The Memorabilia

Produced by John Bickers

THE MEMORABILIA

Recollections of Socrates

By Xenophon

Translated by H. G. Dakyns

Xenophon the Athenian was born 431 B.C. He was a

pupil of Socrates. He marched with the Spartans,

and was exiled from Athens. Sparta gave him land

and property in Scillus, where he lived for many

years before having to move once more, to settle

in Corinth. He died in 354 B.C.

The Memorabilia is a recollection of Socrates in

word and deed, to show his character as the best

and happiest of men.

PREPARER'S NOTE

First Published 1897 by Macmillan and Co.

This was typed from Dakyns' series, "The Works of Xenophon," a

four-volume set. The complete list of Xenophon's works (though

there is doubt about some of these) is:

Work Number of books

The Anabasis 7

The Hellenica 7

The Cyropaedia 8

The Memorabilia 4

The Symposium 1

The Economist 1

On Horsemanship 1

The Sportsman 1

The Cavalry General 1

The Apology 1

On Revenues 1

The Hiero 1

The Agesilaus 1

The Polity of the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians 2

Text in brackets "{}" is my transliteration of Greek text into

English using an Oxford English Dictionary alphabet table. The

diacritical marks have been lost.

THE MEMORABILIA

or

Recollections of Socrates

BOOK I

I

I have often wondered by what arguments those who indicted (1) Socrates

could have persuaded the Athenians that his life was justly forfeit to

the state. The indictment was to this effect: "Socrates is guilty of

crime in refusing to recognise the gods acknowledged by the state,

and importing strange divinities of his own; he is further guilty of

corrupting the young."

(1) {oi grapsamenoi} = Meletus (below, IV. iv. 4, viii. 4; "Apol." 11,

19), Anytus ("Apol." 29), and Lycon. See Plat. "Apol." II. v. 18;

Diog. Laert. II. v. (Socr.); M. Schanz, "Plat. Apol. mit deutschen

Kemmentar, Einleitung," S. 5 foll.

In the first place, what evidence did they produce that Socrates refused

to recognise the gods acknowledged by the state? Was it that he did not

sacrifice? or that he dispensed with divination? On the contrary, he was

often to be seen engaged in sacrifice, at home or at the common altars

of the state. Nor was his dependence on divination less manifest. Indeed

that saying of his, "A divinity (2) gives me a sign," was on everybody's

lips. So much so that, if I am not mistaken, it lay at the root of

the imputation that he imported novel divinities; though there was no

greater novelty in his case than in that of other believers in oracular

help, who commonly rely on omens of all sorts: the flight or cry

of birds, the utterances of man, chance meetings, (3) or a victim's

entrails. Even according to the popular conception, it is not the mere

fowl, it is not the chance individual one meets, who knows what things

are profitable for a man, but it is the gods who vouchsafe by such

instruments to signify the same. This was also the tenet of Socrates.

Only, whereas men ordinarily speak of being turned aside, or urged

onwards by birds, or other creatures encountered on the path, Socrates

suited his language to his conviction. "The divinity," said he, "gives

me a sign." Further, he would constantly advise his associates to do

this, or beware of doing that, upon the authority of this same divine

voice; and, as a matter of fact, those who listened to his warnings

prospered, whilst he who turned a deaf ear to them repented afterwards.

(4) Yet, it will be readily conceded, he would hardly desire to present

himself to his everyday companions in the character of either knave

or fool. Whereas he would have appeared to be both, supposing (5) the

God-given revelations had but revealed his own proneness to deception.

It is plain he would not have ventured on forecast at all, but for his

belief that the words he spoke would in fact be verified. Then on whom,

or what, was the assurance rooted, if not upon God? And if he had faith

in the gods, how could he fail to recognise them?

(2) Or, "A divine something." See "Encyc. Brit." "Socrates." Dr. H.

Jackason; "The Daemon of Socrates," F. W. H. Myers; K. Joel, "Der

echte und der Xenophontische Sokrates," i. p. 70 foll.; cf.

Aristot. "M. M." 1182 a 10.

(3) See Aesch. "P. V." 487, {enodious te sombolous}, "and pathway

tokens," L. Campbell; Arist. "Birds," 721, {sombolon ornin}:

"Frogs," 196, {to sometukhon exion}; "Eccl." 792; Hor. "Od." iii.

27, 1-7.

(4) See "Anab." III. i. 4; "Symp." iv. 48.

(5) Or, "if his vaunted manifestations from heaven had but manifested

the falsity of his judgment."

But his mode of dealing with his intimates has another aspect. As

regards the ordinary necessities of life, (6) his advice was, "Act as

you believe (7) these things may best be done." But in the case of those

darker problems, the issues of which are incalculable, he directed his

friends to consult the oracle, whether the business should be undertaken

or not. "No one," he would say, "who wishes to manage a house or city

with success: no one aspiring to guide the helm of state aright, can

afford to dipense with aid from above. Doubtless, skill in carpentering,

building, smithying, farming, of the art of governing men, together with

the theory of these processes, and the sciences of arithmetic,

economy, strategy, are affairs of study, and within the grasp of human

intelligence. Yet there is a side even of these, and that not the least

important, which the gods reserve to themselves, the bearing of which is

hidden from mortal vision. Thus, let a man sow a field or plant a farm

never so well, yet he cannot foretell who will gather in the fruits:

another may build him a house of fairest proportion, yet he knows not

who will inhabit it. Neither can a general foresee whether it will

profit him to conduct a campaign, nor a politician be certain whether

his leadership will turn to evil or good. Nor can the man who weds a

fair wife, looking forward to joy, know whether through her he shall not

reap sorrow. Neither can he who has built up a powerful connection in

the state know whether he shall not by means of it be cast out of his

city. To suppose that all these matters lay within the scope of human

judgment, to the exclusion of the preternatural, was preternatural

folly. Nor was it less extravagant to go and consult the will of Heaven

on any questions which it is given to us to decide by dint of learning.

As though a man should inquire, "Am I to choose an expert driver as my

coachman, or one who has never handled the reins?" "Shall I appoint a

mariner to be skipper of my vessel, or a landsman?" And so with respect

to all we may know by numbering, weighing, and measuring. To seek advice

from Heaven on such points was a sort of profanity. "Our duty is plain,"

he would observe; "where we are permitted to work through our natural

faculties, there let us by all means apply them. But in things which are

hidden, let us seek to gain knowledge from above, by divination; for the

gods," he added, "grant signs to those to whom they will be gracious."

(6) Or, "in the sphere of the determined," {ta anagkaia} = certa,

quorum eventus est necessarius; "things positive, the law-ordained

department of life," as we might say. See Grote, "H. G." i. ch.

xvi. 500 and passim.

(7) Reading {os nomizoien}, or if {os enomizen}, translate "As to

things with certain results, he advised them to do them in the way

in which he believed they would be done best"; i.e. he did not

say, "follow your conscience," but, "this course seems best to me

under the circumstances."

Again, Socrates ever lived in the public eye; at early morning he was to

be seen betaking himself to one of the promenades, or wrestling-grounds;

at noon he would appear with the gathering crowds in the market-place;

and as day declined, wherever the largest throng might be encountered,

there was he to be found, talking for the most part, while any one who

chose might stop and listen. Yet no one ever heard him say, or saw him

do anything impious or irreverent. Indeed, in contrast to others he set

his face against all discussion of such high matters as the nature of

the Universe; how the "kosmos," as the savants (8) phrase it, came into

being; (9) or by what forces the celestial phenomena arise. To trouble

one's brain about such matters was, he argued, to play the fool. He

would ask first: Did these investigators feel their knowledge of

things human so complete that they betook themselves to these lofty

speculations? Or did they maintain that they were playing their proper

parts in thus neglecting the affairs of man to speculate on the concerns

of God? He was astonished they did not see how far these problems lay

beyond mortal ken; since even those who pride themselves most on their

discussion of these points differ from each other, as madmen do. For

just as some madmen, he said, have no apprehension of what is truly

terrible, others fear where no fear is; some are ready to say and do

anything in public without the slightest symptom of shame; (10) others

think they ought not so much as to set foot among their fellow-men; some

honour neither temple, nor altar, nor aught else sacred to the name

of God; others bow down to stocks and stones and worship the very

beasts:--so is it with those thinkers whose minds are cumbered with

cares (11) concerning the Universal Nature. One sect (12) has discovered

that Being is one and indivisible. Another (13) that it is infinite in

number. If one (14) proclaims that all things are in a continual flux,

another (15) replies that nothing can possibly be moved at any time.

The theory of the universe as a process of birth and death is met by the

counter theory, that nothing ever could be born or ever will die.

(8) Lit. "the sophists." See H. Sidgwick, "J. of Philol." iv. 1872; v.

1874.

(9) Reading {ephu}. Cf. Lucian, "Icaromenip." xlvi. 4, in imitation of

this passage apparently; or if {ekhei}, translate "is arranged."

See Grote, "H. G." viii. 573.

(10) See "Anab." V. iv. 30.

(11) See Arist. "Clouds," 101, {merimnophrontistai kaloi te kagathoi}.

(12) e.g. Xenophanes and Parmenides, see Grote, "Plato," I. i. 16

foll.

(13) e.g. Leucippus and Democritus, ib. 63 foll.

(14) e.g. Heraclitus, ib. 27 foll.

(15) e.g. Zeno, ib. ii. 96.

But the questioning of Socrates on the merits of these speculators

sometimes took another form. The student of human learning expects, he

said, to make something of his studies for the benefit of himself or

others, as he likes. Do these explorers into the divine operations hope

that when they have discovered by what forces the various phenomena

occur, they will create winds and waters at will and fruitful seasons?

Will they manipulate these and the like to suit their needs? or has no

such notion perhaps ever entered their heads, and will they be content

simply to know how such things come into existence? But if this was

his mode of describing those who meddle with such matters as these, he

himself never wearied of discussing human topics. What is piety? what is

impiety? What is the beautiful? what the ugly? What the noble? what the

base? What are meant by just and unjust? what by sobriety and madness?

what by courage and cowardice? What is a state? what is a statesman?

what is a ruler over men? what is a ruling character? and other like

problems, the knowledge of which, as he put it, conferred a patent of

nobility on the possessor, (16) whereas those who lacked the knowledge

might deservedly be stigmatised as slaves.

(16) Or, "was distinctive of the 'beautiful and good.'" For the phrase

see below, ii. 2 et passim.

Now, in so far as the opinions of Socrates were unknown to the world at

large, it is not surprising that the court should draw false conclusions

respecting them; but that facts patent to all should have been ignored

is indeed astonishing.

At one time Socrates was a member of the Council, (17) he had taken

the senatorial oath, and sworn "as a member of that house to act in

conformity with the laws." It was thus he chanced to be President of the

Popular Assembly, (18) when that body was seized with a desire to put

the nine (19) generals, Thrasyllus, Erasinides, and the rest, to death

by a single inclusive vote. Whereupon, in spite of the bitter resentment

of the people, and the menaces of several influential citizens,

he refused to put the question, esteeming it of greater importance

faithfully to abide by the oath which he had taken, than to gratify the

people wrongfully, or to screen himself from the menaces of the mighty.

The fact being, that with regard to the care bestowed by the gods upon

men, his belief differed widely from that of the multitude. Whereas most

people seem to imagine that the gods know in part, and are ignorant in

part, Socrates believed firmly that the gods know all things--both the

things that are said and the things that are done, and the things that

are counselled in the silent chambers of the heart. Moreover, they are

present everywhere, and bestow signs upon man concerning all the things

of man.

(17) Or "Senate." Lit. "the Boule."

(18) Lit. "Epistates of the Ecclesia." See Grote, "H. G." viii. 271;

Plat. "Apol." 32 B.

(19) {ennea} would seem to be a slip of the pen for {okto}, eight. See

"Hell." I. v. 16; vi. 16; vi. 29; vii. 1 foll.

I can, therefore, but repeat my former words. It is a marvel to me

how the Athenians came to be persuaded that Socrates fell short of

sober-mindedness as touching the gods. A man who never ventured one

impious word or deed against the gods we worship, but whose whole

language concerning them, and his every act, closely coincided, word

for word, and deed for deed, with all we deem distinctive of devoutest

piety.

II

No less surprising to my mind is the belief that Socrates corrupted

the young. This man, who, beyond what has been already stated, kept

his appetites and passions under strict control, who was pre-eminently

capable of enduring winter's cold and summer's heat and every kind of

toil, who was so schooled to curtail his needs that with the scantiest

of means he never lacked sufficiency--is it credible that such a

man could have made others irreverent or lawless, or licentious, or

effeminate in face of toil? Was he not rather the saving of many through

the passion for virtue which he roused in them, and the hope he infused

that through careful management of themselves they might grow to be

truly beautiful and good--not indeed that he ever undertook to be a

teacher of virtue, but being evidently virtuous himself he made those

who associated with him hope that by imitating they might at last

resemble him.

But let it not be inferred that he was negligent of his own body

or approved of those who neglected theirs. If excess of eating,

counteracted by excess of toil, was a dietary of which he disapproved,

(1) to gratify the natural claim of appetite in conjunction with

moderate exercise was a system he favoured, as tending to a healthy

condition of the body without trammelling the cultivation of the spirit.

On the other hand, there was nothing dandified or pretentious about

him; he indulged in no foppery of shawl or shoes, or other effeminacy of

living.

(1) See (Plat.) "Erast." 132 C.

Least of all did he tend to make his companions greedy of money. He

would not, while restraining passion generally, make capital out of the

one passion which attached others to himself; and by this abstinence,

he believed, he was best consulting his own freedom; in so much that he

stigmatised those who condescended to take wages for their society as

vendors of their own persons, because they were compelled to discuss for

the benefits of their paymasters. What surprised him was that any one

possessing virtue should deign to ask money as its price instead of

simply finding his reward in the acquisition of an honest friend, as if

the new-fledged soul of honour could forget her debt of gratitude to her

greatest benefactor.

For himself, without making any such profession, he was content to

believe that those who accepted his views would play their parts as good

and true friends to himself and one another their lives long. Once more

then: how should a man of this character corrupt the young? unless the

careful cultivation of virtue be corruption.

But, says the accuser, (2) by all that's sacred! did not Socrates cause

his associates to despise the established laws when he dwelt on the

folly of appointing state officers by ballot? (3) a principle which, he

said, no one would care to apply in selecting a pilot or a flute-player

or in any similar case, where a mistake would be far less disastrous

than in matters political. Words like these, according to the accuser,

tended to incite the young to contemn the established constitution,

rendering them violent and headstrong. But for myself I think that

those who cultivate wisdom and believe themselves able to instruct

their fellow-citizens as to their interests are least likely to become

partisans of violence. They are too well aware that to violence attach

enmities and dangers, whereas results as good may be obtained by

persuasion safely and amicably. For the victim of violence hates with

vindictiveness as one from whom something precious has been stolen,

while the willing subject of persuasion is ready to kiss the hand which

has done him a service. Hence compulsion is not the method of him

who makes wisdom his study, but of him who wields power untempered

by reflection. Once more: the man who ventures on violence needs the

support of many to fight his battles, while he whose strength lies in

persuasiveness triumphs single-handed, for he is conscious of a cunning

to compel consent unaided. And what has such a one to do with the

spilling of blood? since how ridiculous it were to do men to death

rather than turn to account the trusty service of the living.

(2) {o kategoros} = Polycrates possibly. See M. Schantz, op. cit.,

"Einleitun," S. 6: "Die Anklagerede des Polykrates"; Introduction,

p. xxxii. foll.

(3) i.e. staking the election of a magistrate on the colour of a bean.

See Aristot. "Ath. Pol." viii. 2, and Dr. Sandys ad loc.

But, the accuser answers, the two men (4) who wrought the greatest evils

to the state at any time--to wit, Critias and Alcibiades--were both

companions of Socrates--Critias the oligarch, and Alcibiades the

democrat. Where would you find a more arrant thief, savage, and murderer

(5) than the one? where such a portent of insolence, incontinence,

and high-handedness as the other? For my part, in so far as these two

wrought evil to the state, I have no desire to appear as the apologist

of either. I confine myself to explaining what this intimacy of theirs

with Socrates really was.

(4) See "Hell." I. and II. passim.

(5) Reading {kleptistatos te kai biaiotatos kai phonikotatos}, or if

{pleonektistatos te kai biaiotatis}, translate "such a manner of

greed and violence as the one, of insolence, etc., as the other?"

See Grote, "H. G." viii. 337.

Never were two more ambitious citizens seen at Athens. Ambition was in

their blood. If they were to have their will, all power was to be in

their hands; their fame was to eclipse all other. Of Socrates they

knew--first that he lived an absolutely independent life on the

scantiest means; next that he was self-disciplined to the last degree

in respect of pleasures; lastly that he was so formidable in debate that

there was no antagonist he could not twist round his little finger. Such

being their views, and such the character of the pair, which is the more

probable: that they sought the society of Socrates because they felt the

fascination of his life, and were attracted by the bearing of the man?

or because they thought, if only we are leagued with him we shall become

adepts in statecraft and unrivalled in the arts of speech and action?

For my part I believe that if the choice from Heaven had been given them

to live such a life as they saw Socrates living to its close, or to die,

they would both have chosen death.

Their acts are a conclusive witness to their characters. They no sooner

felt themselves to be the masters of those they came in contact with

than they sprang aside from Socrates and plunged into that whirl of

politics but for which they might never have sought his society.

It may be objected: before giving his companions lessons in politics

Socrates had better have taught them sobriety. (6) Without disputing the

principle, I would point out that a teacher cannot fail to discover to

his pupils his method of carrying out his own precepts, and this along

with argumentative encouragement. Now I know that Socrates disclosed

himself to his companions as a beautiful and noble being, who would

reason and debate with them concerning virtue and other human interests

in the noblest manner. And of these two I know that as long as they were

companions of Socrates even they were temperate, not assuredly from fear

of being fined or beaten by Socrates, but because they were persuaded

for the nonce of the excellence of such conduct.

(6) {sophrosune} = "sound-mindedness," "temperence." See below, IV.

iii. 1.

Perhaps some self-styled philosophers (7) may here answer: "Nay, the man

truly just can never become unjust, the temperate man can never become

intemperate, the man who has learnt any subject of knowledge can

never be as though he had learnt it not." That, however, is not my own

conclusion. It is with the workings of the soul as with those of the

body; want of exercise of the organ leads to inability of function, here

bodily, there spiritual, so that we can neither do the things that

we should nor abstain from the things we should not. And that is why

fathers keep their sons, however temperate they may be, out of the reach

of wicked men, considering that if the society of the good is a training

in virtue so also is the society of the bad its dissolution.

(7) In reference to some such tenet as that of Antisthenes ap. Diog.

Laert. VI. ix. 30, {areskei d' autois kai ten areten didakten

einai, katha phesin 'Antisthenes en to 'Rraklei kai anapobleton

uparkhein}. Cf. Plat. "Protag." 340 D, 344 D.

To this the poet (8) is a witness, who says:

"From the noble thou shalt be instructed in nobleness; but, and if

thou minglest with the base thou wilt destroy what wisdom thou

hast now";

And he (9) who says:

"But the good man has his hour of baseness as well as his hour of

virtue"--

to whose testimony I would add my own. For I see that it is impossible

to remember a long poem without practice and repetition; so is

forgetfulness of the words of instruction engendered in the heart

that has ceased to value them. With the words of warning fades the

recollection of the very condition of mind in which the soul yearned

after holiness; and once forgetting this, what wonder that the man

should let slip also the memory of virtue itself! Again I see that a man

who falls into habits of drunkenness or plunges headlong into licentious

love, loses his old power of practising the right and abstaining from

the wrong. Many a man who has found frugality easy whilst passion was

cold, no sooner falls in love than he loses the faculty at once, and in

his prodigal expenditure of riches he will no longer withhold his hand

from gains which in former days were too base to invite his touch. Where

then is the difficulty of supposing that a man may be temperate to-day,

and to-morrow the reverse; or that he who once has had it in his power

to act virtuously may not quite lose that power? (10) To myself, at all

events, it seems that all beautiful and noble things are the result

of constant practice and training; and pre-eminently the virtue of

temperance, seeing that in one and the same bodily frame pleasures are

planted and spring up side by side with the soul and keep whispering in

her ear, "Have done with self-restraint, make haste to gratify us and

the body." (11)

(8) Theognis, 35, 36. See "Symp." ii. 4; Plat. "Men." 95 D.

(9) The author is unknown. See Plat. "Protag." l.c.

(10) Cf. "Cyrop." V. i. 9 foll.; VI. i. 41.

(11) See my remarks, "Hellenica Essays," p. 371 foll.

But to return to Critias and Alcibiades, I repeat that as long as they

lived with Socrates they were able by his support to dominate their

ignoble appetites; (12) but being separated from him, Critias had to

fly to Thessaly, (13) where he consorted with fellows better versed in

lawlessness than justice. And Alcibiades fared no better. His personal

beauty on the one hand incited bevies of fine ladies (14) to hunt him

down as fair spoil, while on the other hand his influence in the state

and among the allies exposed him to the corruption of many an adept in

the arts of flattery; honoured by the democracy and stepping easily

to the front rank he behaved like an athlete who in the games of the

Palaestra is so assured of victory that he neglects his training; thus

he presently forgot the duty which he owed himself.

(12) Cf. (Plat.) "Theag." 130 A.

(13) See "Hell." II. iii. 36.

(14) Cf. Plut. "Ages.," "Alcib."

Such were the misadventures of these two. Is the sequel extraordinary?

Inflated with the pride of ancestry, (15) exalted by their wealth,

puffed up by power, sapped to the soul's core by a host of human

tempters, separate moreover for many a long day from Socrates--what

wonder that they reached the full stature of arrogancy! And for the

offences of these two Socrates is to be held responsible! The accuser

will have it so. But for the fact that in early days, when they

were both young and of an age when dereliction from good feeling and

self-restraint might have been expected, this same Socrates kept them

modest and well-behaved, not one word of praise is uttered by the

accuser for all this. That is not the measure of justice elsewhere

meted. Would a master of the harp or flute, would a teacher of any sort

who has turned out proficient pupils, be held to account because one of

them goes away to another teacher and turns out to be a failure? Or what

father, if he have a son who in the society of a certain friend remains

an honest lad, but falling into the company of some other becomes

a good-for-nothing, will that father straightway accuse the earlier

instructor? Will not he rather, in proportion as the boy deteriorates in

the company of the latter, bestow more heartfelt praise upon the former?

What father, himself sharing the society of his own children, is held to

blame for their transgressions, if only his own goodness be established?

Here would have been a fair test to apply to Socrates: Was he guilty of

any base conduct himself? If so let him be set down as a knave, but if,

on the contrary, he never faltered in sobriety from beginning to end,

how in the name of justice is he to be held to account for a baseness

which was not in him?

(15) Or, "became overweening in arrogance." Cf. "Henry VIII. II. iv.

110": "But your heart is crammed with arrogancy, spleen, and

pride."

I go further: if, short of being guilty of any wrong himself, he saw

the evil doings of others with approval, reason were he should be held

blameworthy. Listen then: Socrates was well aware that Critias was

attached to Euthydemus, (16) aware too that he was endeavouring to deal

by him after the manner of those wantons whose love is carnal of the

body. From this endeavour he tried to deter him, pointing out how

illiberal a thing it was, how ill befitting a man of honour to appear

as a beggar before him whom he loved, in whose eyes he would fain be

precious, ever petitioning for something base to give and base to get.

(16) See below, IV. ii. 1 (if the same person).

But when this reasoning fell on deaf ears and Critias refused to be

turned aside, Socrates, as the story goes, took occasion of the presence

of a whole company and of Euthydemus to remark that Critias appeared to

be suffering from a swinish affection, or else why this desire to rub

himself against Euthydemus like a herd of piglings scraping against

stones.

The hatred of Critias to Socrates doubtless dates from this incident.

He treasured it up against him, and afterwards, when he was one of the

Thirty and associated with Charicles as their official lawgiver, (17)

he framed the law against teaching the art of words (18) merely from a

desire to vilify Socrates. He was at a loss to know how else to lay hold

of him except by levelling against him the vulgar charge (19) against

philosophers, by which he hoped to prejudice him with the public. It

was a charge quite unfounded as regards Socrates, if I may judge from

anything I ever heard fall from his lips myself or have learnt about him

from others. But the animus of Critias was clear. At the time when the

Thirty were putting citizens, highly respectable citizens, to death

wholesale, and when they were egging on one man after another to the

commission of crime, Socrates let fall an observation: "It would be

sufficiently extraordinary if the keeper of a herd of cattle (20) who

was continually thinning and impoverishing his cattle did not admit

himself to be a sorry sort of herdsman, but that a ruler of the state

who was continually thinning and impoverishing the citizens should

neither be ashamed nor admit himself to be a sorry sort of ruler was

more extraordinary still." The remark being reported to the government,

Socrates was summoned by Critias and Charicles, who proceeded to point

out the law and forbade him to converse with the young. "Was it open to

him," Socrates inquired of the speaker, "in case he failed to understand

their commands in any point, to ask for an explanation?"

(17) Lit. "Nomothetes." See "Hell." II. iii. 2; Dem. 706. For

Charicles see Lys. "c. Eratosth." S. 56; Aristot. "Pol." v. 6. 6.

(18) See Diog. Laert. II. v. ("Socr.")

(19) i.e. {to ton etto logon kreitto poiein}, "of making the worse

appear the better cause." Cf. Arist. "Clouds."

(20) See Dio Chrys. "Or." 43.

"Certainly," the two assented.

Then Socrates: I am prepared to obey the laws, but to avoid

transgression of the law through ignorance I need instruction: is it on

the supposition that the art of words tends to correctness of statement

or to incorrectness that you bid us abstain from it? for if the former,

it is clear we must abstain from speaking correctly, but if the latter,

our endeavour should be to amend our speech.

To which Charicles, in a fit of temper, retorted: In consideration of

your ignorance, (21) Socrates, we will frame the prohibition in

language better suited to your intelligence: we forbid you to hold any

conversation whatsoever with the young.

(21) See Aristot. "de Soph. El." 183 b7.

Then Socrates: To avoid all ambiguity then, or the possibility of my

doing anything else than what you are pleased to command, may I ask you

to define up to what age a human being is to be considered young?

For just so long a time (Charicles answered) as he is debarred from

sitting as a member of the Council, (22) as not having attained to the

maturity of wisdom; accordingly you will not hold converse with any one

under the age of thirty.

(22) The Boule or Senate. See W. L. Newman, "Pol. Aristot." i. 326.

Soc. In making a purchase even, I am not to ask, what is the price of

this? if the vendor is under the age of thirty?

Cha. Tut, things of that sort: but you know, Socrates, that you have

a way of asking questions, when all the while you know how the matter

stands. Let us have no questions of that sort.

Soc. Nor answers either, I suppose, if the inquiry concerns what I know,

as, for instance, where does Charicles live? or where is Critias to be

found?

Oh yes, of course, things of that kind (replied Charicles), while

Critias added: But at the same time you had better have done with your

shoemakers, carpenters, and coppersmiths. (23) These must be pretty well

trodden out at heel by this time, considering the circulation you have

given them.

(23) Cf. Plat. "Gorg." 491 A; "Symp." 221 E; Dio Chrys. "Or." 55, 560

D, 564 A.

Soc. And am I to hold away from their attendant topics also--the just,

the holy, and the like?

Most assuredly (answered Charicles), and from cowherds in particular; or

else see that you do not lessen the number of the herd yourself.

Thus the secret was out. The remark of Socrates about the cattle had

come to their ears, and they could not forgive the author of it.

Perhaps enough has been said to explain the kind of intimacy which

had subsisted between Critias and Socrates, and their relation to one

another. But I will venture to maintain that where the teacher is not

pleasing to the pupil there is no education. Now it cannot be said of

Critias and Alcibiades that they associated with Socrates because they

found him pleasing to them. And this is true of the whole period. From

the first their eyes were fixed on the headship of the state as their

final goal. During the time of their intimacy with Socrates there were

no disputants whom they were more eager to encounter than professed

politicians.

Thus the story is told of Alcibiades--how before the age of twenty he

engaged his own guardian, Pericles, at that time prime minister of the

state, in a discussion concerning laws.

Alc. Please, Pericles, can you teach me what a law is?

Per. To be sure I can.

Alc. I should be so much obliged if you would do so. One so often hears

the epithet "law-abiding" applied in a complimentary sense; yet, it

strikes me, one hardly deserves the compliment, if one does not know

what a law is.

Per. Fortunately there is a ready answer to your difficulty. You wish to

know what a law is? Well, those are laws which the majority, being met

together in conclave, approve and enact as to what it is right to do,

and what it is right to abstain from doing.

Alc. Enact on the hypothesis that it is right to do what is good? or to

do what is bad?

Per. What is good, to be sure, young sir, not what is bad.

Alc. Supposing it is not the majority, but, as in the case of an

oligarchy, the minority, who meet and enact the rules of conduct, what

are these?

Per. Whatever the ruling power of the state after deliberation enacts as

our duty to do, goes by the name of laws.

Alc. Then if a tyrant, holding the chief power in the state, enacts

rules of conduct for the citizens, are these enactments law?

Per. Yes, anything which a tyrant as head of the state enacts, also goes

by the name of law.

Alc. But, Pericles, violence and lawlessness--how do we define them?

Is it not when a stronger man forces a weaker to do what seems right to

him--not by persuasion but by compulsion?

Per. I should say so.

Alc. It would seem to follow that if a tyrant, without persuading

the citizens, drives them by enactment to do certain things--that is

lawlessness?

Per. You are right; and I retract the statement that measures passed by

a tyrant without persuasion of the citizens are law.

Alc. And what of measures passed by a minority, not by persuasion of the

majority, but in the exercise of its power only? Are we, or are we not,

to apply the term violence to these?

Per. I think that anything which any one forces another to do without

persuasion, whether by enactment or not, is violence rather than law.

Alc. It would seem that everything which the majority, in the exercise

of its power over the possessors of wealth, and without persuading them,

chooses to enact, is of the nature of violence rather than of law?

To be sure (answered Pericles), adding: At your age we were clever hands

at such quibbles ourselves. It was just such subtleties which we used to

practise our wits upon; as you do now, if I mistake not.

To which Alcibiades replied: Ah, Pericles, I do wish we could have met

in those days when you were at your cleverest in such matters.

Well, then, as soon as the desired superiority over the politicians of

the day seemed to be attained, Critias and Alcibiades turned their backs

on Socrates. They found his society unattractive, not to speak of the

annoyance of being cross-questioned on their own shortcomings. Forthwith

they devoted themselves to those affairs of state but for which they

would never have come near him at all.

No; if one would seek to see true companions of Socrates, one must

look to Crito, (24) and Chaerephon, and Chaerecrates, to Hermogenes,

to Simmias and Cebes, to Phaedondes and others, who clung to him not to

excel in the rhetoric of the Assembly or the law-courts, but with the

nobler ambition of attaining to such beauty and goodliness of soul as

would enable them to discharge the various duties of life to house and

family, to relatives and friends, to fellow-citizens, and to the state

at large. Of these true followers not one in youth or old age was ever

guilty, or thought guilty, of committing any evil deed.

(24) For these true followers, familiar to us in the pages of Plato,

("Crito," "Apol.," "Phaedo," etc) see Cobet, "Pros. Xen."

"But for all that," the accuser insists, "Socrates taught sons to pour

contumely upon their fathers (25) by persuading his young friends that

he could make them wiser than their sires, or by pointing out that

the law allowed a son to sue his father for aberration of mind, and to

imprison him, which legal ordinance he put in evidence to prove that it

might be well for the wiser to imprison the more ignorant."

(25) See "Apol." 20; Arist. "Clouds," 1407, where Pheidippides "drags

his father Strepsiades through the mire."

Now what Socrates held was, that if a man may with justice incarcerate

another for no better cause than a form of folly or ignorance, this same

person could not justly complain if he in his turn were kept in bonds by

his superiors in knowledge; and to come to the bottom of such questions,

to discover the difference between madness and ignorance was a problem

which he was perpetually working at. His opinion came to this: If a

madman may, as a matter of expediency to himself and his friends, be

kept in prison, surely, as a matter of justice, the man who knows not

what he ought to know should be content to sit at the feet of those who

know, and be taught.

But it was the rest of their kith and kin, not fathers only (according

to the accuser), whom Socrates dishonoured in the eyes of his circle

of followers, when he said that "the sick man or the litigant does not

derive assistance from his relatives, (26) but from his doctor in the

one case, and his legal adviser in the other." "Listen further to his

language about friends," says the accuser: "'What is the good of their

being kindly disposed, unless they can be of some practical use to you?

Mere goodness of disposition is nothing; those only are worthy of

honour who combine with the knowledge of what is right the faculty of

expounding it;' (27) and so by bringing the young to look upon himself

as a superlatively wise person gifted with an extraordinary capacity for

making others wise also, he so worked on the dispositions of those who

consorted with him that in their esteem the rest of the world counted

for nothing by comparison with Socrates."

(26) See Grote, "H. G." v. 535.

(27) Cf. Thuc. ii. 60. Pericles says, "Yet I with whom you are so

angry venture to say of myself, that I am as capable as any one of

devising and explaining a sound policy."--Jowett.

Now I admit the language about fathers and the rest of a man's

relations. I can go further, and add some other sayings of his, that

"when the soul (which is alone the indwelling centre of intelligence)

is gone out of a man, be he our nearest and dearest friend, we carry the

body forth and bury it out of sight." "Even in life," he used to say,

"each of us is ready to part with any portion of his best possession--to

wit, his own body--if it be useless and unprofitable. He will remove it

himself, or suffer another to do so in his stead. Thus men cut off their

own nails, hair, or corns; they allow surgeons to cut and cauterise

them, not without pains and aches, and are so grateful to the doctor for

his services that they further give him a fee. Or again, a man ejects

the spittle from his mouth as far as possible. (28) Why? Because it is

of no use while it stays within the system, but is detrimental rather."

(28) See Aristot. "Eth. Eud." vii. 1.

Now by these instances his object was not to inculcate the duty of

burying one's father alive or of cutting oneself to bits, but to show

that lack of intelligence means lack of worth; (29) and so he called

upon his hearers to be as sensible and useful as they could be, so that,

be it father or brother or any one else whose esteem he would deserve,

a man should not hug himself in careless self-interest, trusting to mere

relationship, but strive to be useful to those whose esteem he coveted.

(29) i.e. "witless and worthless are synonymous."

But (pursues the accuser) by carefully culling the most immoral

passages of the famous poets, and using them as evidences, he taught his

associates to be evildoers and tyrranical: the line of Hesiod (30) for

instance--

No work is a disgrace; slackness of work is the disgrace--

"interpreted," says the accuser, "by Socrates as if the poet enjoined us

to abstain from no work wicked or ignoble; do everything for the sake of

gain."

(30) "Works and Days," 309 {'Ergon d' ouden oneidos}. Cf. Plat.

"Charm." 163 C.

Now while Socrates would have entirely admitted the propositions that

"it is a blessing and a benefit to a man to be a worker," and that "a

lazy do-nothing is a pestilent evil," that "work is good and idleness

a curse," the question arises, whom did he mean by workers? In his

vocabulary only those were good workmen (31) who were engaged on good

work; dicers and gamblers and others engaged on any other base and

ruinous business he stigmatised as the "idle drones"; and from this

point of view the quotation from Hesiod is unimpeachable--

No work is a disgrace; only idlesse is disgrace.

But there was a passage from Homer (32) for ever on his lips, as the

accuser tells us--the passage which says concerning Odysseus,

What prince, or man of name,

He found flight-giv'n, he would restrain with words of gentlest blame:

"Good sir, it fits you not to fly, or fare as one afraid,

You should not only stay yourself, but see the people stayed."

Thus he the best sort us'd; the worst, whose spirits brake out in

noise, (33) He cudgell'd with his sceptre, chid, and said, "Stay,

wretch, be still, And hear thy betters; thou art base, and both in

power and skill Poor and unworthy, without name in counsel or in

war." We must not all be kings.

(31) See below, III. ix. 9.

(32) "Il." ii. 188 foll., 199 foll. (so Chapman).

(33) Lit. "But whatever man of the people he saw and found him

shouting."--W. Leaf.

The accuser informs us that Socrates interpreted these lines as though

the poet approved the giving of blows to commoners and poor folk. Now

no such remark was ever made by Socrates; which indeed would have been

tantamount to maintaining that he ought to be beaten himself. What he

did say was, that those who were useful neither in word nor deed, who

were incapable of rendering assistance in time of need to the army or

the state or the people itself, be they never so wealthy, ought to be

restrained, and especially if to incapacity they added effrontery.

As to Socrates, he was the very opposite of all this--he was plainly

a lover of the people, and indeed of all mankind. Though he had many

ardent admirers among citizens and strangers alike, he never demanded

any fee for his society from any one, (34) but bestowed abundantly upon

all alike of the riches of his soul--good things, indeed, of which

fragments accepted gratis at his hands were taken and sold at high

prices to the rest of the community by some, (35) who were not, as he

was, lovers of the people, since with those who had not money to give in

return they refused to discourse. But of Socrates be it said that in

the eyes of the whole world he reflected more honour on the state and a

richer lustre than ever Lichas, (36) whose fame is proverbial, shed

on Lacedaemon. Lichas feasted and entertained the foreign residents in

Lacedaemon at the Gymnopaediae most handsomely. Socrates gave a lifetime

to the outpouring of his substance in the shape of the greatest benefits

bestowed on all who cared to receive them. In other words, he made

those who lived in his society better men, and sent them on their way

rejoicing.

(34) See "Symp." iv. 43; Plat. "Hipp. maj." 300 D; "Apol." 19 E.

(35) See Diog. Laert. II. viii. 1.

(36) See "Hell." III. ii. 21; Thuc. v. 50; Plut. "Cim." 284 C. For the

Gymnopaediae, see Paus. III. xi. 9; Athen. xiv. p. 631.

To no other conclusion, therefore, can I come but that, being so good a

man, Socrates was worthier to have received honour from the state than

death. And this I take to be the strictly legal view of the case, for

what does the law require? (37) "If a man be proved to be a thief, a

filcher of clothes, a cut-purse, a housebreaker, a man-stealer, a robber

of temples, the penalty is death." Even so; and of all men Socrates

stood most aloof from such crimes.

(37) See "Symp." iv. 36; Plat. "Rep." 575 B; "Gorg." 508 E.

To the state he was never the cause of any evil--neither disaster in

war, nor faction, nor treason, nor any other mischief whatsoever. And if

his public life was free from all offence, so was his private. He never

hurt a single soul either by deprivation of good or infliction of evil,

nor did he ever lie under the imputation of any of those misdoings.

where then is his liability to the indictment to be found? Who, so

far from disbelieving in the gods, as set forth in the indictment, was

conspicuous beyond all men for service to heaven; so far from corrupting

the young--a charge alleged with insistence by the prosecutor--was

notorious for the zeal with which he strove not only to stay his

associates from evil desires, but to foster in them a passionate desire

for that loveliest and queenliest of virtues without which states and

families crumble to decay. (38) Such being his conduct, was he not

worthy of high honour from the state of Athens?

(38) Or, "the noblest and proudest virtue by means of which states and

families are prosperously directed."

III

It may serve to illustrate the assertion that he benefited his

associates partly by the display of his own virtue and partly by verbal

discourse and argument, if I set down my various recollections (1)

on these heads. And first with regard to religion and the concerns of

heaven. In conduct and language his behaviour conformed to the rule laid

down by the Pythia (2) in reply to the question, "How shall we act?" as

touching a sacrifice or the worship of ancestors, or any similar point.

Her answer is: "Act according to the law and custom of your state, and

you will act piously." After this pattern Socrates behaved himself, and

so he exhorted others to behave, holding them to be but busybodies and

vain fellows who acted on any different principle.

(1) Hence the title of the work, {'Apomenmoneumata}, "Recollections,

Memoirs, Memorabilia." See Diog. Laert. "Xen." II. vi. 48.

(2) The Pythia at Delphi.

His formula or prayer was simple: "Give me that which is best for me,"

for, said he, the gods know best what good things are--to pray for gold

or silver or despotic power were no better than to make some particular

throw at dice or stake in battle or any such thing the subject of

prayer, of which the future consequences are manifestly uncertain. (3)

(3) See (Plat.) "Alcib. II." 142 foll.; Valerius Max. vii. 2;

"Spectator," No. 207.

If with scant means he offered but small sacrifices he believed that he

was in no wise inferior to those who make frequent and large sacrifices

from an ampler store. It were ill surely for the very gods themselves,

could they take delight in large sacrifices rather than in small, else

oftentimes must the offerings of bad men be found acceptable rather

than of good; nor from the point of view of men themselves would life

be worth living if the offerings of a villain rather than of a righteous

man found favour in the sight of Heaven. His belief was that the joy of

the gods is greater in proportion to the holiness of the giver, and he

was ever an admirer of that line of Hesiod which says,

According to thine ability do sacrifice to the immortal gods. (4)

(4) Hesiod, "Works and Days," 336. See "Anab." III. ii. 9.

"Yes," he would say, "in our dealings with friends and strangers alike,

and in reference to the demands of life in general, there is no better

motto for a man than that: 'let a man do according to his ability.'"

Or to take another point. If it appeared to him that a sign from

heaven had been given him, nothing would have induced him to go against

heavenly warning: he would as soon have been persuaded to accept the

guidance of a blind man ignorant of the path to lead him on a journey

in place of one who knew the road and could see; and so he denounced the

folly of others who do things contrary to the warnings of God in order

to avoid some disrepute among men. For himself he despised all human

aids by comparison with counsel from above.

The habit and style of living to which he subjected his soul and body

was one which under ordinary circumstances (5) would enable any one

adopting it to look existence cheerily in the face and to pass his days

serenely: it would certainly entail no difficulties as regards expense.

So frugal was it that a man must work little indeed who could not earn

the quantum which contented Socrates. Of food he took just enough

to make eating a pleasure--the appetite he brought to it was sauce

sufficient; while as to drinks, seeing that he only drank when thirsty,

any draught refreshed. (6) If he accepted an invitation to dinner, he

had no difficulty in avoiding the common snare of over-indulgence, and

his advice to people who could not equally control their appetite was to

avoid taking what would allure them to eat if not hungry or to drink if

not thirsty. (7) Such things are ruinous to the constitution, he said,

bad for stomachs, brains, and soul alike; or as he used to put it, with

a touch of sarcasm, (8) "It must have been by feasting men on so many

dainty dishes that Circe produced her pigs; only Odysseus through his

continency and the 'promptings (9) of Hermes' abstained from touching

them immoderately, and by the same token did not turn into a swine." So

much for this topic, which he touched thus lightly and yet seriously.

(5) {ei me ti daimonion eie}, "save under some divinely-ordained

calamity." Cf. "Cyrop." I. vi. 18; "Symp." viii. 43.

(6) See "Ages." ix; Cic. "Tusc." v. 34, 97; "de Fin." ii. 28, 90.

(7) Cf. Plut. "Mor." 128 D; Clement, "Paedag." 2. 173, 33; "Strom." 2,

492, 24; Aelian, "N. A." 8, 9.

(8) "Half in gibe and half in jest," in ref. to "Od." x. 233 foll.:

"So she let them in..."

(9) {upothemosune}, "inspiration." Cf. "Il." xv. 412; "Od." xvi. 233.

But as to the concerns of Aphrodite, his advice was to hold strongly

aloof from the fascination of fair forms: once lay finger on these

and it is not easy to keep a sound head and a sober mind. To take a

particular case. It was a mere kiss which, as he had heard, Critobulus

(10) had some time given to a fair youth, the son of Alcibiades. (11)

Accordingly Critobulus being present, Socrates propounded the question.

(10) For Critobulus (the son of Crito) see "Econ." i. 1 foll.; "Symp."

i. 3 foll.

(11) See Isocr. "Or." xvi. Cobet conj. {ton tou 'Axiokhou uion}, i.e.

Clinias.

Soc. Tell me, Xenophon, have you not always believed Critobulus to be a

man of sound sense, not wild and self-willed? Should you not have said

that he was remarkable for his prudence rather than thoughtless or

foolhardy?

Xen. Certainly that is what I should have said of him.

Soc. Then you are now to regard him as quite the reverse--a hot-blooded,

reckless libertine: this is the sort of man to throw somersaults into

knives, (12) or to leap into the jaws of fire.

(12) Cf. "Symp." ii. 10, iv. 16. See Schneider ad loc.

Xen. And what have you seen him doing, that you give him so bad a

character?

Soc. Doing? Why, has not the fellow dared to steal a kiss from the son

of Alcibiades, most fair of youths and in the golden prime?

Xen. Nay, then, if that is the foolhardy adventure, it is a danger which

I could well encounter myself.

Soc. Poor soul! and what do you expect your fate to be after that

kiss? Let me tell you. On the instant you will lose your freedom, the

indenture of your bondage will be signed; it will be yours on compulsion

to spend large sums on hurtful pleasures; you will have scarcely a

moment's leisure left for any noble study; you will be driven to concern

yourself most zealously with things which no man, not even a madman,

would choose to make an object of concern.

Xen. O Heracles! how fell a power to reside in a kiss!

Soc. Does it surprise you? Do you not know that the tarantula, which is

no bigger than a threepenny bit, (13) has only to touch the mouth and it

will afflict its victim with pains and drive him out of his senses.

(13) Lit. "a half-obol piece." For the {phalaggion} see Aristot. "H.

A." ix. 39, 1.

Xen. Yes, but then the creature injects something with its bite.

Soc. Ah, fool! and do you imagine that these lovely creatures infuse

nothing with their kiss, simply because you do not see the poison? Do

you not know that this wild beast which men call beauty in its bloom is

all the more terrible than the tarantula in that the insect must first

touch its victim, but this at a mere glance of the beholder, without even

contact, will inject something into him--yards away--which will make

him man. And may be that is why the Loves are called "archers," because

these beauties wound so far off. (14) But my advice to you, Xenophon,

is, whenever you catch sight of one of these fair forms, to run

helter-skelter for bare life without a glance behind; and to you,

Critobulus, I would say, "Go abroad for a year: so long time will it

take to heal you of this wound."

(14) L. Dindorf, etc. regard the sentence as a gloss. Cf. "Symp." iv.

26 ({isos de kai... entimoteron estin}).

Such (he said), in the affairs of Aphrodite, as in meats and drinks,

should be the circumspection of all whose footing is insecure. At least

they should confine themselves to such diet as the soul would dispense

with, save for some necessity of the body; and which even so ought

to set up no disturbance. (15) But for himself, it was clear, he was

prepared at all points and invulnerable. He found less difficulty in

abstaining from beauty's fairest and fullest bloom than many others from

weeds and garbage. To sum up: (16) with regard to eating and drinking

and these other temptations of the sense, the equipment of his soul made

him independent; he could boast honestly that in his moderate fashion

(17) his pleasures were no less than theirs who take such trouble to

procure them, and his pains far fewer.

(15) Cf. "Symp." iv. 38.

(16) L. Dindorf (brackets) this passage as spurious.

(17) On the principle "enough is as good as a feast," {arkountos}.

IV

A belief is current, in accordance with views maintained concerning

Socrates in speech and writing, and in either case conjecturally, that,

however powerful he may have been in stimulating men to virtue as a

theorist, he was incapable of acting as their guide himself. (1) It

would be well for those who adopt this view to weigh carefully not only

what Socrates effected "by way of castigation" in cross-questioning

whose who conceived themselves to be possessed of all knowledge, but

also his everyday conversation with those who spent their time in close

intercourse with himself. Having done this, let them decide whether he

was incapable of making his companions better.

(1) Al. "If any one believes that Socrates, as represented in certain

dialogues (e.g. of Plato, Antisthenes, etc.) of an imaginary

character, was an adept ({protrepsasthai}) in the art of

stimulating people to virtue negatively but scarcely the man to

guide ({proagein}) his hearers on the true path himself." Cf.

(Plat.) "Clitophon," 410 B; Cic. "de Or." I. xlvii. 204; Plut.

"Mor." 798 B. See Grote, "Plato," iii. 21; K. Joel, op. cit. p. 51

foll.; Cf. below, IV. iii. 2.

I will first state what I once heard fall from his lips in a discussion

with Aristodemus, (2) "the little," as he was called, on the topic of

divinity. (3) Socrates had observed that Aristodemus neither sacrificed

nor gave heed to divination, but on the contrary was disposed to

ridicule those who did.

(2) See Plat. "Symp." 173 B: "He was a little fellow who never wore

any shoes, Aristodemus, of the deme of Cydathenaeum."--Jowett.

(3) Or, "the divine element."

So tell me, Aristodemus (he began), are there any human beings who have

won your admiration for their wisdom?

Ar. There are.

Soc. Would you mention to us their names?

Ar. In the writings of epic poetry I have the greatest admiration for

Homer.... And as a dithyrambic poet for Melanippides. (4) I admire also

Sophocles as a tragedian, Polycleitus as a sculptor, and Zeuxis as a

painter.

(4) Melanippides, 430 B.C. See Cobet, "Pros. Xen." s.n.

Soc. Which would you consider the more worthy of admiration, a fashioner

of senseless images devoid of motion or one who could fashion living

creatures endowed with understanding and activity?

Ar. Decidedly the latter, provided his living creatures owed their birth

to design and were not the offspring of some chance.

Soc. But now if you had two sorts of things, the one of which presents

no clue as to what it is for, and the other is obviously for some useful

purpose--which would you judge to be the result of chance, which of

design?

Ar. Clearly that which is produced for some useful end is the work of

design.

Soc. Does it not strike you then that he who made man from the beginning

(5) did for some useful end furnish him with his several senses--giving

him eyes to behold the visible word, and ears to catch the intonations

of sound? Or again, what good would there be in odours if nostrils had

not been bestowed upon us? what perception of sweet things and pungent,

and of all the pleasures of the palate, had not a tongue been fashioned

in us as an interpreter of the same? And besides all this, do you

not think this looks like a matter of foresight, this closing of the

delicate orbs of sight with eyelids as with folding doors, which, when

there is need to use them for any purpose, can be thrown wide open and

firmly closed again in sleep? and, that even the winds of heaven may not

visit them too roughly, this planting of the eyelashes as a protecting

screen? (6) this coping of the region above the eyes with cornice-work

of eyebrow so that no drop of sweat fall from the head and injure them?

again this readiness of the ear to catch all sounds and yet not to be

surcharged? this capacity of the front teeth of all animals to cut

and of the "grinders" to receive the food and reduce it to pulp? the

position of the mouth again, close to the eyes and nostrils as a portal

of ingress for all the creature's supplies? and lastly, seeing that

matter passing out (7) of the body is unpleasant, this hindward

direction of the passages, and their removal to a distance from the

avenues of sense? I ask you, when you see all these things constructed

with such show of foresight can you doubt whether they are products of

chance or intelligence?

(5) Cf. Aristot. "de Part. Animal." 1. For the "teleological" views

see IV. iii. 2 foll.

(6) "Like a sieve" or "colander."

(7) "That which goeth out of a man."

Ar. To be sure not! Viewed in this light they would seem to be the

handiwork of some wise artificer, (8) full of love for all things

living. (9)

(8) "Demiurge."

(9) Passage referred to by Epictetus ap. Stob. "Flor." 121, 29.

Soc. What shall we say of this passion implanted in man to beget

offspring, this passion in the mother to rear her babe, and in the

creature itself, once born, this deep desire of life and fear of death?

Ar. No doubt these do look like the contrivances of some one

deliberately planning the existence of living creatures.

Soc. Well, and doubtless you feel to have a spark of wisdom yourself?

Ar. Put your questions, and I will answer.

Soc. And yet you imagine that elsewhere no spark of wisdom is to be

found? And that, too, when you know that you have in your body a tiny

fragment only of the mighty earth, a little drop of the great waters,

and of the other elements, vast in their extent, you got, I presume,

a particle of each towards the compacting of your bodily frame? Mind

alone, it would seem, which is nowhere to be found, (10) you had the

lucky chance to snatch up and make off with, you cannot tell how. And

these things around and about us, enormous in size, infinite in number,

owe their orderly arrangement, as you suppose, to some vacuity of wit?

(10) Cf. Plat. "Phileb." 30 B: "Soc. May our body be said to have a

soul? Pro. Clearly. Soc. And whence comes that soul, my dear

Protarchus, unless the body of the universe, which contains

elements similar to our bodies but finer, has also a soul? Can

there be any other source?"--Jowett. Cic. "de N. D." ii. 6; iii.

11.

Ar. It may be, for my eyes fail to see the master agents of these, as

one sees the fabricators of things produced on earth.

Soc. No more do you see your own soul, which is the master agent of your

body; so that, as far as that goes, you may maintain, if you like, that

you do nothing with intelligence, (11) but everything by chance.

(11) Or, "by your wit," {gnome}.

At this point Aristodemus: I assure you, Socrates, that I do not disdain

the Divine power. On the contrary, my belief is that the Divinity is too

grand to need any service which I could render.

Soc. But the grander that power is, which deigns to tend and wait upon

you, the more you are called upon to honour it.

Ar. Be well assured, if I could believe the gods take thought for all

men, I would not neglect them.

Soc. How can you suppose that they do not so take thought? Who, in the

first place, gave to man alone of living creatures his erect posture,

enabling him to see farther in front of him and to contemplate more

freely the height above, and to be less subject to distress than other

creatures (endowed like himself with eyes and ears and mouth). (12)

Consider next how they gave to the beast of the field (13) feet as a

means of progression only, but to man they gave in addition hands--those

hands which have achieved so much to raise us in the scale of happiness

above all animals. Did they not make the tongue also? which belongs

indeed alike to man and beast, but in man they fashioned it so as to

play on different parts of the mouth at different times, whereby we can

produce articulate speech, and have a code of signals to express our

every want to one another. Or consider the pleasures of the sexual

appetite; limited in the rest of the animal kingdom to certain seasons,

but in the case of man a series prolonged unbroken to old age. Nor did

it content the Godhead merely to watch over the interests of man's body.

What is of far higher import, he implanted in man the noblest and most

excellent type of soul. For what other creature, to begin with, has

a soul to appreciate the existence of the gods who have arranged this

grand and beauteous universe? What other tribe of animals save man

can render service to the gods? How apt is the spirit of man to take

precautions against hunger and thirst, cold and heat, to alleviate

disease and foster strength! how suited to labour with a view to

learning! how capable of garnering in the storehouse of his memory all

that he has heard or seen or understood! Is it not most evident to you

that by the side of other animals men live and move a race of gods--by

nature excellent, in beauty of body and of soul supreme? For, mark you,

had a creature of man's wit been encased in the body of an ox, (14)

he would have been powerless to carry out his wishes, just as the

possession of hands divorced from human wit is profitless. And then you

come, you who have obtained these two most precious attributes, and give

it as your opinion, that the gods take no thought or care for you. Why,

what will you have them to do, that you may believe and be persuaded

that you too are in their thoughts?

(12) See Kuhner for an attempt to cure the text.

(13) {erpetois}, a "poetical" word. Cf. "Od." iv. 418; Herod. i. 140.

(14) See Aristot. "de Part. Animal." iv. 10.

Ar. When they treat me as you tell us they treat you, and send me

counsellors to warn me what I am to do and what abstain from doing, (15)

I will believe.

(15) See IV. iii. 12.

Soc. Send you counsellors! Come now, what when the people of Athens make

inquiry by oracle, and the gods' answer comes? Are you not an Athenian?

Think you not that to you also the answer is given? What when they send

portents to forewarn the states of Hellas? or to all mankind? Are you

not a man? a Hellene? Are not these intended for you also? Can it be

that you alone are excepted as a signal instance of Divine neglect?

Again, do you suppose that the gods could have implanted in the heart

of man the belief in their capacity to work him weal or woe had they not

the power? Would not men have discovered the imposture in all this lapse

of time? Do you not perceive that the wisest and most perdurable of

human institutions--be they cities or tribes of men--are ever the most

God-fearing; and in the individual man the riper his age and judgment,

the deeper his religousness? Ay, my good sir (he broke forth), lay to

heart and understand that even as your own mind within you can turn and

dispose of your body as it lists, so ought we to think that the wisdom

which abides within the universal frame does so dispose of all things as

it finds agreeable to itself; for hardly may it be that your eye is able

to range over many a league, but that the eye of God is powerless to

embrace all things at a glance; or that to your soul it is given to

dwell in thought on matters here or far away in Egypt or in Sicily,

but that the wisdom and thought of God is not sufficient to include all

things at one instant under His care. If only you would copy your

own behaviour (16) where human beings are concerned. It is by acts of

service and of kindness that you discover which of your fellows are

willing to requite you in kind. It is by taking another into your

counsel that you arrive at the secret of his wisdom. If, on like

principle, you will but make trial of the gods by acts of service,

whether they will choose to give you counsel in matters obscure to

mortal vision, you shall discover the nature and the greatness of

Godhead to be such that they are able at once to see all things and to

hear all things and to be present everywhere, nor does the least thing

escape their watchful care.

(16) Or, "reason as you are wont to do."

To my mind the effect of words like these was to cause those about him

to hold aloof from unholiness, baseness, and injustice, not only whilst

they were seen of men, but even in the solitary place, since they must

believe that no part of their conduct could escape the eye of Heaven.

V

I suppose it may be taken as admitted that self-control is a noble

acquirement for a man. (1) If so, let us turn and consider whether by

language like the following he was likely to lead his listeners onwards

(2) to the attainment of this virtue. "Sirs," he would say, "if a war

came upon us and we wished to choose a man who would best help us to

save ourselves and to subdue our enemy, I suppose we should scarcely

select one whom we knew to be a slave to his belly, to wine, or lust,

and prone to succumb to toil or sleep. Could we expect such an one to

save us or to master our foes? Or if one of us were nearing the end of

his days, and he wished to discover some one to whom he might entrust

his sons for education, his maiden daughters for protection, and his

property in general for preservation, would he deem a libertine worthy

of such offices? Why, no one would dream of entrusting his flocks and

herds, his storehouses and barns, or the superintendence of his works to

the tender mercies of an intemperate slave. If a butler or an errand boy

with such a character were offered to us we would not take him as a free

gift. And if he would not accept an intemperate slave, what pains should

the master himself take to avoid that imputation. (3) For with the

incontinent man it is not as with the self-seeker and the covetous.

These may at any rate be held to enrich themselves in depriving others.

But the intemperate man cannot claim in like fashion to be a blessing

to himself if a curse to his neighbours; nay, the mischief which he

may cause to others is nothing by comparison with that which redounds

against himself, since it is the height of mischief to ruin--I do not

say one's own house and property--but one's own body and one's own soul.

Or to take an example from social intercourse, no one cares for a guest

who evidently takes more pleasure in the wine and the viands than in the

friends beside him--who stints his comrades of the affection due to them

to dote upon a mistress. Does it not come to this, that every honest man

is bound to look upon self-restraint as the very corner-stone of virtue:

(4) which he should seek to lay down as the basis and foundation of his

soul? Without self-restraint who can lay any good lesson to heart or

practise it when learnt in any degree worth speaking of? Or, to put it

conversely, what slave of pleasure will not suffer degeneracy of soul

and body? By Hera, (5) well may every free man pray to be saved from the

service of such a slave; and well too may he who is in bondage to such

pleasures supplicate Heaven to send him good masters, seeing that is the

one hope of salvation left him."

(1) Lit. "a beautiful and brave possession."

(2) {proubibaze}.

(3) Or, "how should the master himself beware lest he fall into that

category."

(4) {krepida}. See Pind. "Pyth." iv. 138; ib. vii. 3; ib. fr. 93.

(5) See below, III. x. 9, xi. 5; IV. ii. 9, iv. 8; "Econ." x. 1;

"Cyrop." I. iv. 12; Plat. "Phaedr." 230 B. Cf. Shakesp. "by'r

Lakin."

Well-tempered words: yet his self-restraint shone forth even more in

his acts than in his language. Not only was he master over the pleasures

which flow from the body, but of those also which are fed by riches, his

belief being that he who receives money from this or that chance donor

sets up over himself a master, and binds himself to an abominable

slavery.

VI

In this context some discussions with Antiphon the sophist (1) deserve

record. Antiphon approaches Socrates in hope of drawing away his

associates, and in their presence thus accosts him.

(1) {o teratoskopos}, "jealous of Socrates," according to Aristotle

ap. Diog. Laert. II. v. 25. See Cobet, "Pros. Xen."

Antiphon. Why, Socrates, I always thought it was expected of students of

philosophy to grow in happiness daily; but you seem to have reaped other

fruits from your philosophy. At any rate, you exist, I do not say live,

in a style such as no slave serving under a master would put up with.

Your meat and your drink are of the cheapest sort, and as to clothes,

you cling to one wretched cloak which serves you for summer and winter

alike; and so you go the whole year round, without shoes to your feet

or a shirt to your back. Then again, you are not for taking or making

money, the mere seeking of which is a pleasure, even as the possession

of it adds to the sweetness and independence of existence. I do not know

whether you follow the common rule of teachers, who try to fashion

their pupils in imitation of themselves, (2) and propose to mould the

characters of your companions; but if you do you ought to dub yourself

professor of the art of wretchedness. (3)

(2) Or, "try to turn out their pupils as copies of themselves."

(3) See Arist. "Clouds," {on o kakodaimon Sokrates kai Khairephon}.

Thus challenged, Socrates replied: One thing to me is certain, Antiphon;

you have conceived so vivid an idea of my life of misery that for

yourself you would choose death sooner than live as I do. Suppose now we

turn and consider what it is you find so hard in my life. Is it that he

who takes payment must as a matter of contract finish the work for which

he is paid, whereas I, who do not take it, lie under no constraint to

discourse except with whom I choose? Do you despise my dietary on the

ground that the food which I eat is less wholesome and less stengthening

than yours, or that the articles of my consumption are so scarce and

so much costlier to procure than yours? Or have the fruits of your

marketing a flavour denied to mine? Do you not know the sharper the

appetite the less the need of sauces, the keener the thirst the less the

desire for out-of-the-way drinks? And as to raiment, clothes, you know,

are changed on account of cold or else of heat. People only wear boots

and shoes in order not to gall their feet and be prevented walking.

Now I ask you, have you ever noticed that I keep more within doors than

others on account of the cold? Have you ever seen me battling with

any one for shade on account of the heat? Do you not know that even a

weakling by nature may, by dint of exercise and practice, come to outdo

a giant who neglects his body? He will beat him in the particular point

of training, and bear the strain more easily. But you apparently will

not have it that I, who am for ever training myself to endure this,

that, and the other thing which may befall the body, can brave all

hardships more easily than yourself for instance, who perhaps are not

so practised. And to escape slavery to the belly or to sleep or lechery,

can you suggest more effective means than the possession of some

powerful attraction, some counter-charm which shall gladden not only in

the using, but by the hope enkindled of its lasting usefulness? And yet

this you do know; joy is not to him who feels that he is doing well in

nothing--it belongs to one who is persuaded that things are progressing

with him, be it tillage or the working of a vessel, (4) or any of the

thousand and one things on which a man may chance to be employed. To

him it is given to rejoice as he reflects, "I am doing well." But is

the pleasured derived from all these put together half as joyous as the

consciousness of becoming better oneself, of acquiring better and better

friends? That, for my part, is the belief I continue to cherish.

(4) "The business of a shipowner or skipper."

Again, if it be a question of helping one's friends or country, which of

the two will have the larger leisure to devote to these objects--he who

leads the life which I lead to-day, or he who lives in the style which

you deem so fortunate? Which of the two will adopt a soldier's life more

easily--the man who cannot get on without expensive living, or he to

whom whatever comes to hand suffices? Which will be the readier to

capitulate and cry "mercy" in a siege--the man of elaborate wants, or

he who can get along happily with the readiest things to hand? You,

Antiphon, would seem to suggest that happiness consists of luxury and

extravagance; I hold a different creed. To have no wants at all is, to

my mind, an attribute of Godhead; (5) to have as few wants as possible

the nearest approach to Godhead; and as that which is divine is

mightiest, so that is next mightiest which comes closest to the divine.

(5) Cf. Aristot. "Eth. N." x. viii. 1.

Returning to the charge at another time, this same Antiphon engaged

Socrates in conversation thus.

Ant. Socrates, for my part, I believe you to be a good and upright man;

but for your wisdom I cannot say much. I fancy you would hardly dispute

the verdict yourself, since, as I remark, you do not ask a money payment

for your society; and yet if it were your cloak now, or your house, or

any other of your possessions, you would set some value upon it, and

never dream, I will not say of parting with it gratis, but of exchanging

it for less than its worth. A plain proof, to my mind, that if you

thought your society worth anything, you would ask for it not less than

its equivalent in gold. (6) Hence the conclusion to which I have come,

as already stated: good and upright you may be, since you do not

cheat people from pure selfishness; but wise you cannot be, since your

knowledge is not worth a cent.

(6) Or rather "money," lit. "silver."

To this onslaught Socrates: Antiphon, it is a tenet which we cling to

that beauty and wisdom have this in common, that there is a fair way and

a foul way in which to dispose of them. The vendor of beauty purchases

an evil name, but supposing the same person has discerned a soul of

beauty in his lover and makes that man his friend, we regard his choice

as sensible. (7) So is it with wisdom; he who sells it for money to the

first bidder we name a sophist, (8) as though one should say a man who

prostitutes his wisdom; but if the same man, discerning the noble nature

of another, shall teach that other every good thing, and make him his

friend, of such a one we say he does that which it is the duty of every

good citizen of gentle soul to do. In accordance with this theory, I

too, Antiphon, having my tastes, even as another finds pleasure in his

horse and his hounds, (9) and another in his fighting cocks, so I too

take my pleasure in good friends; and if I have any good thing myself I

teach it them, or I commend them to others by whom I think they will be

helped forwards on the path of virtue. The treasures also of the wise of

old, written and bequeathed in their books, (10) I unfold and peruse in

common with my friends. If our eye light upon any good thing we cull it

eagerly, and regard it as great gain if we may but grow in friendship

with one another.

(7) Add "and a sign of modesty," {sophrona nomizomen}.

(8) {sophistas}. See Grote, "H. G." viii. 482 foll.; "Hunting," xi.

foll.

(9) Cf. Plat. "Lys." 211 E.

(10) Cf. "Symp." iv. 27.

As I listened to this talk I could not but reflect that he, the master,

was a person to be envied, and that we, his hearers, were being led by

him to beauty and nobility of soul.

Again on some occasion the same Antiphon asked Socrates how he expected

to make politicians of others when, even if he had the knowledge, he did

not engage in politics himself.

Socrates replied: I will put to you a question, Antiphon: Which were

the more statesmanlike proceeding, to practise politics myself

single-handed, or to devote myself to making as many others as possible

fit to engage in that pursuit?

VII

Let us here turn and consider whether by deterring his associates from

quackery and false seeming he did not directly stimulate them to the

pursuit of virtue. (1) He used often to say there was no better road

to renown than the one by which a man became good at that wherein he

desired to be reputed good. (2) The truth of the concept he enforced as

follows: "Let us reflect on what a man would be driven to do who wanted

to be thought a good flute player, without really being so. He would

be forced to imitate the good flute player in the externals of his art,

would he not? and first or all, seeing that these artists always have

a splendid equipment, (3) and travel about with a long train of

attendants, he must have the same; in the next place, they can command

the plaudits of a multitude, he therefore must pack a conclave of

clackers. But one thing is clear: nothing must induce him to give

a performance, or he will be exposed at once, and find himself a

laughing-stock not only as a sorry sort of flute player, but as a

wretched imposter. And now he has a host of expenses to meet; and not

one advantage to be reaped; and worse than all his evil reputation. What

is left him but to lead a life stale and unprofitable, the scorn and

mockery of men? Let us try another case. Suppose a man wished to be

thought a good general or a good pilot, though he were really nothing of

the sort, let us picture to our minds how it will fare with him. Of two

misfortunes one: either with a strong desire to be thought proficient in

these matters, he will fail to get others to agree with him, which will

be bad enough; or he will succeed, with worse result; since it stands

to reason that anyone appointed to work a vessel or lead an army without

the requisite knowledge will speedily ruin a number of people whom he

least desires to hurt, and will make but a sorry exit from the

stage himself." Thus first by one instance and then another would

he demonstrate the unprofitableness of trying to appear rich, or

courageous, or strong, without really being the thing pretended. "You

are sure sooner or later to have commands laid upon you beyond your

power to execute, and failing just where you are credited with capacity,

the world will give you no commiseration." "I call that man a cheat, and

a great cheat too," he would say, "who gets money or goods out of some

one by persuasion, and defrauds him; but of all imposters he surely is

the biggest who can delude people into thinking that he is fit to lead

the state, when all the while he is a worthless creature." (4)

(1) {apotrepon proutrepen}. See K. Joel, op. cit. p. 450 foll.

(2) Cf. "Cyrop." I. vi. 22.

(3) Or, "furniture of the finest," like Arion's in Herod. i. 24.

Schneid. cf. Demosth. 565. 6.

(4) Here follows the sentence ({emoi men oun edokei kai tou

alazoneuesthai apotrepein tous sunontas toiade dialegomenos}),

which, for the sake of convenience, I have attached to the first

sentence of Bk. II. ch. i. ({edokei de moi... ponou.}) I

believe that the commentators are right in bracketing both one and

the other as editorial interpolations.

BOOK II

I

Now, if the effect of such discourses was, as I imagine, to deter his

hearers from the paths of quackery and false-seeming, (1) so I am

sure that language like the following was calculated to stimulate his

followers to practise self-control and endurance: self-control in

the matters of eating, drinking, sleeping, and the cravings of lust;

endurance of cold and heat and toil and pain. He had noticed the undue

licence which one of his acquaintances allowed himself in all such

matters. (2) Accordingly he thus addressed him:

(1) This sentence in the Greek concludes Bk. I. There is something

wrong or very awkward in the text here.

(2) Cf. Grote, "Plato," III. xxxviii. p. 530.

Tell me, Aristippus (Socrates said), supposing you had two children

entrusted to you to educate, one of them must be brought up with an

aptitude for government, and the other without the faintest propensity

to rule--how would you educate them? What do you say? Shall we begin our

inquiry from the beginning, as it were, with the bare elements of food

and nutriment?

Ar. Yes, food to begin with, by all means, being a first principle, (3)

without which there is no man living but would perish.

(3) Aristippus plays upon the word {arkhe}.

Soc. Well, then, we may expect, may we not, that a desire to grasp food

at certain seasons will exhibit itself in both the children?

Ar. It is to be expected.

Soc. Which, then, of the two must be trained, of his own free will, (4)

to prosecute a pressing business rather than gratify the belly?

(4) {proairesis}.

Ar. No doubt the one who is being trained to govern, if we would not

have affairs of state neglected during (5) his government.

(5) Lit. "along of."

Soc. And the same pupil must be furnished with a power of holding out

against thirst also when the craving to quench it comes upon him?

Ar. Certainly he must.

Soc. And on which of the two shall we confer such self-control in regard

to sleep as shall enable him to rest late and rise early, or keep vigil,

if the need arise?

Ar. To the same one of the two must be given that endurance also.

Soc. Well, and a continence in regard to matters sexual so great that

nothing of the sort shall prevent him from doing his duty? Which of them

claims that?

Ar. The same one of the pair again.

Soc. Well, and on which of the two shall be bestowed, as a further gift,

the voluntary resolution to face toils rather than turn and flee from

them?

Ar. This, too, belongs of right to him who is being trained for

government.

Soc. Well, and to which of them will it better accord to be taught all

knowledge necessary towards the mastery of antagonists?

Ar. To our future ruler certainly, for without these parts of learning

all his other capacities will be merely waste.

Soc. (6)Will not a man so educated be less liable to be entrapped by

rival powers, and so escape a common fate of living creatures, some

of which (as we all know) are hooked through their own greediness, and

often even in spite of a native shyness; but through appetite for

food they are drawn towards the bait, and are caught; while others are

similarly ensnared by drink?

(6) (SS. 4, 5, L. Dind. ed Lips.)

Ar. Undoubtedly.

Soc. And others again are victims of amorous heat, as quails, for

instance, or partridges, which, at the cry of the hen-bird, with

lust and expectation of such joys grow wild, and lose their power of

computing dangers: on they rush, and fall into the snare of the hunter?

Aristippus assented.

Soc. And would it not seem to be a base thing for a man to be affected

like the silliest bird or beast? as when the adulterer invades the

innermost sanctum (7) of the house, though he is well aware of the risks

which his crime involves, (8) the formidable penalties of the law,

the danger of being caught in the toils, and then suffering the direst

contumely. Considering all the hideous penalties which hang over the

adulterer's head, considering also the many means at hand to release him

from the thraldom of his passion, that a man should so drive headlong on

to the quicksands of perdition (9)--what are we to say of such frenzy?

The wretch who can so behave must surely be tormented by an evil spirit?

(10)

(7) {eis as eirktas}. The penetralia.

(8) Or, "he knows the risks he runs of suffering those penalties with

which the law threatens his crime should he fall into the snare,

and being caught, be mutilated."

(9) Or, "leap headlong into the jaws of danger."

(10) {kakodaimonontos}.

Ar. So it strikes me.

Soc. And does it not strike you as a sign of strange indifference that,

whereas the greater number of the indispensable affairs of men, as for

instance, those of war and agriculture, and more than half the rest,

need to be conducted under the broad canopy of heaven, (11) yet the

majority of men are quite untrained to wrestle with cold and heat?

(11) Or, "in the open air."

Aristippus again assented.

Soc. And do you not agree that he who is destined to rule must train

himself to bear these things lightly?

Ar. Most certainly.

Soc. And whilst we rank those who are self-disciplined in all these

matters among persons fit to rule, we are bound to place those incapable

of such conduct in the category of persons without any pretension

whatsoever to be rulers?

Ar. I assent.

Soc. Well, then, since you know the rank peculiar to either section of

mankind, did it ever strike you to consider to which of the two you are

best entitled to belong?

Yes I have (replied Aristippus). I do not dream for a moment of ranking

myself in the class of those who wish to rule. In fact, considering how

serious a business it is to cater for one's own private needs, I look

upon it as the mark of a fool not to be content with that, but to

further saddle oneself with the duty of providing the rest of the

community with whatever they may be pleased to want. That, at the cost

of much personal enjoyment, a man should put himself at the head of a

state, and then, if he fail to carry through every jot and tittle of

that state's desire, be held to criminal account, does seem to me the

very extravagance of folly. Why, bless me! states claim to treat their

rulers precisely as I treat my domestic slaves. I expect my attendants

to furnish me with an abundance of necessaries, but not to lay a finger

on one of them themselves. So these states regard it as the duty of a

ruler to provide them with all the good things imaginable, but to keep

his own hands off them all the while. (12) So then, for my part, if

anybody desires to have a heap of pother himself, (13) and be a nuisance

to the rest of the world, I will educate him in the manner suggested,

and he shall take his place among those who are fit to rule; but for

myself, I beg to be enrolled amongst those who wish to spend their days

as easily and pleasantly as possible.

(12) Or, "but he must have no finger in the pie himself."

(13) See Kuhner ad loc.

Soc. Shall we then at this point turn and inquire which of the two are

likely to lead the pleasanter life, the rulers or the ruled?

Ar. By all means let us do so.

Soc. To begin then with the nations and races known to ourselves. (14)

In Asia the Persians are the rulers, while the Syrians, Phrygians,

Lydians are ruled; and in Europe we find the Scythians ruling, and the

Maeotians being ruled. In Africa (15) the Carthaginians are rulers, the

Libyans ruled. Which of these two sets respectively leads the happier

life, in your opinion? Or, to come nearer home--you are yourself a

Hellene--which among Hellenes enjoy the happier existence, think you,

the dominant or the subject states?

(14) Or, "the outer world, the non-Hellenic races and nationalities of

which we have any knowledge."

(15) Lit. "Libya."

Nay, (16) I would have you to understand (exclaimed Aristippus) that I

am just as far from placing myself in the ranks of slavery; there is, I

take it, a middle path between the two which it is my ambition to tread,

avoiding rule and slavery alike; it lies through freedom--the high road

which leads to happiness.

(16) Or, "Pardon me interrupting you, Socrates; but I have not the

slightest intention of placing myself." See W. L. Newman, op. cit.

i. 306.

Soc. True, if only your path could avoid human beings, as it avoids rule

and slavery, there would be something in what you say. But being placed

as you are amidst human beings, if you purpose neither to rule nor to be

ruled, and do not mean to dance attendance, if you can help it, on those

who rule, you must surely see that the stronger have an art to seat the

weaker on the stool of repentance (17) both in public and in private,

and to treat them as slaves. I daresay you have not failed to note this

common case: a set of people has sown and planted, whereupon in comes

another set and cuts their corn and fells their fruit-trees, and in

every way lays siege to them because, though weaker, they refuse to pay

them proper court, till at length they are persuaded to accept slavery

rather than war against their betters. And in private life also,

you will bear me out, the brave and powerful are known to reduce the

helpless and cowardly to bondage, and to make no small profit out of

their victims.

(17) See "Symp." iii. 11; "Cyrop." II. ii. 14; Plat. "Ion," 535 E; L.

Dindorf ad loc.

Ar. Yes, but I must tell you I have a simple remedy against all such

misadventures. I do not confine myself to any single civil community. I

roam the wide world a foreigner.

Soc. Well, now, that is a masterly stroke, upon my word! (18) Of course,

ever since the decease of Sinis, and Sciron, and Procrustes, (19)

foreign travellers have had an easy time of it. But still, if I bethink

me, even in these modern days the members of free communities do

pass laws in their respective countries for self-protection against

wrong-doing. Over and above their personal connections, they provide

themselves with a host of friends; they gird their cities about with

walls and battlements; they collect armaments to ward off evil-doers;

and to make security doubly sure, they furnish themselves with allies

from foreign states. In spite of all which defensive machinery these

same free citizens do occasionally fall victims to injustice. But you,

who are without any of these aids; you, who pass half your days on the

high roads where iniquity is rife; (20) you, who, into whatever city

you enter, are less than the least of its free members, and moreover are

just the sort of person whom any one bent on mischief would single out

for attack--yet you, with your foreigner's passport, are to be

exempt from injury? So you flatter yourself. And why? Will the state

authorities cause proclamation to be made on your behalf: "The person

of this man Aristippus is secure; let his going out and his coming in

be free from danger"? Is that the ground of your confidence? or do you

rather rest secure in the consciousness that you would prove such a

slave as no master would care to keep? For who would care to have in

his house a fellow with so slight a disposition to work and so strong

a propensity to extravagance? Suppose we stop and consider that very

point: how do masters deal with that sort of domestic? If I am not

mistaken, they chastise his wantonness by starvation; they balk his

thieving tendencies by bars and bolts where there is anything to steal;

they hinder him from running away by bonds and imprisonment; they drive

the sluggishness out of him with the lash. Is it not so? Or how do you

proceed when you discover the like tendency in one of your domestics?

(18) Or, "Well foiled!" "A masterly fall! my prince of wrestlers."

(19) For these mythical highway robbers, see Diod. iv. 59; and for

Sciron in particular, Plut. "Theseus," 10.

(20) Or, "where so many suffer wrong."

Ar. I correct them with all the plagues, till I force them to serve me

properly. But, Socrates, to return to your pupil educated in the royal

art, (21) which, if I mistake not, you hold to be happiness: how, may I

ask, will he be better off than others who lie in evil case, in spite

of themselves, simply because they suffer perforce, but in his case the

hunger and the thirst, the cold shivers and the lying awake at nights,

with all the changes he will ring on pain, are of his own choosing? For

my part I cannot see what difference it makes, provided it is one and

the same bare back which receives the stripes, whether the whipping be

self-appointed or unasked for; nor indeed does it concern my body in

general, provided it be my body, whether I am beleaguered by a whole

armament of such evils (22) of my own will or against my will--except

only for the folly which attaches to self-appointed suffering.

(21) Cf. below, IV. ii. 11; Plat. "Statesm." 259 B; "Euthyd." 291 C;

K. Joel, op. cit. p. 387 foll. "Aristippus anticipates Adeimantus"

("Rep." 419), W. L. Newman, op. cit. i. 395.

(22) Cf. "suffers the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune."

Soc. What, Aristippus, does it not seem to you that, as regards such

matters, there is all the difference between voluntary and involuntary

suffering, in that he who starves of his own accord can eat when he

chooses, and he who thirsts of his own free will can drink, and so for

the rest; but he who suffers in these ways perforce cannot desist from

the suffering when the humour takes him? Again, he who suffers hardship

voluntarily, gaily confronts his troubles, being buoyed on hope

(23)--just as a hunter in pursuit of wild beasts, through hope of

capturing his quarry, finds toil a pleasure--and these are but prizes of

little worth in return for their labours; but what shall we say of their

reward who toil to obtain to themselves good friends, or to subdue their

enemies, or that through strength of body and soul they may administer

their households well, befriend their friends, and benefit the land

which gave them birth? Must we not suppose that these too will take

their sorrows lightly, looking to these high ends? Must we not suppose

that they too will gaily confront existence, who have to support them

not only their conscious virtue, but the praise and admiration of the

world? (24) And once more, habits of indolence, along with the fleeting

pleasures of the moment, are incapable, as gymnastic trainers say, of

setting up (25) a good habit of body, or of implanting in the soul any

knowledge worthy of account; whereas by painstaking endeavour in the

pursuit of high and noble deeds, as good men tell us, through endurance

we shall in the end attain the goal. So Hesiod somewhere says: (26)

Wickedness may a man take wholesale with ease, smooth is the way

and her dwelling-place is very nigh; but in front of virtue the

immortal gods have placed toil and sweat, long is the path and

steep that leads to her, and rugged at the first, but when the

summit of the pass is reached, then for all its roughness the path

grows easy.

(23) Cf. above, I. vi. 8.

(24) Or, "in admiration of themselves, the praise and envy of the

world at large."

(25) See Hippocrates, "V. Med." 18.

(26) Hesiod, "Works and Days," 285. See Plat. "Prot." 340 C; "Rep."

ii. 364 D; "Laws," iv. 718 E.

And Ephicharmus (27) bears his testimony when he says:

The gods sell us all good things in return for our labours.

(27) Epicharmus of Cos, the chief comic poet among the Dorians, fl.

500 B.C. Cf. Plat. "Theaet." 152 E, "the prince of comedy";

"Gorg." 505 D.

And again in another passage he exclaims:

Set not thine heart on soft things, thou knave, lest thou light

upon the hard.

And that wise man Prodicus (28) delivers himself in a like strain

concerning virtue in that composition of his about Heracles, which

crowds have listened to. (29) This, as far as I can recollect it, is the

substance at least of what he says:

(28) Prodicus of Ceos. See Plat. "Men." 24; "Cratyl." 1; Philostr.

"Vit. Soph." i. 12.

(29) Or, "which he is fond of reciting as a specimen of style." The

title of the {epideixis} was {'Orai} according to Suidas,

{Prodikos}.

"When Heracles was emerging from boyhood into the bloom of youth, having

reached that season in which the young man, now standing upon the verge

of independence, shows plainly whether he will enter upon the path of

virtue or of vice, he went forth into a quiet place, and sat debating

with himself which of those two paths he should pursue; and as he there

sat musing, there appeared to him two women of great stature which drew

nigh to him. The one was fair to look upon, frank and free by gift

of nature, (30) her limbs adorned with purity and her eyes with

bashfulness; sobriety set the rhythm of her gait, and she was clad in

white apparel. The other was of a different type; the fleshy softness

of her limbs betrayed her nurture, while the complexion of her skin was

embellished that she might appear whiter and rosier than she really

was, and her figure that she might seem taller than nature made her;

she stared with wide-open eyes, and the raiment wherewith she was clad

served but to reveal the ripeness of her bloom. With frequent glances

she surveyed her person, or looked to see if others noticed her; while

ever and anon she fixed her gaze upon the shadow of herself intently.

(30) Reading {eleutherion phusei,...} or if {eleutherion,

phusei...} translate "nature had adorned her limbs..."

"Now when these two had drawn near to Heracles, she who was first

named advanced at an even pace (31) towards him, but the other, in her

eagerness to outstrip her, ran forward to the youth, exclaiming, 'I see

you, Heracles, in doubt and difficulty what path of life to choose; make

me your friend, and I will lead you to the pleasantest road and easiest.

This I promise you: you shall taste all of life's sweets and escape all

bitters. In the first place, you shall not trouble your brain with

war or business; other topics shall engage your mind; (32) your only

speculation, what meat or drink you shall find agreeable to your palate;

what delight (33) of ear or eye; what pleasure of smell or touch; what

darling lover's intercourse shall most enrapture you; how you shall

pillow your limbs in softest slumber; how cull each individual pleasure

without alloy of pain; and if ever the suspicion steal upon you that the

stream of joys will one day dwindle, trust me I will not lead you where

you shall replenish the store by toil of body and trouble of soul. No!

others shall labour, but you shall reap the fruit of their labours; you

shall withhold your hand from nought which shall bring you gain. For to

all my followers I give authority and power to help themselves freely

from every side.'

(31) Or, "without change in her demeanour."

(32) Reading {diese}, or {dioisei}, "you shall continue speculating

solely."

(33) It will be recollected that Prodicus prided himself on {orthotes

onomaton}. Possibly Xenophon is imitating (caricaturing?) his

style. {terphtheies, estheies, euphrantheies}.

"Heracles hearing these words made answer: 'What, O lady, is the name

you bear?' To which she: 'Know that my friends call be Happiness,

but they that hate me have their own nicknames (34) for me, Vice and

Naughtiness.'

(34) So the vulg. {upokorizomenoi} is interpreted. Cobet ("Pros. Xen."

p. 36) suggests {upoknizomenoi} = "quippe qui desiderio

pungantur."

"But just then the other of those fair women approached and spoke:

'Heracles, I too am come to you, seeing that your parents are well

known to me, and in your nurture I have gauged your nature; wherefore I

entertain good hope that if you choose the path which leads to me, you

shall greatly bestir yourself to be the doer of many a doughty deed of

noble emprise; and that I too shall be held in even higher honour for

your sake, lit with the lustre shed by valorous deeds. (35) I will not

cheat you with preludings of pleasure, (36) but I will relate to you the

things that are according to the ordinances of God in very truth. Know

then that among things that are lovely and of good report, not one have

the gods bestowed upon mortal men apart from toil and pains. Would

you obtain the favour of the gods, then must you pay these same gods

service; would you be loved by your friends, you must benefit these

friends; do you desire to be honoured by the state, you must give the

state your aid; do you claim admiration for your virtue from all Hellas,

you must strive to do some good to Hellas; do you wish earth to yield

her fruits to you abundantly, to earth must you pay your court; do you

seek to amass riches from your flocks and herds, on them must you bestow

your labour; or is it your ambition to be potent as a warrior, able to

save your friends and to subdue your foes, then must you learn the arts

of war from those who have the knowledge, and practise their application

in the field when learned; or would you e'en be powerful of limb and

body, then must you habituate limbs and body to obey the mind, and

exercise yourself with toil and sweat.'

(35) Or, "bathed in the splendour of thy virtues."

(36) Or, "honeyed overtures of pleasure."

"At this point, (as Prodicus relates) Vice broke in exclaiming: 'See

you, Heracles, how hard and long the road is by which yonder woman would

escort you to her festal joys. (37) But I will guide you by a short and

easy road to happiness.'

(37) Hesiod, "Theog." 909; Milton, "L'Allegro," 12.

"Then spoke Virtue: 'Nay, wretched one, what good thing hast thou? or

what sweet thing art thou acquainted with--that wilt stir neither hand

nor foot to gain it? Thou, that mayest not even await the desire of

pleasure, but, or ever that desire springs up, art already satiated;

eating before thou hungerest, and drinking before thou thirsteth; who to

eke out an appetite must invent an army of cooks and confectioners; and

to whet thy thirst must lay down costliest wines, and run up and down

in search of ice in summer-time; to help thy slumbers soft coverlets

suffice not, but couches and feather-beds must be prepared thee and

rockers to rock thee to rest; since desire for sleep in thy case springs

not from toil but from vacuity and nothing in the world to do. Even the

natural appetite of love thou forcest prematurely by every means thou

mayest devise, confounding the sexes in thy service. Thus thou educatest

thy friends: with insult in the night season and drowse of slumber

during the precious hours of the day. Immortal, thou art cast forth

from the company of gods, and by good men art dishonoured: that sweetest

sound of all, the voice of praise, has never thrilled thine ears; and

the fairest of all fair visions is hidden from thine eyes that have

never beheld one bounteous deed wrought by thine own hand. If thou

openest thy lips in speech, who will believe thy word? If thou hast need

of aught, none shall satisfy thee. What sane man will venture to join

thy rablle rout? Ill indeed are thy revellers to look upon, young men

impotent of body, and old men witless in mind: in the heyday of life

they batten in sleek idleness, and wearily do they drag through an age

of wrinkled wretchedness: and why? they blush with shame at the thought

of deeds done in the past, and groan for weariness at what is left to

do. During their youth they ran riot through their sweet things, and

laid up for themselves large store of bitterness against the time of

eld. But my companionship is with the gods; and with the good among men

my conversation; no bounteous deed, divine or human, is wrought without

my aid. Therefore am I honoured in Heaven pre-eminently, and upon

earth among men whose right it is to honour me; (38) as a beloved

fellow-worker of all craftsmen; a faithful guardian of house and lands,

whom the owners bless; a kindly helpmeet of servants; (39) a brave

assistant in the labours of peace; an unflinching ally in the deeds of

war; a sharer in all friendships indispensable. To my friends is given

an enjoyment of meats and drinks, which is sweet in itself and devoid

of trouble, in that they can endure until desire ripens, and sleep more

delicious visits them than those who toil not. Yet they are not pained

to part with it; nor for the sake of slumber do they let slip the

performance of their duties. Among my followers the youth delights in

the praises of his elders, and the old man glories in the honour of the

young; with joy they call to memory their deeds of old, and in to-day's

well-doing are well pleased. For my sake they are dear in the sight

of God, beloved of their friends and honoured by the country of their

birth. When the appointed goal is reached they lie not down in oblivion

with dishonour, but bloom afresh--their praise resounded on the lips of

men for ever. (40) Toils like these, O son of noble parents, Heracles,

it is yours to meet with, and having endured, to enter into the heritage

assured you of transcendant happiness.'"

(38) Reading {ois prosekei}, or if {proseko}, translate "to whom I am

attached."

(39) Cf. "Econ." v. 8.

(40) Or, "so true is it, a branch is left them; undying honour to

their name!"

This, Aristippus, in rough sketch is the theme which Prodicus pursues

(41) in his "Education of Heracles by Virtue," only he decked out

his sentiments, I admit, in far more magnificent phrases than I have

ventured on. Were it not well, Aristippus, to lay to heart these

sayings, and to strive to bethink you somewhat of that which touches the

future of our life?

(41) Reading {diokei}, al. {diokei} = "so Prodicus arranged the parts

of his discourse."

II

At another time, he had noticed the angry temper shown by Lamprocles,

the elder of his sons, towards their mother, and thus addressed himself

to the lad.

Soc. Pray, my son, did you ever hear of certain people being called

ungrateful?

That I have (replied the young man).

Soc. And have you understood what it is they do to get that bad name?

Lamp. Yes, I have: when any one has been kindly treated, and has it in

his power to requite the kindness but neglects to do so, men call him

ungrateful.

Soc. And you admit that people reckon the ungrateful among wrongdoers?

Lamp. I do.

Soc. And has it ever struck you to inquire whether, as regards the right

or wrong of it, ingratitude may not perhaps resemble some such conduct

as the enslavement, say, of prisoners, which is accounted wrong towards

friends but justifiable towards enemies?

Lamp. Yes, I have put that question to myself. In my opinion, no matter

who confers the kindness, friend or foe, the recipient should endeavour

to requite it, failing which he is a wrongdoer.

Soc. Then if that is how the matter stands, ingratitude would be an

instance of pure unadulterate wrongdoing?

Lamprocles assented to the proposition.

Soc. It follows, then, that in proportion to the greatness of the

benefit conferred, the greater his misdoing who fails to requite the

kindness?

Lamprocles again assented.

Socrates continued: And where can we hope to find greater benefits than

those which children derive from their parents--their father and mother

who brought them out of nothingness into being, who granted them to look

upon all these fair sights, and to partake of all those blessings which

the gods bestow on man, things so priceless in our eyes that one and all

we shudder at the thought of leaving them, and states have made death

the penalty for the greatest crimes, because there is no greater evil

through fear of which to stay iniquity.

You do not suppose that human beings produce children for the sake of

carnal pleasure (1) merely; were this the motive, street and bordell are

full of means to quit them of that thrall; whereas nothing is plainer

than the pains we take to seek out wives who shall bear us the finest

children. (2) With these we wed, and carry on the race. The man has a

twofold duty to perform: partly in cherishing her who is to raise up

children along with him, and partly towards the children yet unborn

in providing them with things that he thinks will contribute to their

well-being--and of these as large a store as possible. The woman,

conceiving, bears her precious burthen with travail and pain, and at the

risk of life itself--sharing with that within her womb the food on which

she herself is fed. And when with much labour she has borne to the end

and brought forth her offspring, she feeds it and watches over it with

tender care--not in return for any good thing previously received, for

indeed the babe itself is little conscious of its benefactor and cannot

even signify its wants; only she, the mother, making conjecture of what

is good for it, and what will please it, essays to satisfy it; (3)

and for many months she feeds it night and day, enduring the toil nor

recking what return she shall receive for all her trouble. Nor does the

care and kindness of parents end with nurture; but when the children

seem of an age to learn, they teach them themselves whatever cunning

they possess, as a guide to life, or where they feel that another is

more competent, to him they send them to be taught at their expense.

Thus they watch over their children, doing all in their power to enable

them to grow up to be as good as possible.

(1) Lit. "the joys of Aphrodite."

(2) "For the procreation of children." See below, IV. iv. 22; "Pol.

Lac." i.

(3) Lit. "to leave nought lacking."

So be it (the youth answered); but even if she have done all that,

and twenty times as much, no soul on earth could endure my mother's

cross-grained temper.

Then Socrates: Which, think you, would be harder to bear--a wild beast's

savagery or a mother's?

Lamp. To my mind, a mother's--at least if she be such as mine.

Soc. Dear me! And has this mother ever done you any injury--such as

people frequently receive from beasts, by bite or kick?

Lamp. If she has not done quite that, she uses words which any one would

sooner sell his life than listen to.

Soc. And how many annoyances have you caused your mother, do you

suppose, by fretfulness and peevishness in word and deed, night and day,

since you were a little boy? How much sorrow and pain, when you were

ill?

Lamp. Well, I never said or did anything to bring a blush to her cheeks.

Soc. No, come now! Do you suppose it is harder for you to listen to your

mother's speeches than for actor to listen to actor on the tragic stage,

(4) when the floodgates of abuse are opened?

(4) See Grote, "H. G." viii. 457; Plut. "Solon," xxix.

Lamp. Yes; for the simple reason that they know it is all talk on their

parts. The inquisitor may cross-question, but he will not inflict

a fine; the threatener may hurl his menaces, but he will do no

mischief--that is why they take it all so easily.

Soc. Then ought you to fly into a passion, who know well enough that,

whatever your mother says, she is so far from meaning you mischief that

she is actually wishing blessings to descend upon you beyond all others?

Or do you believe that your mother is really ill disposed towards you?

Lamp. No, I do not think that.

Soc. Then this mother, who is kindly disposed to you, and takes such

tender care of you when you are ill to make you well again, and to see

that you want for nothing which may help you; and, more than all, who is

perpetually pleading for blessings in your behalf and offering her vows

to Heaven (5)--can you say of her that she is cross-grained and harsh?

For my part, I think, if you cannot away with such a mother, you cannot

away with such blessings either.

(5) Or, "paying vows."

But tell me (he proceeded), do you owe service to any living being,

think you? or are you prepared to stand alone? Prepared not to please or

try to please a single soul? to follow none? To obey neither general nor

ruler of any sort? Is that your attitude, or do you admit that you owe

allegiance to somebody?

Lamp. Yes; certainly I owe allegiance.

Soc. May I take it that you are willing to please at any rate your

neighbour, so that he may kindle a fire for you in your need, may prove

himself a ready helpmate in good fortune, or if you chance on evil and

are stumbling, may friendlily stand by your side to aid?

Lamp. I am willing.

Soc. Well, and what of that other chance companion--your

fellow-traveller by land or sea? what of any others, you may light upon?

is it indifferent to you whether these be friends or not, or do you

admit that the goodwill of these is worth securing by some pains on your

part?

Lamp. I do.

Soc. It stands thus then: you are prepared to pay attention to this,

that, and the other stranger, but to your mother who loves you more than

all else, you are bound to render no service, no allegiance? Do you

not know that whilst the state does not concern itself with ordinary

ingratitude or pass judicial sentence on it; whilst it overlooks the

thanklessness of those who fail to make return for kindly treatment, it

reserves its pains and penalties for the special case? If a man render

not the service and allegiance due to his parents, on him the finger

of the law is laid; his name is struck off the roll; he is forbidden to

hold the archonship--which is as much as to say, "Sacrifices in behalf

of the state offered by such a man would be no offerings, being tainted

with impiety; nor could aught else be 'well and justly' performed

of which he is the doer." Heaven help us! If a man fail to adorn the

sepulchre of his dead parents the state takes cognisance of the matter,

and inquisition is made in the scrutiny of the magistrates. (6) And as

for you, my son, if you are in your sober senses, you will earnestly

entreat your mother, lest the very gods take you to be an ungrateful

being, and on their side also refuse to do you good; and you will beware

of men also, lest they should perceive your neglect of your parents, and

with one consent hold you in dishonour; (7) and so you find yourself in

a desert devoid of friends. For if once the notion be entertained that

here is a man ungrateful to his parents, no one will believe that any

kindness shown you would be other than thrown away.

(6) Lit. "the docimasia." See Gow, "Companion," xiv.

(7) "Visiti with atimia."

III

At another time the differences between two brothers named Chaerephon

and Chaerecrates, both well known to him, had drawn his attention; and

on seeing the younger of the two he thus addressed him.

Soc. Tell me, Chaerecrates, you are not, I take it, one of those strange

people who believe that goods are better and more precious than a

brother; (1) and that too although the former are but senseless chattels

which need protection, the latter a sensitive and sensible being who

can afford it; and what is more, he is himself alone, whilst as for them

their name is legion. And here again is a marvellous thing: that a man

should count his brother a loss, because the goods of his brother are

not his; but he does not count his fellow-citizens loss, and yet their

possessions are not his; only it seems in their case he has wits to see

that to dwell securely with many and have enough is better than to own

the whole wealth of a community and to live in dangerous isolation; but

this same doctrine as applied to brothers they ignore. Again, if a

man have the means, he will purchase domestic slaves, because he wants

assistants in his work; he will acquire friends, because he needs their

support; but this brother of his--who cares about brothers? It seems

a friend may be discovered in an ordinary citizen, but not in a blood

relation who is also a brother. And yet it is a great vantage-ground

towards friendship to have sprung from the same loins and to have been

suckled at the same breasts, since even among beasts a certain natural

craving, and sympathy springs up between creatures reared together. (2)

Added to which, a man who has brothers commands more respect from the

rest of the world than the man who has none, and who must fight his own

battles. (3)

(1) Cf. "Merchant of Venice," II. viii. 17: "Justice! the law! my

ducats, and my daughter!"

(2) Or, "a yearning after their foster-brothers manifests itself in

animals." See "Cyrop." VIII. vii. 14 foll. for a parallel to this

discussion.

(3) Lit. "and is less liable to hostility."

Chaer. I daresay, Socrates, where the differences are not profound,

reason would a man should bear with his brother, and not avoid him for

some mere trifle's sake, for a brother of the right sort is, as you say,

a blessing; but if he be the very antithesis of that, why should a man

lay his hand to achieve the impossible?

Soc. Well now, tell me, is there nobody whom Chaerephon can please any

more than he can please yourself; or do some people find him agreeable

enough?

Chaer. Nay, there you hit it. That is just why I have a right to detest

him. He can be pleasing enough to others, but to me, whenever he appears

on the scene, he is not a blessing--no! but by every manner of means the

reverse.

Soc. May it not happen that just as a horse is no gain to the inexpert

rider who essays to handle him, so in like manner, if a man tries to

deal with his brother after an ignorant fashion, this same brother will

kick?

Chaer. But is it likely now? How should I be ignorant of the art of

dealing with my brother if I know the art of repaying kind words and

good deeds in kind? But a man who tries all he can to annoy me by word

and deed, I can neither bless nor benefit, and, what is more, I will not

try.

Soc. Well now, that is a marvellous statement, Chaerecrates. Your dog,

the serviceable guardian of your flocks, who will fawn and lick the hand

of your shepherd, when you come near him can only growl and show his

teeth. Well; you take no notice of the dog's ill-temper, you try to

propitiate him by kindness; but your brother? If your brother were what

he ought to be, he would be a great blessing to you--that you admit;

and, as you further confess, you know the secret of kind acts and words,

yet you will not set yourself to apply means to make him your best of

friends.

Chaer. I am afraid, Socrates, that I have no wisdom or cunning to make

Chaerephon bear himself towards me as he should.

Soc. Yet there is no need to apply any recondite or novel machinery.

Only bait your hook in the way best known to yourself, and you will

capture him; whereupon he will become your devoted friend.

Chaer. If you are aware that I know some love-charm, Socrates, of which

I am the happy but unconscious possessor, pray make haste and enlighten

me.

Soc. Answer me then. Suppose you wanted to get some acquaintance to

invite you to dinner when he next keeps holy day, (4) what steps would

you take?

(4) "When he next does sacrifice"; see "Hiero," viii. 3. Cf. Theophr.

"Char." xv. 2, and Prof. Jebb's note ad loc.

Chaer. No doubt I should set him a good example by inviting him myself

on a like occasion.

Soc. And if you wanted to induce some friend to look after your affairs

during your absence abroad, how would you achieve your purpose?

Chaer. No doubt I should present a precedent in undertaking to look

after his in like circumstances.

Soc. And if you wished to get some foreign friend to take you under his

roof while visiting his country, what would you do?

Chaer. No doubt I should begin by offering him the shelter of my own

roof when he came to Athens, in order to enlist his zeal in furthering

the objects of my visit; it is plain I should first show my readiness to

do as much for him in a like case.

Soc. Why, it seems you are an adept after all in all the philtres known

to man, only you chose to conceal your knowledge all the while; or is

it that you shrink from taking the first step because of the scandal you

will cause by kindly advances to your brother? And yet it is commonly

held to redound to a man's praise to have outstripped an enemy in

mischief or a friend in kindness. Now if it seemed to me that Chaerephon

were better fitted to lead the way towards this friendship, (5) I

should have tried to persuade him to take the first step in winning your

affection, but now I am persuaded the first move belongs to you, and to

you the final victory.

(5) Reading {pros ten philian}, or if {phusin}, transl. "natural

disposition."

Chaer. A startling announcement, Socrates, from your lips, and most

unlike you, to bid me the younger take precedence of my elder brother.

Why, it is contrary to the universal custom of mankind, who look to the

elder to take the lead in everything, whether as a speaker or an actor.

Soc. How so? Is it not the custom everywhere for the younger to step

aside when he meets his elder in the street and to give him place? Is he

not expected to get up and offer him his seat, to pay him the honour of

a soft couch, (6) to yield him precedence in argument?

(6) Lit. "with a soft bed," or, as we say, "the best bedroom."

My good fellow, do not stand shilly-shallying, (7) but put out your hand

caressingly, and you will see the worthy soul will respond at once with

alacrity. Do you not note your brother's character, proud and frank and

sensitive to honour? He is not a mean and sorry rascal to be caught by a

bribe--no better way indeed for such riff-raff. No! gentle natures need

a finer treatment. You can best hope to work on them by affection.

(7) Or, "have no fears, essay a soothing treatment."

Chaer. But suppose I do, and suppose that, for all my attempts, he shows

no change for the better?

Soc. At the worst you will have shown yourself to be a good, honest,

brotherly man, and he will appear as a sorry creature on whom kindness

is wasted. But nothing of the sort is going to happen, as I conjecture.

My belief is that as soon as he hears your challenge, he will embrace

the contest; pricked on by emulous pride, he will insist upon getting

the better of you in kindness of word and deed.

At present you two are in the condition of two hands formed by God to

help each other, but which have let go their business and have turned to

hindering one another all they can. You are a pair of feet fashioned on

the Divine plan to work together, but which have neglected this in order

to trammel each other's gait. Now is it not insensate stupidity (8) to

use for injury what was meant for advantage? And yet in fashioning

two brothers God intends them, methinks, to be of more benefit to one

another than either two hands, or two feet, or two eyes, or any other

of those pairs which belong to man from his birth. (9) Consider how

powerless these hands of ours if called upon to combine their action at

two points more than a single fathom's length apart; (10) and these feet

could not stretch asunder (11) even a bare fathom; and these eyes, for

all the wide-reaching range we claim for them, are incapable of seeing

simultaneously the back and front of an object at even closer quarters.

But a pair of brothers, linked in bonds of amity, can work each for the

other's good, though seas divide them. (12)

(8) "Boorishness verging upon monomania."

(9) "With which man is endowed at birth."

(10) "More than an 'arms'-stretch' asunder."

(11) Lit. "reach at one stretch two objects, even over that small

distance."

(12) "Though leagues separate them."

IV

I have at another time heard him discourse on the kindred theme of

friendship in language well calculated, as it seemed to me, to help a

man to choose and also to use his friends aright.

He (Socrates) had often heard the remark made that of all possessions

there is none equal to that of a good and sincere friend; but, in spite

of this assertion, the mass of people, as far as he could see, concerned

themselves about nothing so little as the acquisition of friends.

Houses, and fields, and slaves, and cattle, and furniture of all sorts

(he said) they were at pains to acquire, and they strove hard to keep

what they had got; but to procure for themselves this greatest of all

blessings, as they admitted a friend to be, or to keep the friends whom

they already possessed, not one man in a hundred ever gave himself a

thought. It was noticeable, in the case of a sickness befalling a man's

friend and one of his own household simultaneously, the promptness with

which the master would fetch the doctor to his domestic, and take every

precaution necessary for his recovery, with much expenditure of pains;

but meanwhile little account would be taken of the friend in like

condition, and if both should die, he will show signs of deep annoyance

at the death of his domestic, which, as he reflects, is a positive loss

to him; but as regards his friend his position is in no wise materially

affected, and thus, though he would never dream of leaving his other

possessions disregarded and ill cared for, friendship's mute appeal is

met with flat indifference. (1)

(1) Or, "the cry of a friend for careful tending falls on deaf ears."

Or to take (said he) a crowning instance: (2) with regard to ordinary

possessions, however multifarious these may be, most people are at least

acquainted with their number, but if you ask a man to enumerate his

friends, who are not so very many after all perhaps, he cannot; or if,

to oblige the inquirer, he essays to make a list, he will presently

retract the names of some whom he had previously included. (3) Such is

the amount of thought which people bestow upon their friends.

(2) Or, "Nor had he failed to observe another striking contrast." Cf.

Cic. "Lael." 17; Diog. Laert. ii. 30.

(3) i.e. "like a chess-player recalling a move."

And yet what thing else may a man call his own is comparable to this one

best possession! what rather will not serve by contrast to enhance the

value of an honest friend! Think of a horse or a yoke of oxen; they have

their worth; but who shall gauge the worth of a worthy friend? Kindlier

and more constant than the faithfullest of slaves--this is that

possession best named all-serviceable. (4) Consider what the post is

that he assigns himself! to meet and supplement what is lacking to

the welfare of his friends, to promote their private and their public

interests, is his concern. Is there need of kindly action in any

quarter? he will throw in the full weight of his support. Does some

terror confound? he is at hand to help and defend by expenditure of

money and of energy, (5) by appeals to reason or resort to force. His

the privilege alike to gladden the prosperous in the hour of success and

to sustain their footing who have well-nigh slipped. All that the hands

of a man may minister, all that the eyes of each are swift to see, the

ears to hear, and the feet to compass, he with his helpful arts will not

fall short of. Nay, not seldom that which a man has failed to accomplish

for himself, has missed seeing or hearing or attaining, a friend acting

in behalf of friend will achieve vicariously. And yet, albeit to try and

tend a tree for the sake of its fruit is not uncommon, this copious mine

of wealth--this friend--attracts only a lazy and listless attention on

the part of more than half the world.

(4) "A vessel fit for all work indeed is this friend." Cf. Ar. "Ach."

936, {pagkhreston aggos estai}, like the "leather bottel."

(5) Or, "by dint of his diplomacy."

V

I remember listening to another argument of his, the effect of which

would be to promote self-examination. The listener must needs be brought

to ask himself, "Of what worth am I to my friends?" It happened thus.

One of those who were with him was neglectful, as he noted, of a friend

who was at the pinch of poverty (Antisthenes). (1) Accordingly, in the

presence of the negligent person and of several others, he proceeded to

question the sufferer.

(1) Antisthenes, "cynicorum et stoicorum parens." Cic. "de Or." iii.

17; "ad Att." xii. 38. See below, III. iii. 17; "Symp." passim;

Diog. Laert. II. v.; VI. i.

Soc. What say you, Antisthenes?--have friends their values like domestic

slaves? One of these latter may be worth perhaps two minae, (2) another

only half a mina, a third five, and a fourth as much as ten; while they

do say that Nicias, (3) the son of Niceratus, paid a whole talent for

a superintendent of his silver mines. And so I propound the question to

myself as follows: "Have friends, like slaves, their market values?"

(2) A mina = L4 circ.

(3) For Nicias see Thuc. vii. 77 foll.; "Revenues," iv. 14; Plut.

"Nic." IV. v.; Lys. "de bon. Aristoph." 648.

Not a doubt of it (replied Antisthenes). At any rate, I know that I

would rather have such a one as my friend than be paid two minae, and

there is such another whose worth I would not estimate at half a mina,

and a third with whom I would not part for ten, and then again a fourth

whose friendship would be cheap if it cost me all the wealth and pains

in the world to purchase it.

Well then (continued Socrates), if that be so, would it not be well if

every one were to examine himself: "What after all may I chance to be

worth to my friends?" Should he not try to become as dear as possible,

so that his friends will not care to give him up? How often do I hear

the complaint: "My friend So-and-so has given me up"; or "Such an one,

whom I looked upon as a friend, has sacrificed me for a mina." And every

time I hear these remarks, the question arises in my mind: If the vendor

of a worthless slave is ready to part with him to a purchaser for what

he will fetch--is there not at least a strong temptation to part with a

base friend when you have a chance of making something on the exchange?

Good slaves, as far as I can see, are not so knocked down to the hammer;

no, nor good friends so lightly parted with.

VI

Again, in reference to the test to be applied, if we would gauge the

qualifications of a friend worth the winning, the following remarks of

Socrates could not fail, I think, to prove instructive. (1)

(1) Or, "Again, as to establishing a test of character, since a friend

worth having must be of a particular type, I cannot but think that

the following remarks would prove instructive."

Tell me (said Socrates, addressing Critobulus), supposing we stood in

need of a good friend, how should we set about his discovery? We

must, in the first place, I suppose, seek out one who is master of his

appetites, not under the dominion, that is, of his belly, not addicted

to the wine-cup or to lechery or sleep or idleness, since no one

enslaved to such tyrants could hope to do his duty either by himself or

by his friends, could he?

Certainly not (Critobulus answered).

Soc. Do you agree, then, that we must hold aloof from every one so

dominated?

Cri. Most assuredly.

Well then (proceeded Socrates), what shall we say of the spendthrift who

has lost his independence and is for ever begging of his neighbours;

if he gets anything out of them he cannot repay, but if he fails to get

anything, he hates you for not giving--do you not think that this man

too would prove but a disagreeable friend?

Cri. Certainly.

Soc. Then we must keep away from him too?

Cri. That we must.

Soc. Well! and what of the man whose strength lies in monetary

transactions? (2) His one craving is to amass money; and for that reason

he is an adept at driving a hard bargain (3)--glad enough to take in,

but loath to pay out.

(2) Or, "the money-lender? He has a passion for big money-bags."

(3) Or, "hard in all his dealings."

Cri. In my opinion he will prove even a worse fellow than the last.

Soc. Well! and what of that other whose passion for money-making is so

absorbing that he has no leisure for anything else, save how he may add

to his gains?

Cri. Hold aloof from him, say I, since there is no good to be got out of

him or his society.

Soc. Well! what of the quarrelsome and factious person (4) whose main

object is to saddle his friends with a host of enemies?

(4) "The partisan."

Cri. For God's sake let us avoid him also.

Soc. But now we will imagine a man exempt indeed from all the above

defects--a man who has no objection to receive kindnesses, but it never

enters into his head to do a kindness in return.

Cri. There will be no good in him either. But, Socrates, what kind of

man shall we endeavour to make our friend? what is he like?

Soc. I should say he must be just the converse of the above: he has

control over the pleasures of the body, he is kindly disposed, (5)

upright in all his dealings, (6) very zealous is he not to be outdone in

kindness by his benefactors, if only his friends may derive some profit

from his acquaintance.

(5) Reading {eunous}, or if {euorkos}, transl. "a man of his word."

(6) Or, "easy to deal with."

Cri. But how are we to test these qualities, Socrates, before

acquaintance?

Soc. How do we test the merits of a sculptor?--not by inferences drawn

from the talk of the artist merely. No, we look to what he has already

achieved. These former statues of his were nobly executed, and we trust

he will do equally well with the rest.

Cri. You mean that if we find a man whose kindness to older friends

is established, we may take it as proved that he will treat his newer

friends as amiably?

Soc. Why, certainly, if I see a man who has shown skill in the handling

of horses previously, I argue that he will handle others no less

skilfully again.

Cri. Good! and when we have discovered a man whose friendship is worth

having, how ought we to make him our friend?

Soc. First we ought to ascertain the will of Heaven whether it be

advisable to make him our friend.

Cri. Well! and how are we to effect the capture of this friend of our

choice, whom the gods approve? will you tell me that?

Not, in good sooth (replied Socrates), by running him down like a hare,

nor by decoying him like a bird, or by force like a wild boar. (7) To

capture a friend against his will is a toilsome business, and to bind

him in fetters like a slave by no means easy. Those who are so treated

are apt to become foes instead of friends. (8)

(7) Reading {kaproi}, al. {ekhthroi}, "an enemy."

(8) Or, "Hate rather than friendship is the outcome of these methods."

Cri. But how convert them into friends?

Soc. There are certain incantations, we are told, which those who know

them have only to utter, and they can make friends of whom they list;

and there are certain philtres also which those who have the secret of

them may administer to whom they like and win their love.

Cri. From what source shall we learn them?

Soc. You need not go farther than Homer to learn that which the Sirens

sang to Odysseus, (9) the first words of which run, I think, as follows:

Hither, come hither, thou famous man, Odysseus, great glory of the

Achaeans!

(9) "Od." xii. 184.

Cri. And did the magic words of this spell serve for all men alike? Had

the Sirens only to utter this one incantation, and was every listener

constrained to stay?

Soc. No; this was the incantation reserved for souls athirst for fame,

of virtue emulous.

Cri. Which is as much as to say, we must suit the incantation to the

listener, so that when he hears the words he shall not think that the

enchanter is laughing at him in his sleeve. I cannot certainly conceive

a method better calculated to excite hatred and repulsion than to go

to some one who knows that he is small and ugly and a weakling, and to

breathe in his ears the flattering tale that he is beautiful and tall

and stalwart. But do you know any other love-charms, Socrates?

Soc. I cannot say that I do; but I have heard that Pericles (10) was

skilled in not a few, which he poured into the ear of our city and won

her love.

(10) See above, I. ii. 40; "Symp." viii. 39.

Cri. And how did Themistocles (11) win our city's love?

(11) See below, III. vi. 2; IV. ii. 2.

Soc. Ah, that was not by incantation at all. What he did was to encircle

our city with an amulet of saving virtue. (12)

(12) See Herod. vii. 143, "the wooden wall"; Thuc. i. 93, "'the walls'

of Athens."

Cri. You would imply, Socrates, would you not, that if we want to win

the love of any good man we need to be good ourselves in speech and

action?

And did you imagine (replied Socrates) that it was possible for a bad

man to make good friends?

Cri. Why, I could fancy I had seen some sorry speech-monger who was fast

friends with a great and noble statesman; or again, some born commander

and general who was boon companion with fellows quite incapable of

generalship. (13)

(13) Or, "Why, yes, when I see some base orator fast friends with a

great leader of the people; or, again, some fellow incapable of

generalship a comrade to the greatest captains of his age."

Soc. But in reference to the point we were discussing, may I ask whether

you know of any one who can attach a useful friend to himself without

being of use in return? (14) Can service ally in friendship with

disservice?

(14) Add, "Can service ally in friendship with disservice? Must there

not be a reciprocity of service to make friendship lasting?"

Cri. In good sooth no. But now, granted it is impossible for a base man

to be friends with the beautiful and noble, (14) I am concerned at once

to discover if one who is himself of a beautiful and noble character

can, with a wave of the hand, as it were, attach himself in friendship

to every other beautiful and noble nature.

(14) {kalous kagathous}.

Soc. What perplexes and confounds you, Critobulus, is the fact that

so often men of noble conduct, with souls aloof from baseness, are not

friends but rather at strife and discord with one another, and deal more

harshly by one another than they would by the most good-for-nothing of

mankind.

Cri. Yes, and this holds true not of private persons only, but states,

the most eager to pursue a noble policy and to repudiate a base one,

are frequently in hostile relation to one another. As I reason on

these things my heart fails me, and the question, how friends are to

be acquired, fills me with despondency. The bad, as I see, cannot be

friends with one another. For how can such people, the ungrateful, or

reckless, or covetous, or faithless, or incontinent, adhere together as

friends? Without hesitation I set down the bad as born to be foes not

friends, and as bearing the birthmark of internecine hate. But then

again, as you suggest, no more can these same people harmonise in

friendship with the good. For how should they who do evil be friends

with those who hate all evil-doing? And if, last of all, they that

cultivate virtue are torn by party strife in their struggle for the

headship of the states, envying one another, hating one another, who are

left to be friends? where shall goodwill and faithfulness be found among

men?

Soc. The fact is there is some subtlety in the texture of these things.

(15) Seeds of love are implanted in man by nature. Men have need of

one another, feel pity, help each other by united efforts, and in

recognition of the fact show mutual gratitude. But there are seeds of

war implanted also. The same objects being regarded as beautiful or

agreeable by all alike, they do battle for their possession; a spirit of

disunion (16) enters, and the parties range themselves in adverse camps.

Discord and anger sound a note of war: the passion of more-having,

staunchless avarice, threatens hostility; and envy is a hateful fiend.

(17)

(15) i.e. a cunning intertwining of the threads of warp and woof.

(16) Cf. Shelley, "The devil of disunion in their souls."

(17) The diction is poetical.

But nevertheless, through all opposing barriers friendship steals her

way and binds together the beautiful and good among mankind. (18) Such

is their virtue that they would rather possess scant means painlessly

than wield an empire won by war. In spite of hunger and thirst they will

share their meat and drink without a pang. Not bloom of lusty youth, nor

love's delights can warp their self-control; nor will they be tempted

to cause pain where pain should be unknown. It is theirs not merely

to eschew all greed of riches, not merely to make a just and lawful

distribution of wealth, but to supply what is lacking to the needs of

one another. Theirs it is to compose strife and discord not in painless

oblivion simply, but to the general advantage. Theirs also to hinder

such extravagance of anger as shall entail remorse hereafter. And as to

envy they will make a clean sweep and clearance of it: the good things

which a man possesses shall be also the property of his friends, and the

goods which they possess are to be looked upon as his. Where then is

the improbability that the beautiful and noble should be sharers in the

honours (19) of the state not only without injury, but even to their

mutual advantage?

(18) Or, as we say, "the elite of human kind."

(19) "And the offices."

They indeed who covet and desire the honours and offices in a state

for the sake of the liberty thereby given them to embezzle the public

moneys, to deal violently by their fellow-creatures, and to batten in

luxury themselves, may well be regarded as unjust and villainous persons

incapable of harmony with one another. But if a man desire to obtain

these selfsame honours in order that, being himself secure against

wrong-doing, he may be able to assist his friends in what is right, and,

raised to a high position, (20) may essay to confer some blessing on the

land of his fathers, what is there to hinder him from working in harmony

with some other of a like spirit? Will he, with the "beautiful and

noble" at his side, be less able to aid his friends? or will his

power to benefit the community be shortened because the flower of that

community are fellow-workers in that work? Why, even in the contests

of the games it is obvious that if it were possible for the stoutest

combatants to combine against the weakest, the chosen band would come

off victors in every bout, and would carry off all the prizes. This

indeed is against the rules of the actual arena; but in the field of

politics, where the beautiful and good hold empery, and there is nought

to hinder any from combining with whomsoever a man may choose to benefit

the state, it will be a clear gain, will it not, for any one engaged

in state affairs to make the best men his friends, whereby he will find

partners and co-operators in his aims instead of rivals and antagonists?

And this at least is obvious: in case of foreign war a man will need

allies, but all the more if in the ranks opposed to him should stand the

flower of the enemy. (21) Moreover, those who are willing to fight

your battles must be kindly dealt with, that goodwill may quicken to

enthusiasm; and one good man (22) is better worth your benefiting that a

dozen knaves, since a little kindness goes a long way with the good, but

with the base the more you give them the more they ask for.

(20) "As archon," or "raised to rule."

(21) Lit. "the beautiful and good."

(22) Or, "the best, though few, are better worth your benefiting than

the many base."

So keep a good heart, Critobulus; only try to become good yourself, and

when you have attained, set to your hand to capture the beautiful and

good. Perhaps I may be able to give you some help in this quest, being

myself an adept in Love's lore. (23) No matter who it is for whom my

heart is aflame; in an instant my whole soul is eager to leap forth.

With vehemence I speed to the mark. I, who love, demand to be loved

again; this desire in me must be met by counter desire in him; this

thirst for his society by thirst reciprocal for mine. And these will

be your needs also, I foresee, whenever you are seized with longing to

contract a friendship. Do not hide from me, therefore, whom you would

choose as a friend, since, owing to the pains I take to please him

who pleases me, I am not altogether unversed, I fancy, in the art of

catching men. (24)

(23) "An authority in matters of love." Cf. Plat. "Symp." 177 D; Xen.

"Symp." viii. 2.

(24) See below, III. xi. 7; cf. Plat. "Soph." 222; N. T. Matt. iv. 19,

{alieis anthropon}.

Critobulus replied: Why, these are the very lessons of instruction,

Socrates, for which I have been long athirst, and the more particularly

if this same love's lore will enable me to capture those who are good of

soul and those who are beautiful of person.

Soc. Nay, now I warn you, Critobulus, it is not within the province of

my science to make the beautiful endure him who would lay hands upon

them. And that is why men fled from Scylla, I am persuaded, because she

laid hands upon them; but the Sirens were different--they laid hands on

nobody, but sat afar off and chanted their spells in the ears of all;

and therefore, it is said, all men endured to listen, and were charmed.

Cri. I promise I will not lay violent hands on any; therefore, if you

have any good device for winning friends, instruct your pupil.

Soc. And if there is to be no laying on of the hands, there must be no

application either of the lips; is it agreed?

Cri. No, nor application of the lips to any one--not beautiful.

Soc. See now! you cannot open your mouth without some luckless

utterance. Beauty suffers no such liberty, however eagerly the ugly may

invite it, making believe some quality of soul must rank them with the

beautiful.

Cri. Be of good cheer then; let the compact stand thus: "Kisses for the

beautiful, and for the good a rain of kisses." So now teach us the art

of catching friends.

Soc. Well then, when you wish to win some one's affection, you will

allow me to lodge information against you to the effect that you admire

him and desire to be his friend?

Cri. Lodge the indictment, with all my heart. I never heard of any one

who hated his admirers.

Soc. And if I add to the indictment the further charge that through your

admiration you are kindly disposed towards him, you will not feel I am

taking away your character?

Cri. Why, no; for myself I know a kindly feeling springs up in my heart

towards any one whom I conceive to be kindly disposed to me.

Soc. All this I shall feel empowered to say about you to those whose

friendship you seek, and I can promise further help; only there is a

comprehensive "if" to be considered: if you will further authorise me to

say that you are devoted to your friends; that nothing gives you so much

joy as a good friend; that you pride yourself no less on the fine deeds

of those you love than on your own; and on their good things equally

with your own; that you never weary of plotting and planning to procure

them a rich harvest of the same; and lastly, that you have discovered

a man's virtue is to excel his friends in kindness and his foes in

hostility. If I am authorised thus to report of you, I think you will

find me a serviceable fellow-hunter in the quest of friends, which is

the conquest of the good.

Cri. Why this appeal to me?--as if you had not free permission to say

exactly what you like about me.

Soc. No; that I deny, on the authority of Aspasia. (25) I have it from

her own lips. "Good matchmakers," she said tome, "were clever hands at

cementing alliances between people, provided the good qualities they

vouched for were truthfully reported; but when it came to their telling

lies, for her part she could not compliment them. (26) Their poor

deluded dupes ended by hating each other and the go-betweens as well."

Now I myself am so fully persuaded of the truth of this that I feel it

is not in my power to say aught in your praise which I cannot say with

truth.

(25) Aspasia, daughter of Axiochus, of Miletus. See "Econ." iii. 14;

Plat. "Menex." 235 E; Aesch. Socrat. ap. Cic. "de Invent." I.

xxxi. 51. See Grote, "H. G." vi. 132 foll.; Cobet, "Pros. Xen."

(26) Reading {ouk ethelein epainein}, or if {ouk ophelein epainousas}

with Kuhner transl. "Good matchmakers, she told me, have to

consult truth when reporting favourably of any one: then indeed

they are terribly clever at bringing people together: whereas

false flatterers do no good; their dupes," etc.

Cri. Really, Socrates, you are a wonderfully good friend to me--in so

far as I have any merit which will entitle me to win a friend, you will

lend me a helping hand, it seems; otherwise you would rather not forge

any petty fiction for my benefit.

Soc. But tell me, how shall I assist you best, think you? By praising

you falsely or by persuading you to try to be a good man? Or if it is

not plain to you thus, look at the matter by the light of some examples.

I wish to introduce you to a shipowner, or to make him your friend: I

begin by singing your praises to him falsely thus, "You will find him a

good pilot"; he catches at the phrase, and entrusts his ship to you,

who have no notion of guiding a vessel. What can you expect but to make

shipwreck of the craft and yourself together? or suppose by similar

false assertions I can persuade the state at large to entrust her

destinies to you--"a man with a fine genius for command," I say, "a

practised lawyer," "a politician born," and so forth. The odds are, the

state and you may come to grief through you. Or to take an instance

from everyday life. By my falsehoods I persuade some private person to

entrust his affairs to you as "a really careful and business-like

person with a head for economy." When put to the test would not your

administration prove ruinous, and the figure you cut ridiculous? No, my

dear friend, there is but one road, the shortest, safest, best, and it

is simply this: In whatsoever you desire to be deemed good, endeavour

to be good. For of all the virtues namable among men, consider, and

you will find there is not one but may be increased by learning and

practice. For my part then, Critobulus, these are the principles on

which we ought to go a-hunting; but if you take a different view, I am

all attention, please instruct me.

Then Critobulus: Nay, Socrates, I should be ashamed to gainsay what you

have said; if I did, it would neither be a noble statement nor a true.

(27)

(27) {kala... alethe}.

VII

He had two ways of dealing with the difficulties of his friends: where

ignorance was the cause, he tried to meet the trouble by a dose of

common sense; or where want and poverty were to blame, by lessoning them

that they should assist one another according to their ability; and here

I may mention certain incidents which occurred within my own knowledge.

How, for instance, he chanced upon Aristarchus wearing the look of one

who suffered from a fit of the "sullens," and thus accosted him.

Soc. You seem to have some trouble on your mind, Aristarchus; if so, you

should share it with your friends. Perhaps together we might lighten the

weight of it a little.

Aristarchus answered: Yes, Socrates, I am in sore straits indeed. Ever

since the party strife declared itself in the city, (1) what with the

rush of people to Piraeus, and the wholesale banishments, I have been

fairly at the mercy of my poor deserted female relatives. Sisters,

nieces, cousins, they have all come flocking to me for protection. I

have fourteen free-born souls, I tell you, under my single roof, and how

are we to live? We can get nothing out of the soil--that is in the hands

of the enemy; nothing from my house property, for there is scarcely a

living soul left in the city; my furniture? no one will buy it; money?

there is none to be borrowed--you would have a better chance to find

it by looking for it on the road than to borrow it from a banker. Yes,

Socrates, to stand by and see one's relatives die of hunger is hard

indeed, and yet to feed so many at such a pinch impossible.

(1) i.e. circa 404-403 B.C. See "Hell." II. iv.

After he listened to the story, Socrates asked: How comes it that

Ceramon, (2) with so many mouths to feed, not only contrives to furnish

himself and them with the necessaries of life, but to realise a handsome

surplus, whilst you being in like plight (3) are afraid you will one and

all perish of starvation for want of the necessaries of life?

(2) An employer of labour, apparently, on a grand scale.

(3) Lit. "with your large family to feed." L. Dindorf would like to

read {su de oligous}, "you with your small family."

Ar. Why, bless your soul, do you not see he has only slaves and I have

free-born souls to feed?

Soc. And which should you say were the better human beings, the

free-born members of your household or Ceramon's slaves?

Ar. The free souls under my roof without a doubt.

Soc. Is it not a shame, then, that he with his baser folk to back

him should be in easy circumstances, while you and your far superior

household are in difficulties?

Ar. To be sure it is, when he has only a set of handicraftsmen to feed,

and I my liberally-educated household.

Soc. What is a handicraftsman? Does not the term apply to all who can

make any sort of useful product or commodity?

Ar. Certainly.

Soc. Barley meal is a useful product, is it not?

Ar. Pre-eminently so.

Soc. And loaves of bread?

Ar. No less.

Soc. Well, and what do you say to cloaks for men and for women--tunics,

mantles, vests? (4)

(4) For these articles of dress see Becker's "Charicles," Exc. i. to

Sc. xi. "Dress."

Ar. Yes, they are all highly useful commodities.

Soc. Then your household do not know how to make any of these?

Ar. On the contrary, I believe they can make them all.

Soc. Then you are not aware that by means of the manufacture of one of

these alone--his barley meal store--Nausicydes (5) not only maintains

himself and his domestics, but many pigs and cattle besides, and

realises such large profits that he frequently contributes to the state

benevolences; (6) while there is Cyrebus, again, who, out of a bread

factory, more than maintains the whole of his establishment, and lives

in the lap of luxury; and Demeas of Collytus gets a livelihood out of

a cloak business, and Menon as a mantua-maker, and so, again, more than

half the Megarians (7) by the making of vests.

(5) Nausicydes. Cobet, "Pros. Xen." cf. Aristoph. "Eccles." 426.

(6) Lit. "state liturgies," or "to the burden of the public services."

For these see Gow, "Companion," xviii. "Athenian Finance."

(7) Cf. Arist. "Acharnians," 519, {esukophantei Megareon ta

khlaniskia}. See Dr. Merry's note ad loc.

Ar. Bless me, yes! They have got a set of barbarian fellows, whom they

purchase and keep, to manufacture by forced labour whatever takes their

fancy. My kinswomen, I need not tell you, are free-born ladies.

Soc. Then, on the ground that they are free-born and your kinswomen,

you think that they ought to do nothing but eat and sleep? Or is it your

opinion that people who live in this way--I speak of free-born people

in general--lead happier lives, and are more to be congratulated, than

those who give their time and attention to such useful arts of life as

they are skilled in? Is this what you see in the world, that for the

purpose of learning what it is well to know, and of recollecting the

lessons taught, or with a view to health and strength of body, or for

the sake of acquiring and preserving all that gives life its charm,

idleness and inattention are found to be helpful, whilst work and study

are simply a dead loss? Pray, when those relatives of yours were taught

what you tell me they know, did they learn it as barren information

which they would never turn to practical account, or, on the contrary,

as something with which they were to be seriously concerned some day,

and from which they were to reap advantage? Do human beings in general

attain to well-tempered manhood by a course of idling, or by carefully

attending to what will be of use? Which will help a man the more to grow

in justice and uprightness, to be up and doing, or to sit with folded

hands revolving the ways and means of existence? As things now stand,

if I am not mistaken, there is no love lost between you. You cannot help

feeling that they are costly to you, and they must see that you find

them a burthen? This is a perilous state of affairs, in which hatred and

bitterness have every prospect of increasing, whilst the pre-existing

bond of affection (8) is likely to be snapped.

(8) Or, "the original stock of kindliness will be used up."

But now, if only you allow them free scope for their energies, when you

come to see how useful they can be, you will grow quite fond of them,

and they, when they perceive that they can please you, will cling to

their benefactor warmly. Thus, with the memory of former kindnesses

made sweeter, you will increase the grace which flows from kindnesses

tenfold; you will in consequence be knit in closer bonds of love and

domesticity. If, indeed, they were called upon to do any shameful work,

let them choose death rather than that; but now they know, it would

seem, the very arts and accomplishments which are regarded as the

loveliest and the most suitable for women; and the things which we know,

any of us, are just those which we can best perform, that is to say,

with ease and expedition; it is a joy to do them, and the result is

beautiful. (9) Do not hesitate, then, to initiate your friends in what

will bring advantage to them and you alike; probably they will gladly

respond to your summons.

(9) Or, "with ease, rapidity, pleasure and effect."

Well, upon my word (Aristarchus answered), I like so well what you

say, Socrates, that though hitherto I have not been disposed to borrow,

knowing that when I had spent what I got I should not be in a condition

to repay, I think I can now bring myself to do so in order to raise a

fund for these works.

Thereupon a capital was provided; wools were purchased; the good man's

relatives set to work, and even whilst they breakfasted they worked, and

on and on till work was ended and they supped. Smiles took the place of

frowns; they no longer looked askance with suspicion, but full into each

other's eyes with happiness. They loved their kinsman for his kindness

to them. He became attached to them as helpmates; and the end of it all

was, he came to Socrates and told him with delight how matters fared;

"and now," he added, "they tax me with being the only drone in the

house, who sit and eat the bread of idleness."

To which Socrates: Why do not you tell them the fable of the dog? (10)

Once on a time, so goes the story, when beasts could speak, the sheep

said to her master, "What a marvel is this, master, that to us, your

own sheep, who provide you with fleeces and lambs and cheese, you give

nothing, save only what we may nibble off earth's bosom; but with this

dog of yours, who provides you with nothing of the sort, you share

the very meat out of your mouth." When the dog heard these words, he

answered promptly, "Ay, in good sooth, for is it not I who keep you safe

and sound, you sheep, so that you are not stolen by man nor harried by

wolves; since, if I did not keep watch over you, you would not be able

so much as to graze afield, fearing to be destroyed." And so, says

the tale, the sheep had to admit that the dog was rightly preferred to

themselves in honour. And so do you tell your flock yonder that like the

dog in the fable you are their guardian and overseer, and it is thanks

to you that they are protected from evil and evildoers, so that they

work their work and live their lives in blissful security.

(10) See Joseph Jacobs, "The Fables of Aesop," vol. i. p. 26 foll.,

for "a complete list of the Fables given in Greek literature up to

the fall of Greek independence." Cf. Hesiod, "Works and Days," 202

foll.; Archilochus, 89 (60), Bergk; Herod. i. 141; Aesch.

"Myrmid." fr. 123; Aristot. "Rhet." II. xx.

VIII

At another time chancing upon an old friend whom he had not seen for a

long while, he greeted him thus.

Soc. What quarter of the world do you hail from, Eutherus?

The other answered: From abroad, just before the close of the war; but

at present from the city itself. (1) You see, since we have been denuded

of our possessions across the frontier, (2) and my father left me

nothing in Attica, I must needs bide at home, and provide myself with

the necessaries of life by means of bodily toil, which seems preferable

to begging from another, especially as I have no security on which to

raise a loan.

(1) Lit. "from here." The conversation perhaps takes place in Piraeus

404 B.C.

(2) Or, "colonial possession." Cf. "Symp." iv. 31.

Soc. And how long do you expect your body to be equal to providing the

necessaries of life for hire?

Euth. Goodness knows, Socrates--not for long.

Soc. And when you find yourself an old man, expenses will not diminish,

and yet no one will care to pay you for the labour of your hands.

Euth. That is true.

Soc. Would it not be better then to apply yourself at once to such

work as will stand you in good stead when you are old--that is, address

yourself to some large proprietor who needs an assistant in managing his

estate? (3) By superintending his works, helping to get in his crops,

and guarding his property in general, you will be a benefit to the

estate and be benefited in return.

(3) Cf. "Cyrop." VIII. iii. 48.

I could not endure the yoke of slavery, Socrates! (he exclaimed).

Soc. And yet the heads of departments in a state are not regarded as

adopting the badge of slavery because they manage the public property,

but as having attained a higher degree of freedom rather.

Euth. In a word, Socrates, the idea of being held to account to another

is not at all to my taste.

Soc. And yet, Eutherus, it would be hard to find a work which did

not involve some liability to account; in fact it is difficult to do

anything without some mistake or other, and no less difficult, if

you should succeed in doing it immaculately, to escape all unfriendly

criticism. I wonder now whether you find it easy to get through your

present occupations entirely without reproach. No? Let me tell you what

you should do. You should avoid censorious persons and attach yourself

to the considerate and kind-hearted, and in all your affairs accept

with a good grace what you can and decline what you feel you cannot do.

Whatever it be, do it heart and soul, and make it your finest work. (4)

There lies the method at once to silence fault-finders and to minister

help to your own difficulties. Life will flow smoothly, risks will be

diminished, provision against old age secured.

(4) Or, "study to make it your finest work, the expression of a real

enthusiasm."

IX

At another time, as I am aware, he had heard a remark made by Crito (1)

that life at Athens was no easy matter for a man who wished to mind his

own affairs.

(1) Crito. See above, I. ii. 48; Cobet, "P. X."; cf. Plat. "Rep."

viii. 549 C.

As, for instance, at this moment (Crito proceeded) there are a set

of fellows threatening me with lawsuits, not because they have any

misdemeanour to allege against me, but simply under the conviction that

I will sooner pay a sum of money than be troubled further.

To which Socrates replied: Tell me, Crito, you keep dogs, do you not, to

ward off wolves from your flocks?

Cr. Certainly; it pays to do so.

Soc. Then why do you not keep a watchman willing and competent to ward

off this pack of people who seek to injure you?

I should not at all mind (he answered), if I were not afraid he might

turn again and rend his keeper.

What! (rejoined Socrates), do you not see that to gratify a man like

yourself is far pleasanter as a matter of self-interest than to quarrel

with you? You may be sure there are plenty of people here who will take

the greatest pride in making you their friend.

Accordingly, they sought out Archedemus, (2) a practical man with a

clever tongue in his head (3) but poor; the fact being, he was not the

sort to make gain by hook or by crook, but a lover of honesty and of

too good a nature himself to make his living as a pettifogger. (4) Crito

would then take the opportunity of times of harvesting and put aside

small presents for Achedemus of corn and oil, or wine, or wool, or any

other of the farm produce forming the staple commodities of life, or he

would invite him to a sacrificial feast, and otherwise pay him marked

attention. Archedemus, feeling that he had in Crito's house a harbour

of refuge, could not make too much of his patron, and ere long he

had hunted up a long list of iniquities which could be lodged against

Crito's pettifogging persecutors themselves, and not only their numerous

crimes but their numerous enemies; and presently he prosecuted one of

them in a public suit, where sentence would be given against him "what

to suffer or what to pay." (5) The accused, conscious as he was of

many rascally deeds, did all he could to be quit of Archedemus, but

Archedemus was not to be got rid of. He held on until he had made the

informer not only loose his hold of Crito but pay himself a sum of

money; and now that Archedemus had achieved this and other similar

victories, it is easy to guess what followed. (6) It was just as when

some shepherd has got a very good dog, all the other shepherds wish

to lodge their flocks in his neighbourhood that they too may reap the

benefit of him. So a number of Crito's friends came begging him to allow

Archedemus to be their guardian also, and Archedemus was overjoyed to

do something to gratify Crito, and so it came about that not only Crito

abode in peace, but his friends likewise. If any of those people with

whom Archedemus was not on the best of terms were disposed to throw

it in his teeth that he accepted his patron's benefits and paid in

flatteries, he had a ready retort: "Answer me this question--which is

the more scandalous, to accept kindnesses from honest folk and to repay

them, with the result that I make such people my friends but quarrel

with knaves, or to make enemies of honourable gentlemen (7) by attempts

to do them wrong, with the off-chance indeed of winning the friendship

of some scamps in return for my co-operation, but the certainty of

losing in the tone of my acquaintances?" (8)

(2) Archedemus, possibly the demagogue, "Hell." I. vii. 2. So Cobet,

"P. X.," but see Grote, "H. G." viii. 245.

(3) Lit. "very capable of speech and action"--the writer's favourite

formula for the well-trained Athenian who can speak fluently and

reason clearly, and act energetically and opportunely.

(4) Reading {kai euphuesteros on} (or {e os})... {apo sukophanton}

(or {sukophantion}), after Cobet, "P. X." s.v. Archedemus. The

MSS. give {kai ephe raston einai}--"nothing is easier," he said,

"than recovering from sycophants."

(5) For this formula cf. "Econ." vi. 24. Cf. Plat. "Statesm." 299 A.

(6) {ede tote}. Cf. Plat. "Laws," vi. 778 C.

(7) Lit. the {kaloi kagathoi}, which like {khrestous} and {ponerous}

has a political as well as an ethical meaning.

(8) Lit. "must associate with these (the {ponerois}) instead of those

(the {kalois te kagathois}).

The net result of the whole proceedings was that Archedemus was now

Crito's right hand, (9) and by the rest of Crito's friends he was held

in honour.

(9) He was No. 1--{eis}.

X

Again I may cite, as known to myself, (1) the following discussion; the

arguments were addressed to Diodorus, one of his companions. The master

said:

(1) Or, "for which I can personally vouch."

Tell me, Diodorus, if one of your slaves runs away, are you at pains to

recover him?

More than that (Diodorus answered), I summon others to my aid and I have

a reward cried for his recovery.

Soc. Well, if one of your domestics is sick, do you tend him and call in

the doctors to save his life?

Diod. Decidedly I do.

Soc. And if an intimate acquaintance who is far more precious to you

than any of your household slaves is about to perish of want, you would

think it incumbent on you to take pains to save his life? Well! now you

know without my telling you that Hermogenes (2) is not made of wood or

stone. If you helped him he would be ashamed not to pay you in kind.

And yet--the opportunity of possessing a willing, kindly, and trusty

assistant well fitted to do your bidding, and not merely that, but

capable of originating useful ideas himself, with a certain forecast

of mind and judgment--I say such a man is worth dozens of slaves. Good

economists tell us that when a precious article may be got at a low

price we ought to buy. And nowadays when times are so bad it is possible

to get good friends exceedingly cheap.

(2) Hermogenes, presumably the son of Hipponicus. See I. ii. 48.

Diodorus answered: You are quite right, Socrates; bid Hermogenes come to

me.

Soc. Bid Hermogenes come to you!--not I indeed! since for aught I can

understand you are no better entitled to summon him that to go to him

yourself, nor is the advantage more on his side than your own.

Thus Diodorus went off in a trice to seek Hermogenes, and at no great

outlay won to himself a friend--a friend whose one concern it now was to

discover how, by word or deed, he might help and gladden Diodorus.

BOOK III

I

Aspirants to honour and distinction (1) derived similar help from

Socrates, who in each case stimulated in them a persevering assiduity

towards their several aims, as the following narratives tend to show. He

had heard on one occasion of the arrival in Athens of Dionysodorus, (2)

who professed to teach the whole duty of a general. (3) Accordingly he

remarked to one of those who were with him--a young man whose anxiety to

obtain the office of Strategos (4) was no secret to him:

(1) {ton kalon} = everything which the {kalos te kagathos} should aim

at, but especially the honourable offices of state such as the

Archonship, Strategia, Hipparchia, etc. See Plat. "Laches."

(2) Dionysodorus of Chios, presumably. See Plat. "Euthyd." 271 C foll.

(3) A professor of the science and art of strategy.

(4) Lit. "that honour," sc. the Strategia.

Soc. It would be monstrous on the part of any one who sought to become

a general (5) to throw away the slightest opportunity of learning the

duties of the office. Such a person, I should say, would deserve to be

fined and punished by the state far more than the charlatan who without

having learnt the art of a sculptor undertakes a contract to carve a

statue. Considering that the whole fortunes of the state are entrusted

to the general during a war, with all its incidental peril, it is only

reasonable to anticipate that great blessings or great misfortunes

will result in proportion to the success or bungling of that officer. I

appeal to you, young sir, do you not agree that a candidate who, while

taking pains to be elected neglects to learn the duties of the office,

would richly deserve to be fined?

(5) i.e. "head of the war department, and commander-in-chief," etc.

With arguments like these he persuaded the young man to go and take

lessons. After he had gone through the course he came back, and Socrates

proceeded playfully to banter him.

Soc. Behold our young friend, sirs, as Homer says of Agamemnon, of mein

majestical, (6) so he; does he not seem to move more majestically, like

one who has studied to be a general? Of course, just as a man who

has learned to play the harp is a harper, even if he never touch the

instrument, or as one who has studied medicine is a physician, though he

does not practise, so our friend here from this time forward is now and

ever shall be a general, even though he does not receive a vote at the

elections. But the dunce who has not the science is neither general

nor doctor, no, not even if the whole world appointed him. But (he

proceeded, turning to the youth), in case any of us should ever find

ourselves captain or colonel (7) under you, to give us some smattering

of the science of war, what did the professor take as the starting-point

of his instruction in generalship? Please inform us.

(6) "Il." iii. 169, 170.

(7) Or, "brigadier or captain," lit. taxiarch or lochagos.

Then the young man: He began where he ended; he taught me tactics

(8)--tactics and nothing else.

(8) Cf. "Cyrop." I. vi. 12 foll.; VIII. v. 15.

Yet surely (replied Socrates) that is only an infinitesimal part of

generalship. A general (9) must be ready in furnishing the material of

war: in providing the commissariat for his troops; quick in devices, he

must be full of practical resource; nothing must escape his eye or tax

his endurance; he must be shrewd, and ready of wit, a combination at

once of clemency and fierceness, of simplicity and of insidious

craft; he must play the part of watchman, of robber; now prodigal as

a spendthrift, and again close-fisted as a miser, the bounty of his

munificence must be equalled by the narrowness of his greed; impregnable

in defence, a very dare-devil in attack--these and many other qualities

must he possess who is to make a good general and minister of war; they

must come to him by gift of nature or through science. No doubt it is a

grand thing also to be a tactician, since there is all the difference in

the world between an army properly handled in the field and the same

in disorder; just as stones and bricks, woodwork and tiles, tumbled

together in a heap are of no use at all, but arrange them in a certain

order--at bottom and atop materials which will not crumble or rot,

such as stones and earthen tiles, and in the middle between the two put

bricks and woodwork, with an eye to architectural principle, (10) and

finally you get a valuable possession--to wit, a dwelling-place.

(9) A strategos. For the duties and spheres of action of this officer,

see Gow, op. cit. xiv. 58.

(10) "As in the building of a house." See Vitrivius, ii. 3; Plin. xxv.

14.

The simile is very apt, Socrates (11) (replied the youth), for in

battle, too, the rule is to draw up the best men in front and rear,

with those of inferior quality between, where they may be led on by the

former and pushed on by the hinder.

(11) Cf. "Il." iv. 297 foll.; "Cyrop." VI. iii. 25; Polyb. x. 22.

Soc. Very good, no doubt, if the professor taught you to distinguish

good and bad; but if not, where is the use of your learning? It would

scarcely help you, would it, to be told to arrange coins in piles, the

best coins at top and bottom and the worst in the middle, unless you

were first taught to distinguish real from counterfeit.

The Youth. Well no, upon my word, he did not teach us that, so that the

task of distinguishing between good and bad must devolve on ourselves.

Soc. Well, shall we see, then, how we may best avoid making blunders

between them?

I am ready (replied the youth).

Soc. Well then! Let us suppose we are marauders, and the task imposed

upon us is to carry off some bullion; it will be a right disposition of

our forces if we place in the vanguard those who are the greediest of

gain? (12)

(12) "Whose fingers itch for gold."

The Youth. I should think so.

Soc. Then what if there is danger to be faced? Shall the vanguard

consist of men who are greediest of honour?

The Youth. It is these, at any rate, who will face danger for the sake

of praise and glory. (13) Fortunately such people are not hid away in

a corner; they shine forth conspicuous everywhere, and are easy to be

discovered.

(13) Cf. Shakesp. "seeking the bubble reputation even in the cannon's

mouth."

Soc. But tell me, did he teach you how to draw up troops in general,

or specifically where and how to apply each particular kind of tactical

arrangement?

The Youth. Nothing of the sort.

Soc. And yet there are and must be innumerable circumstances in which

the same ordering of march or battle will be out of place.

The Youth. I assure you he did not draw any of these fine distinctions.

He did not, did not he? (he answered). Bless me! Go back to him again,

then, and ply him with questions; if he really has the science, and is

not lost to all sense of shame, he will blush to have taken your money

and then to have sent you away empty.

II

At another time he fell in with a man who had been chosen general and

minister of war, and thus accosted him.

Soc. Why did Homer, think you, designate Agamemnon "shepherd of the

peoples"? (1) Was it possibly to show that, even as a shepherd must care

for his sheep and see that they are safe and have all things needful,

and that the objects of their rearing be secured, so also must a general

take care that his soldiers are safe and have their supplies, and attain

the objects of their soldiering? Which last is that they may get the

mastery of their enemies, and so add to their own good fortune and

happiness; or tell me, what made him praise Agamemnon, saying--

He is both a good king and a warrior bold? (2)

Did he mean, perhaps, to imply that he would be a 'warrior bold,' not

merely in standing alone and bravely battling against the foe, but as

inspiring the whole of his host with like prowess; and by a 'good king,'

not merely one who should stand forth gallantly to protect his own life,

but who should be the source of happiness to all over whom he reigns?

Since a man is not chosen king in order to take heed to himself, albeit

nobly, but that those who chose him may attain to happiness through him.

And why do men go soldiering except to ameliorate existence? (3) and to

this end they choose their generals that they may find in them guides to

the goal in question. He, then, who undertakes that office is bound to

procure for those who choose him the thing they seek for. And indeed it

were not easy to find any nobler ambition than this, or aught ignobler

than its opposite.

(1) "Il." ii. 243. "The People's Paster," Chapman.

(2) "Il." iii. 179; cf. "Symp." iv. 6. A favourite line of Alexander

the Great's, it is said.

(3) Of, "that life may reach some flower of happiness."

After such sort he handled the question, what is the virtue of a good

leader? and by shredding off all superficial qualities, laid bare as

the kernel of the matter that it is the function of every leader to make

those happy whom he may be called upon to lead. (4)

(4) Cf. Plat. "Rep." 342.

III

The following conversation with a youth who had just been elected

hipparch (1) (or commandant of cavalry), I can also vouch for. (2)

(1) Cf. "Hipparch."

(2) Lit. "I know he once held."

Soc. Can you tell us what set you wishing to be a general of cavalry,

young sir? What was your object? I suppose it was not simply to ride at

the head of the "knights," an honour not denied to the mounted archers,

(3) who ride even in front of the generals themselves?

(3) Lit. "Hippotoxotai." See Boeckh, "P. E. A." II. xxi. p. 264 (Eng.

tr.)

Hipp. You are right.

Soc. No more was it for the sake merely of public notoriety, since a

madman might boast of that fatal distinction. (4)

(4) Or, "as we all know, 'Tom Fool' can boast," etc.

Hipp. You are right again.

Soc. Is this possibly the explanation? you think to improve the

cavalry--your aim would be to hand it over to the state in better

condition than you find it; and, if the cavalry chanced to be called

out, you at their head would be the cause of some good thing to Athens?

Hipp. Most certainly.

Soc. Well, and a noble ambition too, upon my word--if you can achieve

your object. The command to which you are appointed concerns horses and

riders, does it not?

Hipp. It does, no doubt.

Soc. Come then, will you explain to us first how you propose to improve

the horses.

Hipp. Ah, that will scarcely form part of my business, I fancy. Each

trooper is personally responsible for the condition of his horse.

Soc. But suppose, when they present themselves and their horses, (5) you

find that some have brought beasts with bad feet or legs or otherwise

infirm, and others such ill-fed jades that they cannot keep up on the

march; others, again, brutes so ill broken and unmanageable that they

will not keep their place in the ranks, and others such desperate

plungers that they cannot be got to any place in the ranks at all. What

becomes of your cavalry force then? How will you charge at the head of

such a troop, and win glory for the state?

(5) For this phrase, see Schneider and Kuhner ad loc.

Hipp. You are right. I will try to look after the horses to my utmost.

Soc. Well, and will you not lay your hand to improve the men themselves?

Hipp. I will.

Soc. The first thing will be to make them expert in mounting their

chargers?

Hipp. That certainly, for if any of them were dismounted he would then

have a better chance of saving himself.

Soc. Well, but when it comes to the hazard of engagement, what will

you do then? Give orders to draw the enemy down to the sandy ground (6)

where you are accustomed to manouvre, or endeavour beforehand to put

your men through their practice on ground resembling a real battlefield?

(6) e.g. the hippodrome at Phaleron.

Hipp. That would be better, no doubt.

Soc. Well, shall you regard it as a part of your duty to see that as

many of your men as possible can take aim and shoot on horseback? (7)

(7) Cf. "Hipparch," i. 21.

Hipp. It will be better, certainly.

Soc. And have you thought how to whet the courage of your troopers? to

kindle in them rage to meet the enemy?--which things are but stimulants

to make stout hearts stouter?

Hipp. If I have not done so hitherto, I will try to make up for lost

time now.

Soc. And have you troubled your head at all to consider how you are to

secure the obedience of your men? for without that not one particle

of good will you get, for all your horses and troopers so brave and so

stout.

Hipp. That is a true saying; but how, Socrates, should a man best bring

them to this virtue? (8)

(8) {protrepsasthai}. See above, I. ii. 64; below, IV. v. 1.

Soc. I presume you know that in any business whatever, people are more

apt to follow the lead of those whom they look upon as adepts; thus in

case of sickness they are readiest to obey him whom they regard as

the cleverest physician; and so on a voyage the most skilful pilot; in

matters agricultural the best farmer, and so forth.

Hipp. Yes, certainly.

Soc. Then in this matter of cavalry also we may reasonably suppose that

he who is looked upon as knowing his business best will command the

readiest obedience.

Hipp. If, then, I can prove to my troopers that I am better than all of

them, will that suffice to win their obedience?

Soc. Yes, if along with that you can teach them that obedience to you

brings greater glory and surer safety to themselves.

Hipp. How am I to teach them that?

Soc. Upon my word! How are you to teach them that? Far more easily, I

take it, than if you had to teach them that bad things are better than

good, and more advantageous to boot.

Hipp. I suppose you mean that, besides his other qualifications a

commandant of cavalry must have command of speech and argument? (9)

(9) Or, "practise the art of oratory"; "express himself clearly and

rationally." See Grote, "H. G." VIII. lxvii. p. 463 note;

"Hipparch," i. 24; viii. 22.

Soc. Were you under the impression that the commandant was not to open

his mouth? Did it never occur to you that all the noblest things

which custom (10) compels us to learn, and to which indeed we owe our

knowledge of life, have all been learned by means of speech (11) and

reason; and if there be any other noble learning which a man may learn,

it is this same reason whereby he learns it; and the best teachers are

those who have the freest command of thought and language, and those

that have the best knowledge of the most serious things are the most

brilliant masters of disputation. Again, have you not observed that

whenever this city of ours fits out one of her choruses--such as that,

for instance, which is sent to Delos (12)--there is nothing elsewhere

from any quarter of the world which can compete with it; nor will you

find in any other state collected so fair a flower of manhood as in

Athens? (13)

(10) Cf Arist. "Rhet." ii. 12, {oi neoi pepaideuntai upo tou nomou

monon}.

(11) {dia logou}.

(12) See Thuc. iii. 104; and below, IV. viii. 2.

(13) See references ap. Schneider and Kuhner; "Symp." iv. 17.

Hipp. You say truly.

Soc. But for all that, it is not in sweetness of voice that the

Athenians differ from the rest of the world so much, nor in stature of

body or strength of limb, but in ambition and that love of honour (14)

which most of all gives a keen edge to the spirit in the pursuit of

things lovely and of high esteem.

(14) See below, v. 3; Dem. "de Cor." 28 foll.

Hipp. That, too, is a true saying.

Soc. Do you not think, then, that if a man devoted himself to our

cavalry also, here in Athens, we should far outstrip the rest of the

world, whether in the furnishing of arms and horses, or in orderliness

of battle-array, or in eager hazardous encounter with the foe, if only

we could persuade ourselves that by so doing we should obtain honour and

distinction?

Hipp. It is reasonable to think so.

Soc. Have no hesitation, therefore, but try to guide your men into this

path, (15) whence you yourself, and through you your fellow-citizens,

will reap advantage.

(15) Or, "to conduct which will not certainly fail of profit to

yourself or through you to..."

Yes, in good sooth, I will try (he answered).

IV

At another time, seeing Nicomachides on his way back from the

elections (of magistrates), (1) he asked him: Who are elected generals,

Nicomachides?

(1) Cf. "Pol. Ath." i. 3; Aristot. "Ath. Pol." 44. 4; and Dr. Sandys'

note ad loc. p. 165 of his edition.

And he: Is it not just like them, these citizens of Athens--just like

them, I say--to go and elect, not me, who ever since my name first

appeared on the muster-roll have literally worn myself out with military

service--now as a captain, now as a colonel--and have received all these

wounds from the enemy, look you! (at the same time, and suiting the

action to the word, he bared his arms and proceeded to show the scars

of ancient wounds)--they elect not me (he went on), but, if you please,

Antisthenes! who never served as a hoplite (2) in his life nor in the

cavalry ever made a brilliant stroke, that I ever heard tell of; no! in

fact, he has got no science at all, I take it, except to amass stores of

wealth.

(2) Cf. Lys. xiv. 10.

But still (returned Socrates), surely that is one point in his

favour--he ought to be able to provide the troops with supplies.

Nic. Well, for the matter of that, merchants are good hands at

collecting stores; but it does not follow that a merchant or trader will

be able to command an army.

But (rejoined Socrates) Antisthenes is a man of great pertinacity, who

insists on winning, and that is a very necessary quality in a general.

(3) Do not you see how each time he has been choragos (4) he has been

successful with one chorus after another?

(3) See Grote, "Plato," i. 465 foll.

(4) Choir-master, or Director of the Chorus. It was his duty to

provide and preside over a chorus to sing, dance, or play at any

of the public festivals, defraying the cost as a state service of

{leitourgia}. See "Pol. Ath." iii. 4; "Hiero," ix. 4; Aristot.

"Pol. Ath." 28. 3.

Nic. Bless me! yes; but there is a wide difference between standing at

the head of a band of singers and dancers and a troop of soldiers.

Soc. Still, without any practical skill in singing or in the training

of a chorus, Antisthenes somehow had the art to select the greatest

proficients in both.

Nic. Yes, and by the same reasoning we are to infer that on a campaign

he will find proficients, some to marshal the troops for him and others

to fight his battles?

Soc. Just so. If in matters military he only exhibits the same skill in

selecting the best hands as he has shown in matters of the chorus, it is

highly probable he will here also bear away the palm of victory; and we

may presume that if he expended so much to win a choric victory with a

single tribe, (5) he will be ready to expend more to secure a victory in

war with the whole state to back him.

(5) See Dem. "against Lept." 496. 26. Each tribe nominated such of its

members as were qualified to undertake the burden.

Nic. Do you really mean, Socrates, that it is the function of the same

man to provide efficient choruses and to act as commander-in-chief?

Soc. I mean this, that, given a man knows what he needs to provide,

and has the skill to do so, no matter what the department of things may

be--house or city or army--you will find him a good chief and director

(6) of the same.

(6) Or, "representative."

Then Nicomachides: Upon my word, Socrates, I should never have expected

to hear you say that a good housekeeper (7) and steward of an estate

would make a good general.

(7) Or, "economist"; cf. "Cyrop." I. vi. 12.

Soc. Come then, suppose we examine their respective duties, and so

determine (8) whether they are the same or different.

(8) Lit. "get to know."

Nic. Let us do so.

Soc. Well then, is it not a common duty of both to procure the ready

obedience of those under them to their orders?

Nic. Certainly.

Soc. And also to assign to those best qualified to perform them their

distinctive tasks?

That, too, belongs to both alike (he answered).

Soc. Again, to chastise the bad and reward the good belongs to both

alike, methinks?

Nic. Decidedly.

Soc. And to win the kindly feeling of their subordinates must surely be

the noble ambition of both?

That too (he answered).

Soc. And do you consider it to the interest of both alike to win the

adherence of supporters and allies? (9)

(9) In reference to the necessity of building up a family connection

or political alliances cf. Arist. "Pol." iii. 9, 13.

Nic. Without a doubt.

Soc. And does it not closely concern them both to be good guardians of

their respective charges?

Nic. Very much so.

Soc. Then it equally concerns them both to be painstaking and prodigal

of toil in all their doings?

Nic. Yes, all these duties belong to both alike, but the parallel ends

when you come to actual fighting.

Soc. Yet they are both sure to meet with enemies?

Nic. There is no doubt about that.

Soc. Then is it not to the interest of both to get the upper hand of

these?

Nic. Certainly; but you omit to tell us what service organisation and

the art of management will render when it comes to actual fighting.

Soc. Why, it is just then, I presume, it will be of most service, for

the good economist knows that nothing is so advantageous or so lucrative

as victory in battle, or to put it negatively, nothing so disastrous

and expensive as defeat. He will enthusiastically seek out and provide

everything conducive to victory, he will painstakingly discover and

guard against all that tends to defeat, and when satisfied that all is

ready and ripe for victory he will deliver battle energetically, and

what is equally important, until the hour of final preparation has

arrived, (10) he will be cautious to deliver battle. Do not despise men

of economic genius, Nicomachides; the difference between the devotion

requisite to private affairs and to affairs of state is merely one of

quantity. For the rest the parallel holds strictly, and in this respect

pre-eminently, that both are concerned with human instruments: which

human beings, moreover, are of one type and temperament, whether we

speak of devotion to public affairs or of the administration of private

property. To fare well in either case is given to those who know the

secret of dealing with humanity, whereas the absence of that knowledge

will as certainly imply in either case a fatal note of discord. (11)

(10) Lit. "as long as he is unprepared."

(11) L. Dindorf, "Index Graec." Ox. ed.; cf. Hor. "Ep." II. ii. 144,

"sed verae numerosque modosque ediscere vitae," "the harmony of

life," Conington.

V

A conversation held with Pericles the son of the great statesman may

here be introduced. (1) Socrates began:

(1) Or, "On one occasion Pericles was the person addressed in

conversation." For Pericles see "Hell." I. v. 16; vii. 15; Plut.

"Pericl." 37 (Clough, i. 368).

I am looking forward, I must tell you, Pericles, to a great improvement

in our military affairs when you are minister of war. (2) The prestige

of Athens, I hope, will rise; we shall gain the mastery over our

enemies.

(2) "Strategos."

Pericles replied: I devoutly wish your words might be fulfilled, but how

this happy result is to be obtained, I am at a loss to discover.

Shall we (Socrates continued), shall we balance the arguments for and

against, and consider to what extent the possibility does exist?

Pray let us do so (he answered).

Soc. Well then, you know that in point of numbers the Athenians are not

inferior to the Boeotians?

Per. Yes, I am aware of that.

Soc. And do you think the Boeotians could furnish a better pick of fine

healthy men than the Athenians?

Per. I think we should very well hold our own in that respect.

Soc. And which of the two would you take to be the more united

people--the friendlier among themselves?

Per. The Athenians, I should say, for so many sections of the Boeotians,

resenting the selfish policy (3) of Thebes, are ill disposed to that

power, but at Athens I see nothing of the sort.

(3) "The self-aggrandisement."

Soc. But perhaps you will say that there is no people more jealous of

honour or haughtier in spirit. (4) And these feelings are no weak

spurs to quicken even a dull spirit to hazard all for glory's sake and

fatherland.

(4) Reading {megalophronestatoi}, after Cobet. See "Hipparch," vii. 3;

or if as vulg. {philophronestatoi}, transl. "more affable."

Per. Nor is there much fault to find with Athenians in these respects.

Soc. And if we turn to consider the fair deeds of ancestry, (5) to

no people besides ourselves belongs so rich a heritage of stimulating

memories, whereby so many of us are stirred to pursue virtue with

devotion and to show ourselves in our turn also men of valour like our

sires.

(5) See Wesley's anthem, Eccles. xliv. 1, "Let us now praise famous

men and our fathers that begat us."

Per. All that you say, Socrates, is most true, but do you observe that

ever since the disaster of the thousand under Tolmides at Lebadeia,

coupled with that under Hippocrates at Delium, (6) the prestige of

Athens by comparison with the Boeotians has been lowered, whilst the

spirit of Thebes as against Athens had been correspondingly exalted, so

that those Boeotians who in old days did not venture to give battle

to the Athenians even in their own territory unless they had the

Lacedaemonians and the rest of the Peloponnesians to help them, do

nowadays threaten to make an incursion into Attica single-handed; and

the Athenians, who formerly, if they had to deal with the Boeotians (7)

only, made havoc of their territory, are now afraid the Boeotians may

some day harry Attica.

(6) Lebadeia, 447 B.C.; Delium, 424 B.C. For Tolmides and Hippocrates

see Thuc. i. 113; iv. 100 foll.; Grote, "H. G." v. 471; vi. 533.

(7) Reading {ote B. monoi}, al. {ou monoi}, "when the Boeotians were

not unaided."

To which Socrates: Yes, I perceive that this is so, but it seems to me

that the state was never more tractably disposed, never so ripe for

a really good leader, as to-day. For if boldness be the parent of

carelessness, laxity, and insubordination, it is the part of fear to

make people more disposed to application, obedience, and good order.

A proof of which you may discover in the behaviour of people on

ship-board. It is in seasons of calm weather when there is nothing

to fear that disorder may be said to reign, but as soon as there is

apprehension of a storm, or an enemy in sight, the scene changes; not

only is each word of command obeyed, but there is a hush of silent

expectation; the mariners wait to catch the next signal like an

orchestra with eyes upon the leader.

Per. But indeed, given that now is the opportunity to take obedience

at the flood, it is high time also to explain by what means we are

to rekindle in the hearts of our countrymen (8) the old fires--the

passionate longing for antique valour, for the glory and the wellbeing

of the days of old.

(8) Reading {anerasthenai}, Schneider's emendation of the vulg.

{aneristhenai}.

Well (proceeded Socrates), supposing we wished them to lay claim

to certain material wealth now held by others, we could not better

stimulate them to lay hands on the objects coveted than by showing them

that these were ancestral possessions (9) to which they had a natural

right. But since our object is that they should set their hearts on

virtuous pre-eminence, we must prove to them that such headship combined

with virtue is an old time-honoured heritage which pertains to them

beyond all others, and that if they strive earnestly after it they will

soon out-top the world.

(9) Cf. Solon in the matter of Salamis, Plut. "Sol." 8; Bergk. "Poet.

Lyr. Gr. Solon," SALAMIS, i. 2, 3.

Por. How are we to inculcate this lesson?

Soc. I think by reminding them of a fact already registered in their

minds, (10) that the oldest of our ancestors whose names are known to us

were also the bravest of heroes.

(10) Or, "to which their ears are already opened."

Per. I suppose you refer to that judgment of the gods which, for their

virtue's sake, Cecrops and his followers were called on to decide? (11)

(11) See Apollodorus, iii. 14.

Soc. Yes, I refer to that and to the birth and rearing of Erectheus,

(12) and also to the war (13) which in his days was waged to stay the

tide of invasion from the whole adjoining continent; and that other war

in the days of the Heraclidae (14) against the men of Peloponnese; and

that series of battles fought in the days of Theseus (15)--in all which

the virtuous pre-eminence of our ancestry above the men of their own

times was made manifest. Or, if you please, we may come down to things

of a later date, which their descendants and the heroes of days not so

long anterior to our own wrought in the struggle with the lords of Asia,

(16) nay of Europe also, as far as Macedonia: a people possessing a

power and means of attack far exceeding any who had gone before--who,

moreover, had accomplished the doughtiest deeds. These things the men of

Athens wrought partly single-handed, (17) and partly as sharers with

the Peloponnesians in laurels won by land and sea. Heroes were these men

also, far outshining, as tradition tells us, the peoples of their time.

(12) Cf. "Il." ii. 547, {'Erekhtheos megaletoros k.t.l.}

(13) Cf. Isoc. "Paneg." 19, who handles all the topics.

(14) Commonly spoken of as "the Return." See Grote, "H. G." II. ch.

xviii.

(15) Against the Amazons and Thracians; cf. Herod. ix. 27; Plut.

"Thes." 27.

(16) The "Persian" wars; cf. Thucyd. I. i.

(17) He omits the Plataeans.

Per. Yes, so runs the story of their heroism.

Soc. Therefore it is that, amidst the many changes of inhabitants, and

the migrations which have, wave after wave, swept over Hellas, these

maintained themselves in their own land, unmoved; so that it was a

common thing for others to turn to them as to a court of appeal on

points of right, or to flee to Athens as a harbour of refuge from the

hand of the oppressor. (18)

(18) Cf. (Plat.) "Menex."; Isocr. "Paneg."

Then Pericles: And the wonder to me, Socrates, is how our city ever came

to decline.

Soc. I think we are victims of our own success. Like some athlete, (19)

whose facile preponderance in the arena has betrayed him into laxity

until he eventually succumbs to punier antagonists, so we Athenians,

in the plenitude of our superiority, have neglected ourselves and are

become degenerate.

(19) Reading {athletai tines}, or if {alloi tines}, translate "any one

else."

Per. What then ought we to do now to recover our former virtue?

Soc. There need be no mystery about that, I think. We can rediscover the

institutions of our forefathers--applying them to the regulation of our

lives with something of their precision, and not improbably with like

success; or we can imitate those who stand at the front of affairs

to-day, (20) adapting to ourselves their rule of life, in which case, if

we live up to the standard of our models, we may hope at least to rival

their excellence, or, by a more conscientious adherence to what they aim

at, rise superior.

(20) Sc. the Lacedaemonians. See W. L. Newman, op. cit. i. 396.

You would seem to suggest (he answered) that the spirit of beautiful and

brave manhood has taken wings and left our city; (21) as, for instance,

when will Athenians, like the Lacedaemonians, reverence old age--the

Athenian, who takes his own father as a starting-point for the contempt

he pours upon grey hairs? When will he pay as strict an attention to the

body, who is not content with neglecting a good habit, (22) but laughs

to scorn those who are careful in this matter? When shall we Athenians

so obey our magistrates--we who take a pride, as it were, in despising

authority? When, once more, shall we be united as a people--we who,

instead of combining to promote common interests, delight in blackening

each other's characters, (23) envying one another more than we envy all

the world besides; and--which is our worst failing--who, in private and

public intercourse alike, are torn by dissension and are caught in a

maze of litigation, and prefer to make capital out of our neighbour's

difficulties rather than to render natural assistance? To make our

conduct consistent, indeed, we treat our national interests no better

than if they were the concerns of some foreign state; we make them bones

of contention to wrangle over, and rejoice in nothing so much as in

possessing means and ability to indulge these tastes. From this hotbed

is engendered in the state a spirit of blind folly (24) and cowardice,

and in the hearts of the citizens spreads a tangle of hatred and mutual

hostility which, as I often shudder to think, will some day cause some

disaster to befall the state greater than it can bear. (25)

(21) Or, "is far enough away from Athens."

(22) See below, III. xii. 5; "Pol. Ath." i. 13; "Rev." iv. 52.

(23) Or, "to deal despitefully with one another."

(24) Reading {ateria}. See L. Dindorf ad loc., Ox. ed. lxii. Al.

{apeiria}, a want of skill, or {ataxia}, disorderliness. Cf. "Pol.

Ath." i. 5.

(25) Possibly the author is thinking of the events of 406, 405 B.C.

(see "Hell." I. vii. and II.), and history may repeat itself.

Do not (replied Socrates), do not, I pray you, permit yourself to

believe that Athenians are smitten with so incurable a depravity. Do you

not observe their discipline in all naval matters? Look at their prompt

and orderly obedience to the superintendents at the gymnastic contests,

(26) their quite unrivalled subservience to their teachers in the

training of our choruses.

(26) Epistatoi, i.e. stewards and training-masters.

Yes (he answered), there's the wonder of it; to think that all those

good people should so obey their leaders, but that our hoplites and our

cavalry, who may be supposed to rank before the rest of the citizens

in excellence of manhood, (27) should be so entirely unamenable to

discipline.

(27) {kalokagathia}.

Then Socrates: Well, but the council which sits on Areopagos is composed

of citizens of approved (28) character, is it not?

(28) Technically, they must have passed the {dokimasia}. And for the

"Aeropagos" see Grote, "H. G." v. 498; Aristot. "Pol." ii. 12;

"Ath. Pol." 4. 4, where see Dr. Sandys' note, p. 18.

Certainly (he answered).

Soc. Then can you name any similar body, judicial or executive, trying

cases or transacting other business with greater honour, stricter

legality, higher dignity, or more impartial justice?

No, I have no fault to find on that score (he answered).

Soc. Then we ought not to despair as though all sense of orderliness and

good discipline had died out of our countrymen.

Still (he answered), if it is not to harp upon one string, I maintain

that in military service, where, if anywhere, sobreity and temperance,

orderliness and good discipline are needed, none of these essentials

receives any attention.

May it not perhaps be (asked Socrates) that in this department they are

officered by those who have the least knowledge? (29) Do you not notice,

to take the case of harp-players, choric performers, dancers, and the

like, that no one would ever dream of leading if he lacked the requisite

knowledge? and the same holds of wrestlers or pancratiasts.

(29) {episteme}. See below, III. ix. 10.

Moreover, while in these cases any one in command can tell you where he

got the elementary knowledge of what he presides over, most generals are

amateurs and improvisers. (30) I do not at all suppose that you are

one of that sort. I believe you could give as clear an account of your

schooling in strategy as you could in the matter of wrestling. No

doubt you have got at first hand many of your father's "rules for

generalship," which you carefully preserve, besides having collected

many others from every quarter whence it was possible to pick up any

knowledge which would be of use to a future general. Again, I feel

sure you are deeply concerned to escape even unconscious ignorance of

anything which will be serviceable to you in so high an office; and

if you detect in yourself any ignorance, you turn to those who have

knowledge in these matters (sparing neither gifts nor gratitude) to

supplement your ignorance by their knowledge and to secure their help.

(30) Cf. "Pol. Lac." xiii. 5.

To which Pericles: I am not so blind, Socrates, as to imagine you say

these words under the idea that I am truly so careful in these matters;

but rather your object is to teach me that the would-be general must

make such things his care. I admit in any case all you say.

Socrates proceeded: Has it ever caught your observation, Pericles, that

a high mountain barrier stretches like a bulwark in front of our country

down towards Boeotia--cleft, moreover, by narrow and precipitous passes,

the only avenues into the heart of Attica, which lies engirdled by a

ring of natural fortresses? (31)

(31) The mountains are Cithaeron and Parnes N., and Cerata N.W.

Per. Certainly I have.

Soc. Well, and have you ever heard tell of the Mysians and Pisidians

living within the territory of the great king, (32) who, inside their

mountain fortresses, lightly armed, are able to rush down and inflict

much injury on the king's territory by their raids, while preserving

their own freedom?

(32) For this illustration see "Anab." III. ii. 23; cf. "Econ." iv.

18, where Socrates ({XS}) refers to Cyrus's expedition and death.

Per. Yes, the circumstance is not new to me.

And do you not think (added Socrates) that a corps of young able-bodied

Athenians, accoutred with lighter arms, (33) and holding our natural

mountain rampart in possession, would prove at once a thorn in the

enemy's side offensively, whilst defensively they would form a splendid

bulwark to protect the country?

(33) Cf. the reforms of Iphicrates.

To which Pericles: I think, Socrates, these would be all useful

measures, decidedly.

If, then (replied Socrates), these suggestions meet your approbation,

try, O best of men, to realise them--if you can carry out a portion

of them, it will be an honour to yourself and a blessing to the state;

while, if you fail in any point, there will be no damage done to the

city nor discredit to yourself.

VI

Glaucon, (1) the son of Ariston, had conceived such an ardour to gain

the headship of the state that nothing could hinder him but he must

deliver a course of public speeches, (2) though he had not yet reached

the age of twenty. His friends and relatives tried in vain to stop him

making himself ridiculous and being dragged down from the bema. (3)

Socrates, who took a kindly interest in the youth for the sake of

Charmides (4) the son of Glaucon, and of Plato, alone succeeded in

restraining him. It happened thus. He fell in with him, and first of

all, to get him to listen, detained him by some such remarks as the

following: (5)

(1) Glaucon, Plato's brother. Grote, "Plato," i. 508.

(2) "Harangue the People."

(3) See Plat. "Protag." 319 C: "And if some person offers to give them

advice who is not supposed by them to have any skill in the art

(sc. of politics), even though he be good-looking, and rich, and

noble, they will not listen to him, but laugh at him, and hoot

him, until he is either clamoured down and retires of himself; or

if he persists, he is dragged away or put out by the constables at

the command of the prytanes" (Jowett). Cf. Aristoph. "Knights,"

665, {kath eilkon auton oi prutaneis kai toxotai}.

(4) For Charmides (maternal uncle of Plato and Glaucon, cousin of

Critias) see ch. vii. below; Plato the philosopher, Glaucon's

brother, see Cobet, "Pros. Xen." p. 28.

(5) Or, "and in the first instance addressing him in such terms he

could not choose but hear, detained him." See above, II. vi. 11.

Socrates applies his own theory.

Ah, Glaucon (he exclaimed), so you have determined to become prime

minister? (6)

(6) {prostateuein}.

Glauc. Yes, Socrates, I have.

Soc. And what a noble aim! if aught human ever deserved to be called

noble; since if you succeed in your design, it follows, as the night the

day, you will be able not only to gratify your every wish, but you

will be in a position to benefit your friends, you will raise up your

father's house, you will exalt your fatherland, you will become a name

thrice famous in the city first, and next in Hellas, and lastly even

among barbarians perhaps, like Themistocles; but be it here or be it

there, wherever you be, you will be the observed of all beholders. (7)

(7) "The centre of attraction--the cynosure of neighbouring eyes."

The heart of Glaucon swelled with pride as he drank in the words, and

gladly he stayed to listen.

Presently Socrates proceeded: Then this is clear, Glaucon, is it not?

that you must needs benefit the city, since you desire to reap her

honours?

Glauc. Undoubtedly.

Then, by all that is sacred (Socrates continued), do not keep us in the

dark, but tell us in what way do you propose first to benefit the state?

what is your starting-point? (8) When Glaucon remained with sealed lips,

as if he were now for the first time debating what this starting-point

should be, Socrates continued: I presume, if you wished to improve a

friend's estate, you would endeavour to do so by adding to its wealth,

would you not? So here, maybe, you will try to add to the wealth of the

state?

(8) Or, "tell us what your starting-point will be in the path of

benefaction."

Most decidedly (he answered).

Soc. And we may take it the state will grow wealthier in proportion as

her revenues increase?

Glauc. That seems probable, at any rate.

Soc. Then would you kindly tell us from what sources the revenues of the

state are at present derived, and what is their present magnitude? No

doubt you have gone carefully into the question, so that if any of these

are failing you may make up the deficit, or if neglected for any reason,

make some new provision. (9)

(9) Or, "or if others have dropped out or been negligently overlooked,

you may replace them."

Glauc. Nay, to speak the truth, these are matters I have not thoroughly

gone into.

Never mind (he said) if you have omitted the point; but you might oblige

us by running through the items or heads of expenditure. Obviously you

propose to remove all those which are superfluous?

Glauc. Well, no. Upon my word I have not had time to look into that side

of the matter either as yet.

Soc. Then we will postpone for the present the problem of making

the state wealthier; obviously without knowing the outgoings and the

incomings it would be impossible to deal with the matter seriously.

But, Socrates (Glaucon remarked), it is possible to enrich the state out

of the pockets of her enemies!

Yes, to be sure, considerably (answered Socrates), in the event of

getting the better of them; but in the event of being worsted, it is

also possible to lose what we have got.

A true observation (he replied).

And therefore (proceeded Socrates), before he makes up his mind with

what enemy to go to war, a statesman should know the relative powers of

his own city and the adversary's, so that, in case the superiority be

on his own side, he may throw the weight of his advice into the scale

of undertaking war; but if the opposite he may plead in favour of

exercising caution.

You are right (he answered).

Soc. Then would you for our benefit enumerate the land and naval forces

first of Athens and then of our opponents?

Glauc. Pardon me. I could not tell you them off-hand at a moment's

notice.

Or (added Socrates), if you have got the figures on paper, you might

produce them. I cannot tell how anxious I am to hear your statement.

Glauc. No, I assure you, I have not got them even on paper yet.

Soc. Well then, we will defer tending advice on the topic of peace or

war, in a maiden speech at any rate. (10) I can understand that, owing

to the magnitude of the questions, in these early days of your ministry

you have not yet fully examined them. But come, I am sure that you have

studied the defences of the country, at all events, and you know exactly

how many forts and outposts are serviceable (11) and how many are not;

you can tell us which garrisons are strong enough and which defective;

and you are prepared to throw in the weight of your advice in favour

of increasing the serviceable outposts and sweeping away those that are

superfluous?

(10) See "Econ." xi. 1.

(11) Or, "advantageously situated." See the author's own tract on

"Revenues."

Glauc. Yes, sweep them all away, that's my advice; for any good that is

likely to come of them! Defences indeed! so maintained that the property

of the rural districts is simply pilfered.

But suppose you sweep away the outposts (he asked), may not something

worse, think you, be the consequence? will not sheer plundering be free

to any ruffian who likes?... But may I ask is this judgment the

result of personal inspection? have you gone yourself and examined the

defences? or how do you know that they are all maintained as you say?

Glauc. I conjecture that it is so.

Soc. Well then, until we have got beyond the region of conjecture shall

we defer giving advice on the matter? (It will be time enough when we

know the facts.)

Possibly it would be better to wait till then (replied Glaucon).

Soc. Then there are the mines, (12) but, of course, I am aware that you

have not visited them in person, so as to be able to say why they are

less productive than formerly.

(12) Again the author's tract on "Revenues" is a comment on the

matter.

Well, no; I have never been there myself (he answered).

Soc. No, Heaven help us! an unhealthy district by all accounts; so

that, when the moment for advice on that topic arrives, you will have an

excuse ready to hand.

I see you are making fun of me (Glaucon answered).

Soc. Well, but here is a point, I am sure, which you have not neglected.

No, you will have thoroughly gone into it, and you can tell us. For how

long a time could the corn supplies from the country districts support

the city? how much is requisite for a single year, so that the city may

not run short of this prime necessary, before you are well aware; but on

the contrary you with your full knowledge will be in a position to give

advice on so vital a question, to the aid or may be the salvation of

your country?

It is a colossal business this (Glaucon answered), if I am to be obliged

to give attention to all these details.

Soc. On the other hand, a man could not even manage his own house or his

estate well, without, in the first place, knowing what he requires, and,

in the second place, taking pains, item by item, to supply his wants.

But since this city consists of more than ten thousand houses, and it is

not easy to pay minute attention to so many all at once, how is it you

did not practise yourself by trying to augment the resources of one at

any rate of these--I mean your own uncle's? The service would not be

thrown away. Then if your strength suffices in the single case you might

take in hand a larger number; but if you fail to relieve one, how could

you possibly hope to succeed with many? How absurd for a man, if he

cannot carry half a hundredweight, to attempt to carry a whole! (13)

(13) Lit. "a single talent's weight... to carry two."

Glauc. Nay, for my part, I am willing enough to assist my uncle's house,

if my uncle would only be persuaded to listen to my advice.

Soc. Then, when you cannot persuade your uncle, do you imagine you will

be able to make the whole Athenian people, uncle and all, obey you?

Be careful, Glaucon (he added), lest in your thirst for glory and high

repute you come to the opposite. Do you not see how dangerous it is for

a man to speak or act beyond the range (14) of his knowledge? To take

the cases known to you of people whose conversation or conduct clearly

transcends these limits: should you say they gain more praise or more

blame on that account? Are they admired the rather or despised? Or,

again, consider those who do know what they say and what they do; and

you will find, I venture to say, that in every sort of undertaking those

who enjoy repute and admiration belong to the class of those endowed

with the highest knowledge; whilst conversely the people of sinister

reputation, the mean and the contemptible, emanate from some depth of

ignorance and dulness. If therefore what you thirst for is repute and

admiration as a statesman, try to make sure of one accomplishment: in

other words, the knowledge as far as in you lies of what you wish to do.

(15) If, indeed, with this to distinguish you from the rest of the

world you venture to concern yourself with state affairs, it would not

surprise me but that you might reach the goal of your ambition easily.

(14) Or, "to talk of things which he does not know, or to meddle with

them."

(15) Or, "try as far as possible to achieve one thing, and that is to

know the business which you propose to carry out."

VII

Now Charmides, (1) the son of Glaucon, was, as Socrates observed, a man

of mark and influence: a much more powerful person in fact than the mass

of those devoted to politics at that date, but at the same time he was

a man who shrank from approaching the people or busying himself with the

concerns of the state. Accordingly Socrates addressed him thus:

(1) See last chapter for his relationship to Glaucon (the younger) and

Plato; for a conception of his character, Plato's dialogue

"Charmides"; "Theag." 128 E; "Hell." II. iv. 19; "Symp." iv. 31;

Grote, "Plato," i. 480.

Tell me, Charmides, supposing some one competent to win a victory in the

arena and to receive a crown, (2) whereby he will gain honour himself

and make the land of his fathers more glorious in Hellas, (3) were to

refuse to enter the lists--what kind of person should you set him down

to be?

(2) In some conquest (e.g. of the Olympic games) where the prize is a

mere wreath.

(3) Cf. Pindar passim.

Clearly an effeminate and cowardly fellow (he answered).

Soc. And what if another man, who had it in him, by devotion to affairs

of state, to exalt his city and win honour himself thereby, were to

shrink and hesitate and hang back--would he too not reasonably be

regarded as a coward?

Possibly (he answered); but why do you address these questions to me?

Because (replied Socrates) I think that you, who have this power, do

hesitate to devote yourself to matters which, as being a citizen, if for

no other reason, you are bound to take part in. (4)

(4) Or add, "and cannot escape from."

Charm. And wherein have you detected in me this power, that you pass so

severe a sentence upon me?

Soc. I have detected it plainly enough in those gatherings (5) in which

you meet the politicians of the day, when, as I observe, each time they

consult you on any point you have always good advice to offer, and when

they make a blunder you lay your finger on the weak point immediately.

(5) See above, I. v. 4; here possibly of political club conversation.

Charm. To discuss and reason in private is one thing, Socrates, to

battle in the throng of the assembly is another.

Soc. And yet a man who can count, counts every bit as well in a crowd as

when seated alone by himself; and it is the best performer on the harp

in private who carries off the palm of victory in public.

Charm. But do you not see that modesty and timidity are feelings

implanted in man's nature? and these are much more powerfully present to

us in a crowd than within the circle of our intimates.

Soc. Yes, but what I am bent on teaching you is that while you feel no

such bashfulness and timidity before the wisest and strongest of men,

you are ashamed of opening your lips in the midst of weaklings and

dullards. (6) Is it the fullers among them of whom you stand in awe, or

the cobblers, or the carpenters, or the coppersmiths, or the merchants,

or the farmers, or the hucksters of the market-place exchanging their

wares, and bethinking them how they are to buy this thing cheap, and to

sell the other dear--is it before these you are ashamed, for these are

the individual atoms out of which the Public Assembly is composed? (7)

And what is the difference, pray, between your behaviour and that of a

man who, being the superior of trained athletes, quails before a set of

amateurs? Is it not the case that you who can argue so readily with the

foremost statesmen in the city, some of whom affect to look down

upon you--you, with your vast superiority over practised popular

debaters--are no sooner confronted with a set of folk who never in their

lives gave politics a thought, and into whose heads certainly it never

entered to look down upon you--than you are afraid to open your lips in

mortal terror of being laughed at?

(6) Cf. Cic. "Tusc." v. 36, 104; Plat. "Gorg." 452 E, 454 B.

(7) Cf. Plat. "Protag." 319 C. See W. L. Newman, op. cit. i. 103.

Well, but you would admit (he answered) that sound argument does

frequently bring down the ridicule of the Popular Assembly.

Soc. Which is equally true of the others. (8) And that is just what

rouses my astonishment, that you who can cope so easily with these

lordly people (when guilty of ridicule) should persuade yourself that

you cannot stand up against a set of commoners. (9) My good fellow, do

not be ignorant of yourself! (10) do not fall into that commonest of

errors--theirs who rush off to investigate the concerns of the rest of

the world, and have no time to turn and examine themselves. Yet that is

a duty which you must not in cowardly sort draw back from: rather must

you brace ourself to give good heed to your own self; and as to public

affairs, if by any manner of means they may be improved through you, do

not neglect them. Success in the sphere of politics means that not only

the mass of your fellow-citizens, but your personal friends and you

yourself last but not least, will profit by your action.

(8) {oi eteroi}, i.e. "the foremost statesmen" mentioned before. Al.

"the opposite party," the "Tories," if one may so say, of the

political clubs.

(9) Lit. "those... these."

(10) Ernesti aptly cf. Cic. "ad Quint." iii. 6. See below, III. ix. 6;

IV. ii. 24.

VIII

Once when Aristippus (1) set himself to subject Socrates to a

cross-examination, such as he had himself undergone at the hands of

Socrates on a former occasion, (2) Socrates, being minded to benefit

those who were with him, gave his answers less in the style of a debater

guarding against perversions of his argument, than of a man persuaded of

the supreme importance of right conduct. (3)

(1) For Aristippus see above, p. 38; for the connection, {boulomenos

tous sunontas ophelein}, between this and the preceeding chapter,

see above, Conspectus, p. xxvi.

(2) Possibly in reference to the conversation above. In reference to

the present dialogue see Grote, "Plato," I. xi. p. 380 foll.

(3) For {prattein ta deonta} cf. below, III. ix. 4, 11; Plat. "Charm."

164 B; but see J. J. Hartman, "An. Xen." p. 141.

Aristippus asked him "if he knew of anything good," (4) intending in

case he assented and named any particular good thing, like food or

drink, or wealth, or health, or strength, or courage, to point out

that the thing named was sometimes bad. But he, knowing that if a thing

troubles us, we immediately want that which will put an end to our

trouble, answered precisely as it was best to do. (5)

(4) See Grote, "Plato," ii. 585, on Philebus.

(5) Or, "made the happiest answer."

Soc. Do I understand you to ask me whether I know anything good for

fever?

No (he replied), that is not my question.

Soc. Then for inflammation of the eyes?

Aristip. No, nor yet that.

Soc. Well then, for hunger?

Aristip. No, nor yet for hunger.

Well, but (answered Socrates) if you ask me whether I know of any good

thing which is good for nothing, I neither know of it nor want to know.

And when Aristippus, returning to the charge, asked him "if he knew of

any thing beautiful."

He answered: Yes, many things.

Aristip. Are they all like each other?

Soc. On the contrary, they are often as unlike as possible.

How then (he asked) can that be beautiful which is unlike the beautiful?

Soc. Bless me! for the simple reason that it is possible for a man who

is a beautiful runner to be quite unlike another man who is a beautiful

boxer, (6) or for a shield, which is a beautiful weapon for the purpose

of defence, to be absolutely unlike a javelin, which is a beautiful

weapon of swift and sure discharge.

(6) See Grote, "H. G." x. 164, in reference to Epaminondas and his

gymnastic training; below, III. x. 6.

Aristip. Your answers are no better now than (7) when I asked you

whether you knew any good thing. They are both of a pattern.

(7) Or, "You answer precisely as you did when..."

Soc. And so they should be. Do you imagine that one thing is good and

another beautiful? Do not you know that relatively to the same standard

all things are at once beautiful and good? (8) In the first place,

virtue is not a good thing relatively to one standard and a beautiful

thing relatively to another standard; and in the next place, human

beings, on the same principle (9) and relatively to the same standard,

are called "beautiful and good"; and so the bodily frames of men

relatively to the same standards are seen to be "beautiful and good,"

and in general all things capable of being used by man are regarded as

at once beautiful and good relatively to the same standard--the standing

being in each case what the thing happens to be useful for. (10)

(8) Or, "good and beautiful are convertible terms: whatever is good is

beautiful, or whatever is beautiful is good."

(9) Or, "in the same breath." Cf. Plat. "Hipp. maj." 295 D; "Gorg."

474 D.

(10) Or, "and this standard is the serviceableness of the thing in

question."

Aristip. Then I presume even a basket for carrying dung (11) is a

beautiful thing?

(11) Cf. Plat. "Hipp. maj." 288 D, 290 D; and Grote's note, loc. cit.

p. 381: "in regard to the question wherein consists {to kalon}?"

Soc. To be sure, and a spear of gold an ugly thing, if for their

respective uses--the former is well and the latter ill adapted.

Aristip. Do you mean to assert that the same things may be beautiful and

ugly?

Soc. Yes, to be sure; and by the same showing things may be good and

bad: as, for instance, what is good for hunger may be bad for fever, and

what is good for fever bad for hunger; or again, what is beautiful for

wrestling is often ugly for running; and in general everything is good

and beautiful when well adapted for the end in view, bad and ugly when

ill adapted for the same.

Similarly when he spoke about houses, (12) and argued that "the same

house must be at once beautiful and useful"--I could not help feeling

that he was giving a good lesson on the problem: "how a house ought to

be built." He investigated the matter thus:

(12) See K. Joel, op. cit. p. 488; "Classical Review," vii. 262.

Soc. "Do you admit that any one purposing to build a perfect house (13)

will plan to make it at once as pleasant and as useful to live in as

possible?" and that point being admitted, (14) the next question would

be:

(13) Or, "the ideal house"; lit. "a house as it should be."

(14) See below, IV. vi. 15.

"It is pleasant to have one's house cool in summer and warm in winter,

is it not?" and this proposition also having obtained assent, "Now,

supposing a house to have a southern aspect, sunshine during winter will

steal in under the verandah, (15) but in summer, when the sun traverses

a path right over our heads, the roof will afford an agreeable shade,

will it not? If, then, such an arrangement is desirable, the southern

side of a house should be built higher to catch the rays of the winter

sun, and the northern side lower to prevent the cold winds finding

ingress; in a word, it is reasonable to suppose that the pleasantest and

most beautiful dwelling place will be one in which the owner can at

all seasons of the year find the pleasantest retreat, and stow away his

goods with the greatest security."

(15) Or, "porticoes" or "collonades."

Paintings (16) and ornamental mouldings are apt (he said) to deprive one

of more joy (17) than they confer.

(16) See "Econ." ix. 2; Plat. "Hipp. maj." 298 A; "Rep." 529; Becker,

"Charicles," 268 (Engl. trans.)

(17) {euphrosunas}, archaic or "poetical" = "joyance." See "Hiero,"

vi. 1.

The fittest place for a temple or an altar (he maintained) was some site

visible from afar, and untrodden by foot of man: (18) since it was a

glad thing for the worshipper to lift up his eyes afar off and offer up

his orison; glad also to wend his way peaceful to prayer unsullied. (19)

(18) e.g. the summit of Lycabettos, or the height on which stands the

temple of Phygaleia. Cf. Eur. "Phoen." 1372, {Pallados

khrusaspidos blepsas pros oikon euxato} of Eteocles.

(19) See Vitruvius, i. 7, iv. 5, ap. Schneid. ad loc.; W. L. Newman,

op. cit. i. 338.

IX

Being again asked by some one: could courage be taught, (1) or did

it come by nature? he answered: I imagine that just as one body is by

nature stronger than another body to encounter toils, so one soul by

nature grows more robust than another soul in face of dangers. Certainly

I do note that people brought up under the same condition of laws and

customs differ greatly in respect of daring. Still my belief is that by

learning and practice the natural aptitude may always be strengthened

towards courage. It is clear, for instance, that Scythians or

Thracians would not venture to take shield and spear and contend with

Lacedaemonians; and it is equally evident that Lacedaemonians would

demur to entering the lists of battle against Thracians if limited to

their light shields and javelins, or against Scythians without some

weapon more familiar than their bows and arrows. (2) And as far as I can

see, this principle holds generally: the natural differences of one man

from another may be compensated by artificial progress, the result of

care and attention. All which proves clearly that whether nature has

endowed us with keener or blunter sensibilities, the duty of all alike

is to learn and practise those things in which we would fain achieve

distinction.

(1) Or, "When some one retorted upon him with the question: 'Can

courage be taught?'" and for this problem see IV. vi. 10, 11;

"Symp." ii. 12; Plat. "Lach."; "Protag." 349; "Phaedr." 269 D; K.

Joel, op. cit. p. 325 foll.; Grote, "Plato," i. 468 foll., ii. 60;

Jowett, "Plato," i. 77, 119; Newman, op. cit. i. 343.

(2) Or, "against Thracians with light shields and javelins, or against

Scythians with bows and arrows"; and for the national arms of

these peoples respectively see Arist. "Lysistr." 563; "Anab." III.

iv. 15; VI. VII. passim.

Between wisdom and sobriety of soul (which is temperance) he drew no

distinction. (3) Was a man able on the one hand to recognise things

beautiful and good sufficiently to live in them? Had he, on the other

hand, knowledge of the "base and foul" so as to beware of them? If so,

Socrates judged him to be wise at once and sound of soul (or temperate).

(4)

(3) But cf. IV. vi. 7; K. Joel, op. cit. p. 363.

(4) Reading {alla to... kai to}, or more lit. "he discovered the

wise man and sound of soul in his power not only to recognise

things 'beautiful and good,' but to live and move and have his

being in them; as also in his gift of avoiding consciously things

base." Or if {alla ton... kai ton...} transl. "The man who

not only could recognise the beautiful and good, but lived, etc.,

in that world, and who moreover consciously avoided things base, in

the judgment of Socrates was wise and sound of soul." Cf. Plat.

"Charm."

And being further questioned whether "he considered those who have

the knowledge of right action, but do not apply it, to be wise and

self-controlled?"--"Not a whit more," he answered, "than I consider them

to be unwise and intemperate. (5) Every one, I conceive, deliberately

chooses what, within the limits open to him, he considers most conducive

to his interest, and acts accordingly. I must hold therefore that

those who act against rule and crookedly (6) are neither wise nor

self-controlled.

(5) For the phrase "not a whit the more" see below, III. xii. 1;

"Econ." xii. 18. Al. "I should by no means choose to consider them

wise and self-controlled rather than foolish and intemperate."

(6) "Who cannot draw a straight line, ethically speaking."

He said that justice, moreover, and all other virtue is wisdom. That is

to say, things just, and all things else that are done with virtue,

are "beautiful and good"; and neither will those who know these things

deliberately choose aught else in their stead, nor will he who lacks the

special knowledge of them be able to do them, but even if he makes the

attempt he will miss the mark and fail. So the wise alone can perform

the things which are "beautiful and good"; they that are unwise cannot,

but even if they try they fail. Therefore, since all things just, and

generally all things "beautiful and good," are wrought with virtue, it

is clear that justice and all other virtue is wisdom.

On the other hand, madness (he maintained) was the opposite to wisdom;

not that he regarded simple ignorance as madness, (7) but he put it

thus: for a man to be ignorant of himself, to imagine and suppose that

he knows what he knows not, was (he argued), if not madness itself,

yet something very like it. The mass of men no doubt hold a different

language: if a man is all abroad on some matter of which the mass of

mankind are ignorant, they do not pronounce him "mad"; (8) but a like

aberration of mind, if only it be about matters within the scope

of ordinary knowledge, they call madness. For instance, any one who

imagined himself too tall to pass under a gateway of the Long Wall

without stooping, or so strong as to try to lift a house, or to attempt

any other obvious impossibility, is a madman according to them; but in

the popular sense he is not mad, if his obliquity is confined to small

matters. In fact, just as strong desire goes by the name of passion

in popular parlance, so mental obliquity on a grand scale is entitled

madness.

(7) See K. Joel, op. cit. p. 346; Grote, "Plato," i. 400.

(8) Or, "they resent the term 'mad' being applied to people who are

all abroad," etc. See Comte, "Pos. Pol." i. 575; ii. 373 (Engl.

trans.)

In answer to the question: what is envy? he discovered it to be a

certain kind of pain; not certainly the sorrow felt at the misfortunes

of a friend or the good fortune of an enemy--that is not envy; but, as

he said, "envy is felt by those alone who are annoyed at the successes

of their friends." And when some one or other expressed astonishment

that any one friendlily disposed to another should be pained at his

well-doing, he reminded him of a common tendency in people: when any one

is faring ill their sympathies are touched, they rush to the aid of the

unfortunate; but when fortune smiles on others, they are somehow pained.

"I do not say," he added, "this could happen to a thoughtful person; but

it is no uncommon condition of a silly mind." (9)

(9) Or, "a man in his senses... a simpleton"; for the sentiment L.

Dind. cf. Isocr. "ad Demonic." 7 D.

In answer to the question: what is leisure? I discover (he said) that

most men do something: (10) for instance, the dice player, (11) the

gambler, the buffoon, do something, but these have leisure; they can, if

they like, turn and do something better; but nobody has leisure to turn

from the better to the worse, and if he does so turn, when he has no

leisure, he does but ill in that.

(10) See above, I. ii. 57; and in ref. to these definitions, K. Joel,

op. cit. p. 347 foll.

(11) For "dice-playing" see Becker, "Charicl." 354 (Engl. trans.); for

"buffoonery," ib. 98; "Symp."

(To pass to another definition.) They are not kings or rulers (he said)

who hold the sceptre merely, or are chosen by fellows out of the street,

(12) or are appointed by lot, or have stepped into office by violence

or by fraud; but those who have the special knowledge (13) how to rule.

Thus having won the admission that it is the function of a ruler to

enjoin what ought to be done, and of those who are ruled to obey, he

proceeded to point out by instances that in a ship the ruler or captain

is the man of special knowledge, to whom, as an expert, the shipowner

himself and all the others on board obey. So likewise, in the matter

of husbandry, the proprietor of an estate; in that of sickness, the

patient; in that of physical training of the body, the youthful athlete

going through a course; and, in general, every one directly concerned in

any matter needing attention and care will either attend to this

matter personally, if he thinks he has the special knowledge; or, if he

mistrusts his own science, will be eager to obey any expert on the spot,

or will even send and fetch one from a distance. The guidance of this

expert he will follow, and do what he has to do at his dictation.

(12) Tom, Dick, and Harry (as we say).

(13) The {episteme}. See above, III. v. 21; Newman, op. cit. i. 256.

And thus, in the art of spinning wool, he liked to point out that women

are the rulers of men--and why? because they have the knowledge of the

art, and men have not.

And if any one raised the objection that a tyrant has it in his power

not to obey good and correct advice, he would retort: "Pray, how has

he the option not to obey, considering the penalty hanging over him who

disobeys the words of wisdom? for whatever the matter be in which he

disobeys the word of good advice, he will fall into error, I presume,

and falling into error, be punished." And to the suggestion that the

tyrant could, if he liked, cut off the head of the man of wisdom, his

answer was: "Do you think that he who destroys his best ally will go

scot free, or suffer a mere slight and passing loss? Is he more likely

to secure his salvation that way, think you, or to compass his own swift

destruction?" (14)

(14) Or, "Is that to choose the path of safety, think you? Is it not

rather to sign his own death-warrent?" L. Dind. cf. Hesiod, "Works

and Days," 293. See Newman, op. cit. i. 393-397.

When some one asked him: "What he regarded as the best pursuit or

business (15) for a man?" he answered: "Successful conduct"; (16) and

to a second question: "Did he then regard good fortune as an end to

be pursued?"--"On the contrary," he answered, "for myself, I consider

fortune and conduct to be diametrically opposed. For instance, to

succeed in some desirable course of action without seeking to do so, I

hold to be good fortune; but to do a thing well by dint of learning and

practice, that according to my creed is successful conduct, (17) and

those who make this the serious business of their life seem to me to do

well."

(15) Or, "the noblest study."

(16) {eupraxia, eu prattein}--to do well, in the sense both of well or

right doing, and of welfare, and is accordingly opposed to

{eutukhia}, mere good luck or success. Cf. Plat. "Euthyd." 281 B.

(17) Lit. "well-doing"; and for the Socratic view see Newman, op. cit.

i. 305, 401.

They are at once the best and the dearest in the sight of God (18) (he

went on to say) who for instance in husbandry do well the things of

farming, or in the art of healing all that belongs to healing, or

in statecraft the affairs of state; whereas a man who does nothing

well--nor well in anything--is (he added) neither good for anything nor

dear to God.

(18) Or, "most divinely favoured." Cf. Plat. "Euthyphro," 7 A.

X

But indeed, (1) if chance brought him into conversation with any one

possessed of an art, and using it for daily purposes of business, he

never failed to be useful to this kind of person. For instance, stepping

one time into the studio of Parrhasius (2) the painter, and getting into

conversation with him--

(1) {alla men kai}... "But indeed the sphere of his helpfulness was

not circumscribed; if," etc.

(2) For Parrhasius of Ephesus, the son of Evenor and rival of Zeuxis,

see Woltmann and Woermann, "Hist. of Painting," p. 47 foll.;

Cobet, "Pros. Xen." p. 50 (cf. in particular Quint. XII. x. 627).

At the date of conversation (real or ideal) he may be supposed to

have been a young man.

I suppose, Parrhasius (said he), painting may be defined as "a

representation of visible objects," may it not? (3) That is to say, by

means of colours and palette you painters represent and reproduce as

closely as possible the ups and downs, lights and shadows, hard and

soft, rough and smooth surfaces, the freshness of youth and the wrinkles

of age, do you not?

(3) Reading with Schneider, L. Dind., etc., after Stobaeus, {e

graphike estin eikasia}, or if the vulg. {graphike estin e

eikasia}, trans. "Painting is the term applied to a particular

representation," etc.

You are right (he answered), that is so.

Soc. Further, in portraying ideal types of beauty, seeing it is not easy

to light upon any one human being who is absolutely devoid of blemish,

you cull from many models the most beautiful traits of each, and so make

your figures appear completely beautiful? (4)

(4) Cf. Cic. "de Invent." ii. 1 ad in. of Zeuxis; Max. Tur. "Dissert."

23, 3, ap. Schneider ad loc.

Parrh. Yes, that is how we do. (5)

(5) Or, "that is the secret of our creations," or "our art of

composition."

Well, but stop (Socrates continued); do you also pretend to represent in

similar perfection the characteristic moods of the soul, its captivating

charm and sweetness, with its deep wells of love, its intensity of

yearning, its burning point of passion? or is all this quite incapable

of being depicted?

Nay (he answered), how should a mood be other than inimitable, Socrates,

when it possesses neither linear proportion (6) nor colour, nor any of

those qualities which you named just now; when, in a word, it is not

even visible?

(6) Lit. "symmetry." Cf. Plin. xxxv. 10, "primus symmetriam picturae

dedit," etc.

Soc. Well, but the kindly look of love, the angry glance of hate at any

one, do find expression in the human subject, do they not? (7)

(7) Or, "the glance of love, the scowl of hate, which one directs

towards another, are recognised expressions of human feeling." Cf.

the description of Parrhasius's own portrait of Demos, ap. Plin.

loc. cit.

Parrh. No doubt they do.

Soc. Then this look, this glance, at any rate may be imitated in the

eyes, may it not?

Undoubtedly (he answered).

Soc. And do anxiety and relief of mind occasioned by the good or evil

fortune of those we love both wear the same expression?

By no means (he answered); at the thought of good we are radiant, at

that of evil a cloud hangs on the brow.

Soc. Then here again are looks with it is possible to represent?

Parrh. Decidedly.

Soc. Furthermore, as through some chink or crevice, there pierces

through the countenance of a man, through the very posture of his body

as he stands or moves, a glimpse of his nobility and freedom, or again

of something in him low and grovelling--the calm of self-restraint, and

wisdom, or the swagger of insolence and vulgarity?

You are right (he answered).

Soc. Then these too may be imitated?

No doubt (he said).

Soc. And which is the pleasanter type of face to look at, do you

think--one on which is imprinted the characteristics of a beautiful,

good, and lovable disposition, or one which bears the impress of what is

ugly, and bad, and hateful? (8)

(8) For this theory cp. Ruskin, "Mod. P." ii. 94 foll. and indeed

passim.

Parrh. Doubtless, Socrates, there is a vast distinction between the two.

At another time he entered the workshop of the sculptor Cleiton, (9) and

in course of conversation with him said:

(9) An unknown artist. Coraes conj. {Kleona}. Cf. Plin. xxxiv. 19;

Paus. v. 17, vi. 3. He excelled in portrait statues. See Jowett,

"Plato," iv.; "Laws," p. 123.

You have a gallery of handsome people here, (10) Cleiton, runners, and

wrestlers, and boxers, and pancratiasts--that I see and know; but how

do you give the magic touch of life to your creations, which most of all

allures the soul of the beholder through his sense of vision?

(10) Reading after L. Dind. {kaloi ous}, or if vulg. {alloious},

translate "You have a variety of types, Cleiton, not all of one

mould, but runners," etc.; al. "I see quite well how you give the

diversity of form to your runners," etc.

As Cleiton stood perplexed, and did not answer at once, Socrates added:

Is it by closely imitating the forms of living beings that you succeed

in giving that touch of life to your statues?

No doubt (he answered).

Soc. It is, is it not, by faithfully copying the various muscular

contractions of the body in obedience to the play of gesture and poise,

the wrinklings of flesh and the sprawl of limbs, the tensions and

the relaxations, that you succeed in making your statues like real

beings--make them "breathe" as people say?

Cleit. Without a doubt.

Soc. And does not the faithful imitation of the various affections of

the body when engaged in any action impart a particular pleasure to the

beholder?

Cleit. I should say so.

Soc. Then the threatenings in the eyes of warriors engaged in battle

should be carefully copied, or again you should imitate the aspect of a

conqueror radiant with success?

Cleit. Above all things.

Soc. It would seem then that the sculptor is called upon to incorporate

in his ideal form the workings and energies also of the soul?

Paying a visit to Pistias, (11) the corselet maker, when that artist

showed him some exquisite samples of his work, Socrates exclaimed:

(11) Cf. Athen. iv. 20, where the same artist is referred to

apparently as {Piston}, and for the type of person see the

"Portrait of a Tailor" by Moroni in the National Gallery--see

"Handbook," Edw. T. Cook, p. 152.

By Hera! a pretty invention this, Pistias, by which you contrive that

the corselet should cover the parts of the person which need protection,

and at the same time leave free play to the arms and hands.... but

tell me, Pistias (he added), why do you ask a higher price for these

corselets of yours if they are not stouter or made of costlier material

than the others?

Because, Socrates (he answered), mine are of much finer proportion.

Soc. Proportion! Then how do you make this quality apparent to the

customer so as to justify the higher price--by measure or weight? For

I presume you cannot make them all exactly equal and of one pattern--if

you make them fit, as of course you do?

Fit indeed! that I most distinctly do (he answered), take my word for

it: no use in a corselet without that.

But then are not the wearer's bodies themselves (asked Socrates) some

well proportioned and others ill?

Decidedly so (he answered).

Soc. Then how do you manage to make the corselet well proportioned if it

is to fit an ill-proportioned body? (12)

(12) Or, "how do you make a well-proportioned corselet fit an ill-

proportioned body? how well proportioned?"

Pist. To the same degree exactly as I make it fit. What fits is well

proportioned.

Soc. It seems you use the term "well-proportioned" not in an absolute

sense, but in reference to the wearer, just as you might describe a

shield as well proportioned to the individual it suits; and so of a

military cloak, and so of the rest of things, in your terminology? But

maybe there is another considerable advantage in this "fitting"?

Pist. Pray instruct me, Socrates, if you have got an idea.

Soc. A corselet which fits is less galling by its weight than one which

does not fit, for the latter must either drag from the shoulders with a

dead weight or press upon some other part of the body, and so it becomes

troublesome and uncomfortable; but that which fits, having its weight

distributed partly along the collar-bone and shoulder-blade, partly

over the shoulders and chest, and partly the back and belly, feels like

another natural integument rather than an extra load to carry. (13)

(13) Schneider ad loc. cf Eur. "Electr." 192, {prosthemata aglaias},

and for the weight cf. Aristoph. "Peace," 1224.

Pist. You have named the very quality which gives my work its

exceptional value, as I consider; still there are customers, I am bound

to say, who look for something else in a corselet--they must have them

ornamental or inlaid with gold.

For all that (replied Socrates), if they end by purchasing

an ill-fitting article, they only become the proprietors of a

curiously-wrought and gilded nuisance, as it seems to me. But (he

added), as the body is never in one fixed position, but is at one time

curved, at another raised erect how can an exactly-modelled corselet

fit?

Pist. It cannot fit at all.

You mean (Socrates continued) that it is not the exactly-modelled

corselet which fits, but that which does not gall the wearer in the

using?

Pist. There, Socrates, you have hit the very point. I see you understand

the matter most precisely. (14)

(14) Or, "There, Socrates, you have hit the very phrase. I could not

state the matter more explicitly myself."

XI

There was once in the city a fair woman named Theodote. (1) She was

not only fair, but ready to consort with any suitor who might win her

favour. Now it chanced that some one of the company mentioned her,

saying that her beauty beggared description. "So fair is she," he added,

"that painters flock to draw her portrait, to whom, within the limits of

decorum, she displays the marvels of her beauty." "Then there is nothing

for it but to go and see her," answered Socrates, "since to comprehend

by hearsay what is beyond description is clearly impossible." Then he

who had introduced the matter replied: "Be quick then to follow me"; and

on this wise they set off to seek Theodote. They found her "posing" to a

certain painter; and they took their stand as spectators. Presently the

painter had ceased his work; whereupon Socrates:

(1) For Theodote see Athen. v. 200 F, xiii. 574 F; Liban. i. 582. Some

say that it was Theodote who stood by Alcibiades to the last,

though there are apparently other better claimants to the honour.

Plut. "Alc." (Clough, ii. p. 50).

"Do you think, sirs, that we ought to thank Theodote for displaying her

beauty to us, or she us for coming to gaze at her?... It would

seem, would it not, that if the exhibition of her charms is the more

profitable to her, the debt is on her side; but if the spectacle of her

beauty confers the greater benefit on us, then we are her debtors."

Some one answered that "was an equitable statement of the case."

Well then (he continued), as far as she is concerned, the praise we

bestow on her is an immediate gain; and presently, when we have spread

her fame abroad, she will be further benefited; but for ourselves the

immediate effect on us is a strong desire to touch what we have seen;

by and by, too, we shall go away with a sting inside us, and when we

are fairly gone we shall be consumed with longing. Consequently it seems

that we should do her service and she accept our court.

Whereupon Theodote: Oh dear! if that is how the matter stands, it is I

who am your debtor for the spectacle. (2)

(2) In reference to the remark of Socrates above; or, "have to thank

you for coming to look at me."

At this point, seeing that the lady herself was expensively attired,

and that she had with her her mother also, whose dress and style

of attendance (3) were out of the common, not to speak of the

waiting-women--many and fair to look upon, who presented anything but

a forlorn appearance; while in every respect the whole house itself was

sumptuously furnished--Socrates put a question:

(3) Or, "her mother there with her in a dress and general get-up

({therapeia}) which was out of the common." See Becker,

"Charicles," p. 247 (Eng. tr.)

Pray tell me, Theodote, have you an estate in the country?

Theod. Not I indeed.

Soc. Then perhaps you possess a house and large revenues along with it?

Theod. No, nor yet a house.

Soc. You are not an employer of labour on a large scale? (4)

(4) Lit. "You have not (in your employ) a body of handicraftsmen of

any sort?"

Theod. No, nor yet an employer of labour.

Soc. From what source, then, do you get your means of subsistence? (5)

(5) Or, Anglice, "derive your income."

Theod. My friends are my life and fortune, when they care to be kind to

me.

Soc. By heaven, Theodote, a very fine property indeed, and far better

worth possessing than a multitude of sheep or goats or cattle. A flock

of friends!... But (he added) do you leave it to fortune whether a

friend lights like a fly on your hand at random, or do you use any

artifice (6) yourself to attract him?

(6) Or, "means and appliances," "machinery."

Theod. And how might I hit upon any artifice to attract him?

Soc. Bless me! far more naturally than any spider. You know how they

capture the creatures on which they live; (7) by weaving webs of

gossamer, is it not? and woe betide the fly that tumbles into their

toils! They eat him up.

(7) Lit. "the creatures on which they live."

Theod. So then you would counsel me to weave myself some sort of net?

Soc. Why, surely you do not suppose you are going to ensnare that

noblest of all game--a lover, to wit--in so artless a fashion? Do you

not see (to speak of a much less noble sort of game) what a number of

devices are needed to bag a hare? (8) The creatures range for their food

at night; therefore the hunter must provide himself with night dogs.

At peep of dawn they are off as fast as they can run. He must therefore

have another pack of dogs to scent out and discover which way they

betake them from their grazing ground to their forms; (9) and as they

are so fleet of foot that they run and are out of sight in no time, he

must once again be provided with other fleet-footed dogs to follow their

tracks and overtake them; (10) and as some of them will give even these

the slip, he must, last of all, set up nets on the paths at the points

of escape, so that they may fall into the meshes and be caught.

(8) See the author's own treatise on "Hunting," vi. 6 foll.

(9) Lit. "from pasture to bed."

(10) Or, "close at their heels and run them down." See "Hunting"; cf.

"Cyrop." I. vi. 40.

Theod. And by what like contrivance would you have me catch my lovers?

Soc. Well now! what if in place of a dog you can get a man who will hunt

up your wealthy lover of beauty and discover his lair, and having found

him, will plot and plan to throw him into your meshes?

Theod. Nay, what sort of meshes have I?

Soc. One you have, and a close-folding net it is, (11) I trow; to wit,

your own person; and inside it sits a soul that teaches you (12) with

what looks to please and with what words to cheer; how, too, with smiles

you are to welcome true devotion, but to exclude all wantons from your

presence. (13) It tells you, you are to visit your beloved in sickness

with solicitude, and when he has wrought some noble deed you are greatly

to rejoice with him; and to one who passionately cares for you, you are

to make surrender of yourself with heart and soul. The secret of true

love I am sure you know: not to love softly merely, but devotedly. (14)

And of this too I am sure: you can convince your lovers of your fondness

for them not by lip phrases, but by acts of love.

(11) Or, "right well woven."

(12) Lit. "by which you understand."

(13) Or, "with what smiles to lie in wait for (cf. 'Cyrop.' II. iv.

20; Herod. vi. 104) the devoted admirer, and how to banish from

your presence the voluptary."

(14) Or, "that it should be simply soft, but full of tender goodwill."

Theod. No, upon my word, I have none of these devices.

Soc. And yet it makes all the difference whether you approach a human

being in the natural and true way, since it is not by force certainly

that you can either catch or keep a friend. Kindness and pleasure

are the only means to capture this fearful wild-fowl man and keep him

constant.

Theod. You are right.

Soc. In the first place you must make such demands only of your

well-wisher as he can grant without repentance; and in the next place

you must make requital, dispensing your favours with a like economy.

Thus you will best make friends whose love shall last the longest and

their generosity know no stint. (15) And for your favours you will best

win your friends if you suit your largess to their penury; for, mark

you, the sweetest viands presented to a man before he wants them are apt

to prove insipid, or, to one already sated, even nauseous; but create

hunger, and even coarser stuff seems honey-sweet.

(15) Or, "This is the right road to friendship--permanent and open-

handed friendship."

Theod. How then shall I create this hunger in the heart of my friends?

Soc. In the first place you must not offer or make suggestion of your

dainties to jaded appetites until satiety has ceased and starvation

cries for alms. Even then shall you make but a faint suggestion to their

want, with modest converse--like one who would fain bestow a kindness...

and lo! the vision fades and she is gone--until the very pinch of

hunger; for the same gifts have then a value unknown before the moment

of supreme desire.

Then Theodote: Oh why, Socrates, why are you not by my side (like the

huntsman's assistant) to help me catch my friends and lovers?

Soc. That will I be in good sooth if only you can woo and win me.

Theod. How shall I woo and win you?

Soc. Seek and you will find means, if you truly need me.

Theod. Come then in hither and visit me often.

And Socrates, poking sly fun at his own lack of business occupation,

answered: Nay, Theodote, leisure is not a commodity in which I largely

deal. I have a hundred affairs of my own too, private or public, to

occupy me; and then there are my lady-loves, my dear friends, who will

not suffer me day or night to leave them, for ever studying to learn

love-charms and incantations at my lips.

Theod. Why, are you really versed in those things, Socrates?

Soc. Of course, or else how is it, do you suppose, that Apollodorus (16)

here and Antisthenes never leave me; or why have Cebes and Simmias come

all the way from Thebes to stay with me? Be assured these things cannot

happen without diverse love-charms and incantations and magic wheels.

(16) For Apollodorus see "Apol." 28; Plat. "Symp." 172 A; "Phaed." 59

A, 117 D. For Antisthenes see above. For Cebes and Simmias see

above, I. ii. 48; Plat. "Crit." 45 B; "Phaed." passim.

Theod. I wish you would lend me your magic-wheel, (17) then, and I will

set it spinning first of all for you.

(17) Cf. Theocr. ii. 17; Schneider ad loc.

Soc. Ah! but I do not wish to be drawn to you. I wish you to come to me.

Theod. Then I will come. Only, will you be "at home" to me?

Soc. Yes, I will welcome you, unless some one still dearer holds me

engaged, and I must needs be "not at home."

XII

Seeing one of those who were with him, a young man, but feeble of body,

named Epigenes, (1) he addressed him.

(1) Epigenes, possibly the son of Antiphon. See Plat. "Apol." 33 E;

"Phaed." 59 B.

Soc. You have not the athletic appearance of a youth in training, (2)

Epigenes.

(2) {idiotikos}, lit. of the person untrained in gymnastics. See A. R.

Cluer ad loc. Cf. Plat. "Laws," 839 E; I. ii. 4; III. v. 15;

"Symp." ii. 17.

And he: That may well be, seeing I am an amateur and not in training.

Soc. As little of an amateur, I take it, as any one who ever entered the

lists of Olympia, unless you are prepared to make light of that contest

for life and death against the public foe which the Athenians will

institute when the day comes. (3) And yet they are not a few who, owing

to a bad habit of body, either perish outright in the perils of war, or

are ignobly saved. Many are they who for the self-same cause are taken

prisoners, and being taken must, if it so betide, endure the pains of

slavery for the rest of their days; or, after falling into dolorous

straits, (4) when they have paid to the uttermost farthing of all, or

may be more than the worth of all, that they possess, must drag on

a miserable existence in want of the barest necessaries until death

release them. Many also are they who gain an evil repute through

infirmity of body, being thought to play the coward. Can it be that you

despise these penalties affixed to an evil habit? Do you think you

could lightly endure them? Far lighter, I imagine, nay, pleasant even

by comparison, are the toils which he will undergo who duly cultivates

a healthy bodily condition. Or do you maintain that the evil habit

is healthier, and in general more useful than the good? Do you pour

contempt upon those blessings which flow from the healthy state? And

yet the very opposite of that which befalls the ill attends the

sound condition. Does not the very soundness imply at once health and

strength? (5) Many a man with no other talisman than this has passed

safely through the ordeal of war; stepping, not without dignity, (6)

through all its horrors unscathed. Many with no other support than this

have come to the rescue of friends, or stood forth as benefactors of

their fatherland; whereby they were thought worthy of gratitude, and

obtained a great renown and received as a recompense the highest honours

of the State; to whom is also reserved a happier and brighter passage

through what is left to them of life, and at their death they leave

to their children the legacy of a fairer starting-point in the race of

life.

(3) Or, "should chance betide." Is the author thinking of a life-and-

death struggle with Thebes?

(4) e.g. the prisoners in the Latomiae. Thuc. vii. 87.

(5) It is almost a proverb--"Sound of body and limb is hale and

strong." "Qui valet praevalebit."

(6) e.g. Socrates himself, according to Alcibiades, ap. Plat. "Symp."

221 B; and for the word {euskhemonos} see Arist. "Wasps," 1210,

"like a gentleman"; L. and S.; "Cyr." I. iii. 8; Aristot. "Eth.

N." i. 10, 13, "gracefully."

Because our city does not practise military training in public, (7)

that is no reason for neglecting it in private, but rather a reason for

making it a foremost care. For be you assured that there is no contest

of any sort, nor any transaction, in which you will be the worse off for

being well prepared in body; and in fact there is nothing which men do

for which the body is not a help. In every demand, therefore, which can

be laid upon the body it is much better that it should be in the best

condition; since, even where you might imagine the claims upon the body

to be slightest--in the act of reasoning--who does not know the terrible

stumbles which are made through being out of health? It suffices to say

that forgetfulness, and despondency, and moroseness, and madness take

occasion often of ill-health to visit the intellectual faculties so

severely as to expel all knowledge (8) from the brain. But he who is in

good bodily plight has large security. He runs no risk of incurring any

such catastrophe through ill-health at any rate; he has the expectation

rather that a good habit must procure consequences the opposite to those

of an evil habit; (9) and surely to this end there is nothing a man in

his senses would not undergo.... It is a base thing for a man to wax old

in careless self-neglect before he has lifted up his eyes and seen

what manner of man he was made to be, in the full perfection of bodily

strength and beauty. But these glories are withheld from him who is

guilty of self-neglect, for they are not wont to blaze forth unbidden.

(10)

(7) Cf. "Pol. Ath." i. 13; and above, III. v. 15.

(8) Or, "whole branches of knowledge" ({tas epistemas}).

(9) Or, "he may well hope to be insured by his good habit against the

evils attendant on its opposite."

(10) Or, "to present themselves spontaneously."

XII

Once when some one was in a fury of indignation because he had bidden a

passer-by good-day and the salutation was not returned, Socrates

said: "It is enough to make one laugh! If you met a man in a wretched

condition of body, you would not fall into a rage; but because you

stumble upon a poor soul somewhat boorishly disposed, you feel annoyed."

To the remark of another who complained that he did not take his food

with pleasure, he said: "Acumenus (1) has a good prescription for that."

And when the other asked: "And what may that be?" "To stop eating," he

said. "On the score of pleasure, economy, and health, total abstinence

has much in its favour." (2)

(1) A well-known physician. See Plat. "Phaedr." 227 A, 269 A; "Symp."

176 B. A similar story is told of Dr. Abernethy, I think.

(2) Lit. "he would live a happier, thriftier, and healthier life, if

he stopped eating."

And when some one else lamented that "the drinking-water in his house

was hot," he replied: "Then when you want a warm bath you will not have

to wait."

The Other. But for bathing purposes it is cold.

Soc. Do you find that your domestics seem to mind drinking it or washing

in it?

The Other. Quite the reverse; it is a constant marvel to me how

contentedly they use it for either purpose.

Soc. Which is hotter to the taste--the water in your house or the hot

spring in the temple of Asclepius? (3)

(3) In the Hieron at Epidauros probably. See Baedeker, "Greece," p.

240 foll.

The Other. The water in the temple of Asclepius.

Soc. And which is colder for bathing--yours or the cold spring in the

cave of Amphiaraus? (4)

(4) Possibly at Oropos. Cf. Paus. i. 34. 3.

The Other. The water in the cave of Amphiaraus.

Soc. Then please to observe: if you do not take care, they will set you

down as harder to please than a domestic servant or an invalid. (5)

(5) i.e. "the least and the most fastidious of men."

A man had administered a severe whipping to the slave in attendance

on him, and when Socrates asked: "Why he was so wroth with his own

serving-man?" excused himself on the ground that "the fellow was a lazy,

gourmandising, good-for-nothing dolt--fonder of money than of work." To

which Socrates: "Did it ever strike you to consider which of the two in

that case the more deserves a whipping--the master or the man?"

When some one was apprehending the journey to Olympia, "Why are you

afraid of the long distance?" he asked. "Here at home you spend nearly

all your day in taking walks. (6) Well, on your road to Olympia you will

take a walk and breakfast, and then you will take another walk and dine,

and go to bed. Do you not see, if you take and tack together five or six

days' length of walks, and stretch them out in one long line, it will

soon reach from Athens to Olympia? I would recommend you, however,

to set off a day too soon rather than a day too late. To be forced to

lengthen the day's journey beyond a reasonable amount may well be a

nuisance; but to take one day's journey beyond what is necessary is pure

relaxation. Make haste to start, I say, and not while on the road." (7)

(6) {peripateis}, "promenading up and down."

(7) "Festina lente"--that is your motto.

When some one else remarked "he was utterly prostrated after a long

journey," Socrates asked him: "Had he had any baggage to carry?"

"Not I," replied the complainer; "only my cloak."

Soc. Were you travelling alone, or was your man-servant with you?

He. Yes, I had my man.

Soc. Empty-handed, or had he something to carry?

He. Of course; carrying my rugs and other baggage.

Soc. And how did he come off on the journey?

He. Better than I did myself, I take it.

Soc. Well, but now suppose you had had to carry his baggage, what would

your condition have been like?

He. Sorry enough, I can tell you; or rather, I could not have carried it

at all.

Soc. What a confession! Fancy being capable of so much less toil than

a poor slave boy! Does that sound like the perfection of athletic

training?

XIV

On the occasion of a common dinner-party (1) where some of the company

would present themselves with a small, and others with a large supply

of viands, Socrates would bid the servants (2) throw the small supplies

into the general stock, or else to help each of the party to a share all

round. Thus the grand victuallers were ashamed in the one case not

to share in the common stock, and in the other not to throw in their

supplies also. (3) Accordingly in went the grand supplies into the

common stock. And now, being no better off than the small contributors,

they soon ceased to cater for expensive delicacies.

(1) For the type of entertainment see Becker, "Charicles," p. 315

(Eng. tr.)

(2) "The boy."

(3) Or, "were ashamed not to follow suit by sharing in the common

stock and contributing their own portion."

At a supper-party one member of the company, as Socrates chanced to

note, had put aside the plain fare and was devoting himself to certain

dainties. (4) A discussion was going on about names and definitions,

and the proper applications of terms to things. (5) Whereupon Socrates,

appealing to the company: "Can we explain why we call a man a 'dainty

fellow'? What is the particular action to which the term applies?

(6)--since every one adds some dainty to his food when he can get it.

(7) But we have not quite hit the definition yet, I think. Are we to be

called dainty eaters because we like our bread buttered?" (8)

(4) For the distinction between {sitos} and {opson} see Plat. "Rep."

372 C.

(5) Or, "The conversation had fallen upon names: what is the precise

thing denoted under such and such a term? Define the meaning of so

and so."

(6) {opsophagos} = {opson} (or relish) eater, and so a "gourmand" or

"epicure"; but how to define a gourmand?

(7) Lit. "takes some {opson} (relish) to his {sitos} (food)."

(8) Lit. "simply for that" (sc. the taking of some sort of {opson}.

For {epi touto} cf. Plat. "Soph." 218 C; "Parmen." 147 D.)

No! hardly! (some member of the company replied).

Soc. Well, but now suppose a man confine himself to eating venison or

other dainty without any plain food at all, not as a matter of training,

(9) but for the pleasure of it: has such a man earned the title? "The

rest of the world would have a poor chance against him," (10) some

one answered. "Or," interposed another, "what if the dainty dishes he

devours are out of all proportion to the rest of his meal--what of him?"

(11)

(9) Lit. "{opson} (relish) by itself, not for the sake of training,"

etc. The English reader wil bear in mind that a raw beefsteak or

other meat prescribed by the gymnastic trainer in preference to

farinaceous food ({sitos}) would be {opson}.

(10) Or, more lit. "Hardly any one could deserve the appellation

better."

(11) Lit. "and what of the man who eats much {opson} on the top of a

little ({sitos})?" {epesthion} = follows up one course by another,

like the man in a fragment of Euripides, "Incert." 98: {kreasi

boeiois khlora suk' epesthien}, who "followed up his beefsteak

with a garnish of green figs."

Soc. He has established a very fair title at any rate to the

appellation, and when the rest of the world pray to heaven for a fine

harvest: "May our corn and oil increase!" he may reasonably ejaculate,

"May my fleshpots multiply!"

At this last sally the young man, feeling that the conversation set

somewhat in his direction, did not desist indeed from his savoury

viands, but helped himself generously to a piece of bread. Socrates was

all-observant, and added: Keep an eye on our friend yonder, you others

next him, and see fair play between the sop and the sauce. (12)

(12) Lit. "see whether he will make a relish of the staple or a staple

of the relish" ("butter his bread or bread his butter").

Another time, seeing one of the company using but one sop of bread

(13) to test several savoury dishes, he remarked: Could there be a more

extravagant style of cookery, or more murderous to the dainty dishes

themselves, than this wholesale method of taking so many dishes

together?--why, bless me, twenty different sorts of seasoning at one

swoop! (14) First of all he mixes up actually more ingredients than the

cook himself prescribes, which is extravagant; and secondly, he has the

audacity to commingle what the chef holds incongruous, whereby if the

cooks are right in their method he is wrong in his, and consequently the

destroyer of their art. Now is it not ridiculous first to procure the

greatest virtuosi to cook for us, and then without any claim to their

skill to take and alter their procedure? But there is a worse thing in

store for the bold man who habituates himself to eat a dozen dishes at

once: when there are but few dishes served, out of pure habit he will

feel himself half starved, whilst his neighbour, accustomed to send his

sop down by help of a single relish, will feast merrily, be the dishes

never so few.

(13) {psomos}, a sop or morsel of bread (cf. {psomion}, N. T., in mod.

Greek = "bread").

(14) Huckleberry Finn (p. 2 of that young person's "Adventures")

propounds the rationale of the system: "In a barrel of odds and

ends it is different; things get mixed up, and the juice kind of

swaps around, and the things go better."

He had a saying that {euokheisthai}, to "make good cheer," (15) was

in Attic parlance a synonym for "eating," and the affix {eu} (the

attributive "good") connoted the eating of such things as would not

trouble soul or body, and were not far to seek or hard to find. So

that to "make good cheer" in his vocabulary applied to a modest and

well-ordered style of living. (16)

(15) {euokheisthai}, cf. "Cyrop." IV. v. 7; "Pol. Ath." ii. 9; Kuhner

cf. Eustah. "ad Il." ii. p. 212, 37, {'Akhaioi ten trophen okhen

legousin oxutonos}. Athen. viii. 363 B. See "Hipparch," viii. 4,

of horses. Cf. Arist. "H. A." viii. 6.

(16) See "Symp." vi. 7; and for similar far-fetched etymologies, Plat.

"Crat." passim.

BOOK IV

I

Such was Socrates; so helpful under all circumstances and in every

way that no observer, gifted with ordinary sensibility, could fail to

appreciate the fact, that to be with Socrates, and to spend long time

in his society (no matter where or what the circumstances), was indeed

a priceless gain. Even the recollection of him, when he was no longer

present, was felt as no small benefit by those who had grown accustomed

to be with him, and who accepted him. Nor indeed was he less helpful to

his acquaintance in his lighter than in his graver moods.

Let us take as an example that saying of his, so often on his lips:

"I am in love with so and so"; and all the while it was obvious the

going-forth of his soul was not towards excellence of body in the bloom

of beauty, but rather towards faculties of the soul unfolding in virtue.

(1) And these "good natures" he detected by certain tokens: a readiness

to learn that to which the attention was directed; a power of retaining

in the memory the lessons learnt; and a passionate predilection for

those studies in particular which serve to good administration of a

house or of a state, (2) and in general to the proper handling of

man and human affairs. Such beings, he maintained, needed only to

be educated (3) to become not only happy themselves and happy

administrators of their private households, but to be capable of

rendering other human beings as states or individuals happy also.

(1) Or, "not excellence of body in respect of beauty, but of the soul

as regards virtue; and this good natural disposition might be

detected by the readiness of its possessor to learn," etc. Cf.

Plat. "Rep." 535 B.

(2) Cf. above, I. i. 7.

(3) Or, "A person of this type would, if educated, not only prove a

fortune-favoured individual himself and," etc. Al. Kuhner, "Eos,

qui ita instituti sunt, ut tales sint."

He had indeed a different way of dealing with different kinds of

people. (4) Those who thought they had good natural ability and despised

learning he instructed that the most highly-gifted nature stands most

in need of training and education; (5) and he would point out how in the

case of horses it is just the spirited and fiery thoroughbred which, if

properly broken in as a colt, will develop into a serviceable and superb

animal, but if left unbroken will turn out utterly intractable and good

for nothing. Or take the case of dogs: a puppy exhibiting that zest for

toil and eagerness to attack wild creatures which are the marks of high

breeding, (6) will, if well brought up, prove excellent for the chase or

for any other useful purpose; but neglect his education and he will turn

out a stupid, crazy brute, incapable of obeying the simplest command. It

is just the same with human beings; here also the youth of best natural

endowments--that is to say, possessing the most robust qualities of

spirit and a fixed determination to carry out whatever he has laid his

hand to--will, if trained and taught what it is right to do, prove a

superlatively good and useful man. He achieves, in fact, what is best

upon the grandest scale. But leave him in boorish ignorance untrained,

and he will prove not only very bad but very mischievous, (7) and for

this reason, that lacking the knowledge to discern what is right to do,

he will frequently lay his hand to villainous practices; whilst the very

magnificence and vehemence of his character render it impossible either

to rein him in or to turn him aside from his evil courses. Hence in his

case also his achievements are on the grandest scale but of the worst.

(8)

(4) Or, "His method of attack was not indeed uniformly the same. It

varied with the individual."

(5) Or, "If any one was disposed to look down upon learning and study

in reliance upon his own natural ability, he tried to lesson him

that it is just the highly-gifted nature which stands," etc. See

Newman, op. cit. i. 397.

(6) Cf. Aristot. "H. A." ix. 1; and "Hunting," iii. 11.

(7) Or, "and the same man may easily become a master villain of the

most dangerous sort."

(8) Kuhner ad loc. after Fr. Hermann cf. Plato. "Crito," 44 E; "Hipp.

min." 375 E; "Rep." vi. 491 E; "Gorg." 526 A; "Polit." 303 A.

Or to take the type of person so eaten up with the pride of riches that

he conceives himself dispensed from any further need of education--since

it is "money makes the man," and his wealth will amply suffice him to

carry out his desires and to win honours from admiring humanity. (9)

Socrates would bring such people to their senses by pointing out the

folly of supposing that without instruction it was possible to draw the

line of demarcation (10) between what is gainful and what is hurtful

in conduct; and the further folly of supposing that, apart from such

discrimination, a man could help himself by means of wealth alone to

whatever he liked or find the path of expediency plain before him; and

was it not the veriest simplicity to suppose that, without the power of

labouring profitably, a man can either be doing well or be in any sort

of way sufficiently equipped for the battle of life? and again, the

veriest simplicity to suppose that by mere wealth without true knowledge

it was possible either to purchase a reputation for some excellence, or

without such reputation to gain distinction and celebrity?

(9) Or, "and to be honoured by mankind."

(10) Or, "that without learning the distinction it was possible to

distinguish between," etc.

II

Or to come to a third kind--the class of people who are persuaded that

they have received the best education, and are proud of their wisdom:

his manner of dealing with these I will now describe.

Euthydemus (1) "the beautiful" had (Socrates was given to understand)

collected a large library, consisting of the most celebrated poets and

philosophers, (2) by help of which he already believed himself to be

more than a match for his fellows in wisdom, and indeed might presently

expect to out-top them all in capacity of speech and action. (3) At

first, as Socrates noted, the young man by reason of his youth had not

as yet set foot in the agora, (4) but if he had anything to transact,

his habit was to seat himself in a saddler's shop hard by. Accordingly

to this same saddler's shop Socrates betook himself with some of those

who were with him. And first the question was started by some one: "Was

it through consorting with the wise, (5) or by his own unaided talent,

that Themistocles came so to surpass his fellow-citizens that when the

services of a capable man were needed the eyes of the whole community

instinctively turned to him?" Socrates, with a view to stirring (6)

Euthydemus, answered: There was certainly an ingenuous simplicity in the

belief that superiority in arts of comparatively little worth could only

be attained by aid of qualified teachers, but that the leadership of the

state, the most important concern of all, was destined to drop into the

lap of anybody, no matter whom, like an accidental windfall. (7)

(1) Euthydemus, the son of Diocles perhaps. See Plat. "Symp." 222 B,

and Jowet ad loc.; Cobet, "Prosop. Xen." s.n.; K. Joel, op. cit.

p. 372 foll. For {ton kalon} cf. "Phaedr." 278 E, "Isocrates the

fair." For the whole chapter cf. Plat. "Alc." i.; "Lys." 210 E.

See above, "Mem." I. ii. 29; Grote, "Plato," i. ch. x. passim.

(2) Lit. "sophists." See Grote, "H. G." viii. p. 480, note. For

private libraries see Becker, "Char." p. 272 foll. (Eng. tr.)

(3) See "Hipparch," i. 24; "Cyrop." V. v. 46.

(4) See above, III. vi. 1; Schneid. cf. Isocr. "Areop." 149 C.

(5) Cf. Soph. fr. 12, {sophoi turannoi ton sophon xunousia}.

(6) L. and S. cf. Plat. "Lys." 223 A; "Rep." 329 B: "Wishing to draw

him out."

(7) Cf. Plat. "Alc." i. 118 C: "And Pericles is said not to have got

his wisdom by the light of nature, but to have associated with

several of the philosophers" (Jowett).

On a subsequent occasion, Euthydemus being present, though, as was plain

to see, somewhat disposed to withdraw from the friendly concourse, (8)

as if he would choose anything rather than appear to admire Socrates on

the score of wisdom, the latter made the following remarks.

(8) {sunedrias}, "the council."

Soc. It is clear from his customary pursuits, is it not, sirs, that when

our friend Euthydemus here is of full age, and the state propounds some

question for solution, he will not abstain from offering the benefit

of his advice? One can imagine the pretty exordium to his parliamentary

speeches which, in his anxiety not to be thought to have learnt anything

from anybody, he has ready for the occasion. (9) Clearly at the outset

he will deliver himself thus: "Men of Athens, I have never at any time

learnt anything from anybody; nor, if I have ever heard of any one as

being an able statesman, well versed in speech and capable of action,

have I sought to come across him individually. I have not so much as

been at pains to provide myself with a teacher from amongst those who

have knowledge; (10) on the contrary, I have persistently avoided, I

will not say learning from others, but the very faintest suspicion of

so doing. However, anything that occurs to me by the light of nature I

shall be glad to place at your disposal."... How appropriate (11) would

such a preface sound on the lips of any one seeking, say, the office of

state physician, (12) would it not? How advantageously he might begin

an address on this wise: "Men of Athens, I have never learnt the art of

healing by help of anybody, nor have I sought to provide myself with any

teacher among medical men. Indeed, to put it briefly, I have been ever

on my guard not only against learning anything from the profession, but

against the very notion of having studied medicine at all. If, however,

you will be so good as to confer on me this post, I promise I will do

my best to acquire skill by experimenting on your persons." Every one

present laughed at the exordium (and there the matter dropped).

(9) Or, "the pretty exordium... now in course of composition. He

must at all hazards avoid the suspicion of having picked up any

crumb of learning from anybody; how can he help therefore

beginning his speech thus?"

(10) Or, "scientific experts."

(11) Al. "Just as if one seeking the office of state physician were to

begin with a like exordium." {armoseie} = "it would be consistent

(with what has gone before)."

(12) Schneider cf. Plat. "Laws," iv. 720 A; "Gorg." 456 A; and for

"the parish doctor," "Polit." 259 A; Arist. "Acharn." 1030.

Presently, when it became apparent that Euthydemus had got so far that

he was disposed to pay attention to what was said, though he was still

at pains not to utter a sound himself, as if he hoped by silence to

attach to himself some reputation for sagacity, Socrates, wishing to

cure him of that defect, proceeded.

Soc. Is it not surprising that people anxious to learn to play the

harp or the flute, or to ride, or to become proficient in any like

accomplishment, are not content to work unremittingly in private by

themselves at whatever it is in which they desire to excel, but they

must sit at the feet of the best-esteemed teachers, doing all things

and enduring all things for the sake of following the judgment of those

teachers in everything, as though they themselves could not otherwise

become famous; whereas, among those who aspire to become eminent

politically as orators and statesmen, (13) there are some who cannot

see why they should not be able to do all that politics demand, at a

moment's notice, by inspiration as it were, without any preliminary

pains or preparations whatever? And yet it would appear that the latter

concerns must be more difficult of achievement than the former, in

proportion as there are more competitors in the field but fewer who

reach the goal of their ambition, which is as much as to say that a more

sustained effort of attention is needed on the part of those who embark

upon the sea of politics than is elsewhere called for.

(13) Or, more lit. "powerful in speech and action within the sphere of

politics."

Such were the topics on which Socrates was wont in the early days of

their association to dilate in the hearing of Euthydemus; but when the

philosopher perceived that the youth not only could tolerate the turns

of the discussion more readily but was now become a somewhat eager

listener, he went to the saddler's shop alone, (14) and when Euthydemus

was seated by his side the following conversation took place.

(14) The question arises: how far is the conversation historical or

imaginary?

Soc. Pray tell me, Euthydemus, is it really true what people tell me,

that you have made a large collection of the writings of "the wise," as

they are called? (15)

(15) Or, "have collected several works of our classical authors and

philosophers."

Euthydemus answered: Quite true, Socrates, and I mean to go on

collecting until I possess all the books I can possibly lay hold of.

Soc. By Hera! I admire you for wishing to possess treasures of wisdom

rather than of gold and silver, which shows that you do not believe gold

and silver to be the means of making men better, but that the thoughts

(16) of the wise alone enrich with virtue their possessions.

(16) Lit. "gnomes," maxims, sententiae. Cf. Aristot. "Rhet." ii. 21.

And Euthydemus was glad when he heard that saying, for, thought he

to himself, "In the eyes of Socrates I am on the high road to the

acquisition of wisdom." But the latter, perceiving him to be pleased

with the praise, continued.

Soc. And what is it in which you desire to excel, Euthydemus, that you

collect books?

And when Euthydemus was silent, considering what answer he should

make, Socrates added: Possibly you want to be a great doctor? Why,

the prescriptions (17) of the Pharmacopoeia would form a pretty large

library by themselves.

(17) {suggrammata}, "medical treatises." See Aristot. "Eth." x. 9, 21.

No, indeed, not I! (answered Euthydemus).

Soc. Then do you wish to be an architect? That too implies a man of

well-stored wit and judgment. (18)

(18) Or, "To be that implies a considerable store of well-packed

wisdom."

I have no such ambition (he replied).

Soc. Well, do you wish to be a mathematician, like Theodorus? (19)

(19) Of Cyrene (cf. Plat. "Theaet.") taught Plato. Diog. Laert. ii. 8,

19.

Euth. No, nor yet a mathematician.

Soc. Then do you wish to be an astronomer? (20) or (as the youth

signified dissent) possibly a rhapsodist? (21) (he asked), for I am told

you have the entire works of Homer in your possession. (22)

(20) Cf. below, IV. vii. 4.

(21) See "Symp." iii. 6; Plat. "Ion."

(22) See Jowett, "Plato," i. 229; Grote, "Plato," i. 455.

Nay, God forbid! not I! (ejaculated the youth). Rhapsodists have a very

exact acquaintance with epic poetry, I know, of course; but they are

empty-pated creatures enough themselves. (23)

(23) Or, "are simply perfect in the art of reciting epic poetry, but

are apt to be the veriest simpletons themselves."

At last Socrates said: Can it be, Euthydemus, that you are an aspirant

to that excellence through which men become statesmen and administrators

fit to rule and apt to benefit (24) the rest of the world and

themselves?

(24) Or, "statesmen, and economists, and rules, and benefactors of

the rest of the world and themselves."

Yes (replied he), that is the excellence I desire--beyond measure.

Upon my word (said Socrates), then you have indeed selected as the

object of your ambition the noblest of virtues and the greatest of the

arts, for this is the property of kings, and is entitled "royal"; but

(he continued) have you considered whether it is possible to excel in

these matters without being just and upright? (25)

(25) Just, {dikaios} = upright, righteous. Justice, {dikaiosune} =

social uprightness = righteousness, N.T. To quote a friend: "The

Greek {dikaios} combines the active dealing out of justice with

the self-reflective idea of preserving justice in our conduct,

which is what we mean by 'upright.'"

Euth. Certainly I have, and I say that without justice and uprightness

it is impossible to be a good citizen.

No doubt (replied Socrates) you have accomplished that initial step?

Euth. Well, Socrates, I think I could hold my own against all comers as

an upright man.

And have upright men (continued Socrates) their distinctive and

appropriate works like those of carpenters or shoe-makers?

Euth. To be sure they have.

Soc. And just as the carpenter is able to exhibit his works and

products, the righteous man should be able to expound and set forth his,

should he not?

I see (replied Euthydemus) you are afraid I cannot expound the works

of righteousness! Why, bless me! of course I can, and the works of

unrighteousness into the bargain, since there are not a few of that sort

within reach of eye and ear every day.

Shall we then (proceeded Socrates) write the letter R on this side, (26)

and on that side the letter W; and then anything that appears to us

to be the product of righteousness we will place to the R account, and

anything which appears to be the product of wrong-doing and iniquity to

the account of W?

(26) The letter R (to stand for Right, Righteous, Upright, Just). The

letter W (to stand for Wrong, Unrighteous, Unjust).

By all means do so (he answered), if you think that it assists matters.

Accordingly Socrates drew the letters, as he had suggested, and

continued.

Soc. Lying exists among men, does it not?

Euth. Certainly.

To which side of the account then shall we place it? (he asked).

Euth. Clearly on the side of wrong and injustice.

Soc. Deceit too is not uncommon?

Euth. By no means.

Soc. To which side shall we place deceit?

Euth. Deceit clearly on the side of wrong.

Soc. Well, and chicanery (27) or mischief of any sort?

(27) Reading {to kakourgein} (= furari, Sturz); al. {kleptein}, Stob.

Euth. That too.

Soc. And the enslavement of free-born men? (28)

(28) Or, "the kidnapping of men into slavery." {to andrapodizesthai} =

the reduction of a free-born man to a state of slavery. Slavery

itself ({douleia}) being regarded as the normal condition of a

certain portion of the human race and not in itself immoral.

Euth. That too.

Soc. And we cannot allow any of these to lie on the R side of the

account, to the side of right and justice, can we, Euthydemus?

It would be monstrous (he replied).

Soc. Very good. But supposing a man to be elected general, and he

succeeds in enslaving an unjust, wicked, and hostile state, are we to

say that he is doing wrong?

Euth. By no means.

Soc. Shall we not admit that he is doing what is right?

Euth. Certainly.

Soc. Again, suppose he deceives the foe while at war with them?

Euth. That would be all fair and right also.

Soc. Or steals and pillages their property? would he not be doing what

is right?

Euth. Certainly; when you began I thought you were limiting the question

to the case of friends.

Soc. So then everything which we set down on the side of Wrong will now

have to be placed to the credit of Right?

Euth. Apparently.

Soc. Very well then, let us so place them; and please, let us make a

new definition--that while it is right to do such things to a foe, it is

wrong to do them to a friend, but in dealing with the latter it behoves

us to be as straightforward as possible. (29)

(29) Or, "an absolutely straightforward course is necessary."

I quite assent (replied Euthydemus).

So far so good (remarked Socrates); but if a general, seeing his troops

demoralised, were to invent a tale to the effect that reinforcements

were coming, and by means of this false statement should revive the

courage of his men, to which of the two accounts shall we place that act

of fraud? (30)

(30) Cf. "Hell." IV. iii. 10; "Cyrop." I. vi. 31.

On the side of right, to my notion (he replied).

Soc. Or again, if a man chanced to have a son ill and in need of

medicine, which the child refused to take, and supposing the father by

an act of deceit to administer it under the guise of something nice to

eat, and by service of that lie to restore the boy to health, to which

account shall we set down this fraud?

Euth. In my judgment it too should be placed to the same account.

Soc. Well, supposing you have a friend in deplorably low spirits, and

you are afraid he will make away with himself--accordingly you rob him

of his knife or other such instrument: to which side ought we to set the

theft?

Euth. That too must surely be placed to the score of right behaviour.

Soc. I understand you to say that a straightforward course is not in

every case to be pursued even in dealing with friends?

Heaven forbid! (the youth exclaimed). If you will allow me, I rescind my

former statement. (31)

(31) See above, I. ii. 44 ({anatithemai}).

Soc. Allow you! Of course you may--anything rather than make a false

entry on our lists.... But there is just another point we ought not to

leave uninvestigated. Let us take the case of deceiving a friend to

his detriment: which is the more wrongful--to do so voluntarily or

unintentionally?

Euth. Really, Socrates, I have ceased to believe in my own answers, for

all my former admissions and conceptions seem to me other than I

first supposed them. (32) Still, if I may hazard one more opinion, the

intentional deceiver, I should say, is worse than the involuntary.

(32) Or, "all my original positions seem to me now other than I first

conceived them"; or, "everything I first asserted seems now to be

twisted topsy-turvy."

Soc. And is it your opinion that there is a lore and science of Right

and Justice just as there is of letters and grammar? (33)

(33) {mathesis kai episteme tou dikaiou}--a doctrine and a knowledge

of the Just.

Euth. That is my opinion.

Soc. And which should you say was more a man of letters (34)--he who

intentionally misspells or misreads, or he who does so unconsciously?

(34) Or, "more grammatical"; "the better grammarian."

Euth. He who does so intentionally, I should say, because he can spell

or read correctly whenever he chooses.

Soc. Then the voluntary misspeller may be a lettered person, but the

involuntary offender is an illiterate? (35)

(35) Or, "In fact, he who sins against the lore of grammer

intentionally may be a good grammarian and a man of letters, but

he who does so involuntarily is illiterate and a bad grammarian?"

Euth. True, he must be. I do not see how to escape from that conclusion.

Soc. And which of the two knows what is right--he who intentionally lies

and deceives, or he who lies and deceives unconsciously? (36)

(36) Or, Soc. And does he who lies and deceives with intent know what

is right rather than he who does either or both unconsciously?

Euth. Clearly he does.

Euth. The intentional and conscious liar clearly.

Soc. Well then, your statement is this: on the one hand, the man who

has the knowledge of letters is more lettered than he who has no such

knowledge? (37)

(37) Or, Soc. It is a fair inference, is it not, that he who has the

{episteme} of grammar is more grammatical than he who has no such

{episteme}?

Euth. Yes.

Soc. And he who has the {episteme} of things rightful is more

righteous than he who lacks the {episteme}? See Plat. "Hipp.

min."; Arist. "Eth. Eud." VI. v. 7.

Euth. Yes.

Soc. And, on the other, he who has the knowledge of what is right is

more righteous than he who lacks that knowledge?

Euth. I suppose it is, but for the life of me I cannot make head or tail

of my own admission. (38)

(38) Lit. "Apparently; but I appear to myself to be saying this also,

heaven knows how." See Jowett, "Plato," ii. p. 416 (ed. 2).

Soc. Well (look at it like this). Suppose a man to be anxious to speak

the truth, but he is never able to hold the same language about a thing

for two minutes together. First he says: "The road is towards the east,"

and then he says, "No, it's towards the west"; or, running up a column

of figures, now he makes the product this, and again he makes it that,

now more, now less--what do you think of such a man?

Euth. Heaven help us! clearly he does not know what he thought he knew.

Soc. And you know the appellation given to certain people--"slavish,"

(39) or, "little better than a slave?"

(39) {andropododeis}, which has the connotation of mental dulness, and

a low order of intellect, cf. "boorish," "rustic," "loutish,"

("pariah," conceivably). "Slavish," "servile," with us connote

moral rather than intellectual deficiency, I suppose. Hence it is

impossible to preserve the humour of the Socratic argument. See

Newman, op. cit. i. 107.

Euth. I do.

Soc. Is it a term suggestive of the wisdom or the ignorance of those to

whom it is applied?

Euth. Clearly of their ignorance.

Soc. Ignorance, for instance, of smithying?

Euth. No, certainly not.

Soc. Then possibly ignorance of carpentering?

Euth. No, nor yet ignorance of carpentering.

Soc. Well, ignorance of shoemaking?

Euth. No, nor ignorance of any of these: rather the reverse, for the

majority of those who do know just these matters are "little better than

slaves."

Soc. You mean it is a title particularly to those who are ignorant of

the beautiful, the good, the just? (40)

(40) Cf. Goethe's "Im Ganzen Guten Schonen resolut zu leben."

It is, in my opinion (he replied).

Soc. Then we must in every way strain every nerve to avoid the

imputation of being slaves?

Euth. Nay, Socrates, by all that is holy, I did flatter myself that

at any rate I was a student of philosophy, and on the right road to

be taught everything essential to one who would fain make beauty and

goodness his pursuit. (41) So that now you may well imagine my despair

when, for all my pains expended, I cannot even answer the questions put

to me about what most of all a man should know; and there is no path of

progress open to me, no avenue of improvement left.

(41) {tes kalokagathias}, the virtue of the {kalos te kagathos}--

nobility of soul. Cf. above, I. vi. 14.

Thereupon Socrates: Tell me, Euthydemus, have you ever been to Delphi?

Yes, certainly; twice (said he).

Soc. And did you notice an inscription somewhere on the temple:

{GNOMI SEAUTON}--KNOW THYSELF?

Euth. I did.

Soc. Did you, possibly, pay no regard to the inscription? or did you

give it heed and try to discover who and what you were?

I can safely say I did not (he answered). That much I made quite sure

I knew, at any rate; since if I did not know even myself, what in the

world did I know?

Soc. Can a man be said, do you think, to know himself who knows his own

name and nothing more? or must he not rather set to work precisely like

the would-be purchaser of a horse, who certainly does not think that he

has got the knowledge he requires until he has discovered whether the

beast is tractable or stubborn, strong or weak, quick or slow, and

how it stands with the other points, serviceable or the reverse, in

reference to the use and purpose of a horse? So, I say, must a man

in like manner interrogate his own nature in reference to a man's

requirements, and learn to know his own capacities, must he not?

Euth. Yes, so it strikes me: he who knows not his own ability knows not

himself.

Soc. And this too is plain, is it not: that through self-knowledge men

meet with countless blessings, and through ignorance of themselves

with many evils? Because, the man who knows himself knows what is

advantageous to himself; he discerns the limits of his powers, and by

doing what he knows, he provides himself with what he needs and so does

well; or, conversely, by holding aloof from what he knows not, he avoids

mistakes and thereby mishaps. And having now a test to gauge other human

beings he uses their need as a stepping-stone to provide himself with

good and to avoid evil. Whereas he who does not know himself, but is

mistaken as to his own capacity, is in like predicament to the rest of

mankind and all human matters else; he neither knows what he wants,

nor what he is doing, nor the people whom he deals with; and being all

abroad in these respects, he misses what is good and becomes involved in

what is ill.

Again, he that knows what he is doing through the success of his

performance attains to fame and honour; his peers and co-mates are glad

to make use of him, whilst his less successful neighbours, failing

in their affairs, are anxious to secure his advice, his guidance, his

protection; (42) they place their hopes of happiness in him, and for all

these causes (43) single him out as the chief object of their affection.

He, on the contrary, who knows not what he does, who chooses amiss and

fails in what he puts his hands to, not only incurs loss and suffers

chastisement through his blunders, but step by step loses reputation

and becomes a laughing-stock, and in the end is doomed to a life of

dishonour and contempt.

(42) Cf. Dante, "Tu duca, tu maestro, tu signore."

(43) Reading, {dia panta tauta}, or if {dia tauta}, translate "and

therefore."

What is true of individuals is true also of communities. (44) That state

which in ignorance of its power goes to war with a stronger than itself

ends by being uprooted or else reduced to slavery.

(44) Or, more lit. "A law which applies, you will observe, to bodies

politic."

Thereupon Euthydemus: Be assured I fully concur in your opinion; the

precept KNOW THYSELF cannot be too highly valued; but what is the

application? What the starting-point of self-examination? I look to you

for an explanation, if you would kindly give one. (45)

(45) Or, "at what point to commence the process of self-inspection?--

there is the mystery. I look to you, if you are willing, to

interpret it."

Well (replied Socrates), I presume you know quite well the distinction

between good and bad things: your knowledge may be relied upon so far?

Why, yes, to be sure (replied the youth); for without that much

discernment I should indeed be worse than any slave. (46)

(46) Lit. "if I did not know even that."

Come then (said he), do you give me an explanation of the things so

termed.

That is fortunately not hard (replied the youth). First of all, health

in itself I hold to be a good, and disease in itself an evil; and in the

next place the sources of either of those aforenamed, meats and drinks,

and habits of life, (47) I regard as good or evil according as they

contribute either to health or to disease.

(47) Or, "pursuits and occupations"; "manners and customs."

Soc. Then health and disease themselves when they prove to be sources of

any good are good, but when of any evil, evil?

And when (asked he), can health be a source of evil, or disease a source

of good?

Why, bless me! often enough (replied Socrates). In the event, for

instance, of some ill-starred expedition or of some disastrous voyage

or other incident of the sort, of which veritably there are enough to

spare--when those who owing to their health and strength take a part

in the affair are lost; whilst those who were left behind--as hors de

combat, on account of ill-health of other feebleness--are saved.

Euth. Yes, you are right; but you will admit that there are advantages

to be got from strength and lost through weakness.

Soc. Even so; but ought we to regard those things which at one moment

benefit and at another moment injure us in any strict sense good rather

than evil?

Euth. No, certainly not, according to that line of argument. But wisdom,

(48) Socrates, you must on your side admit, is irrefragably a good;

since there is nothing which or in which a wise man would not do better

than a fool.

(48) See above, III. ix. 5. Here {sophia} is not = {sophrosune}.

Soc. What say you? Have you never heard of Daedalus, (49) how he was

seized by Minos on account of his wisdom, and forced to be his slave,

and robbed of fatherland and freedom at one swoop? and how, while

endeavouring to make his escape with his son, he caused the boy's

death without effecting his own salvation, but was carried off among

barbarians and again enslaved?

(49) See Ovid. "Met." viii. 159 foll., 261 foll.; Hygin. "Fab." 39,

40; Diod. Sic. iv. 79; Paus. vii. 4. 6.

Yes, I know the old story (he answered). (50)

(50) Or, "Ah yes, of course; the tale is current."

Soc. Or have you not heard of the "woes of Palamedes," (51) that

commonest theme of song, how for his wisdom's sake Odysseus envied him

and slew him?

(51) See Virg. "Aen." ii. 90; Hygin. 105; Philostr. "Her." x.

Euth. That tale also is current.

Soc. And how many others, pray, do you suppose have been seized on

account of their wisdom, and despatched to the great king and at his

court enslaved? (52)

(52) Cf. Herod. iii. 129.

Well, prosperity, well-being (53) (he exclaimed), must surely be a

blessing, and that the most indisputable, Socrates?

(53) {to eudaimonein}, "happiness." Cf. Herod. i. 86.

It might be so (replied the philosopher) if it chanced not to be in

itself a compound of other questionable blessings.

Euth. And which among the components of happiness and well-being can

possibly be questionable?

None (he retorted), unless of course we are to include among these

components beauty, or strength, or wealth, or reputation, or anything

else of that kind?

Euth. By heaven! of course we are to include these, for what would

happiness be without these?

Soc. By heaven! yes; only then we shall be including the commonest

sources of mischief which befall mankind. How many are ruined by their

fair faces at the hand of admirers driven to distraction (54) by the

sight of beauty in its bloom! how many, tempted by their strength to

essay deeds beyond their power, are involved in no small evils! how

many, rendered effeminate by reason of their wealth, have been plotted

against and destroyed! (55) how many through fame and political power

have suffered a world of woe!

(54) Cf. Plat. "Rep." vii. 517 D; "Phaedr." 249 D.

(55) e.g. Alcibiades.

Well (the youth replied) if I am not even right in praising happiness,

I must confess I know not for what one ought to supplicate the gods in

prayer. (56)

(56) See above for Socrates' own form of supplication.

Nay, these are matters (proceeded Socrates) which perhaps, through

excessive confidence in your knowledge of them, you have failed to

examine into; but since the state, which you are preparing yourself to

direct, is democratically constituted, (57) of course you know what a

democracy is.

(57) Or, "popularly governed."

Euth. I presume I do, decidedly.

Soc. Well, now, is it possible to know what a popular state is without

knowing who the people are?

Euth. Certainly not.

Soc. And whom do you consider to be the people?

Euth. The poor citizens, I should say.

Soc. Then you know who the poor are, of course?

Euth. Of course I do.

Soc. I presume you also know who the rich are?

Euth. As certainly as I know who are the poor.

Soc. Whom do you understand by poor and rich?

Euth. By poor I mean those who have not enough to pay for their

necessaries, (58) and by rich those who have more means than sufficient

for all their needs.

(58) Al. "who cannot contribute their necessary quota to the taxes

(according to the census)."

Soc. Have you noticed that some who possess a mere pittance not only

find this sufficient, but actually succeed in getting a surplus out of

it; while others do not find a large fortune large enough?

I have, most certainly; and I thank you for the reminder (replied

Euthydemus). One has heard of crowned heads and despotic rulers being

driven by want to commit misdeeds like the veriest paupers.

Then, if that is how matters stand (continued Socrates), we must class

these same crowned heads with the commonalty; and some possessors of

scant fortunes, provided they are good economists, with the wealthy?

Then Euthydemus: It is the poverty of my own wit which forces me to this

admission. I bethink me it is high time to keep silence altogether; a

little more, and I shall be proved to know absolutely nothing. And so he

went away crestfallen, in an agony of self-contempt, persuaded that he

was verily and indeed no better than a slave.

Amongst those who were reduced to a like condition by Socrates, many

refused to come near him again, whom he for his part looked upon as

dolts and dullards. (59) But Euthydemus had the wit to understand that,

in order to become worthy of account, his best plan was to associate

as much as possible with Socrates; and from that moment, save for some

necessity, he never left him--in some points even imitating him in his

habits and pursuits. Socrates, on his side, seeing that this was the

young man's disposition, disturbed him as little as possible, but in the

simplest and plainest manner initiated him into everything which he held

to be needful to know or important to practise.

(59) Or, "as people of dull intelligence and sluggish temperament."

Cf. Plat. "Gorg." 488 A.

III

It may be inferred that Socrates was in no hurry for those who were

with him to discover capacities for speech and action or as

inventive geniuses, (1) without at any rate a well-laid foundation of

self-control. (2) For those who possessed such abilities without these

same saving virtues would, he believed, only become worse men with

greater power for mischief. His first object was to instil into those

who were with him a wise spirit in their relation to the gods. (3) That

such was the tenor of his conversation in dealing with men may be

seen from the narratives of others who were present on some particular

occasion. (4) I confine myself to a particular discussion with

Euthydemus at which I was present.

(1) Or, "as speakers" (see ch. vi. below), "and men of action" (see

ch. v. below), "or as masters of invention" (see ch. vii. below).

(2) Or, "but as prior to those excellences must be engrafted in them

{sophrosune} (the virtues of temperance and sanity of soul)."

(3) Lit. "His first object and endeavour was to make those who were

with him {sophronas} (sound of soul) as regards the gods."

(4) Reading after Herbst, Cobet, etc., {diegountai}, or if vulg.

{diegounto}, translate, "from the current accounts penned during

his lifetime by the other witnesses." For {alloi} see K. Joel, op.

cit. pp. 15, 23; above, "Mem." I. iv. 1.

Socrates said: (5) Tell me, Euthydemus, has it ever struck you to

observe what tender pains the gods have taken to furnish man with all

his needs?

(5) For the subject matter of this "teleological" chapter, see above,

I. iv.; K. Joel, op. cit. Appendix, p. 547 foll. in ref. to

Dummler's views.

Euth. No indeed, I cannot say that it has ever struck me.

Well (Socrates continued), you do not need to be reminded that, in the

first place, we need light, and with light the gods supply us.

Euth. Most true, and if we had not got it we should, as far as our own

eyes could help us, be like men born blind.

Soc. And then, again, seeing that we stand in need of rest and

relaxation, they bestow upon us "the blessed balm of silent night." (6)

(6) {kalliston anapauterion}. The diction throughout is "poetical."

Yes (he answered), we are much beholden for that boon.

Soc. Then, forasmuch as the sun in his splendour makes manifest to us

the hours of the day and bathes all things in brightness, but anon night

in her darkness obliterates distinctions, have they not displayed aloft

the starry orbs, which inform us of the watches of the night, whereby we

can accomplish many of our needs? (7)

(7) e.g. for temple orientation see Dr. Penrose quoted by Norman

Lockyer, "Nature," August 31. 1893.

It is so (he answered).

Soc. And let us not forget that the moon herself not only makes clear to

us the quarters of the night, but of the month also?

Certainly (he answered).

Soc. And what of this: that whereas we need nutriment, this too the

heavenly powers yield us? Out of earth's bosom they cause good to spring

up (8) for our benefit; and for our benefit provide appropriate seasons

to furnish us in turn not only with the many and diverse objects of

need, but with the sources also of our joy and gladness? (9)

(8) Cf. Plat. "Laws," 747 D.

(9) Or, "pleasure."

Yes (he answered eagerly), these things bear token truly to a love for

man. (10)

(10) Cf. Plat. "Laws," 713 D; "Symp." 189 D. "These things are signs

of a beneficient regard for man."

Soc. Well, and what of another priceless gift, that of water, which

conspires with earth and the seasons to give both birth and increase to

all things useful to us; nay, which helps to nurture our very selves,

and commingling with all that feeds us, renders it more digestible, more

wholesome, and more pleasant to the taste; and mark you in proportion to

the abundance of our need the superabundance of its supply. What say you

concerning such a boon?

Euth. In this again I see a sign of providential care.

Soc. And then the fact that the same heavenly power has provided us with

fire (11)--our assistant against cold, our auxiliary in darkness, our

fellow-workman in every art and every instrument which for the sake of

its utility mortal man may invent or furnish himself withal. What of

this, since, to put it compendiously, there is nothing serviceable to

the life of man worth speaking of but owes its fabrication to fire? (12)

(11) Lit. "and then the fact that they made provision for us of even

fire"; the credit of this boon, according to Hesiod, being due to

Prometheus.

(12) Or, "no life-aiding appliance worthy of the name."

Euth. Yes, a transcendent instance of benevolent design. (13)

(13) Or, "Yes, that may be called an extreme instance of the divine

'philanthropy.'" Cf. Cic. "de N. D." ii. 62.

Soc. Again, consider the motions of the Sun, (14) how when he has

turned him about in winter (15) he again draws nigh to us, ripening some

fruits, and causing others whose time is past to dry up; how when he has

fulfilled his work he comes no closer, but turns away as if in fear to

scorch us to our hurt unduly; and again, when he has reached a point

where if he should prolong his retreat we should plainly be frozen to

death with cold, note how he turns him about and resumes his approach,

traversing that region of the heavens where he may shed his genial

influence best upon us.

(14) A single MS. inserts a passage {to de kai era...

'Anekphraston}.

(15) i.e. as we say, "after the winter solstice."

Yes, upon my word (he answered), these occurrences bear the impress of

being so ordered for the sake of man.

Soc. And then, again, it being manifest that we could not endure either

scorching heat or freezing cold if they came suddenly upon us, note how

gradually the sun approaches, and how gradually recedes, so that we fail

to notice how we come at last to either extreme. (16)

(16) Or, "note the gradual approach and gradual recession of the sun-

god, so gradual that we reach either extreme in a manner

imperceptibly, and before we are aware of its severity."

For my part (he replied), the question forces itself upon my mind,

whether the gods have any other occupation save only to minister to man;

and I am only hindered from saying so, because the rest of animals would

seem to share these benefits along with man.

Soc. Why, to be sure; and is it not plain that these animals themselves

are born and bred for the sake of man? At any rate, no living creature

save man derives so many of his enjoyments from sheep and goats, horses

and cattle and asses, and other animals. He is more dependent, I should

suppose, on these than even on plants and vegetables. At any rate,

equally with these latter they serve him as means of subsistence or

articles of commerce; indeed, a large portion of the human family do not

use the products of the soil as food at all, but live on the milk and

cheese and flesh of their flocks and herds, whilst all men everywhere

tame and domesticate the more useful kinds of animals, and turn them to

account as fellow-workers in war and for other purposes.

Yes, I cannot but agree with what you say (he answered), when I see that

animals so much stronger than man become so subservient to his hand that

he can use them as he lists.

Soc. And as we reflect on the infinite beauty and utility and the

variety of nature, what are we to say of the fact that man has been

endowed with sensibilities which correspond with this diversity, whereby

we take our fill of every blessing; (17) or, again, this implanted

faculty of reasoning, which enables us to draw inferences concerning the

things which we perceive, and by aid of memory to understand how

each set of things may be turned to our good, and to devise countless

contrivances with a view to enjoying the good and repelling the evil; or

lastly, when we consider the faculty bestowed upon us of interpretative

speech, by which we are enabled to instruct one another, and to

participate in all the blessings fore-named: to form societies, to

establish laws, and to enter upon a civilised existence (18)--what are

we to think?

(17) Or, "Again, when we consider how many beautiful objects there are

serviceable to man, and yet how unlike they are to one another,

the fact that man has been endowed with senses adapted to each

class of things, and so has access to a world of happiness."

(18) Cf. Aristot. "Pol." III. ix. 5.

Euth. Yes, Socrates, decidedly it would appear that the gods do manifest

a great regard, nay, a tender care, towards mankind.

Soc. Well, and what do you make of the fact that where we are powerless

to take advantageous forethought for our future, at this stage they

themselves lend us their co-operation, imparting to the inquirer through

divination knowledge of events about to happen, and instructing him by

what means they may best be turned to good account?

Euth. Ay, and you, Socrates, they would seem to treat in a more friendly

manner still than the rest of men, if, without waiting even to be

inquired of by you, they show you by signs beforehand what you must, and

what you must not do. (19)

(19) See above, I. iv. 14, for a parallel to the train of thought on

the part of Aristodemus "the little," and of Euthydemus; and for

Socrates' {daimonion}, see above; Grote, "Plato," i. 400.

Soc. Yes, and you will discover for yourself the truth of what I say, if,

without waiting to behold the outward and visible forms (20) of the gods

themselves, you will be content to behold their works; and with these

before you, to worship and honour the Divine authors of them. (21)

I would have you reflect that the very gods themselves suggest this

teaching. (22) Not one of these but gives us freely of his blessings;

yet they do not step from behind their veil in order to grant one

single boon. (23) And pre-eminently He who orders and holds together

the universe, (24) in which are all things beautiful and good; (25) who

fashions and refashions it to never-ending use unworn, keeping it free

from sickness or decay, (26) so that swifter than thought it ministers

to his will unerringly--this God is seen to perform the mightiest

operations, but in the actual administration of the same abides himself

invisible to mortal ken. Reflect further, this Sun above our heads, so

visible to all--as we suppose--will not suffer man to regard him too

narrowly, but should any essay to watch him with a shameless stare he

will snatch away their power of vision. And if the gods themselves are

thus unseen, so too shall you find their ministers to be hidden also;

from the height of heaven above the thunderbolt is plainly hurled, and

triumphs over all that it encounters, yet it is all-invisible, no eye

may detect its coming or its going at the moment of its swoop. The winds

also are themselves unseen, though their works are manifest, and through

their approach we are aware of them. And let us not forget, the soul

of man himself, which if aught else human shares in the divine--however

manifestly enthroned within our bosom, is as wholly as the rest hidden

from our gaze. These things you should lay to mind, and not despise

the invisible ones, but learn to recognise their power, as revealed in

outward things, and to know the divine influence. (27)

(20) Cf. Cic. "de N. D." I. xii. 31; Lactantius, "de Ira," xi. 13.

(21) See L. Dindorf ad loc. (ed. Ox. 1862), {theous}; G. Sauppe, vol.

iii. "An. crit." p. xxix; R. Kuhner; C. Schenkl.

(22) i.e. "that man must walk by faith." For {upodeiknunai} cf.

"Econ." xii. 18.

(23) Schneid. cf. Plat. "Crat." 396.

(24) Or, "the co-ordinator and container of the universe."

(25) Or, "in whom all beauty and goodness is."

(26) Cf. "Cyrop." VIII. vii. 22; above, I. iv. 13.

(27) {to daimonion}, the divinity.

Nay, Socrates (replied Euthydemus), there is no danger I shall turn a

deaf ear to the divine influence even a little; of that I am not afraid,

but I am out of heart to think that no soul of man may ever requite the

kindness of the gods with fitting gratitude.

Be not out of heart because of that (he said); you know what answer the

god at Delphi makes to each one who comes asking "how shall I return

thanks to heaven?"--"According to the law and custom of your city"; and

this, I presume, is law and custom everywhere that a man should please

the gods with offerings according to the ability which is in him. (28)

How then should a man honour the gods with more beautiful or holier

honour than by doing what they bid him? but he must in no wise slacken

or fall short of his ability, for when a man so does, it is manifest, I

presume, that at the moment he is not honouring the gods. You must then

honour the gods, not with shortcoming but according to your ability;

and having so done, be of good cheer and hope to receive the greatest

blessings. For where else should a man of sober sense look to receive

great blessings if not from those who are able to help him most, and how

else should he hope to obtain them save by seeking to please his helper,

and how may he hope to please his helper better than by yielding him the

amplest obedience?

(28) Or, "and that law, I presume, is universal which says, Let a

man," etc.; and for the maxim see above; "Anab." III. ii. 9.

By such words--and conduct corresponding to his words--did Socrates

mould and fashion the hearts of his companions, making them at once more

devout and more virtuous. (29)

(29) Or, "sounder of soul and more temperate as well as more pious."

IV

But indeed (1) with respect to justice and uprightness he not only made

no secret of the opinion he held, but gave practical demonstration of

it, both in private by his law-abiding and helpful behaviour to all, (2)

and in public by obeying the magistrates in all that the laws enjoined,

whether in the life of the city or in military service, so that he was

a pattern of loyalty to the rest of the world, and on three several

occasions in particular: first, when as president (Epistates) of

the assembly he would not suffer the sovereign people to take an

unconstitutional vote, (3) but ventured, on the side of the laws, to

resist a current of popular feeling strong enough, I think, to have

daunted any other man. Again, when the Thirty tried to lay some

injunction on him contrary to the laws, he refused to obey, as for

instance when they forbade his conversing with the young; (4) or again,

when they ordered him and certain other citizens to arrest a man to

be put to death, (5) he stood out single-handed on the ground that the

injunctions laid upon him were contrary to the laws. And lastly, when

he appeared as defendant in the suit instituted by Meletus, (6)

notwithstanding that it was customary for litigants in the law courts

to humour the judges in the conduct of their arguments by flattery

and supplications contrary to the laws, (7) notwithstanding also that

defendants owed their acquittal by the court to the employment of such

methods, he refused to do a single thing however habitual in a court of

law which was not strictly legal; and though by only a slight deflection

from the strict path he might easily have been acquitted by his judges,

(8) he preferred to abide by the laws and die rather than transgress

them and live.

(1) L. Dindorf suspects (SS. 1-6, {'Alla men... pollakis}), ed.

Lips. 1872. See also Praef. to Ox. ed. p. viii.

(2) Or, "by his conduct to all, which was not merely innocent in the

eye of law and custom but positively helpful."

(3) See above, I. i. 18; "Hell." I. vii. 14, 15; Grote, "H. G." viii.

272.

(4) See above, I. ii. 35.

(5) Leon of Salamis. See "Hell." II. iii. 39; Plat. "Apol." 32 C;

Andoc. "de Myst." 46.

(6) See above, I. i. 1; Plat. "Apol." 19 C.

(7) Kuhner cf. Quintil. VI. i. 7: "Athenis affectus movere etiam per

praeconem prohibatur orator"; "Apol." 4; Plat. "Apol." 38 D, E.

(8) See Grote, "H. G." viii. p. 663 foll.

These views he frequently maintained in conversation, now with one and

now with another, and one particular discussion with Hippias of Elis (9)

on the topic of justice and uprightness has come to my knowledge. (10)

(9) For this famous person see Cob. "Pros. Xen." s.n.; Plat. "Hipp.

maj." 148; Quint. xii. 11, 21; Grote, "H. G." viii. 524.

(10) Or, "I can personally vouch for."

Hippias had just arrived at Athens after a long absence, and chanced to

be present when Socrates was telling some listeners how astonishing

it was that if a man wanted to get another taught to be a shoemaker or

carpenter or coppersmith or horseman, he would have no doubt where to

send him for the purpose: "People say," (11) he added, "that if a man

wants to get his horse or his ox taught in the right way, (12) the world

is full of instructors; but if he would learn himself, or have his son

or his slave taught in the way of right, he cannot tell where to find

such instruction."

(11) L. Dindorf, after Ruhnken and Valckenar, omits this sentence

{phasi de tines... didaxonton}. See Kuhner ad loc. For the

sentiment see Plat. "Apol." 20 A.

(12) Cf. "Cyrop." II. ii. 26; VIII. iii. 38; also "Horsem." iii. 5;

"Hunting," vii. 4.

Hippias, catching the words, exclaimed in a bantering tone: What! still

repeating the same old talk, (13) Socrates, which I used to hear from

you long ago?

(13) This tale is repeated by Dio Chrys. "Or." III. i. 109. Cf. Plat.

"Gorg." 490 E.

Yes (answered Socrates), and what is still more strange, Hippias, it is

not only the same old talk but about the same old subjects. Now you, I

daresay, through versatility of knowledge, (14) never say the same thing

twice over on the same subject?

(14) Or, "such is the breadth of your learning," {polumathes}. Cf.

Plat. "Hipp. maj."

To be sure (he answered), my endeavour is to say something new on all

occasions.

What (he asked) about things which you know, as for instance in a case

of spelling, if any one asks you, "How many letters in Socrates, and

what is their order?" (15) I suppose you try to run off one string of

letters to-day and to-morrow another? or to a question of arithmetic,

"Does twice five make ten?" your answer to-day will differ from that of

yesterday?

(15) Cf. "Econ." viii. 14; Plat. "Alc." i. 113 A.

Hipp. No; on these topics, Socrates, I do as you do and repeat myself.

However, to revert to justice (and uprightness), (16) I flatter myself

I can at present furnish you with some remarks which neither you nor any

one else will be able to controvert.

(16) Or, "on the topic of the just I have something to say at present

which," etc.

By Hera! (17) (he exclaimed), what a blessing to have discovered! (18)

Now we shall have no more divisions of opinion on points of right and

wrong; judges will vote unanimously; citizens will cease wrangling;

there will be no more litigation, no more party faction, states will

reconcile their differences, and wars are ended. For my part I do not

know how I can tear myself away from you, until I have heard from your

own lips all about the grand discovery you have made.

(17) See above, I. v. 5.

(18) Or, "what a panacea are you the inventor of"; lit. "By Hera, you

have indeed discovered a mighty blessing, if juries are to cease

recording their verdicts 'aye' and 'no'; if citizens are to cease

their wranglings on points of justice, their litigations, and

their party strifes; if states are to cease differing on matters

of right and wrong and appealing to the arbitrament of war."

You shall hear all in good time (Hippias answered), but not until you

make a plain statement of your own belief. What is justice? We have had

enough of your ridiculing all the rest of the world, questioning and

cross-examining first one and then the other, but never a bit will you

render an account to any one yourself or state a plain opinion upon a

single topic. (19)

(19) See Plat. "Gorg." 465 A.

What, Hippias (Socrates retorted), have you not observed that I am in a

chronic condition of proclaiming what I regard as just and upright?

Hipp. And pray what is this theory (20) of yours on the subject? Let us

have it in words.

(20) {o logos}.

Soc. If I fail to proclaim it in words, at any rate I do so in deed and

in fact. Or do you not think that a fact is worth more as evidence than

a word? (21)

(21) Or, "is of greater evidential value," "ubi res adsunt, quid opus

est verbis?"

Worth far more, I should say (Hippias answered), for many a man with

justice and right on his lips commits injustice and wrong, but no doer

of right ever was a misdoer or could possibly be.

Soc. I ask then, have you ever heard or seen or otherwise perceived me

bearing false witness or lodging malicious information, or stirring up

strife among friends or political dissension in the city, or committing

any other unjust and wrongful act?

No, I cannot say that I have (he answered).

Soc. And do you not regard it as right and just to abstain from wrong?

(22)

(22) Or, "is not abstinence from wrongdoing synonymous with righteous

behaviour?"

Hipp. Now you are caught, Socrates, plainly trying to escape from a

plain statement. When asked what you believe justice to be, you keep

telling us not what the just man does, but what he does not do.

Why, I thought for my part (answered Socrates) that the refusal to do

wrong and injustice was a sufficient warrent in itself of righteousness

and justice, but if you do not agree, see if this pleases you better: I

assert that what is "lawful" is "just and righteous."

Do you mean to assert (he asked) that lawful and just are synonymous

terms?

Soc. I do.

I ask (Hippias added), for I do not perceive what you mean by lawful,

nor what you mean by just. (23)

(23) Lit. "what sort of lawful or what sort of just is spoken of."

Soc. You understand what is meant by laws of a city or state?

Yes (he answered).

Soc. What do you take them to be?

Hipp. The several enactments drawn up by the citizens or members of a

state in agreement as to what things should be done or left undone.

Then I presume (Socrates continued) that a member of a state who

regulates his life in accordance with these enactments will be

law-abiding, while the transgressor of the same will be law-less?

Certainly (he answered).

Soc. And I presume the law-loving citizen will do what is just and

right, while the lawless man will do what is unjust and wrong?

Hipp. Certainly.

Soc. And I presume that he who does what is just is just, and he who

does what is unjust is unjust?

Hipp. Of course.

Soc. It would appear, then, that the law-loving man is just, and the

lawless unjust?

Then Hippias: Well, but laws, Socrates, how should any one regard as a

serious matter either the laws themselves, or obedience to them,

which laws the very people who made them are perpetually rejecting and

altering?

Which is also true of war (Socrates replied); cities are perpetually

undertaking war and then making peace again.

Most true (he answered).

Soc. If so, what is the difference between depreciating obedience to law

because laws will be repealed, and depreciating good discipline in war

because peace will one day be made? But perhaps you object to enthusiasm

displayed in defence of one's home and fatherland in war?

No, indeed I do not! I heartily approve of it (he answered).

Soc. Then have you laid to heart the lesson taught by Lycurgus to the

Lacedaemonians, (24) and do you understand that if he succeeded

in giving Sparta a distinction above other states, it was only by

instilling into her, beyond all else, a spirit of obedience to the laws?

And among magistrates and rulers in the different states, you would

scarcely refuse the palm of superiority to those who best contribute

to make their fellow-citizens obedient to the laws? And you would

admit that any particular state in which obedience to the laws is the

paramount distinction of the citizens flourishes most in peace time, and

in time of war is irresistible? But, indeed, of all the blessings which

a state may enjoy, none stands higher than the blessing of unanimity.

"Concord among citizens"--that is the constant theme of exhortation

emphasised by the councils of elders (25) and by the choice spirits of

the community; (26) at all times and everywhere through the length and

breadth of all Hellas it is an established law that the citizens be

bound together by an oath of concord; (27) everywhere they do actually

swear this oath; not of course as implying that citizens shall all vote

for the same choruses, or give their plaudits to the same flute-players,

or choose the same poets, or limit themselves to the same pleasures, but

simply that they shall pay obedience to the laws, since in the end that

state will prove most powerful and most prosperous in which the

citizens abide by these; but without concord neither can a state be well

administered nor a household well organised.

(24) Cf. "Pol. Lac." viii. See Newman, op. cit. i. 396.

(25) Lit. "the Gerousiai." {S} or {X S} uses the Spartan phraseology.

(26) Lit. "the best men." {S} or {X S} speaks as an "aristocrat."

(27) Cf. "Hell." II. iv. 43; Lys. xxv. 21 foll.; Schneid. cf. Lycurg.

"u Leocr." 189.

And if we turn to private life, what better protection can a man

have than obedience to the laws? This shall be his safeguard against

penalties, his guarantee of honours at the hands of the community; it

shall be a clue to thread his way through the mazes of the law courts

unbewildered, secure against defeat, assured of victory. (28) It is

to him, the law-loving citizen, that men will turn in confidence when

seeking a guardian of the most sacred deposits, be it of money or be it

their sons or daughters. He, in the eyes of the state collectively, is

trustworthy--he and no other; who alone may be depended on to render to

all alike their dues--to parents and kinsmen and servants, to friends

and fellow-citizens and foreigners. This is he whom the enemy will

soonest trust to arrange an armistice, or a truce, or a treaty of peace.

They would like to become the allies of this man, and to fight on

his side. This is he to whom the allies (29) of his country will most

confidently entrust the command of their forces, or of a garrison, or

their states themselves. This, again, is he who may be counted on to

recompense kindness with gratitude, and who, therefore, is more sure of

kindly treatment than another whose sense of gratitude is fuller. (30)

The most desirable among friends, the enemy of all others to be avoided,

clearly he is not the person whom a foreign state would choose to go

to war with; encompassed by a host of friends and exempt from foes, his

very character has a charm to compel friendship and alliance, and before

him hatred and hostility melt away.

(28) Or, "ignorant of hostile, assured of favourable verdict."

(29) Lit. "the Allies," e.g. of Sparta or of Athens, etc.

(30) Lit. "From whom may the doer of a deed of kindness more

confidently expect the recompense of gratitude than from your

lover of the law? and whom would one select as the recipient of

kindness rather than a man susceptible of gratitude?"

And now, Hippias, I have done my part; that is my proof and

demonstration that the "lawful" and "law-observant" are synonymous

with the "upright" and the "just"; do you, if you hold a contrary view,

instruct us. (31)

(31) For the style of this enconium (of the {nomimos}) cf. "Ages." i.

36; and for the "Socratic" reverence for law cf. Plat. "Crito."

Then Hippias: Nay, upon my soul, Socrates, I am not aware of holding any

contrary opinion to what you have uttered on the theme of justice. (32)

(32) Lit. "the just and upright," {tou dikaiou}.

Soc. But now, are you aware, Hippias, of certain unwritten laws? (33)

(33) See Soph. "Antig." "Oed. T." 865, and Prof. Jebb ad loc.; Dem.

"de Cor." 317, 23; Aristot. "Rhet." I. xiii.

Yes (he answered), those held in every part of the world, and in the

same sense.

Can you then assert (asked Socrates) of these unwritten laws that men

made them?

Nay, how (he answered) should that be, for how could they all have come

together from the ends of the earth? and even if they had so done, men

are not all of one speech? (34)

(34) Or, "there would be difficulty of understanding each other, and a

babel of tongues."

Soc. Whom then do you believe to have been the makers of these laws.

Hipp. For my part, I think that the gods must have made these laws for

men, and I take it as proof that first and foremost it is a law and

custom everywhere to worship and reverence the gods.

Soc. And, I presume, to honour parents is also customary everywhere?

Yes, that too (he answered).

Soc. And, I presume, also the prohibition of intermarriage between

parents and children?

Hipp. No; at that point I stop, Socrates. That does not seem to me to be

a law of God.

Now, why? (he asked).

Because I perceive it is not infrequently transgressed (he answered).

(35)

(35) Or, "as I perceive, it is not of universal application, some

transgress it."

Soc. Well, but there are a good many other things which people

do contrary to law; only the penalty, I take it, affixed to the

transgression of the divine code is certain; there is no escape for the

offender after the manner in which a man may transgress the laws of man

with impunity, slipping through the fingers of justice by stealth, or

avoiding it by violence.

Hipp. And what is the inevitable penalty paid by those who, being

related as parents and children, intermingle in marriage?

Soc. The greatest of all penalties; for what worse calamity can human

beings suffer in the production of offspring than to misbeget? (36)

(36) Or, "in the propagation of the species than to produce

misbegotten children."

Hipp. But how or why should they breed them ill where nothing hinders

them, being of a good stock themselves and producing from stock as good?

Soc. Because, forsooth, in order to produce good children, it is not

simply necessary that the parents should be good and of a good stock,

but that both should be equally in the prime and vigour of their bodies.

(37) Do you suppose that the seed of those who are at their prime is

like theirs who either have not yet reached their prime, or whose prime

has passed?

(37) Cf. Plat. "Laws," viii. 839 A; Herbst, etc., cf. Grotius, "de

Jure," ii. 5, xii. 4.

Hipp. No, it is reasonable to expect that the seed will differ.

Soc. And for the better--which?

Hipp. Theirs clearly who are at their prime.

Soc. It would seem that the seed of those who are not yet in their prime

or have passed their prime is not good?

Hipp. It seems most improbable it should be.

Soc. Then the right way to produce children is not that way?

Hipp. No, that is not the right way.

Soc. Then children who are so produced are produced not as they ought to

be?

Hipp. So it appears to me.

What offspring then (he asked) will be ill produced, ill begotten, and

ill born, if not these?

I subscribe to that opinion also (replied Hippias).

Soc. Well, it is a custom universally respected, is it not, to return

good for good, and kindness with kindness?

Hipp. Yes, a custom, but one which again is apt to be transgressed.

Soc. Then he that so transgresses it pays penalty in finding himself

isolated; bereft of friends who are good, and driven to seek after those

who love him not. Or is it not so that he who does me kindness in

my intercourse with him is my good friend, but if I requite not this

kindness to my benefactor, I am hated by him for my ingratitude, and yet

I must needs pursue after him and cling to him because of the great gain

to me of his society?

Hipp. Yes, Socrates. In all these cases, I admit, there is an

implication of divine authority; (38) that a law should in itself be

loaded with the penalty of its transgression does suggest to my mind a

higher than human type of legislator.

(38) Lit. "Yes, upon my word, Socrates, all these cases look very like

(would seem to point to) the gods."

Soc. And in your opinion, Hippias, is the legislation of the gods just

and righteous, or the reverse of what is just and righteous?

Hipp. Not the reverse of what is just and righteous, Socrates, God

forbid! for scarcely could any other legislate aright, of not God

himself.

Soc. It would seem then, Hippias, the gods themselves are well pleased

that "the lawful" and "the just" should be synonymous? (39)

(39) Or, "it is well pleasing also to the gods that what is lawful is

just and what is just is lawful."

By such language and by such conduct, through example and precept alike,

he helped to make those who approached him more upright and more just.

V

And now I propose to show in what way he made those who were with him

more vigorous in action. (1) In the first place, as befitted one whose

creed was that a basis of self-command is indispensable to any noble

performance, he manifested himself to his companions as one who

had pre-eminently disciplined himself; (2) and in the next place by

conversation and discussion he encouraged them to a like self-restraint

beyond all others. (3) Thus it was that he continued ever mindful

himself, and was continually reminding all whom he encountered,

of matters conducive to virtue; as the following discussion with

Euthydemus, which has come to my knowledge, (4) will serve to

illustrate--the topic of the discussion being self-command.

(1) Lit. "more practical," i.e. more energetic and effective.

(2) "If any one might claim to be a prince of ascetics, it was

Socrates; such was the ineffaceable impression left on the minds

of his associates."

(3) Or, "he stimulated in these same companions a spirit of self-

restraint beyond all else."

(4) Or, "which I can vouch for."

Tell me, Euthydemus (he began), do you believe freedom to be a noble and

magnificent acquisition, whether for a man or for a state?

I cannot conceive a nobler or more magnificent (he answered).

Soc. Then do you believe him to be a free man who is ruled by the

pleasures of the body, and thereby cannot perform what is best?

Certainly not (he answered).

Soc. No! for possibly to perform what is best appears to you to savour

of freedom? And, again, to have some one over you who will prevent you

doing the like seems a loss of freedom?

Most decidedly (he answered).

Soc. It would seem you are decidedly of opinion that the incontinent are

the reverse of free? (5)

(5) Or, "incontinency is illiberal."

Euth. Upon my word, I much suspect so.

Soc. And does it appear to you that the incontinent man is merely

hindered from doing what is noblest, or that further he is impelled to

do what is most shameful?

Euth. I think he is as much driven to the one as he is hindered from the

other.

Soc. And what sort of lords and masters are those, think you, who at

once put a stop to what is best and enforce what is worst?

Euth. Goodness knows, they must be the very worst of masters.

Soc. And what sort of slavery do you take to be the worst?

I should say (he answered) slavery to the worst masters.

It would seem then (pursued Socrates) that the incontinent man is bound

over to the worst sort of slavery, would it not?

So it appears to be (the other answered).

Soc. And does it not appear to you that this same beldame incontinence

shuts out wisdom, which is the best of all things, (6) from mankind,

and plunges them into the opposite? Does it not appear to you that she

hinders men from attending to things which will be of use and benefit,

and from learning to understand them; that she does so by dragging them

away to things which are pleasant; and often though they are well aware

of the good and of the evil, she amazes and confounds (7) their wits and

makes them choose the worse in place of the better?

(6) "Wisdom, the greatest good which men can possess."

(7) Schneid. cf. Plat. "Protag." 355 A; and "Symp." iv. 23.

Yes, so it comes to pass (he answered).

Soc. And (8) soundness of soul, the spirit of temperate modesty? Who has

less claim to this than the incontinent man? The works of the temperate

spirit and the works of incontinency are, I take it, diametrically

opposed?

(8) "And if this be so concerning wisdom, {sophia}, what of

{sophrasune}, soundness of soul--sobriety?"

That too, I admit (he answered).

Soc. If this then be so concerning these virtues, (9) what with regard

to carefulness and devotion to all that ought to occupy us? Can anything

more seriously militate against these than this same incontinence?

(9) Or add, "If this be so concerning not wisdom only, but concerning

temperance and soundness of soul, what," etc.

Nothing that I can think of (he replied).

Soc. And can worse befall a man, think you? Can he be subjected to a

more baleful influence than that which induces him to choose what is

hurtful in place of what is helpful; which cajoles him to devote himself

to the evil and to neglect the good; which forces him, will he nill he,

to do what every man in his sober senses would shrink from and avoid?

I can imagine nothing worse (he replied).

Soc. Self-control, it is reasonable to suppose, will be the cause of

opposite effects upon mankind to those of its own opposite, the want of

self-control?

Euth. It is to be supposed so.

Soc. And this, which is the source of opposite effects to the very

worst, will be the very best of things?

Euth. That is the natural inference.

Soc. It looks, does it not, Euthydemus, as if self-control were the best

thing a man could have?

It does indeed, Socrates (he answered).

Soc. But now, Euthydemus, has it ever occurred to you to note one fact?

What fact? (he asked).

Soc. That, after all, incontinency is powerless to bring us to that

realm of sweetness which some look upon (10) as her peculiar province;

it is not incontinency but self-control alone which has the passport to

highest pleasures.

(10) Or, "which we are apt to think of as."

In what way? (he asked). How so?

Why, this way (Socrates answered): since incontinency will not suffer us

to resist hunger and thirst, or to hold out against sexual appetite, or

want of sleep (which abstinences are the only channels to true pleasure

in eating and drinking, to the joys of love, to sweet repose and

blissful slumber won by those who will patiently abide and endure till

each particular happiness is at the flood) (11)--it comes to this: by

incontinency we are cut off from the full fruition of the more obvious

and constantly recurring pleasures. (12) To self-control, which alone

enables us to endure the pains aforesaid, alone belongs the power to

give us any pleasure worth remembering in these common cases.

(11) Or, "at its season." Lit. "is as sweet as possible."

(12) Or, "from tasting to any extent worth speaking of the most

necessary and all-pervading sources of happiness."

You speak the words of truth (13) (he answered).

(13) Lit. "What you say is absolutely and entirely true" (the "vraie

verite" of the matter).

Soc. Furthermore, (14) if there be any joy in learning aught "beautiful

and good," or in patient application to such rules as may enable a man

to manage his body aright, or to administer his household well, or to

prove himself useful to his friends and to the state, or to dominate

his enemies--which things are the sources not only of advantage but of

deepest satisfaction (15)--to the continent and self-controlled it

is given to reap the fruits of them in their performance. It is the

incontinent who have neither part nor lot in any one of them. Since we

must be right in asserting that he is least concerned with such things

who has least ability to do them, being tied down to take an interest in

the pleasure which is nearest to hand.

(14) Or, "But indeed, if there be joy in the pursuit of any noble

study or of such accomplishments as shall enable," etc.

(15) Or, "of the highest pleasures."

Euthydemus replied: Socrates, you would say, it seems to me, that a man

who is mastered by the pleasures of the body has no concern at all with

virtue.

And what is the distinction, Euthydemus (he asked), between a man devoid

of self-control and the dullest of brute beasts? A man who foregoes all

height of aim, who gives up searching for the best and strives only to

gratify his sense of pleasure, (16) is he better than the silliest of

cattle? (17)... But to the self-controlled alone is it given to discover

the hid treasures. These, by word and by deed, they will pick out and

make selection of them according to their kinds, choosing deliberately

the good and holding aloof from the evil. (18) Thus (he added) it is

that a man reaches the zenith, as it were, of goodness and happiness,

thus it is that he becomes most capable of reasoning and discussion.

(19) The very name discussion ({dialegesthai}) is got from people coming

together and deliberating in common by picking out and selecting things

({dialegein}) according to their kinds. (20) A man then is bound to

prepare himself as much as possible for this business, and to pursue it

beyond all else with earnest resolution; for this is the right road to

excellence, this will make a man fittest to lead his fellows and be a

master in debate. (21)

(16) Or, "and seeks by hook and by crook to do what is pleasantest."

(17) i.e. he becomes an animal "feeding a blind life within the

brain."

(18) Or, "selecting the ore and repudiating the dross." Kuhner cf.

Plat. "Laws," v. 735 B.

(19) Or, "draws nearer to happiness and perfection, and is most

capable of truth-disclosing conversation." Cf. Plat. "Apol." 41:

"What would not a man give, O judges, to be able to examine the

leaders of the great Trojan expedition, or Odysseus, or Sisyphus,

or numberless others, men and women too! What infinite delight

would there be in conversing with them and asking them questions!"

(Jowett).

(20) For {dialegein kata gene} = {dialegesthai}, cf. Grote, "H. G."

viii. 590.

(21) Cf. Plat. "Rep." 534 D; "Phaedr." 252 E; "Crat." 390 C;

"Statesm." 286 D foll.

VI

At this point I will endeavour to explain in what way Socrates fostered

this greater "dialectic" capacity among his intimates. (1) He held

firmly to the opinion that if a man knew what each reality was, he would

be able to explain this knowledge to others; but, failing the possession

of that knowledge, it did not surprise him that men should stumble

themselves and cause others to stumble also. (2) It was for this reason

that he never ceased inquiring with those who were with him into

the true nature of things that are. (3) It would be a long business

certainly to go through in detail all the definitions at which he

arrived; I will therefore content myself with such examples as will

serve to show his method of procedure. As a first instance I will

take the question of piety. The mode of investigation may be fairly

represented as follows.

(1) Lit. "essayed to make those who were with him more potent in

dialectic."

(2) Or, "Socrates believed that any one who knew the nature of

anything would be able to let others into his secret; but, failing

that knowledge, he thought the best of men would be but blind

leaders of the blind, stumbling themselves and causing others to

stumble also."

(3) Or add, "'What is this among things? and what is its definition?'

--such was the ever-recurrent question for which he sought an

answer."

Tell me (said he), Euthydemus, what sort of thing you take piety to be?

Something most fair and excellent, no doubt (the other answered). (4)

(4) Or, "A supreme excellence, no doubt."

Soc. And can you tell me what sort of person the pious man is? (5)

(5) Or, "can you give me a definition of the pious man?"; "tell me who

and what the pious man is."

I should say (he answered) he is a man who honours the gods.

Soc. And is it allowable to honour the gods in any mode or fashion one

likes?

Euth. No; there are laws in accordance with which one must do that.

Soc. Then he who knows these laws will know how he must honour the gods?

I think so (he answered).

Soc. And he who knows how he must honour the gods conceives that

he ought not to do so except in the manner which accords with his

knowledge? (6) Is it not so?

(6) i.e. "his practice must square with his knowledge and be the

outward expression of his belief?"

Euth. That is so. (7)

(7) "That is so; you rightly describe his frame of mind and

persuasion."

Soc. And does any man honour the gods otherwise than he thinks he ought?

(8)

(8) "As he should and must." See K. Joel, op. cit. p. 322 foll.

I think not (he answered).

Soc. It comes to this then: he who knows what the law requires in

reference to the gods will honour the gods in the lawful way? (9)

(9) Or, "he who knows what is lawful with regard to Heaven pays honour

to Heaven lawfully."

Euth. Certainly.

Soc. But now, he who honours lawfully honours as he ought? (10)

(10) "As he should and must."

Euth. I see no alternative.

Soc. And he who honours as he ought is a pious man?

Euth. Certainly.

Soc. It would appear that he who knows what the law requires with

respect to the gods will correctly be defined as a pious man, and that

is our definition?

So it appears to me, at any rate (he replied). (11)

(11) "I accept it at any rate as mine." N.B.--in reference to this

definition of Piety, the question is never raised {poion ti esti

nomos}; nor yet {poioi tines eisin oi theoi}; but clearly there is

a growth in {ta nomima}. Cf. the conversation recorded in St. John

iv. 7 foll., and the words (verse 23) {pneuma o Theos kai tous

proskunountas auton en pneumati kai aletheia dei proskunein},

which the philosopher Socrates would perhaps readily have assented

to.

Soc. But now, with regard to human beings; is it allowable to deal with

men in any way one pleases? (12)

(12) Or, "may a man deal with his fellow-men arbitrarily according to

his fancy?" See above, II. vii. 8.

Euth. No; with regard to men also, he will be a law-observing man (13)

who knows what things are lawful as concerning men, in accordance with

which our dealings with one another must be conducted. (14)

(13) Or, "he is a man full of the law (lawful) and law-abiding who

knows," etc.

(14) Reading {kath' a dei pros allelous khresthai}, subaud.

{allelois}, or if vulg. {kath' a dei pos allelois khresthai},

translate "must be specifically conducted."

Soc. Then those who deal with one another in this way, deal with each

other as they ought? (15)

(15) "As they should and must."

Obviously (he answered).

Soc. And they who deal with one another as they ought, deal well and

nobly--is it not so?

Certainly (he answered).

Soc. And they who deal well and nobly by mankind are well-doers in

respect of human affairs?

That would seem to follow (he replied).

Soc. I presume that those who obey the laws do what is just and right?

Without a doubt, (he answered).

Soc. And by things right and just you know what sort of things are

meant?

What the laws ordain (he answered).

Soc. It would seem to follow that they who do what the laws ordain both

do what is right and just and what they ought? (16)

(16) "What they should and must."

Euth. I see no alternative.

Soc. But then, he who does what is just and right is upright and just?

(17)

(17) This proposition, as Kuhner argues (ad loc.), is important as

being the middle term of the double syllogism (A and B)--

A. Those who do what the law demands concerning men do what is

just and right.

Those who do what is just and right are righteous and just.

Ergo--Those who do what the law demands concerning men are

righteous and just.

B. Those who know what is just and right ought (and are bound,

cf. above, III. ix. 4) to do also what is just and right.

Those who do what is just and right are righteous and just.

Ergo--Righteous and Just ({dikaioi}) may be defined as "Those

who know what the law demands (aliter things right and just)

concerning men."

I should say so myself (he answered).

Soc. And should you say that any one obeys the laws without knowing what

the laws ordain?

I should not (he answered).

Soc. And do you suppose that any one who knows what things he ought to

do supposes that he ought not to do them? (18)

(18) Or, "and no one who knows what he must and should do imagines

that he must and should not do it?"

No, I suppose not (he answered).

Soc. And do you know of anybody doing other than what he feels bound to

do? (19)

(19) Or, "and nobody that you know of does the contrary of what he

thinks he should do?"

No, I do not (he answered).

Soc. It would seem that he who knows what things are lawful (20) as

concerning men does the things that are just and right?

(20) Or, "of lawful obligation."

Without a doubt (he answered).

Soc. But then, he who does what is just and right is upright and just?

(21)

(21) N.B.--In reference to this definition of justice, see K. Joel,

op. cit. p. 323 foll., "Das ist eine Karrikatur des Sokratischen

Dialogs."

Who else, if not? (he replied).

Soc. It would seem, then, we shall have got to a right definition if we

name as just and upright those who know the things which are lawful as

concerning men?

That is my opinion (he answered).

Soc. And what shall we say that wisdom is? Tell me, does it seem to you

that the wise are wise in what they know, (22) or are there any who are

wise in what they know not?

(22) Or, "in that of which they have the knowledge ({episteme})."

Euth. Clearly they are wise in what they know; (23) for how could a man

have wisdom in that which he does not know?

(23) Or, "their wisdom is confined to that of which they have the

{episteme}. How could a man be wise in what he lacks the knowledge

of?"

Soc. In fact, then, the wise are wise in knowledge?

Euth. Why, in what else should a man be wise save only in knowledge?

Soc. And is wisdom anything else than that by which a man is wise, think

you?

Euth. No; that, and that only, I think.

Soc. It would seem to follow that knowledge and wisdom are the same?

Euth. So it appears to me.

Soc. May I ask, does it seem to you possible for a man to know all the

things that are?

Euth. No, indeed! not the hundredth part of them, I should say.

Soc. Then it would seem that it is impossible for a man to be all-wise?

Quite impossible (he answered).

Soc. It would seem the wisdom of each is limited to his knowledge; each

is wise only in what he knows?

Euth. That is my opinion. (24)

(24) Cf. Plat. "Theaet." 145 D. N.B.--For this definition of wisdom

see K. Joel, ib. p. 324 foll.

Soc. Well! come now, Euthydemus, as concerning the good: ought we to

search for the good in this way?

What way? (he asked).

Soc. Does it seem to you that the same thing is equally advantageous to

all?

No, I should say not (he answered).

Soc. You would say that a thing which is beneficial to one is sometimes

hurtful to another?

Decidedly (he replied).

Soc. And is there anything else good except that which is beneficial,

should you say? (25)

(25) Or reading (1) {allo d' an ti phaies e agathon einai to

ophelimon}; or else (2) {allo d' an ti phaies agathon einai to

ophelimon}; (in which case {alloti} = {allo ti e};) translate (1)

"and what is beneficial is good (or a good), should you not say?"

lit. "could you say that the beneficial is anything else than good

(or a good)?" or else (2) "and what is beneficial is good (or a

good)? or is it anything else?"

Nothing else (he answered).

Soc. It would seem to follow that the beneficial is good relatively to

him to whom it is beneficial?

That is how it appears to me (he answered).

Soc. And the beautiful: can we speak of a thing as beautiful in any

other way than relatively? or can you name any beautiful thing, body,

vessel, or whatever it be, which you know of as universally beautiful?

(26)

(26) i.e. "beautiful in all relations into which it enters." Reading

{to de kalon ekhoimen an pos allos eipein e estin onomazein kalon

e soma e skeuos e all' otioun, o oistha pros tanta kalon on; Ma

Di', ouk egog', ephe}. For other emendations of the vulg., and the

many interpretations which have been given to the passage, see R.

Kuhner ad loc.

Euth. I confess I do not know of any such myself. (27)

(27) Or, adopting the reading {ekhois an} in place of {ekhoimen an}

above, translate "I certainly cannot, I confess."

Soc. I presume to turn a thing to its proper use is to apply it

beautifully?

Euth. Undoubtedly it is a beautiful appliance. (28)

(28) Or, "I presume it is well and good and beautiful to use this,

that, and the other thing for the purpose for which the particular

thing is useful?"--"That nobody can deny (he answered)." It is

impossible to convey simply the verbal play and the quasi-

argumentative force of the Greek {kalos ekhei pros ti tini

khresthai}. See K. Joel, p. 426.

Soc. And is this, that, and the other thing beautiful for aught else

except that to which it may be beautifully applied?

Euth. No single thing else.

Soc. It would seem that the useful is beautiful relatively to that for

which it is of use?

So it appears to me (he answered).

Soc. And what of courage, (29) Euthydemus? I presume you rank courage

among things beautiful? It is a noble quality? (30)

(29) Or, perhaps better, "fortitude." See H. Sidgwick, "Hist. of

Ethics," p. 43.

(30) It is one of {ta kala}. See K. Joel, ib. p. 325, and in reference

to the definitions of the Good and of the Beautiful, ib. p. 425

foll.

Nay, one of the most noble (he answered).

Soc. It seems that you regard courage as useful to no mean end?

Euth. Nay, rather the greatest of all ends, God knows.

Soc. Possibly in face of terrors and dangers you would consider it an

advantage to be ignorant of them?

Certainly not (he answered).

Soc. It seems that those who have no fear in face of dangers, simply

because they do not know what they are, are not courageous?

Most true (he answered); or, by the same showing, a large proportion of

madmen and cowards would be courageous.

Soc. Well, and what of those who are in dread of things which are not

dreadful, are they--

Euth. Courageous, Socrates?--still less so than the former, goodness

knows.

Soc. Possibly, then, you would deem those who are good in the face of

terrors and dangers to be courageous, and those who are bad in the face

of the same to be cowards?

Certainly I should (he answered).

Soc. And can you suppose any other people to be good in respect of such

things except those who are able to cope with them and turn them to

noble account? (31)

(31) {kalos khresthai}, lit. "make a beautiful use of them."