being asked, "What act

(would satisfy him)?" he answered once more, saying, "The same which

you performed aforetime, and suffered no wrong at our hands"--in other

words, the surrender of the acropolis. (8) But to this they could not

bring themselves. Whereupon he invaded the territory of Phlius, and

promptly drawing lines of circumvallation, commenced the siege. Many of

the Lacedaemonians objected, for the sake of a mere handful of wretched

people, so to embroil themselves with a state of over five thousand men.

(9) For, indeed, to leave no doubt on this score, the men of Phlius met

regularly in assembly in full view of those outside. But Agesilaus was

not to be beaten by this move. Whenever any of the townsmen came out,

drawn by friendship or kinship with the exiles, in every case the king's

instructions were to place the public messes (10) at the service of

the visitors, and, if they were willing to go through the course of

gymnastic training, to give them enough to procure necessaries. All

members of these classes were, by the general's strict injunctions,

further to be provided with arms, and loans were to be raised for the

purpose without delay. Presently the superintendents of this branch of

the service were able to turn out a detachment of over a thousand men,

in the prime of bodily perfection, well disciplined and splendidly

armed, so that in the end the Lacedaemonians affirmed: "Fellow-soldiers

of this stamp are too good to lose." Such were the concerns of

Agesilaus.

(8) See above, IV. iv. 15.

(9) See Grote, "H. G." x. 45, note 4; and below, V. iv. 13.

(10) See "Pol. Lac." v.

Meanwhile Agesipolis on leaving Macedonia advanced straight upon

Olynthus and took up a strategical position in front of the town.

Finding that no one came out to oppose him, he occupied himself for the

present with pillaging any remnant of the district still intact, and with

marching into the territory allied with the enemy, where he destroyed

the corn. The town of Torone he attacked and took by storm. But while he

was so engaged, in the height of mid-summer he was attacked by a burning

fever. In this condition his mind reverted to a scene once visited, the

temple of Dionysus at Aphytis, and a longing for its cool and sparkling

waters and embowered shades (11) seized him. To this spot accordingly

he was carried, still living, but only to breathe his last outside the

sacred shrine, within a week of the day on which he sickened. His body

was laid in honey and conveyed home to Sparta, where he obtained royal

sepulchre.

(11) Lit. "shady tabernacles."

When the news reached Agesilaus he displayed none of the satisfaction

which might possibly have been expected at the removal of an antagonist.

On the contrary, he wept and pined for the companionship so severed, it

being the fashion at Sparta for the kings when at home to mess together

and to share the same quarters. Moreover, Agesipolis was admirably

suited to Agesilaus, sharing with the merriment of youth in tales of the

chase and horsemanship and boyish loves; (12) while, to crown all, the

touch of reverence due from younger to elder was not wanting in their

common life. In place of Agesipolis, the Lacedaemonians despatched

Polybiades as governor to Olynthus.

(12) See "Ages." viii. 2.

B.C. 379. Agesilaus had already exceeded the time during which the

supplies of food in Phlius were expected to last. The difference, in

fact, between self-command and mere appetite is so great that the men of

Phlius had only to pass a resolution to cut down the food expenditure by

one half, and by doing so were able to prolong the siege for twice

the calculated period. But if the contrast between self-restraint and

appetite is so great, no less startling is that between boldness and

faint-heartedness. A Phliasian named Delphion, a real hero, it would

seem, took to himself three hundred Phliasians, and not only succeeded

in preventing the peace-party from carrying out their wishes, but was

equal to the task of incarcerating and keeping safely under lock and key

those whom he mistrusted. Nor did his ability end there. He succeeded

in forcing the mob of citizens to perform garrison duty, and by

vigorous patrolling kept them constant to the work. Over and over again,

accompanied by his personal attendants, he would dash out of the walls

and drive in the enemy's outposts, first at one point and then at

another of the beleaguering circle. But the time eventually came when,

search as they might by every means, these picked defenders (13) could

find no further store of food within the walls, and they were forced to

send to Agesilaus, requesting a truce for an embassy to visit Sparta,

adding that they were resolved to leave it to the discretion of the

authorities at Lacedaemon to do with their city what they liked.

Agesilaus granted a pass to the embassy, but, at the same time, he was

so angry at their setting his personal authority aside, that he sent to

his friends at home and arranged that the fate of Phlius should be

left to his discretion. Meanwhile he proceeded to tighten the cordon of

investment, so as to render it impossible that a single soul inside

the city should escape. In spite of this, however, Delphion, with

one comrade, a branded dare-devil, who had shown great dexterity

in relieving the besieging parties of their arms, escaped by night.

Presently the deputation returned with the answer from Lacedaemon that

the state simply left it entirely to the discretion of Agesilaus

to decide the fate of Phlius as seemed to him best. Then Agesilaus

announced his verdict. A board of one hundred--fifty taken from the

restored exiles, fifty from those within the city--were in the first

place to make inquisition as to who deserved to live and who to

die, after which they were to lay down laws as the basis of a new

constitution. Pending the carrying out of these transactions, he left a

detachment of troops to garrison the place for six months, with pay

for that period. After this he dismissed the allied forces, and led the

state (14) division home. Thus the transactions concerning Phlius were

brought to a conclusion, having occupied altogether one year and eight

months.

(13) See below, "Hell." VII. i. 19.

(14) {to politokon}, the citizen army. See above, IV. iv. 19; "Pol.

Lac." xi.

Meanwhile Polybiades had reduced the citizens of Olynthus to the last

stage of misery through famine. Unable to supply themselves with corn

from their own land, or to import it by sea, they were forced to send an

embassy to Lacedaemon to sue for peace. The plenipotentiaries on their

arrival accepted articles of agreement by which they bound themselves

to have the same friends and the same foes as Lacedaemon, to follow her

lead, and to be enrolled among her allies; and so, having taken an oath

to abide by these terms, they returned home.

On every side the affairs of Lacedaemon had signally prospered: Thebes

and the rest of the Boeotian states lay absolutely at her feet; Corinth

had become her most faithful ally; Argos, unable longer to avail herself

of the subterfuge of a movable calendar, was humbled to the dust; Athens

was isolated; and, lastly, those of her own allies who displayed a

hostile feeling towards her had been punished; so that, to all outward

appearance, the foundations of her empire were at length absolutely well

and firmly laid.

IV

Abundant examples might be found, alike in Hellenic and in foreign

history, to prove that the Divine powers mark what is done amiss,

winking neither at impiety nor at the commission of unhallowed acts;

but at present I confine myself to the facts before me. (1) The

Lacedaemonians, who had pledged themselves by oath to leave the states

independent, had laid violent hands on the acropolis of Thebes, and were

eventually punished by the victims of that iniquity single-handed--the

Lacedaemonians, be it noted, who had never before been mastered by

living man; and not they alone, but those citizens of Thebes who

introduced them to their acropolis, and who wished to enslave their city

to Lacedaemon, that they might play the tyrant themselves--how fared

it with them? A bare score of the fugitives were sufficient to destroy

their government. How this happened I will now narrate in detail.

(1) Or, "it is of my own subject that I must now speak." For the

"peripety," or sudden reversal of circumstances, on which the plot

of the "Hellenica" hinges, see Grote, "H. G." x. 100-108. Cf.

Soph. "Oed. Tyr." 450; "Antig." 1066; Thuc. v. 116; "Hellenica

Essays," "Xenophon," p. 382 foll. This passage is perhaps the key

to the historian's position.

There was a man named Phyllidas--he was secretary to Archias, that is,

to the polemarchs. (2) Beyond his official duties, he had rendered his

chief other services, and all apparently in an exemplary fashion. A

visit to Athens in pursuance of some business brought this man into

contact with a former acquaintance of his, Melon, one of the exiles

who had fled for safety to Athens. Melon had various questions to ask

touching the sort of tyranny practised by Archias in the exercise of the

polemarchy, and by Philip. He soon discovered that affairs at home were

still more detestable to Phyllidas than to himself. It only remained

to exchange pledges, and to arrange the details of what was to be done.

After a certain interval Melon, accompanied by six of the trustiest

comrades he could find among his fellow-exiles, set off for Thebes. They

were armed with nothing but daggers, and first of all crept into the

neighbourhood under cover of night. The whole of the next day they lay

concealed in a desert place, and drew near to the city gates in the

guise of labourers returning home with the latest comers from the

fields. Having got safely within the city, they spent the whole of that

night at the house of a man named Charon, and again the next day in the

same fashion. Phyllidas meanwhile was busily taken up with the concerns

of the polemarchs, who were to celebrate a feast of Aphrodite on going

out of office. Amongst other things, the secretary was to take this

opportunity of fulfilling an old undertaking, which was the introduction

of certain women to the polemarchs. They were to be the most majestic

and the most beautiful to be found in Thebes. The polemarchs, on their

side (and the character of the men is sufficiently marked), were looking

forward to the pleasures of the night with joyful anticipation. Supper

was over, and thanks to the zeal with which the master of the ceremonies

responded to their mood, they were speedily intoxicated. To their

oft-repeated orders to introduce their mistresses, he went out and

fetched Melon and the rest, three of them dressed up as ladies and the

rest as their attendant maidens. Having brought them into the treasury

of the polemarchs' residence, (3) he returned himself and announced to

Archias and his friends that the women would not present themselves

as long as any of the attendants remained in the room; whereupon they

promptly bade all withdraw, and Phyllidas, furnishing the servants with

a stoup of wine, sent them off to the house of one of them. And now at

last he introduced the mistresses, and led them to their seats beside

their respective lords. It was preconcerted that as soon as they were

seated they were to throw aside their veils and strike home. That is one

version of the death of the polemarchs. (4) According to another, Melon

and his friends came in as revellers, and so despatched their victims.

(2) Lit. "to Archias and his (polemarchs)"; but the Greek phrase does

not, as the English would, imply that there were actually more

than two polemarchs, viz. Archias and Philippus. Hypates and

Leontiades belonged to the faction, but were neither of them

polemarchs.

(3) Lit. "Polemarcheion."

(4) Or, "and so, according to the prevalent version of the matter, the

polemarchs were slain. But some say that..."

That over, Phyllidas, with three of the band, set off to the house of

Leontiades. Arrived there, he knocked on the door, and sent in word that

he had a message from the polemarchs. Leontiades, as chance befell, was

still reclining in privacy after dinner, and his wife was seated beside

him working wools. The fidelity of Phyllidas was well known to him, and

he gave orders to admit him at once. They entered, slew Leontiades, and

with threats silenced his wife. As they went out they ordered the door

to be shut, threatening that if they found it open they would kill every

one in the house. And now that this deed was done, Phyllidas, with two

of the band, presented himself at the prison, telling the gaoler he had

brought a man from the polemarchs to be locked up. The gaoler opened the

door, and was at once despatched, and the prisoners were released. These

they speedily supplied with arms taken from the armoury in the stoa,

and then led them to the Ampheion, (5) and bade them take up a position

there, after which they at once made a proclamation calling on all

Thebans to come out, horse and foot, seeing that the tyrants were dead.

The citizens, indeed, as long as it was night, not knowing whom or

what to trust, kept quiet, but when day dawned and revealed what had

occurred, the summons was responded to with alacrity, heavy infantry and

cavalry under arms alike sallying forth. Horsemen were also despatched

by the now restored exiles to the two Athenian generals on the frontier;

and they, being aware of the object of the message (promptly responded).

(6)

(5) See plan of Thebes, "Dict. Geog."; Arrian, "Anab." i. 8; Aesch.

"Sept. c. Theb." 528.

(6) Supply {epeboethoun}. There is a lacuna in the MSS. at this point.

On the other hand, the Lacedaemonian governor in the citadel, as soon

as that night's proclamation reached his ears, was not slow to send

to Plataeae (7) and Thespiae for reinforcements. The approach of the

Plataeans was perceived by the Theban cavalry, who met them and killed a

score of them and more, and after that achievement returned to the

city, to find the Athenians from the frontier already arrived. Then they

assaulted the acropolis. The troops within recognised the paucity of

their own numbers, whilst the zeal of their opponents (one and all

advancing to the attack) was plainly visible, and loud were the

proclamations, promising rewards to those who should be first to scale

the walls. All this so worked upon their fears that they agreed to

evacuate the place if the citizens would allow them a safe-conduct to

retire with their arms. To this request the others gladly yielded, and

they made a truce. Oaths were taken on the terms aforesaid, and the

citizens dismissed their adversaries. For all that, as the garrison

retired, those of them who were recognised as personal foes were seized

and put to death. Some were rescued through the good offices of the

Athenian reinforcements from the frontier, who smuggled them across and

saved them. The Thebans were not content with putting the men to

death; if any of them had children, these also were sacrificed to their

vengeance.

(7) This city had been refounded in B.C. 386 (Isocr. "Plat." 20, 21).

See Freeman, op. cit. ch. iv. p. 170: "Its restoration implied not

only a loss of Theban supremacy, but the actual loss of that

portion of the existing Theban territory which had formerly formed

the Plataian district."

B.C. 378. When the news of these proceedings reached Sparta the first

thing the Lacedaemonians did was to put to death the governor, who had

abandoned the Cadmeia instead of awaiting reinforcements, and the next

was to call out the ban against Thebes. Agesilaus had little taste to

head the expedition; he pointed out that he had seen more than forty

years' service, (8) and that the exemption from foreign duty applicable

to others at that age was applicable on the same principle to the king.

Such were the ostensible grounds on which he excused himself from the

present expedition, but his real objections lay deeper. He felt certain

that if he led the expedition his fellow-citizens would say: "Agesilaus

caused all this trouble to the state in order to aid and abet tyrants."

Therefore he preferred to leave his countrymen to settle the matter

themselves as they liked. Accordingly the ephors, instructed by

the Theban exiles who had escaped the late massacres, despatched

Cleombrotus. He had not commanded before, and it was the depth of

winter.

(8) And was therefore more than fifty-eight years old at this date.

See "Ages." i. 6.

Now while Chabrias, with a body of Athenian peltasts, kept watch and